PIAFFE INTO POLITICS: POWER AND IDENTITY IN HORSEMANSHIP

TRAINING

by

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ABSTRACT

The universal centering of human life and activity produces the binary of the human as different from and superior to the nonhuman animal. This centering establishes the priorities, comfort, and survival of humans as more important than the health and well being of nonhuman animals. This preference for human concerns belittles the needs of nonhuman animal others. If human interaction with animals reflects much more about the human than the animal, then, this pervasive experience of preferential treatment for the human species is incontrovertibly linked to (human) conceptions of power and political identity. This project will specifically examine the possibilities of equitable horse and human relationships within the context of dressage training. I ask, “can training allow for a praxis of equity and justice between horses and humans?”
DEDICATION

For Yvette and Joey.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

WSM  Refers to Donna Haraway’s book entitled *When Species Meet*

CSM  Refers to Donna Haraway’s book entitled *Companion Species Manifesto*

FCM  Refers to Martin Heidegger’s book entitled *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Chapter Introduction

The universal centering of human life and activity produces the binary of the human as different from and superior to the nonhuman animal. This centering establishes the priorities, comfort, and survival of humans as more important than the health and well being of nonhuman animals. This preference for human concerns belittles the needs of nonhuman animal others. I assert that this pervasive experience of preferential treatment for the human species is incontrovertibly linked to (human) political identity. In this way, human interactions with nonhuman animals reflect much more about the human than the animal. Addressing these political and ethical implications show intersections with traditional categories of political identity. This project specifically examines the possibilities of equitable horse and human relationships within the context of dressage training. I ask, “can training allow for a praxis of equity and justice between horses and humans?”

Relationships between humans and nonhuman animals illustrate fundamental questions of justice, similar to considering relationships within human communities. The fundamental nature of this consideration has little to do with “liking” or enjoying the company of companion animals (Wolfe 7-8 Animal Rites). Justice and the consideration of nonhuman animals forms a connection through radical political action in daily choices. The transformation of these relationships into radical political action is explained by Manuela Rossini. She states
“If we fight racism and (hetro)sexism because we declare discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics - such as “black,” “woman” or “lesbian” to be wrong and unjust, then we should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity” (Rossini 5).

In this way, to address the violent history of oppression, consistency requires considering the terms of relationships between humans and other creatures. This line of thinking necessarily engages with intersectionality across race, gender, class, nation, and other human constructed binaries. Rossini illustrates that through developing and reinventing a political praxis, humans continually struggle with positioning individuals in opposition to one another through binaries. Here, the rhetorical devices used to position human groups in opposition to one another reflect similar rhetorical devices used to oppose human and nonhuman animals. Together Patton and Haas broadly contextualize current equine-human interactions. They situate this project and demonstrate that equine-human interaction is wide and varied. This variety requires taking stock of current interactions to envision a just daily practice.

Within this introduction, I first speak with contemporary scholar Paul Patton and his critical engagement with problems that arise in horse training. This section will seriously consider the problem of training as a system of creating submission. Here I will also focus on the human centered goals of animal training. From this analysis, I will explicate training as a process which inscribes a discourse while simultaneously changing and writing on the bodies of both the horse and rider. I start with this discussion to will highlight the importance of thinking with material constructedness and communication within cross-species relationships.
Next, I speak to the role of the horse as a species in the whole of human history. Considering the entirety of the equine influence on human beings and culture is far beyond the scope of this project. To acknowledge this influence and reveal riding as part of an artistic process, I look to writer Jessie Haas’ collection of poetry that lyrically tracks horses and humans growing together through shared evolutionary history. I particularly focus on the history of power in human-horse interaction in her poem “Peasant Eyes.” To illustrate the complex nature of power within human and horse relationships, I juxtapose, Haas’ poem “Advice to a Young Woman.” The poem glimpses moment where a little girl, through a connection to a pony, develops agency.

The political and ethical implications of cross-species relationships first struck me while reading Paul Patton’s chapter in Zoontologies entitled “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses.” This text started my consideration of horse-human relationships, including thinking about my own relationship with my horse, as distinctive political entities. This work and my own connection to horses as a rider led me to focus on research on horses, specifically. Prior to any academic investigation, I felt there may be something unique about the process of riding that requires an entire embodied vocabulary. Patton also came to his academic interest in horses and other cross-species relationships through his love of training and riding horses. Patton’s approach to training grounds many considerations in this project.

Patton critically engages the practice of training and highlights several problems that arise in training. Specifically, he interrogates the problems and possibilities of considering training as anything other than submission to commands. Within the context of training and riding, Patton demonstrates that his time spent with horses closes the distance between species
difference. The shrinking size of gaps between species difference attests to species as only a socially constructed binary. Patton concludes that “Good training establishes a form of language that closes that gap, which is another way of saying that it enables a form of interaction that enhances the power and feeling of both horse and rider” (97). Considering training as a type of language is both serious and important. As a language, training inscribes a discourse while simultaneously changing and writing on the bodies of both the horse and rider. It is necessary to consider the outcomes of this discourse both in terms of cross-species relationships and material constructedness. Then, the question must be asked can training allow for a praxis of equity and justice between horses and humans?

Commands given by the rider, and submitted to by horse, ground the traditional narrative of equine training. Within the traditional narrative, this submission is the goal of the relationship. Vicki Hearne uses anthropomorphic language to describe, and inscribe, this cross-species relationship as a sacred duty for the trainer. Hearne, similar to Patton, developed an interest in training animals from spending time with and investing in individual nonhuman animals. It is important to note that Hearne is a decisive figure in current dog and animal training. Many trainers reject her methods. However, I use her text in relation to Patton’s approach. Hearne shares a “special kind of respect, awe, and delight” that results “from prolonged engagement with the character and capacities of a particular animal” (Hearne 93-94). Patton also sees, following Hearne, a unique importance and richness to training relationships (Patton 84). Hearne hopes trainers transcend the moment of submission into a sacred understanding of responsibility to their nonhuman partners (Hearne 85). While many humans seek a deep connection with horses, Hearne pushes this connection to an extreme. She describes the transfer of thought into
movement during the riding experience. Hearne asserts that this process is “the collapse of command and obedience into a single supple relation” (Hearne 93). In this way, she collapses human and horse identities into one entity.

In contrast, Patton rejects this statement to remind his readers that the goals in the arena are human centered. Therefore, for Patton, the relationship between the horse and rider fundamentally centers on command (91). Patton asserts that no matter what style or language of imagery is used, speak with or about, work with the horse, all conversations are still commands (92). He states “When horses compete in jumping and dressage, it is because they have been trained to do so in order to satisfy the culturally acquired desires of their trainers and riders” (95). Patton even responds to both ancient and modern horse trainers who insist that training develops what comes naturally to the horse. On this matter, Patton asserts that this reasoning only disguises the command based nature of the conversation with a “thin veil” (Patton 95). Despite lacking a critical theory approach to power, Patton offers an important foundation for scholarly engagement with equine training.

For Patton, the communicative nature of cross-species relationships inseparably binds these relationships to ethical considerations. Patton asserts that communication between humans, as well as between nonhuman animal species, requires an establishment of trust between the participants. To show this instability, Patton looks to problematic relationships between humans. Leaving the training relationship unexamined beyond this point fails to recognize the nuanced experience of cross-species training relationships. I agree that communication creates an important aspect of training. However, communication, alone, does not beget trust. Because
creating trust is difficult to establish in any relationship, I assert that horse and human relationships require further serious scholarly investigation.

Patton illuminates an important part of the training relationship: “Both training and riding involve the exercise of power over the animal and, contrary to the view of many philosophers and trainers, relations of communication are not external but immanent to relations of power” (91). I support this assertion in my rhetorical analysis in chapter four and five. Communication and power are deeply connected. Patton navigates this tenuous relationship and finds redemption in cross-species training relationships. While I agree with his outcome, I disagree with his logic. His outcome redeems training relationships beyond relationships of domination. He evidences that humans currently abuse relationships through constructed differences, including gender, race, and class. In contrast, Patton asserts that “the differences between trainers and their subjects are natural differences between animal kinds endowed with different power and capacities” (97). In this way, Patton believes species difference to be real or factual and, therefore, appropriate grounds for differentiated treatment. In contrast to this view, this project evidences that species, like race, gender, and class is a constructed category.

1.2 Horses and Humans

Detailing the role of the equine species in the whole of human history exceeds the limit of this dissertation project. Other scholars, authors, and artists have advanced the process of mapping out the specific details of interaction between horses and humans throughout history. Horses have acted, and continued to act, as beasts of burden, farm equipment, instruments of war, companion animals, transportation devices, athletic competition partners, expensive commodities in several industries, destructive pests, healing therapists, and modes of
entertainment. These varied relationships with horses have influenced nearly all parts of human existence, including religion, transportation, and international conflict. Human history cannot be accurately told without acknowledgement of the function and physical strength of the horse. Just as horses have shaped early industrial improvements as well as the transnational expansion of human influence and power, humans have shaped the lives, habits, and bodies of horses. I return to consider how power acts within these human and horse relationships through the lens of Foucault in later chapters. Before approaching that specific and helpful lens, I present a wider summary of how many horses and human interact and rhetorical tropes associated with these relationships through an investigation of two poems. Attention to the rhetoric describing these relationships grounds my rhetorical analysis through the entire dissertation.

Jessie Haas’s poem “Peasant Eyes” illustrates the history of power in human-horse interactions. Power, made accessible through the use of horses, was and continues oppress humans and nonhuman animals. However, the power of oppression is not the only site or influence for the history of horse-human relationships. “Advice to a Young Woman,” by Jessie Haas, gives insight into the horse-human relationship that often produces agency for young women. This trope of women as empowered by horses is enacted across popular culture, folklore, and, even, scholarly work. Together these poems demonstrate a strong juxtaposition in the applications of power enabled by equines. Analyzing these examples, which demonstrate contrasting uses of power, serves to narrow the vast history of horses and humans and explore a few individual human-horse relationships. This tension serves as a site of analysis for this project, develops an introduction for this project, and a grounds considerations of nonhuman animals in political theory.
Jessie Haas’ poetry collection *Hoofprints*, reveals the lives of humans and horses in many different circumstances. Within these snapshots of multi-specied lives, Haas demonstrates horses and human in multi-dynamic power relationships. The collection grounds itself in simultaneous narratives of evolutionary biology and creation myths through an ode to the most distant ancestor of today’s modern horse; the Hyracotherium. While many images, throughout history and in Haas’ collection, present horses as majestic, free, and very powerful beings, there are just as many, if not more, real-lived experiences that demonstrate the opposite. Haas develops the tension between several opposing narratives. This dissertation uses opposing narratives to highlight sites of contention that call for scholarly investigation. To illustrate counter narratives Haas highlights two interactions. First, she illustrates the Mexican groom who earns only seven hundred dollars a week for “polishing the expensive/ living sculptures” (Haas, “West Palm”). Second, she displays commodified mares, adult female horses, who are kept perpetually pregnant. The mare’s urine is collected by means of a painful tube for use by menopausal human women in hormonal treatment. These experiences provide a counter narrative to horses existing as continuously free and majestic creatures and show that often horses “not free. Not now. Not hardly” (Haas, “Dappled Things”, line 14). These illustrations begin to demonstrate horses and humans within multi-dynamic power relationships.

To extend this demonstration, “Peasant Eyes” questions the human-centered power asserted by means of the horse. The beginning of the poem reminds the reader that “America’s the refuge of the peasants” (line 3). This reminder sets the poem towards demonstrating that the horse-human connection is deeply embedded in the fabric of the American nation, as well as the world. This poem depicts the importance the historical relationships between horses and humans,
which are laden with not only cross-species domination, but also intra-species domination and oppression.

By weaving back and forth in a distinctively non-chronological manner, Haas shows several scenes: the mounted white plantation overseer watching black slaves in early America, emperors conquering lands with cavalry soldiers, and English nobility fox hunting through “the poor man’s garden” destroying his produce and dinner (“Peasant Eyes” line 16). In addition to English nobility trampling gardens, the poem illustrates men from many nationalities and backgrounds riding and stealing from watching peasants. These men include the “Cossacks,” Russian cavalrymen, or tribal fighters, and the “Kazakhs,” a formerly nomadic people of central Asia. Illustrating the crusades’ connection to the power of horses, she states “churchmen tried to bind that power to God” (line 14). This line demonstrates that the power of the horse is a valued commodity and desired by transcendent and incorporeal deities. Modern armies are envisioned as the speaker describes a “general up on horseback” who holds his riding whip tightly as he directs infantry into “No Man’s Land” (line 14-15). Here the horse physically raises the general over the infantry troops, likely protecting him from the first wave of attack. For my project these images contextualize the histories that connect humans and horses.

Leaving the historic images of men and horses, “Peasant Eyes” takes a rhetorical turn in the last sentence and addresses the reader. The sentence reads: “When you mount, most innocent of riders. seeking mystic oneness with your horse,/ it’s not just little horseless girls/ who look up, squiggle-eyed,/ it’s all who feel the peasant in their bones,/ whether they know that’s what they feel, or not” (line 18-24). The statement “seeking mystic oneness with your horse” mirrors this project’s quest to extract the possibilities of moving beyond a horse-human relationship executed
only in domination. In this direct address to the rider-reader, the terms “seeking” and “mystic” imply that horse-human relationships rooted in “oneness” are always not readily apparent. However, “oneness” suggests that a symbiotic relationship may exist outside of a master and slave narrative. This type of relationship is sought by the poem’s innocent rider. Perhaps the trouble in seeking this relationship develops because the rider-reader is unaware of the histories of power associated with mounted humans and their horses. The rider-reader is reminded of the histories of power inscribed in each modern horse and all horse-human relationships.

The description of these histories are marked with gender differences and inequality. Calling to mind “little horseless girls” draws attention to the construction of human-horse relationships around race and gender. While not specifically marked with race by Haas, these young girls are assumed into whiteness. This assumption reminds readers of the privileges held by whites, including class privileges. This connection between assumed whiteness and class illustrates the necessity of significant socio-economic status to even access spaces where young girls may gaze longingly at the rider. Haas also illustrates that riding is often marked as a gendered activity. The soldiers and nobility, exclusively described as men, contrast against the “little horseless girls” who are only able to wish to participate in riding. The poem illustrates men riding to conqueror and girls, not even adult women, as wishing to participate in this position of power.

The speaker also calls the reader to remember the power of the gaze as she states “it’s not just little horseless girls/ who look up, squiggle-eyed.” This gaze on the modern rider draws contributions from “all who feel the peasant in their bones,/ whether they know that’s what they feel, or not” (line 22-23). In this way, the gazes of the young girls looking up at the reader-rider
embody many viewpoints and histories. And, these viewpoints speak to a deep sense of ancestral
history and influence on modern human-horse relationships. Using “bones” produces imagery of
an ancient past and connection to the fleshy present. Bones both remain when creatures die and
give structure to all bodies and lives. This connection to all bodies is reinforced with the
statement “whether they know that’s what they feel, or not.” This statement asserts that even if
individual humans do not recognize the connection to peasant ancestry, every person participates
in the gaze on the modern rider. In this way, the histories of the horse intertwine with human
histories. The poem warns riders and readers to remember these histories and the influence of
discourse on material constructedness of beings including the author-rider-reader of this
dissertation project.

In juxtaposition, Haas’ poem “Advice to a Young Woman” offers a glimpse into a
moment where a little girl, through a connection to a pony develops agency. Though this poem
Haas disrupts a heteronormative narrative through illustrating a woman turning away from a man
and to her equine partner. The speaker offers that if given a pony, this young girl will “grow up
strong” and she “won’t beware,” (line 13). Haas does not clarify what kind of unawareness this
will be. But, the following lines suggest that she will be unaware of how she should respond to
men within a heteronormative and patriarchal framework. In illustrating this scene, Haas pushes
against this framework. Using recantations of “You aren’t listening, my dear.” or “Are you
listening, dear?” between the stanzas, offers the picture of a man, possibly a husband, speaking to
a distracted woman. The use of “dear” suggests that the women is personally, possibly intimately,
connected to the male speaker. Similar, to the juxtaposition of this poem to “Peasant Eyes,” the
first two stanzas in “Advice to a Young Woman” speak to horses in war. But, there is a moment
of juxtaposition even within the stanzas. The first stanza describes “Cupid’s bow,” which often creates imagery of cherubs and love. The invocation of “Cupid’s bow” furthers my suggested reading of the speaker as intimately connected to the woman-rider. The speaker changes the initial imagery associated with Cupid bow’s through explicating the reason for the curve in the bow; “curved to clear/ A horse’s neck, make killing easy--” (line 3-4). Again, this juxtaposition disrupts a initially hetronormative scene. In this way, just as Haas explicates the bow as a weapon, she illustrates normative narratives as pernicious practices that remove agency from othered individuals.

As the male speaker doles out his advice, he becomes continually more agitated. To demonstrate this frustration, each stanza ends in a dash and the middle of a sentence, indicating that the speaker must stop to redirect the attention of the woman to whom he is speaking. The last stanza ends with, speaking of the little girl who should not be given a pony but if she is “She’ll make her own decisions --oh!/ Dear, you aren’t listening” (line 14-15). As a reader, I am hopeful that to the young woman who is receiving this advice is also a rider, who learned to make her own decisions by developing self-confidence through an interspecies relationship based in training as a language of communication. In this case, the distracted woman asserts agency through her own decisions about directing her attention as she sees fit. It is implied that through this horse-human relationship, the young girl learns to be “strong” and “make her own decisions,” two characteristics that defy the space and shape created for girls and women by the patriarchy.

While not complete in scope, these two poems illustrate some of the varied interactions between horses and humans. Through interactions the horses aid in the development of innately
political collective and individual identities. And, through these interactions the material constructedness of existence may be continually questioned. As I answer this project’s larger question (can training allow for a praxis of equity and justice?), I ground my theorizing within these interactions to consider the outcomes of cross-species discourse. This imagery evidences the nuanced and many power relationships possible between humans and horses.

1.3 Chapter Summaries

My project examines the possibilities of creating just and equitable relationships between humans and horses. I derive my answer from rhetorical analysis and close readings of an equine training text as well as theoretical texts on power and identity. Below I outlined the chapters in this project.

Chapter Two: Contextualizing the Animal within Political Identity.

In chapter two, I illustrate the necessity of recognizing the interconnectedness of nonhuman and human lives through theorizing with Derrida and Woolf. In this process, I use these lines of inquiry to rupture traditional rhetorical theory. Here, I support and assert that nonhuman animal lives and bodies are inscribed by and use discourse and language. This rupture shows multiple narratives of human and nonhuman animal relationships. I focus on the varied nature of human interaction with chickens to reveal that concern for nonhuman animal lives is a part of all human lives. Therefore, illustrating that this project speaks to many people, not just animal lovers.

Chapter Three: Mapping the Animal(s) through Political Theory.

My third chapter undertakes the task of showing links and connections between human political identity and nonhuman creatures in the form of a literature review. Extractions from
early thought on nonhuman animal others will come from classical members of the political
theory cannon, including Aristotle, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Mill. I give considerable
space to Mill and his contributions to the study and understanding of difference and progressive
politics. Heavy consideration also rests on Zoopolis, which offers a novel political theory. This
theory starts within the question of the animal and seeks to develop a body politic with the
specific aim of creating a flourishing coexistence between human and nonhuman creatures. The
chapter ends with a discussion of published critiques of Zoopolis as well as my own contribution
to the discussion. I assert that this political praxis must move beyond upholding human
exceptionalism to create a body politic concerned with engagement across species.

Chapter Four: Dressage in Practice and in Text.

This chapter asserts that horseback riding and training may subvert the strict binary of the
human and the animal. I analyze two texts, one video taped dressage performance and one
training manual. This chapter first considers the outcomes of dressage training. Here, I explicate
the story of one particular dressage performance to ground my theoretical project in a particular
narrative. At the 2006 World Equestrian Games, Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné
performed their musical freestyle to a montage of 80s and 90s instrumental rock ballads.
Commentators and spectators critically acclaimed this performance. Following the games, the
YouTube video of the performance went viral online and reached many individuals, well beyond
dressage riders and spectators. I critically consider this performance with attention to embodied
relationships, performativity, and agency.

Next, I analyze a horse training and instruction manual as a rhetorical artifact. The
Complete Training of Horse and Rider in the Principles of Classical Horsemanship by Colonel
Alois Podhajsky, an Olympic medalist and the director of The Spanish Riding School in Vienna from 1939 to 1965, was originally published in 1967. This text is still the definitive instructional text for the Olympic sport of dressage. This text illustrates the method of The Spanish Riding School, founded in 1572 by the Austrian Empire.

Podhajsky’s manual provides a set of instructions on the way humans “should” interact with horses. In this way, the text serves as a useful example for examining the mechanisms, realities, and implications of animals as reflections of and for the benefit of humanity. While humans use horses and other animals to pull carts and plows, most systems of horse training focus on horseback riding. Through riding, riders and horses have adopted effective, varied, and unique languages of nonverbal communication. Riding makes the relationship between humans and horses one that should be described as both discursive and embodied. The nonverbal communication in the human-horse relationship informs my larger research question. I assert that modes of discourse inscribe a praxis of training horses and a radical politics disrupts the dominant anthropocentric worldview.

Chapter Five: Recognizing and Responding to the Power of Discourse within Training Relationships.

My fifth chapter illustrates the use of power within the texts I previously analyzed. Here, I use Foucault to create a working definition and method of analyzing power. This chapter also illustrates the foundations and possibilities of growth towards a body politic that understands many different creaturely rhetorics. I investigate the practicality of the idea of “becoming with” developed by Donna Haraway while considering the process of “becoming with” within animal training. To consider why rhetoric surrounding the political assessments of nonhuman animal
others might change, I further connect political identity to the embodied relationships, performativity, and agency. To do so, I draw connections between Donaldson and Kymlicka and Podjihsky’s texts and posthuman scholarship. Within this assertion, I understand the gaze to beget language and language to facilitate the power of recognition.

Chapter Six: Reflections and Conclusions.

My last chapter discusses the implications of this line of inquiry and possibilities for future research. Analysis of this text will be thematically organized by addressing the implications of discursive relationships between nonhuman and human animals and the importance of the embodied relationships between horses and riders. This project concludes with a short meditation on my own relationship with horses, specifically one horse, “my horse,” Rolls Royette or Yvette. This mediation will speak to the effectiveness of the posthuman worldview against the previously accepted notion of the animal as a mere tool of reflection for the human. In conclusion, I will further illustrate the connection between the many ways in which humans use animal bodies and responding and being responsible to others.
CHAPTER 2: THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL (as) OTHER

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This project reveals the political and ethical intersections of human and nonhuman animal interactions, particular those facilitated by horseback riding. I contextualize my argument around the power, possibilities, and problems of discourse. This chapter illustrates the necessity of recognizing the interconnectedness of nonhuman and human lives. I assert that this recognition creates an immediate need for a political practice rooted in a just daily praxis.

To contextualize the theoretical nature of this project, I look to Derrida. Derrida offers two salient lines of inquiry. First, he asks why, how, and with what authority do humans name all nonhuman creatures as “the animal”? Why and with what authority did humans choose to condense the entire animal kingdom, save humans, into one singular term of “the animal”? Second, Derrida quires the ontological existence of the demarcation lines between the human and the nonhuman-animal. He questions what form can maintain this practice of drawing lines. His questioning does not seek to erase the line that previously illustrated limits between humans and nonhuman animals. Instead, his argument calls for the drawing of multiple lines between humans and nonhuman animals, as well as lines between individuals within the same species. Redrawing and blurring the lines between humans and nonhumans becomes necessary when searching for justice within a body politic. I illustrate, through Hobbes the vital connection between "what is human" and sovereign protection. I assert that to produce a political theory which takes seriously
the needs and concerns of many creatures, the current discourse on and investment in the "human" must radically change. Derrida’s two questions begin this radical destabilization.

Within this chapter, I also display a few tenets and tools of rhetorical theory to examine narratives of human and nonhuman animal relationships. Following this illustration of rhetorical theory scholarship, I juxtapose human engagement with chickens, both male roosters who are used in cockfights and chickens who are used in the production of poultry. Both of these engagements illustrate major consequences for the communities touched by practices of engagement with nonhuman animal lives. Neither of these examples demonstrate a complete picture of human engagement with animals. Rather, the differences in the examples show how varied animal and human interaction may be. Here I use narratives about chickens, rather than examples of horses, because of the immense presence of the meat-industrial complex in modern America. ³

Last, I offer Virginia Woolf’s metaphor of the mirror. In this metaphor Woolf asserts that women act as mirrors when men hold women in their gaze. I extend this metaphor to demonstrate that humans use nonhuman animals as mirrors in a similar process. In this way, the nonhuman animal mirror reflects an aggrandized sense of self to the human, just as the men-women mirror bolsters the man. To show the influence of this process I illustrate how Martin Heidegger exemplifies the relationship of the mirror between human and nonhuman animals. For Heidegger, humans understand their essence only when contrasted against nonhuman animals. Closely related to my project main question, the following chapter evidences that training facilitates individual relationships and halts the practice of using nonhuman animals as mirrors to reflect humans. I assert that in rejecting the practice of the mirror (and discourse which includes
defining humans as what animals are not), humans subvert the histories that position nonhuman-animals and human in a binary definition.

Recognizing the interconnectedness of nonhuman and human lives requires scholars to envision and develop a politics rooted in acknowledging nonhuman animal lives. Simply, we must create a praxis of coexistence. Several authors have begun this project through advancements in political science, critical animal studies, and, posthumanism. Slippages exist between these genres of scholarly work. Similarly, Derrida finds slippage between the process of naming other creatures, as well as between the human and nonhuman animals. Many scholarly works cannot, and should not, be clearly classified as a part of one genre and not another. This project calls for and is answered with a truly intersectional and interdisciplinary approach. Particularly, the study of identity within political theory slips into posthumanism that slides into critical animal studies through posthumanism’s main chore of de-centering of the human.

2.2 Contextualizing with Derrida

A unique history of engaging the question of the animal is outlined in Derrida’s posthumously published work, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. This text opens with the scene of Derrida being gazed upon, viewed, and, looked at by his pet cat. Derrida insists that a reorientation of the entire philosophical, thus political, tradition arises in this moment of being seen and viewed by the companion animal. He boldly challenges his readers here:

“I’ll venture to say that never, on the part of any great philosopher from Plato to Heidegger, or anyone at all who takes on, *as a philosophical question in and of itself*, the question called that of the animal and of the limit between the animal and the human,
have I noticed a protestation based on principle, and especially not a protestation that amounts to anything, against the general singular that is *the animal*” (ATT 40).

For Derrida, the first question of the animal, asks why, how, and with what authority do humans name all nonhuman creatures as “the animal” and, at the same time, condense the entire animal kingdom, except humans, into one singular term of “the animal”? This question reorganizes and reorients the position and boundaries of humans. Questioning this term highlights the constructed nature of “the animal” and binary limitations between humans and nonhuman animals. Derrida sees that “*all philosophers have judged that limit to be single and indivisible*” (ATT 40). Derrida warns against the practice of condensing or essentializing all animals into the singular “the animal.” Similar warnings have come repeatedly from feminist and critical race theorists to disrupt the practice of condensing all women or blacks into one singular noun. He creates a new term “*animot,*” in French, to recall “the extreme diversity of animals that “the animal” erases, and which, when written, makes it plain that this word [*mot*] is precisely only a word.” (ATT x).

The creation of the noun “*animot*” accomplishes two goals. First, this new term halts the violent nature of erasing species diversity used in the traditional discourse. Second, this new term calls into the question of the presumed authority of humans to name and condense all other creatures into “the animal.” Questioning the authority of naming simultaneously questions the baseline of relationships between humans and nonhuman animals. Drawing from the moment with his cat, Derrida sees these questions as essential subsequent to the recognition of a nonhuman animal as the possessor of the gaze. Together, these questions destabilize the demarcation between “the human” and “the animal.”
Derrida’s second major line of inquiry facilitates the advancement of my project. He queries the ontological existence of the demarcation between the human-animal and in what form drawing lines, if at all, be maintained. This questioning does not seek to erase these lines that previously illustrated limits between humans and nonhuman animals. Instead, his argument calls for drawing multiple lines between humans and nonhuman animals, as well as lines between individuals within the same species. Drawing, and thinking through multiple lines allows “differences of degree take the place of opposition” (Naas 233). In this way, Derrida works to dispel animals and humans as a binary. Changing the structure of binaries, both ontological reorientation and physical movement of bodies, will be considered and reconsidered throughout this dissertation. Changing the way binaries are considered and their physical orientations create new intellectual and physical space for a process of “becoming with.” I examine “Becoming with” as a term that is invoked by posthumanism scholars to thoughtfully engage the lived realities of existing in community with others regardless of species in my later chapters.

Derrida is clear that a binary model is not an effective or appropriate description. He states “I have thus never believed in some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal. I am not about to begin to do so now. That would be worse than sleepwalking, it would simply be too asinine” (ATT 30). To illustrate that a simple binary fails to describe the continuum of differences across species, Derrida sees no reason to claim and engage facts developed from animal behavior studies, biology, or other sciences. Scholar Michael Naas clarifies that Derrida does not contest “the fact that animals do not have such and such a capacity or attribute but the principle by which philosophers have claimed that humans do” (231 Naas).
Here, Derrida’s form of questioning mimics his content. In that way, questioning human authority begins a radical praxis of de-centering humans as the only rational political actor.

Derrida further explores the idea of laying claim to human responses through engaging Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass*. Derrida reflects on Alice’s response to the “inconvenient habit of kittens” of purring regardless of the contents of human statements. Alice takes this reaction, of purring, not as a legitimate response but instead as a machinist operation, projecting a Cartesian view of the kittens (ATT 8). In doing so, Alice lays forth the assumption that she, as a human, can indeed, decipher between a “yes” or “no,” or any other content. This assumption incorrectly legitimizes the response of a human over that of the kitten. In this philosophical exercise, the kitten symbolizes the animal. The kittens become symbolic through the vagueness of their individual identities. However, the Cheshire Cat ruptures Alice’s traditional line of thinking of “the animal” as passive and humans as rational actors. He states “We're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad” (ATT 9). The Cheshire Cat’s claim to a lack of sanity for both himself and Alice destabilizes and delegitimizes the response and words of humans as well as nonhuman animals. If humans are “mad” (and who can argue we are not?), humans lose the otherwise exceptional ability to claim access to reason. The Cheshire Cat’s interactions with Alice rupture access to legitimate responses. In this rupture humans must rethink and struggle with the process and implications of reaction and response.

By way of this struggle, Derrida leads scholars to “rethink the very basis of ethics, decision, and responsibility” (*ATT* 42). It is noteworthy that ethics, decision, and responsibility exist in the core of training relationships between human and nonhuman animals. Therefore, Derrida’s call to reconsider the gaze fits into reconceptualizing training instructions.
Considering and reconsidering Derrida’s rupture of ethics, decision, and responsibility will be at the forefront of exploring both theoretical engagements with animals as well as practical and embodied engagements. Derrida considers previous philosophers in light of their treatment or disregard of the animal. His words that instruct this connection are worth repeating here:

“For this question of the animal is not just interesting and serious in its own right. It also provides us with an indispensable intertwining thread for reading philosophers and for gaining access to a sort of secret "architectonics" in the construction-and therefore in the deconstruction-of a discursive apparatus, a coherence, if not a system. One understands a philosopher only by heeding closely what he means to demonstrate, and in reality fails to demonstrate, concerning the limit between human and animal” (ATT 106).

Derrida’s use of “only” demonstrates the importance of how readers consider philosophers. When reading philosophy, readers must consider how authors present conceptions of the limit between the human and animal. The phrase “and in reality fails to demonstrate” shows that an author’s treatment of the question of the animal gives crucial information about their worldview. Information also appears as authors avoid, or minimally address, the question of the animal. This phrase, combined with Derrida’s assertion of the question of the animal as an “indispensable intertwining,” illustrates that the consideration of the question of the animal is critical to any worldview, even if the question is ignored or marginalized.

Considering the animal other creates powerful sites to construct a new political world views and ways of being. This powerful mode of construction makes a new way of being viable and reveals the blueprint of the previous, no longer functional system. This power partially derives from the centrally located position of the question of the animal (Naas 235). Creating a
philosophy or political theory that does not consider “the animal” or nonhuman animal others, is akin to building a gothic church without a cornerstone.

2.3 Rupturing Rhetorical Theory Traditions

The centrality of my project’s question is demonstrated through a few tenets of rhetorical theory that I employ within later chapters. Traditional rhetorical theory, largely perpetuated by Kenneth Burke’s claim that man is “the symbol using animal,” rejects considering animals as symbol users. Burke’s view, which still holds considerable authority, assumes that humans have the ability and power to name animals and all other objects. For example, in Carroll’s novel, Alice demonstrates that she has the ability to interpret signs while the kittens do not. Burke lays claim to human language as unique and privileged in contrast to the purring of kittens or actions of other animals. However, contemporary theorists, including scholar Stephen Lind argues for “an opening up of perspective” to enrich the discipline with nonhuman animal and human-animal communication extending the possibilities of symbol use to nonhuman animals (227). Lind clarifies an important part of Burke’s theory; there is a difference between signs and symbols and motion and action; “Signs are natural and compulsorily generated, whereas symbols are contextually invented and purposefully used. The difference between signs and symbols is then inherently linked to Burke’s conceptual and terminological distinctions between motion and action.” The fire that creates smoke stands as an example of a motion or sign. The fire is not rational or intentional in its representation of burning but, nonetheless, fire gives a sign that wood is burning through the smoke. For Burke, humans act and use symbols while all other creatures communicate through motion and signs. But, Lind sees this schism as artificial (229-230). Derrida's mission to reconceptualize ethics, decision, and responsibility supports
Lind’s process of blurring the edges and lines that previously controlled symbolic action and excluded language from nonhuman animals.

However, unlike Derrida, Lind uses several examples of scientific investigation on birds, monkeys, great apes, marine mammals, and other animals to show active use of symbolic communication (Lind 231-4). For example, Lind reveals how Vervet Monkeys use distinct calls to alert others nearby of specific threats. Short, tonal calls are made for an approaching eagle while “high pitched chutters” are emitted when a snake approaches (233). Specifically, he refutes the cornerstone of Burke’s theory through an important clarification. Lind asserts that because the bird cannot communicate in a way Burke prescribes, it does not mean that birds do not communicate. Moreover, the lack of human understanding of nonhuman communication fails to evidence that humans hold authority over how all creatures communicate (231). Likewise, Lind refreshes his readers with the thought “we take for granted that other humans have their own subjective agency because they act in ways that correspond to our experiences of our own subjectivities” (235). Many modes of communication must be valued. In chapters four and five, I illustrate training as a way to value different modes of communication. Lind concludes that the differences in animal communication is not in type but degree (239). For the larger project at hand that considers horse training, power, and identity, this point is key. Just as much difference exists across species within the “anamot,” much difference exists in communication and demonstrations of agency.

2.4 Everyday Praxis Reflects Theory: Considering the Current State of Chickens

When considering nonhuman animal agency in human approaches to nonhuman-animal and cross-species communication, it is also necessary to theorize how humans position animal
bodies on a daily basis. I heartily agree with bell hooks’ statement that “everything we do is rooted in theory” (Hooks 15). In the case of human and nonhuman interaction, hooks’ quote instructs that all of the ways humans engage with other creatures illustrate human political practice and identity. Currently, humans lack a viable praxis of political thought that provides for sustained coexistence and flourishing across species. Systems of government and cultural traditions rest in the crux of human exceptionalism almost exclusively. The question of the animal is rarely, if ever, answered in a significant manner sustained by any reasonable system of logic. Here, I will demonstrate the instability in how humans currently answer the question of the animal through everyday practices. Below, I juxtapose human engagement with chickens, both male roosters used in cockfights and chickens who are used in the production of poultry. Both of these engagements illustrate major consequences for the communities touched by these practices.

Most Americans avoid killing horses, a baby cow or, even, a mouse with their own hands. And, many would avoid such tasks at very high costs. Similarly, abuse of house pets, including cats and dogs, is deemed unacceptable and often illegal. In this way, Americans illustrate an acknowledgement the value of nonhuman animal lives. Yet, most Americans do not avoid sweet treats containing gelatin, well seasoned veal, soft leather, or life-saving pharmaceuticals once tested on animals. Most do not want to break the neck of the chicken, pluck her feathers, and butcher her into smaller pieces. But, chicken pieces arrive in sanitized plastic wrap, cooking a favorite chicken dish is rarely a problem worth thinking twice about. The sanitation of animal flesh away from whole animal bodies diminishes a reflective space in a dramatic way. The reduction of this space mirrors the reduction of the implications of cross-species interaction. The clear plastic around meat-cuts obfuscates and sterilizes human interaction with nonhuman
creatures. This process names the human species as normative and the nonhuman animal as deviant in an attempt to erase human responsibility. While constantly attempted around food, this obfuscation lacks the possibility of completely hiding any nonhuman-animal. The process of hiding interaction and cleansing human responsibility is not limited to the packaging of meat. Donna Haraway explains it best as she states there “is no way to eat and not to kill, no way to eat and not to become with other mortal beings to whom we are accountable, no way to pretend innocence and transcendence or a final piece” (WSM 295). This process recurs beyond the meat-industrial complex and enters into many interventions in cross-species relationships.

In his 2010 book, Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight About Animals, animal studies scholar Hal Herzog brings this struggle of reflection and action into new relief. He directly juxtaposes unique types of human and nonhuman animal relationships through two contrasting narratives. For my project, his stark comparisons serve as a starting position to evaluate the ethical and political implications of human and non-human animal relationships. Herzog does not attempt to sway his readers though debate. Instead, he creates a space that can serve as a place for reflection on the moral and psychological implications of these human and nonhuman animal interactions. The creation of this space identifies these relationships as socially intelligible. He shares that “It is our interaction with animals that offer an unusual glimpse into human nature” (location 582). The trope of animals facilitating a process of looking is made apparent in Derrida’s interaction with his cat and will later be developed in Virginia Woolf’s conception of mirrors. Through the entirety of this project, it will become clear that rhetorical positioning of animal subjects often involve the process of looking, seeing, or reflecting.
Herzog questions which option is kinder to the chicken -- a cock fight or an order of Chicken McNuggets. Through thick description of the people, places and animals that participate in both fighting roosters and eating chicken, Herzog shows that relationships between and in these activities are extremely complex. Both activities end with dead chickens. However, focusing only on this result circumvents complete reflection on these two chicken-human interactions.

Rooster fights mark both participants and supporters as socially taboo and the activity is regularly outlawed and named “evil,” “unjustifiable” or “distinguishing.” In contrast to this dominant narrative, Herzog evidences that several cockfighters, or owners of one or many fighting roosters, provide better food, living spaces, and medical care for their roosters than many people receive. Many cockfighters often put the care of their flocks before their own self-care, Herzog found. Fighting roosters are raised and trained as specialized athletes for at least two years before participating in a fight. The human cockfighters demonstrate a great deal of pride in their birds. Human cockfighters express this pride through giving the birds names, understanding their likes and dislikes, and knowing their individualized fighting styles. Herzog shows that human cockfighters rarely see a difference in their interaction with birds from other human and nonhuman animal interactions. Many compared their sport to hunters, circus animal trainers, even scientists and meat-eaters.

All of these comparisons illustrate systems that exploit or use animal bodies and end with dead animal subjects. Herazog illustrates the surprisingly “normal” lives lead by most participants. Many participants see themselves as a part of a persecuted group. The interviewed cockfighters suggest that their chickens are “too dumb” to feel pain or that this activity cannot be
labeled as animal cruelty because the roosters are willing participants (Location 2637, 2613). While Herzog rejects both of these premises, he does present his reader with a striking fact; “As many as 30% of the 120 million wild birds shot by hunters each year in the United States will fall from the sky wounded and fully conscious” (location 2613). Hunting is a much more widely acceptable activity, despite the similar suffering inflicted on avian targets. Simply, “there is much more suffering caused by the legal sport of recreational hunting than the outlawed sport of cockfighting” (location 2613).

In contrast to the culture of cockfighting, consider the process of manufacturing a chicken breast packaged in plastic wrap and styrofoam at a grocery store. Biologically engineered chicken “meat machines” produce the vast majority of consumed chicken meat. Brand names like the Cobb 500 or the Cobb 700 erase the individual chicken and rhetorically emphasize their position as a commodity. Additional brands, rather than breeds, are created for specific markets. For example, the Cobb Avian 48 can be found in live marketplaces around the world (Location 2695). Through specialized breeding, branded chickens reduce the production cost by growing faster and consuming less food.

Herzog reveals that reducing the time needed for animals in food production to reach maturation is a new development. He shares, “in 1925, it took 120 days and ten pounds of feed to produce a scrawny two-and-a-half pound bird. Now chickens are slaughtered when they are six or seven weeks old, at which time they will weigh nearly five pounds” (Location 2702). This intense exponential growth leads to tremendous health issues for the chickens, similar to overweight humans. Like humans, these engineered chickens face painful illnesses including “arthritis, heart disease, sudden death syndrome, and a host of metabolic disorders” (Location
Most often, the high proportion of breast weight causes extreme leg pain, including “lameness, ruptured tendons, and twisted leg syndrome” (Locations 2702). This leg pain is so extreme that Donald Brome, who studies animal welfare as a professor at Cambridge University, considers the pain suffered by chickens in poultry production to be “world’s largest animal welfare problem” (location 2709). These animals “will never seen sun or sky,” spend most of their days lying in their own excrement, and often develop associated sores, blisters, and burns. Until they are taken to slaughter, they exist in a 600 X 60 foot “grow-out house” with 30,000 other birds. Ammonia from of the accumulated urine produces microbes that burn the eyes and lungs of both resident chickens and any humans who enter the house. The chickens develop many chronic respiratory diseases from these unsafe conditions, resulting in the continuous feeding of antibiotics. Despite a chronically ill existence, these engineered birds are deemed acceptable to feed the human masses.

The humans who must enter these houses also risk their health are low-paid chicken catchers. Herzog reports that this hourly workforce is made up of poor minorities lacking health benefits. Barely protected by masks and throwaway coveralls, chicken catchers grab ten birds at a time until all 30,000 are loaded into wire crates. This process always takes place a night, out of the view of the public. In this process, nearly a fourth of the six to seven week old birds will be injured (Location 2716). Currently, technology exists to more effectively move chickens into transport cages with significantly less injury and panic. However, Herzog reports that the vast majority of chicken consumed in the United States are still collected by this process that risks the health of the workers and the injury of chickens. The illumination of this process brings into clear view the intimate connections between the struggle for coexistence with nonhuman
creatures and the struggle for equality across human creatures mediated by differences of gender, race, and class.

Reasonable and intellectual reflection on relationships between humans and mass produced broiler chickens stems from articulating the processes of slaughter. Currently, about “140 birds per minute” are slaughtered at just one production line at one facility. Most facilities contain many simulations production lines and the United States contains many slaughtering facilities throughout the nation (location 2730). The slaughtering process begins as the birds are “dumped from their crates, shackled tightly by their legs with metal cuffs, and hung-head down from a conveyer belt” (Location 2730). Conveyer belt first stops to submerge the bird’s heads at a seven to ten-second electrified water bath with the intention of stunning the animals. Next, the birds approach a set of rotating blades that should sever the chickens’ carotid arteries. Following a period that allows for the bodies to bleed out, the mechanical belt dunks the chickens in a scalding hot tank. While efficient, Herzog reminds his readers that this widely used system of production is far from completely effective. He evidences that some “birds are not completely stunned before their throats are slit, and if the neck cutting blades miss a chicken's carotid arteries, it will be conscious when it is submerged in the hot water of the scald tank” (Location 3730). This process and information about this process is systematically and intentionally housed outside of the public eye. When this information is hidden from view, it is easy to disregard repeated injures. Confrontation with the details of this process demands reflection how and why these practices are sustained and who sustains them.

For every 10,000 to 20,000 chickens who are systemically killed and dismembered by the processes of the meat-industrial complex, only one gamecock dies (Location 2751). Further, this
gamecock will, on average, live fifteen times longer and, as the above comparison notes, much more pleasantly. In this way, it is important to notice that the public marginalizes gamecock fighters for animal cruelty, not lovers of McDonald’s chicken nuggets. The vast majority of American body politic eats chicken produced by the meat-industrial complex and lives without scorned for their involvement in animal cruelty. This overwhelming ratio of chickens slaughtered for food to those who die fighting is not a special case or an exception to the rule. Animals killed in the meat-industrial complex for human consumption far outweigh the number of animals used for other purposes. For every one animal used in a scientific experiment, 200 are slaughtered for food, for each unwanted dog euthanized in an animal shelter, 2,000 food animals die, and, perhaps the most unanimously agreed upon cruelty, for every “baby harp seal bludgeoned to death on a canadian ice float” 40,000 animals are slaughtered for consumption (Location 2751). These totals quickly add up to the “72 billion pounds of animal flesh” consumed each year by Americans” (Location 2751).

The public at large finds the first to be a deviant practice and the later to be an acceptable practice without moral implications. This leads me to believe that the process of marginalization of gamecock fighters is not solely motivated by a coherent set of guiding values or principles which benevolently advocates for the welfare of nonhuman creatures. While both situations end tragically with a dead bird, these situations more importantly reveal clues of how humans arrived at the ontological position to create both of these scenarios. Questioning the ontological root of the many and varied interactions between humans and nonhuman animals creates a new center of discussion and site for analysis. Questioning the ontological positions allows, if not demands, considerable interaction with the political theory cannon.
2.5 Setting Humanity Apart (Human Exceptionalism): Tools of the Mirror

In *A Room of One’s Own*, Virginia Woolf offers the metaphor that women act as mirrors when men hold women in their gaze. She asserts, “Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size” (35). The looking-glass aggrandizes, empowers, and creates a sense of self-assurance in the male viewer while simultaneously objectifying, diminishing, and repossessing women as the embodied mirror. In this act of gazing, Woolf insists, men acquire a “feeling that [they have] some innate superiority... over other people” (35). Looking into a mirror across the breakfast and dinner table, in this way, “charges the vitality” of the viewer and enables him to feel secure. This sense of security carries him into the hostile world of business and conflict. Men continue to seek this kind of reflection to quickly create an illusion of confidence, courage, and strength. Simultaneously, women continue to struggle to move beyond the restrictive scope of the male gaze. I assert that men and women possess an additional looking-glass in the bodies of nonhuman animals. Both the collective “animal” and individual nonhuman animal lives can be used as looking-glass for humans. Woolf asserts that reflections of the self “are essential to all violent and heroic action” (36). In this way humans transform nonhuman animal lives into a looking glass. This human-nonhuman animal mirror reflects an aggrandized sense of self to the human, just as the men-women mirror bolsters the man. This process and theme can be reasonably expected to continue over time and in different circumstances. While working to answer my main question (Can an equitable and just relationship between horses and humans develop in training?), I also show that posthuman theory and modes of training subvert this tradition use of animals as mirrors.
To illustrate the appearance of animals constructed as a mirror, consider the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s understanding of the animal in *The Fundamental Concepts* grows from his understanding illustrated in *Being in Time*. In *Being in Time* the animal appears only briefly to be positioned against, or as a negation to, the Desein. Here the animal is called an “it” that “merely has life” and lacks access to the Desein. However, in *The Fundamental Concepts* Heidegger makes a salient point for this project. He states “In the end our… analysis of captivation as the essence of animality provides as it were a suitable background against which the essence of humanity can now be set off” (282). In this way, Heidegger exemplifies the relationship of the mirror between human and nonhuman animals. For Heidegger, humans understand their essence only when contrasted against nonhuman animals. My project advocates for creating a self definition not based in othering.

In *The Fundamental Concepts*, Heidegger presents nearly one hundred and forty pages devoted to the “essence of animality.” While the animal does not come into being or existence as a “who” (“a dog does not exist but merely lives”), the nonhuman animal is pushed into proximity with the human. In this way, his use of the nonhuman animal reinscribes human exceptionalism (FCM 210, Iveson 48). By definition human exceptionalism is only a valid thesis when the animal is held in comparison (FCM 271). This comparison or “setting off” functions as the human looking into the animal-mirror to define him or herself and the human species.

Heidegger’s use of captivation illustrates the theoretical importance of proximity and exceptionalism. He states, “captivation is the condition of possibility for the fact that, in accordance with its essence, the animal behaves within an environment but never within a world” (FCM 239). Iverson develops this assertion through demonstrating that “as far as
Heidegger’s animal is concerned, there can be neither anything beyond, nor any differentiation within, the disinhibiting ring that marks the absolute limit of her environmental capture” (Iveson 49). Here, the animal may only continue (again, not exist or have being) as poor-in-the-world (Iveson 49). Iveson further asserts a key component of this project:

“that the analysis of the animal’s way of being is undertaken solely in order that the proper essence of the human can be subsequently disclosed through the negation of its negation, that is, through the dialectical disclosing of the essence of the world. Such a methodology thus presupposes a categorial and teleological human/animal distinction.” (49)

Heidegger asserts that animals live in a clearly marked sphere or ring that limits them to live only as poor-in-the-world. Simultaneously, this sphere creates space to position the Dasein “which ‘is’ nearest to Being” as excluding the animal from the possibility of an “authentic existence” (Iveson 49). In this way, Iverson clarifies it is “with the capacity to apprehend something as something, that Heidegger draws the abyssal lines between the human Dasein and the animal, one which permits neither the possibility of a human animal or that of a nonhuman Dasein” (Iveson 50). Heidegger’s drawing of lines between the human directly contrasts the lines prescribed by Derrida. Here, Heidegger’s line between the human and the nonhuman is a thick, permanent line that creates a deep chasm between two kinds of being.

Iverson suggests that

“the animal in Heidegger’s discourse is less a negative to be negated than a mirror which reflects only the essence of being-human that being-human itself renders invisible - a
mirror in which ‘we humans’ always already find ourselves, but without ever disclosing
(if indeed such a disclosure were possible) the essence of animality” (Iverson 50).

Iverson asserts that interrupting the metaphysical, dialectical, and physical corral of demarcation
around nonhuman animals creates the possibility of becoming-with animals. Currently, within a
state where the “unthinking utilisation and consumption of fetishised (and thus doubly
disembodied) flesh are corpses” (Iverson 77), the possibility of becoming-with animals is
regularly and systematically prohibited. Iveson stresses that “to give this death is to bear witness,
to attest, being (always adequately) response-able to this death of this other animal” (Iveson 77).
In this way, we must recognize nonhuman animal death to achieve a flourishing political praxis.
Recognizing these previously ignored deaths turns humans into beings that can respond and who
are responsible for others around them. This response emphasizes that we can never be alone in
the world. Recognizing and responding to death illustrates additional reason for previously
comparing fighting roosters and food production chickens. I return to this theme of how killing
may be done and mourning in chapters five and six. There I engage Foucault, Haraway, and
Butler.

In embracing our vulnerability, humans may become active subjects. For posthumanist
philosophy, this process enacts a metaphysical, dialectical, and practical recognition of death of
animal others. I return to this connection between animals and killing through a discussion of
Haraway’s understanding of who or what may be made killable. Iveson concludes with the
following important illustration:

It is imperative, if we are to be (albeit inadequately) responsible within the midst of a
largely unremarked global slaughter, for posthumanist philosophy to think both the
finitude and the non-substitutable deaths of nonhuman animals. To think, that is to say, in sharing the proximal distance to the as such that is being-with, and thus to think the sharing of each other and of the world, always already separated by the greatest possible proximity (70).

The oxymoronic phrase of separation through proximity highlights the difficulty in approaching and working through being-with, or sharing experiences, between nonhuman and humans. This struggle is compounded by the sharing of space and place throughout the world.

Again, consider Woolf’s example, in which she demonstrates that after looking into this aggrandizing mirror across the breakfast table men are enabled to “start the day confident, braced” and “believing themselves desired” (Woolf 36). Men can enter into the world and bravely take on the tasks of “symbolic and linguistic exchange with others” (Woolf 44). By creating “women” as an entity that lacks by its very definition, the viewer (the man) is able to exist as a being confident in its possessions or characteristics. This power is so dynamic that Woolf asserts that “without that power probably the earth would still be swamp and jungle” (35). While somewhat tongue in cheek, Woolf’s statement makes clear that humans may have a problematic history of transforming our world. This transformation is not tricky and troublesome simply because of the horrors of deforestation and human expansion, regardless of normative evaluation. This transformation is problematic because the mechanism of the mirror initiates human exceptionalism, which, in turn, gathers strength from creating, then diminishing, the other. Just a mirror is always separate from the individual gazing into the looking-glass, the reflected image is the closest imitation or likeness available. But, the image will never be the same as the one who gazes into the mirror.
CHAPTER 3: MAPPING THE ANIMAL(S) THROUGH POLITICAL THEORY

3.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter explores the transitioning presence of nonhuman animals in the history of political theory. Political theory most often utilizes animals as metaphors and comparisons. Thinkers from the political theory cannon illuminate the tradition of considering animals within political theory. A contemporary theory centers animals at the very core of creating a cohesive system of justice demonstrating change over time. Political theory initially declared man as the political animal through Aristotle, while Donaldson and Kymlicka include animals as political agents. Through this participation, animals occupy an important role human understanding of governments, communities, and, even, individual identity. Nonhuman animals permanently exist in the fabric of political theory.

This chapter demonstrates the use of animals in political theory through extractions of early and contemporary political thought. Aristotle, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, and Mill appear because of their particular discursive use of animals. These short, but necessary, extractions demonstrate how political thinkers prior to the 20th Century considered the animal other. To enrich the canonical writers’ offerings, I present modern and contemporary secondary literature. This review addresses the canonical figures in chronological order, while the secondary sources will be thematically inserted. In this way, the literature illuminates a process of working through
and with nonhuman creatures. This process lacks a completely linear projection. The chapter highlights divergent strands of thought.

3.2 Contextualizing Animals in Political Science

Political science contributes to animal studies through analysis of the animal rights political movement. This section points out the historical theoretical engagement with animal consciousness, and considers the relationship between human and nonhuman animals. Contemporary scholars enrich this discussion with previous investigations of the canonical theorists and their contributions to animals studies.

Robert Garner offers a meta-analysis of the contributions of political science to animal studies. While he terms the focus of the article to be animal studies, he directs particular attention to the study of the animal rights political movement. The work develops an understanding of the animal rights movement in contrast to other issue-oriented political movements. Jasper and Poulson demonstrate an important difference between issue-oriented movements and other political movements. In issue-oriented movements “unlike other social movements where networks are the key, people are recruited into the animal right movement through the use of ‘moral shocks’” (Garner 396). The specifics of these moral shocks will be further developed in my next chapter.

Research by Greanville and Moss, Nibert, and Shapiro demonstrate that animal protection activists tend to share political values with other progressive causes centered on civil rights, women’s rights, and the environment. From this research Garner hypothesizes that ideology is key to organizational recruitment and political mobilization for the animal protection movement. Garner also offers analysis of moral and legal philosophy that contributes to
perceptions of the animal protection movement. Garner categorizes seminal contributors, Singer and Regan, as first wave theorists who have now “given way” to the second wave of theorists, including Pluhar, DeGrazia, Carruthers, and Leahy (Garner 397). I assert he uses the term of waves to stylistically link the animal rights movement with other progressive movements, particularly feminism. Garner posits that arguments over the moral status of humans and animals have become “stale,” focusing on two main claims. First, “that while animals are still regarded as property it is impossible to achieve the equal consideration of human and animal interests” (Garner 397). The second claim asserts that “the property status of animals is incompatible with even the most basic protection of animals” (Garner 397). Francione, Kelch, and Wise offer similar encapsulations of the main arguments in this field.

Garner concludes with the assertion that “the relationship between liberalism and animal protection is problematic because the principle of moral pluralism -- the liberal view that a range of different, and often incompatible, moral views should be tolerated -- is difficult to reconcile with the moral imperative to prohibit the exploitation of animals for food, clothing, and sport” (Garner 399). Garner’s meta analysis creates a broad understanding of the current contributions of political science to animal studies. Beginning with this broad understanding grounds investigation into political philosophy history. Now, I examine individual canonical thinkers for their contributions to nonhuman-human animal relationships.

Aristotle.

Political theory literature considers non-human animals as early as classical antiquity. Aristotle offers an early definition of man as a rational or political animal. Aristotle’s History of Animals demonstrates the amount, level, or degree of political engagement separates humans
from animals. Importantly, political engagement exists in the social interactions of other species (Berry 828). For example in Aristotle’s *History of Animals*, he states “Some of these qualities in man, as compared with the corresponding qualities in animals, differ only quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more or less of this quality.” (Aristotle, “Book VIII”, 1).

Aristotle goes beyond comparing species. He states “certain psychical qualities are identical with one another” (Aristotle, “Book VIII”, 1). Aristotle explains “a graduated differentiation” in both psychological and physical traits between species (Aristotle Book IX par. 7). Despite these initial assertions, Aristotle’s work on animals is not above critique. Consider his statement that the “life of animals, then, may be divided into two acts - procreation and feeding: for these two acts all their interests and life concentrate” (Aristotle “Book IX” par. 7). Aristotle begins the western epistemology of categorizing, illustrating the importance of categories to his work. Later in the same work, Aristotle describes examples of animals nesting, cooperative parental efforts, and monogamy between pigeons. It seems unreasonable to condense all of these activities into the simple title of procreation. In a similar way, categorizing all human childhood and adolescent development as procreation would also be unreasonable. Aristotle begins the western epistemology of categorizing. The condensation of nesting, cooperative parental efforts, and monogamy into procreation fails to account for the complexity of nonhuman animal life. Aristotle's overgeneralization of animal life activities begins a long history of combining the entirety of animal variation into a single noun, “the animal,” as identified by Derrida in the last chapter.

Along with directly describing his understanding of nonhuman creatures, Aristotle beings the trope of using animals in metaphors within political theory. The metaphoric use of animals
reveals interaction between the lived experiences with human and nonhuman creatures. A more contemporary theorist, Hannah Arendt demonstrates that Aristotle deems humans to be the only animals that use this political interaction to subjectively create differences of “good” and “bad.” Further, humans, alone, use language to signify these normative decisions (Arendt 27). Arendt illustrates that the use of these normative decisions begins the continuous manipulation of “the animal” to define and shape the process of naming individuals as human. Humans are incapable of defining ourselves without excluding the animal. Excluding the animal simultaneously names the animal as the other. In this way, Aristotle’s use begins a long tradition of humans requiring nonhuman animals for self-definition and self-identification.

Porphyry.

The neo-Platonist and early vegetarian Porphyry penned a book length work titled *On Abstinence from Animal Flesh*. He argues, to reach the ultimate goal of the divine, humans must give justice to all sentient beings, including nonhuman animals (Porphyry par. 1-3). To ground this commitment, he asserts “justice pertains to rational beings” and evidences the rationality of nonhuman animals (Porphyry par. 1). Similar to Aristotle, he sees a difference in degree between the rationality held by humans and nonhuman animals. He asserts “it is demonstrated that brutes are rational animals, reason in most of them being indeed imperfect, of which, nevertheless, they are not entirely deprived” (Porphyry par. 10).

Porphyry also begins two lines of inquiry still researched today. First, Porphyry makes a strong argument that nonhuman animals interact in just ways with one another. He notes observations of bees, ants, doves, and storks. For example, he includes anecdotal remarks of ring-tailed doves that “destroy those who are found by them to have committed
adultery” (Porphyry par. 8). Porphyry views the bird’s monogamous “chastity” as virtuous and just (Porphyry par. 8). Similar modern inquires also struggle with anthropomorphizing and applying heteronormative standards to nonhuman animals. Second, Porphyry sees power in the history of companion species (Porphyry par. 9). When speaking about companion species, he states “Nature, also, the fabricator of their frame, constituted them so as to be in want of men, and fashioned men so as to require their assistance; thus producing an innate justice in them towards us, and in us towards them” (Porphyry par. 9). Later scientists and philosophers come to understand Porphyry’s “nature” as evolutionary history. Coevolutionary history intertwines companion animals, who regularly assist humans, into intersubjective dependence for survival. Porphyry asserts “Birds, therefore, and dogs, and many quadrupeds, such as goats, horses, sheep, asses, and mules, would perish, if deprived of an association with mankind” (paragraph 9). Modern scholars and activists continue to struggle with this problem. The struggle exists on a spectrum between is it more just to distance humans from all animals and, thus, allow many companion species to perish.

Porphyry also wrestles with the abuse of nonhuman animals by humans. In this process, he considers that when animals act unjustly towards one another, these acts often stem from hunger or other essential needs. He demonstrates there is, most often, a stark difference between reasons guiding human injustice towards nonhuman animals. Speaking about humans, he asserts “we through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of luxury, frequently sporting in theaters, and in hunting slaughter the greater part of animals” (Porphyry par. 9). While his critique appears prior to the meat-industrial complex, his dissatisfaction with interspecies violence speaks to the ongoing problematic ways humans use animals for sport and luxury. Here, his writing is a
precursor to the lines of inquiry wrestled with by Donna Haraway and others in my later chapters.

Similar to Porphyry’s moral obligation, a commitment to act justly towards nonhuman animals repeatedly appears in human history. The Hebrew bible presents a similar moral obligation. This obligation centers on reducing animal suffering during slaughter. Later Christian theologians, including Saints Paul of the New Testament, Augustine, Thomas did not find the same concern for non-human species. Scholars record Paul as particularly harsh towards animals, Augustine emphatically rejects the Manichean tradition of vegetarianism, and Thomas develops the view that non-human animals were made for human use (Franklin 757). Scholars, following these theologians, continue to wrestle with these foundational frameworks.

Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes characterizes the power of the sovereign through the trope of the animal. This characterization grounds a cornerstone of political science and theory. Hobbes attempts to discover why humans struggle to live peaceful lives, similar to his observations of the ants and bees (Berry 829-830). Through the trope of the animal, Hobbes illuminates the power of the state to recognize political subjects. In this way, the state calls individuals into being “human.” Once named as human, these individuals are included in the state’s protection. This process of naming and protecting specific bodies re-inscribes the sovereign’s ultimate authority to offer protection from a state of war. Here, the state requires determining what is human and who is protected by law.

In Of The Citizen, Hobbes illustrates the example of the deformed newborn. In this case, the sovereign must decide to protect or reject the infant. This act demonstrates the far reaching
authority of the sovereign. Tobias Menely offers insight on this point. Menely states that the
sovereign's “authority to shape the symbolic and thus the political order - the sovereign ‘will
decide’ what and who ‘is a human being’ - is sustained by the threat of violence” (Menely 569).
Menely demonstrates that this violence is categorized, by Hobbes, as beastly. Menely evidences
Hobbes’ examples of Romulus, the founder of Rome, raised by wolves, and Richard the
Lionheart whose crest, which includes lions, emblematizes monarchies today (Hobbes, Of The
Citizen 4, Menley 568).

As previously mentioned, Hobbes briefly directs attention to the image and symbolism of
the lion. Here, the lion symbolizes the monarchy and warrants additional consideration. This
usage illuminates the importance of animal symbolism in political philosophy. Modern rhetorical
scholar Steve Baker presents a theoretical and practical approach to animals in human rhetoric.
Baker focuses his analysis on political cartoons and other politicalized images from Britain in the
1980s. Baker explicitly states that human depictions and practical uses of animals reflect human
nature much more than any one or collective animal nature. Baker asserts that a whole animal
image will be used to identify oneself. For example, a cartoon eagle may represent the United
States or an individual politician. Baker terms this use of whole animal imagery as
theriomorphic. However, when depicting an opponent, the image will become a caricature of an
animal or animals. Sometimes, these caricatures will combine both human and nonhuman
elements (therianthropic) to create and reinforce negative associations. For example, a
politician’s head depicted with the body of an elephant or donkey. Theriomorphic and
therianthropic caricatures closely relate to the difference in the rhetorical devices of metaphor
and metonymy. While the term metaphor denotes a direct comparison between two entities, the
term metonymy indicates an intimate association between two entities. Baker asserts that a metaphor creates or connotes “distance and otherness” while the use of a metonymic device gives a “sense of familiar proximity” (86). These four terms aid in understanding symbolic uses of animal bodies.

Hobbes’ maxim, “Man is a God to man, and Man is a wolf to Man,” demonstrates the human need for the nonhuman animal other in describing political subjectivity (Hobbes Of The Citizen 3). Humans attempt to understand themselves and their relationships to other humans through an appropriation of a nonhuman animal. Hobbes clarifies this process of using nonhuman animals when he declares “Animal is in the definition of man” (Hobbes, Of The Citizen 107). To describe and establish human as a descriptive category, humans must use other species in that discursive process. Inherent in this process is a continuous tension. The act of naming an individual as human seeks to remove that individual from the sphere of the animal. However, that act of naming expands the human category to include the nonhuman animal. In this way, Hobbes creates a paradox. Through his discursive choices, Hobbes fails to engage the basics of civilization without renaming man as part of the nonhuman animal.

Hobbes’ paradox is further evaluated by Giorgio Agamben. Agamben considers how the sovereign may exist both inside and outside the law. This position troubles Agamben because the sovereign must establish himself as both inside and outside of his own definition of human. Agamben offers his idea of modern humans to unpack the paradox of this position. He states

"If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside and the inhuman is produced by animalizing the human, here the inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the humanization of
an animal: the man-ape, the infant savage, but also and above all the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form" (Hobbes The Open 37).

This defining process occurs through exclusion. In this way, Agamben demonstrates that both human and animal lives are at stake through this exclusion. After the exclusionary process, citizens are only left with a bare life. For Agamben, a bare life is a life that has no rights, value nor possibility of recognition (The Open 38). Menely supports this claim. He offers that bare life “is life endowed with symbolism by the violence exercised on it, life made figurative through its disfigurement, included in the law by its exclusion” (569). This violence intimately connects the lived experiences of bodies named into a bare life. And, this violence demonstrates the paradox of Hobbes’ sovereign violence. For Menely, “it precedes the figurative and is itself figurative, a graphic substantialization of the power of the law on vulnerable flesh” (569). In this way, the bare life both illustrates and is an illustration of the violent tension within Hobbes’ concept of sovereignty. In Homo Sacer, Agamben literally and figuratively places bare life creatures between the “passage between animal and man [...] exclusion and inclusion” (105). The bare life turns humans into beast, and thus, excludes individuals from the protection of the sovereign. Thus, for Agamben, Derrida, and Menely, the term animal includes not only living nonhuman creatures but also “the figurative status of those exceptional beings on whom and by whom violence may be justly exercised” (Menely 570). I return to the just application of violence and its ramifications in the next chapter.

In his conclusion, Agamben writes “man has always been the result of a simultaneous division and articulation of the animal and the human, in which one of the two terms of the operation was what was at stake in it” (The Open 92). In this way, Agamben illustrates that in
order to move past this binary rhetoric and existence, humans must reveal and accept the “central emptiness” of that space that previously separated man and animal (The Open 92). Menley supports this reading of Agamben through exploring Agamben’s interaction with Hobbes. Meneley asserts that the difference between man and animal that makes “it possible to represent the political life of mankind” (570). He emphasizes that both humans and nonhuman creatures are “equally subject to the disfiguration of sovereign violence” (570). Meneley concludes, “there will be only beastly sovereigns and their exceptions...” therefore “there will be only animals” (580). Meneley demonstrates that the history of man, which continuously attempts to separate from the history of animals, fails in this objective. In naming difference, men implicitly name similarities. Meneley positively presents the site of this failure in sovereignty.

Despite the implications of sovereignty, humans conceive nature as beyond the reach of the sovereignty. Nature exists only under the threat of encroachment. Yet, creatures named to a bare life are not returned to nature. Even in their diminished state, these creatures are still held within the power of the sovereign. Here, the sovereign withholds their rights. Hudson asserts that theses spaces of exception no longer exist at the outskirts of the physical boundaries of political society. Political society engulfs this space and creates spaces within the physical boundaries of the state. Here humans are “stripped of citizenship, denied a political voice, and subjected absolutely to political decisions in which they have no rights or recourse” (Hudson 1664). To illustrate groups who once held citizenship rights, Hudson manifests Guantanamo Bay detainees, political refugees, and prisoners. I offer racial minorities and women in an additional nuanced layer. The sovereign confines these groups to particular spaces and roles. While several groups differ from one another, each live with reduced or nullified rights of citizenship. In this way,
humans who only have access to a bare life illustrate the limited positions of nonhuman animals. In return, nonhuman animals also illuminate the object treatment of these groups.

This analysis responds to detractors of posthumanism and critical animal studies who believe that valuing animals will devalue humans. Humans are already systematically devalued through the exclusion of the animal. The bare life shows that in defining “humans” against “animal,” humans position other groups as part animal to justify reduced rights and unjust treatment. This process of exclusion requires devaluing both humans and animals. Individuals who hold a possessive investment in the current fictionalized value of humanity perpetuate this narrative. This fictionalized value, I assert, receives support for the same reason that other social constructs of difference are perpetuated. Privileges continue to be staked out by such an investment. Animal studies plays a critical role in identifying privilege obtained this constructs of difference. Additionally, as this matrix demystifies and, ideally, embraces a politics, that offers more than the bare life to all creatures.

Descartes.

Next, I consider political thinkers who influenced viewing humans and animals as at odds. Rene Descartes famously considered animals to be machines. This view influenced the widespread practice of vivisection, or the dissection of live animals (Harrison 220). Derrida illustrates the importance of Descartes contributions to the human and animal binary. Descartes forcibly asserts this theoretical cornerstone in Discourse on Method. This text aligns machines and animals, while separating them from humans (Descartes 29-31). Many scholars continue to assert that Descartes considered animals to be machines and his students, including Malebranche,
perpetuated this notion. Malebranche later wrote that animals "eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing" (Harrison 219).

With Malebranche’s statement, scholars question Descartes personal treatment of animals. Researchers agree that Descartes had a pet, a small dog he named Monsieur Grat. His pet ownership creates more interest on how and to what degree he attributes feelings to animals (Harrison 219). Harrison offers an important meta-analysis of Descartes’ views of animals through accessing Descartes’ primary sources. These letters, personal papers, and published works reveal a narrative different than the widely popular view of Descartes as cruel to animals. Harrison contends that Descartes’ should be read as agnostic towards animals feelings. Harrison shares letters written by Descartes to various contemporary scholars and friends to support Descartes’ animal agnosticism. Harrison quotes:

“to More: ‘we cannot at all prove the presence of a thinking soul in animals;’ to Reneri: the behaviour of animals 'is not at all a sufficient basis to prove [that they have souls];' to the objections of Arnauld: ‘we have had no cause for ascribing anything more to them [animals], beyond... the principle depending solely on the animal spirits.' In a similar vein, Descartes informed Plempius that he had deliberately refrained from giving strong arguments for his view about souls 'partly for fear of writing something false while refuting falsehood, partly for fear of seeming to want to ridicule received Scholastic opinions” (226).

This primary source evidence suggests that Descartes never denied animals consciousness or souls. Instead, this support illustrates that Descartes was unable to know, completely, if animals do possess consciousness or souls. Harrison contends this conclusion:
“It is in this light that we are to read Descartes' candid admission to Henry More, that 'though I regard it as established that we cannot prove there is any thought in animals, I do not think it is thereby proved that there is not, since the human mind does not reach into their hearts’” (226).

Here Descartes directly speaks to his inability to know if nonhuman animals have the capacity for thought. In this way, Harrison advocates for a more compassionate reading of Descartes. Tension builds between the traditional view of Descartes cruelly supporting vivisection and Harrison’s reflection of Descartes as unable to decide on the nature of animals. These tensions mirror ongoing discussions in animal rights. Neither view extends rights to nonhuman animals reflecting the Enlightenment’s general treatment of nonhuman animals. However, eighteenth century thinkers energized this consideration (Franklin 758).

**Locke.**

In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke offers a window into his understanding of the animal other, particularly nonhuman animal consciousness and the nonhuman animal mind. This view begins deconstructing Descartes categorization of animals as machines. Locke shares his understanding on the nonhuman animal in this passage:

“It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction” (Locke 117).

While not equating human and animal minds, Locke demonstrates a much different understanding of the animal mind than his predecessors. Here, Locke illustrates a difference in
degree or amount between human and animal access to logic. In this way, Locke demonstrates a difference in scale rather than kind and returns to the thoughts of Ancient Greek scholars. Locke mocks fellow humans who fail to recognize and give credence to the possibilities of nonhuman animal minds. He questions how humans can contend that animals do not think. When considering the possibilities of animals thinking, he contends that dogs or elephants “give all the demonstration of it imaginable, expect only telling us that they do” (Locke 87). His choice to assert that animal give “all the demonstration” of thinking “imaginable” forcefully requires opening communication and language beyond words. In later chapters, I return to the serious importance of wordless cross-species communication.

**Bentham.**

The history of utilitarian political thought parallels many aspects of the broad history of animal rights. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a dramatic increase and slow acceptance of utilitarianism. Prominent modern animal rights continue to enlist utilitarian arguments to criticize animal suffering. Jeremy Bentham, a late eighteenth century scholar, first insisted that suffering must be the benchmark for extending justice to nonhuman animals (Cochrane 25). His original comparison, which immediately links racial discrimination to species discrimination, is worth considering at length here:

“The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the
faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty of discourse? ... The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being? ... The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breathes …” (Betham).

Bentham’s use of *os sacrum* reveals an important point. From Latin *os sacrum* translates as “the sacred bone.” Greek in origin, the term suggests a belief that the soul resides within a particular bone. This is the key to Bentham’s claim because he illustrates that he understands nonhuman creatures as worthy of concern without a connection to a divine power. Bentham pairs the absence of the soul, as an insufficient reason, to other physical characteristics. This move places, along with Bentham’s overall thesis of considering suffering, the material reality of many creatures in center stage.

Bentham also gives the imagery of the “line” as a physical and literal point of demarcation around species. In doing so Bentham sets the bar for consideration of rights, not at reason but at species. The history of political thinkers has placed immense value on man’s ability to reason and as a mode of distinction from other living beings. For example, Descartes asserts that it is through reason that humans know the divine being. This logic cements a link that is amplified through the Judeo-Christian tradition. Bentham’s change this is a large shift away from both popular and traditional world views and, thus, directly disrupts the trajectory of human essentialism. Consider Bentham’s statement in *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, “But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conservable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old” (Betham). To make this comparison in the utilitarian tradition serves to, again, disrupt the logic of human exceptionalism through
juxtaposing the human infant next to the horse and dog. In demonstrating that not all humans are capable of reason, in the traditional manner of logic and connection to a deity, Bentham’s statement opens consideration for rights to more creatures instead of closing the possibility of excluding individuals from protection. (More on sovereign protection and the animal will be considered in my discussion of Thomas Hobbes below.) Confidently I assert that the point of this juxtaposition is not to reduce rights and protections from human infants. Instead, by changing the paradigm that considers protection more individuals are open to inclusion.

Mill.

For a considerable amount of space, I focus on John Stuart Mill’s contribution to the study of difference and, indirectly, the consideration of the animal other. His contribution is particularly noteworthy for this project because he is one of the few canonical political theorists who gave serious consideration to the question of women and gender. In this way, he articulates ramifications of subverting traditional binaries. Mill demands the emancipation and education of women and generates an enduring power, making his text ripe for discussion on conceptualizing the other. He invokes metaphors rooted in the idea of the natural world and in the concept of the animal. For example, in Principles of Political Economy, Mill affirms that "the reasons for legal intervention in favor of children apply not less strongly to the case of those unfortunate slaves - the animals" (546). He uses the normalized plight of the poor conditions of nonhuman animals to highlight the dangerous conditions of child factory workers. In many ways, his core values of individuality, justice and equality are timeless and an intricate necessity in affirming an equitable lifestyle. For this project, these values help develop a political praxis that considers human as well as nonhuman animals.
Mill offers that human nature “is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to for exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing” (*On Liberty* 56-7). This complex metaphor pushes back on the Cartesian view of the body and engages scenes from nature to juxtapose the difference between the machine and nature. Posthumanists bridge a similar gap between machine and nature much later on. Mill asserts that human nature is ever changing, gaining strength, and growing towards fullness. In this way, Mill imagines human nature by characteristics that resonate with the modern notion of organic. While Mill does not use the term organic, he presents a tree’s growth as analogous to the possibilities of human capacities. He insists that humans, like trees, must not be “rooted out and consumed” or “clipped into pollards” (Mill 59). In this way, Mill presents the possibilities of human nature to be unsullied by industrialization and analogous to natural growth. The analogy assists Mill by describing how human nature may flourish without oppression or subjugation.

In the article “The Subjection of Women,” Mary Lyndon Shanley claims that Mill’s *The Subjection of Women* contributed directly to "liberal feminism's assault on patriarchal understanding of the domain of person authority" (Shanley 418). Mill shows that the state already had an important role in domestic matters that were once considered to be private and personal matters. He argued that by upholding laws that encourage male dominance in marriage and excluding women from educational and professional opportunities, the state was already deeply entrenched to areas considered personal authority. With this context, neither public nor private life may be properly considered without the other (Shanley 418). To fully understand Mill’s call for equal partners in marriage, it is necessary to examine the possibility and results of
unequals in a marriage. Mill is very clear and direct on this topic. A marriage of unequal persons is no better than the relationship between a master and slave. Shanley reminds the reader that through the analogy of the master and slave Hegel shows the master as one who only views himself as a lord over others and objects. Through this worldview the master can never achieve freedom. This absolute reliance on his slaves for his own self identity blinds him completely of the possibility (Shanley 411). For Mill, society has created masters out of the male half of the species. His own words most clearly document his anguish with this development that penetrates deeply into the minds of most men. Mill asks his readers to consider a boy that may be without any special merit who solely by the virtue of his birth feels

“superior of all and every one of an entire half of the human race: including probably some whose real superiority to himself he has daily or hourly occasion to feel; but even if in his whole conduct he habitually follows a woman's guidance, still, if he is a fool, she thinks that of course she is not, and cannot be, equal in ability and judgment to himself; and if he is not a fool, he does worse — he sees that she is superior to him, and believes that, notwithstanding her superiority, he is entitled to command and she is bound to obey” (Mill 205)

Mill compares this self-worship found in the male half of the species to the self-worship that is indulged by a monarch or a feudal superior. This, socially imposed and subsequently internalized self-worship of the male, begins Mill’s protests.

With the prompting of his long time partner and eventual wife, Mrs. Harriet Taylor, Mill wrote several newspaper articles showing the current legal system offered no protection to married women assaulted by their husbands. He emphasized this atrocity by showing that these
women were forced to live in the same home as their attackers (Ryan 156). Mill explores this concept even further in *The Subjection of Women* as he condemns the practice of marital rape. Mill shows his readers that even though a husband may be well aware that his wife despises him, from his place of superiority the husband is allowed to “claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations.” He further discusses that no slave is “a slave to the same lengths” as a wife in nineteenth century England (*Subjection of Women* 157). Although, modern readers are well aware through American slave narratives that slaves were often raped by their masters, his point here is nonetheless salient. And, the use of the animal metaphor again, highlights this salience. Within the confines of a society that creates men believing they are superior, a woman can never achieve freedom and happiness. In addition to the obvious unhappiness of women in these circumstances, Mill illustrates additional dangers to the entire society. As men continuously exercise absolute power, their own characters are brutalized and degraded (Ryan 156).

To return, briefly, to my last chapter, I assert that Derrida’s conclusions reflect Mill’s work. Both Mill and Derrida agree that the process of othering is harmful to all members of society. Both assert that obstructive power degrades the oppressed as well as the oppressors, abet in different ways. Derrida moves beyond Mill’s consideration as he deconstructs the metaphor of the animal and describes the state of cross-species interaction with lines of demarcation. The use of the animal metaphor will be revisited again before the conclusion of this chapter.

As an early canonical scholar, Mill’s contributions to feminism are significant and provide foundations for not only feminism, but also, I suggest, posthuman scholarship. In addition to demonstrating a helpful content and form, Mill also shows the usefulness of offering
alternatives or additions to current conceptions of justice to improve the lives of others. Next, I assert that his style of evidence and alternative mode of embracing political identities hold similarities to posthumanism. In order to embrace many political identities, new subjects must be sustained through recognizing the material constructedness of all subjects.

Mill’s feminism is deeply rooted in his understanding of justice and sets him apart from much of the political theory cannon. I critically examine Mill to illuminate the growth from liberalism to feminism and from feminism to posthumanism. On his conception of justice, Mill builds a case for gender equality with two critical claims. I assert that Mill’s claims critically enhance political, feminist, and posthuman theories. In content and form, Mill presents important examples that demonstrate a method for modern scholar to expand conceptions of justice. Like Mill, modern scholars also expand justice to more individuals. First, Mill asserts that the supposed inferiority of women cannot be substantiated because women have yet to exist in a space free from societal pressures that constantly call them to act feminine. And second, Mill asserts that allowing women to engage in civic activities will benefit society and both sexes. These two important claims offer a foundation for both feminist and posthuman theorists. After evidencing the usefulness of this foundation, I will consider Mill’s hope for friendship between men as women as an example of expanding previous conceptions of justice that is similarly used by posthumanists.

Mill’s understanding and application of justice shows the link between socially imposed narratives and gender roles. Specifically, Mill explains gender roles through a very Bulterian moment. He states "so true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural" (Okin 215). This declaration critically interrogates
Mill’s logical frame of gender equality to a daily praxis for his work and worldview. In a truly radical approach, Mill explains gender roles as arbitrarily created mechanisms that perpetuate inequalities between men and women. In this way, Mill instigates an early step towards deconstructing social mechanisms that perpetuate inequality. This seedling sprouted, and continues to produce, many modern feminist and posthuman arguments.

Mill continues the plant seeds of radical thought as he plainly states the largest benefit of the emancipation, education, and civic engagement of women. At the conclusion of *The Subjection of Women*, he shares “in the private happiness to the liberated half of the species; the difference to them between a life of subjection to the will of others, and a life of rational freedom” (211). Given a contextual understanding of Mill’s view on freedom and autonomy, this statement must be seriously considered. It is striking and important. Mill considers freedom as “the first and strongest want of human nature” (*SoW* 211). Through this claim he demands the emancipation of women. This claim, I believe, is important and often lost, particularly within discussions of difference. Mill is emphasizing that entire societies grow from inclusive practices. In many ways, this point is critically important to this larger project. When more individuals are treated in an egalitarian manner, all creatures, including humans, profit physically, intellectually, and spiritually.

To reveal part of Mill’s contribution to liberal and feminist theory consider Susan Moller Okin contribution in *Women In Western Political Thought*. Okin demonstrates that Mill fervently attempts to apply the principles of liberalism to women, largely through both claims explicated above. However, she critiques his choice to avoid questioning the family structure, as it appears in nineteenth century England. For Okin, Mills’ choice deeply limits his feminist
applications. Okin seeks to simultaneously recognize the progress made by Mill and assert that this progress, alone, is not enough to satisfy a quest for justice. In the same way, so do posthumanist scholars for feminism. Okin finds that Mill begins on the right path towards liberalism but stops before fully exploring the family structure, which eventually becomes a large part of scholarship that is essential to modern liberal feminists.

While not considered completely successful by Okin, Mill speaks to the very best possibilities of marriage in a hopeful tone. Mill’s hopefulness for the possibilities of marriage presents ways of subverting the expected power differential typical to marriage during his lifetime. While Mill spends time on the very worst aspects of marriage, his argument for martial friendship is central to the organic beauty of his work. Mill’s own words best describe this harmonious potential;

“When each of two persons, instead of being a nothing, is a something; when they are attached to one another, and are not too much unlike to begin with; the constant partaking of the same things, assisted by their sympathy, draws out the latent capacities of each for being interested in the things… by a real enriching of the two natures, each acquiring the tastes and capacities of the other in addition to its own” (Mill 208)

Despite his hetero-normative attachments to marriage, Mill shows that people do not develop their personalities and abilities in isolation. Just as a tree cannot grow to its full height when consistently covered by the shade of another single tree or tall building, creatures, nonhuman and human alike, will not grow and develop to their fullest capacities while being forced to cower in absolute subordination or while equally forced to submit another into abject oppression.
Individuals, in this case married adults, enrich one another at a core or, perhaps, primal level through sustained investment in one another. This investment between individuals created a normative good because “human relationships between equals were of a higher, more enriching order than those between unequals” (Shanley 416). Mill preferred relationships between equals over unequals as much as he preferred democracy over despotism (Shanley 416-417). Mill’s call for friendship between a husband and wife marks a departure from previous writers. Scholars from Aristotle to Hegel assert that women lack the innate “moral capacity” for the highest forms of friendship. Therefore, for previous scholars, women cannot be friends with men (Shanley 418). Consider, for a moment, Donna Haraway’s reflections on training her companion canine, Cayenne, through agility courses. Through this process both Haraway and her dog “become with” one another. They enrich one another, drawing out “latent capacities” in one another. This hopeful cross-species moment of translation enriches both partners. Through transforming the daily praxis of marriage, Mill sets the foundation for this strand of posthuman thinking.

Until this point in the history of philosophy, several major thinkers recognized the animal other, considered animals capable of pain, and used the example of the animal to illustrate critique of various oppressions (Rollin 255). Additionally, I have demonstrated in the previous pages, that many of the academic predecessors of “20th century empirically-oriented philosophers and biological and psychological scientists” create a trajectory of thought that should have continued addressing and engaging the animal consciousness. Rollin argues that John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin had reconciliation, if not concern for, animal consciousness. Further, he offers that the “effects of the denial of animal consciousness include profound moral implications for the major uses of
animals in agriculture and scientific research” (Rollin 253). Beyond the pain and suffering of millions of nonhuman animal lives, Rollin asserts that this change in the trajectory of understanding others, more generally science, can be changed not only by new data but by new social values. Rollin states “It appears that scientific ideas can change not only because of disconfirming data or because of the discovery of basic logical flaws, but also because of the rise of new values, which usher in new philosophical commitments or new basic assumptions” (261). These new philosophical commitments saw the emergence of a distinct trend of disregarding and denying animal consciousness and pain.

Rollin demonstrates that through a systematic and unprecedented denial of animal consciousness and pain, humans circumvented a contract once upheld between humans and animals. This contract held that “to succeed in agriculture, one therefore had to know - and meet-animals’ physical and psychological needs, for the agriculturalists did well if and only if the animals did well” (Rollin 268). Rollin, further, demonstrates that this contract does not “survive the emergence of modern science-based technology” (268). Instead, “Industry supplanted husbandry and agriculture became exploitative rather than symbolic” (Rollin 267). The denial of this relationship, or in Rollin’s term “contact,” illustrates my choice to juxtapose cockfighting chickens and mass poultry production. The method used to produce and consume meat, at least in first world nations, obliterates concern for the needs of embodied animals. It is, then, necessary to consider the interactions between all sorts of embodied creatures.

Marx.

The above argument asserts that the process of exclusion lowers value when considering the rights and preferences of nonhuman animals alongside humans. I suggest that this argument
only highlights the privileges of those humans who gain from treating and using specific others as less than human. This reading is supported by Marx’s analysis of the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Like humanity crushed by the force of capitalism, nonhuman animals are also “drowned...in the icy water of egotistical calculation” of profit (Marx 57). Just as exploitation of the labor force is “veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct brutal exploitation” (Marx 58). Contemporary scholar, Hudson argues that “the linkages between surplus populations and nonhuman animals, and between capitalism and animal rights, reveal contradictions inherent in capitalist production” (1659). As the linkage between animal welfare and minority rises, so to does the connection between animal cruelty and the lower classes. Anti-cruelty laws are passed and most dramatically asserted over the working class and poor, consider current dog fighting laws. This process is also, of course, radicalized. But, the cruelty of factory farm held chicken, cows, and other livestock does not receive the same kind of concern as this production adds to the, literal and physical, consumption, and eventually the pacifying, of the middle class.

Hudson is clear on this point of pacification, she states “In capitalism, we become our own slaves” (1673). This is significant because the amount of cruelty that exists within all dog fighting activities is a gallon of water compared to the sea of violence that exists in factory farms. To make fundamental changes, Hudson offers that it is not enough to restructure animal welfare in society within the name of human rights. Instead, political entities must escape this “domination structured by a dichotomous split and moral hierarchy” (Hudson 1672). In doing so, we may see vegetarianism as a possibility to “engage in practices opposed to the hierarchies that separate the human from its own animality” (Hudson 1674). In this way, Hudson argues that
through many practices, including vegetarianism, human should embrace and celebrate their
animality. I assert that these practices may include training and daily communication with
nonhuman animals. This celebration of animality deconstructs the human and animal dichotomy
and re-inscribes new ways of being.

The position of embodied creatures, both human and nonhuman, is often continuously
documented by the economic position and system that normalizes violence across species.
Hudson demonstrates this when she states, "capitalism exercises the structural violence towards
both humans in particular and planetary life in general. It is commonplace" further argues that in
capitalism there is distinct connection between what is termed as "surplus populations" of people
who are impoverished or otherwise unwanted or cared for by the state (Hudson 1673). Therefore,
it is only through a complete revolution that a politics may be created where all creaturely animal
bodies are recognized. This revolution must include the economic system where our bodies
exist. This recognition by the state determines levels of care and protection, thus an essential part
of creating a political praxis that affects all living bodies and more. For Hudson, even
vegetarianism is not enough to escape the weight of capitalism that is invasive to all creaturely
bodies under its existence.

Vegetarianism alone does not address the roots of the capitalist system and the problems
propagated by its continued existence. Because of this burden Hudson argues "in capitalism we
become our own slaves, our own animals" (Hudson 1673). She offers reframing vegetarianism as
a kind of civil disobedience. She suggests that instead of abstaining from meat to avoid the
sacrifice of an animal, vegetarian, instead, should reject eating meat as a "symbolic practice that
questions the sacrificial structure of animalization" within the the capitalist system for both
nonhuman and human bodies. Hudson’s call to create a revolutionary praxis around vegetarianism parallels this project's consideration of the act of riding.

Similar to the ironic twist of Hobbes’ beastly sovereignty, Hudson also shows that "human beings failed to become "human" when they define humanism by excluding parts of themselves" (1674). For Hudson, the drawing of lines, to use Agamben’s terminology, cuts into and not around the human. The species of the human is not only in the critical animal studies theoretical sense but, literally, in the praxis and vocabulary of modern science, a part of the larger category of the human. This directly relates to Derrida’s term “animot.” In the broad sweeping term of the animal, humanity does not only erase the richness of difference in nonhuman animals but also in ourselves.

It is important to remember that animals (in the sense of “animot”) do not fit into a discrete part of humanity but that the human fits into the animal kingdom. Speciest language that rhetorically fights for human exceptionalism often leads humans to believe themselves superior to animals. This is not the case and illustrated through Hudson’s evaluation of possibilities of “becoming animal.” Hudson introduces this project to theme that will become apparent throughout the rest of this political theory posthumanism and critical animal studies work. Further, the argument of the revolutionary vegetarian states that

"to become truly human requires a different kind of becoming animal, and a different mode of relating to animals in our own animality. We need not stand outside the natural world as observers. We need to engage it as participants in a metabolism of the nature" (Hudson 1675).
The consideration here is with the many embodied creatures that create the fictions term “humanity.” In this way, to embrace the embodied subjects within humanity and avoid investment in a fiction, we must also embrace animality. This language of “becoming animal” echoes and calls into consideration Donna Haraway’s “becoming with.” As a central scholar in Critical Animal Studies and Posthumanism, Haraway’s work will be unpacked in the next chapter.

3.3 A New Animal: Inclusive Political Theory by Donaldson and Kymlicka

Donaldson and Kymlicka offer a decisive turn in the connection between political theory and animals. Instead of using animals as a trope or metaphor, considering animals in comparison to humans, or including animals as a part or afterthought of a human political theory, Zoopolis offers a political theory that begins with nonhuman animals. In this view, all animals, human or nonhuman, are owed universal rights because of their subjectivity. Each holds interests as political subjects. This starting point is essential to moving past a speciesist construction of political identity and community. Their theory establishes a new baseline from which all new political theories should be considered. To demonstrate the impact of this work, I will first outline its contributions and main arguments, review major reviews, and, then, provide additional commentary that will add to this robust discussion.

Before presenting my analysis, I want to make it clear that I do not completely support Donaldson and Kymlicka’s new conception of sovereignty and daily politics. Their new liberal theory does contain some exceptional advancements in navigating daily relationships between human and nonhuman communities. I spend considerable time on their argument because they attempt navigate interactions with animals with theory on sovereignty and political identity. This
approach I believe advances possibilities previously unconsidered within political science. My analysis of Donaldson and Kymlicka main arguments, their critics, and my own additions will reveal the possibilities and problems within their approach.

*Zoopolis* offers not only guidelines for human interaction with nonhuman animals, but creates a citizenship theory based political system. This political system views nonhuman animals and humans as the central focus of cooperative living. This theory goes beyond the traditional animal rights view that animals are best left alone by humans. This citizenship theory also disregards the intuition that justice requires kindness to nonhuman animal others. Instead, Donaldson and Kymlicka develop a group-differentiated citizenship theory that considers domesticated animals, wild animals, and liminal animals as groups that have three distinct types of rights. While wild and domesticated animals are self-explanatory, liminal animals are animals that are wild but live within the territory of human societies. In brief, *Zoopolis* deems domesticated animals as co-citizens in human societies, wild animals as members of separate sovereign states, and liminal animals as denizens. For Donaldson and Kymlicka denizenship reduces both the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. This consideration of animals as various types of citizens is unique and pivotal to the consideration of animals and political theory. I consider each citizenship group individually below. This particular detail will be given to the portion of the *Zoopolis* dedicated to domesticated animals because this project focuses on human-horse relationships. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s commitment to wild and liminal animals will be explained, but in less detail.

*Domesticated Animal Citizens.*
Zoopolis outlines a new theory of domesticated animals as citizens, considers the role of dependency in domestication, and makes suggestions on the difference between training and socialization.

First, Zoopolis deems domesticated animals as citizens within human society. This reorientation of understanding society and citizenship is based first on viewing communities as mixed across species. The second claim includes understanding nonhuman creatures as political agents, who may express their interests, comply with social norms, and participate in fair terms (Donaldson and Kymlicka 122). Citizenship, for domesticated animals, reorders the lives of both human and nonhuman creatures. This citizenship theory includes many rights currently unavailable to nonhuman creatures. Zoopolis gives examples of these rights, including access to basic socialization, mobility, and shared public spaces. Other examples include human responsibilities about protection, use of animal products, use of animal labour, medical care, sex and reproduction, predation and diet, and political representation (Donaldson and Kymlicka 123). Practical considerations for all of these categories, and others, should be examined against full citizenship. For example, Donaldson and Kymlicka offer that well-kept, domestic sheep who are bred not to shed their own wool in the summer should be shorn in a calm and careful manner. The sheep must benefit from the process before others. Then, under careful consideration, and possible regulation, the wool from these sheep could be used, even sold, for human use. Here, the sheep, at very little expense could be an active political community member. Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest an argument may also be made for the use and sale sheep droppings collected from grazing pastures for fertilizer. However, within this frame it would be much more difficult
to use milk from cow’s. In this case, expense of foregoing the ability to raise their own children is very great (Donaldson and Kymlicka 135-6).

These rights create a drastic division from many other theories of animal rights. Contemporary theories of animal rights, including the abolitionist and extinctionist position, often suggest that animals are always best when left alone or separate from humans. Donaldson and Kymlicka see both the process of domestication (through coercive breeding and confinement) and the intent behind domestication (to alter animals for the whims of humans) as morally wrong and unacceptable (82). However, they diverge from many other contemporary theories of animal rights by asserting there

“is nothing inherently undignified or unnatural about either neoteny or dependency, and to condemn domesticated animals on these bases is not only unjustified, but would have pernicious consequences for humans as well” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 83).

In this way, animals are not necessarily worse off because they require contact with humans. As I described in my last chapter, Porphyry asserts a similar argument. Only the pernicious myth that independence from others is an achievable reality would accept such a notion. Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that independence should never be the highest aim of life. All creatures depend on one another to sustain life.

This myth arises from the male bias and the influence of liberalism (Donaldson and Kymlicka 83). N. Katherine Hayles, whose work will be visited in my fifth chapter, encapsulates this sentiment. She asserts that liberalism encourages the “ethical imperative that humans keep control” and anything else within this framework would “abdicate their responsibilities as autonomous independent beings” (Hayles 288). The liberal humanist subject necessitates and
“assumes a vision of the human in which conscious agency is the essence of human identity” (Hayles 288). The myth of independence does not include all human individuals. Through conceptualizing subject as independent, many humans have, unjustly, been rendered particularly unrecognizable\textsuperscript{11}. In chapter three, I will consider posthuman theory literature that bolsters the discussion of finding ways to live with nonhuman creatures.\textsuperscript{12}

Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that “dependency doesn’t intrinsically involved a loss of dignity, but how we \textit{respond} to dependency certainly does.” In this way, we must reconsider dependency in training relationships (Donaldson and Kymlicka 84). Within these relationships theoretical interplay comes to life. Consider, at length, this example:

“If we despise dependency as a kind of weakness, then when a dog paws his dinner bowl, or nudges us winningly to remind us it is walk time, we will see ingratiolation or servility. However, if we don’t view dependency as intrinsically undignified, we will see the dog as a capable individual who knows what he wants and how to communicate in order to get it - as someone who has the potential for agency, preferences, and choice. When we view others as servile dependents, we don’t have to consider them as particular individuals, with unique perspectives, needs, desires, and abilities that can be nurtured. If we look beyond their dependency, however, we can learn how to understand and respond to their wishes, demands, and contributions. We can ask how best to restructure society to enable their potential functioning” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 84).

In this way, part of creating a just political praxis includes changing the normative approach to and discourse about dependency. I assert that \textit{Zoopolis’} presentation of a new body politic creates space for (some) animals to actively participate in that body politic. This new activity
occurs through altering the normative discourse on dependency. This altering is of the text’s most important points. In order to seek justice for domesticated animals, it is the responsibility of humans to “reconstruct our relationships on grounds of justice” not to work towards animal extinction (Donaldson and Kymlicka 86).

Donaldson and Kymlicka understand training differently than the right of socialization. Socialization, as they define it, happens through human or nonhuman creatures learning the “basic and general skills/knowledge” needed to be “accepted into social community” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 123). This includes “establishing control over bodily processes and impulses, learning basic communication, rules of social interaction, and respect for others” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 123). The authors contrast socialization to training. They suggest training “is about developing a particular individual’s capacities and interests. The authors note that some “jobs” nonhuman animals do not need much training to do and that they would find fully satisfying. Zoopolis hedges that regulated hours and working conditions would ensure that the working creatures have at least some autonomy by demonstrating a preference for the job. Consider the example of a dog from a herding breed who guards sheep out of a natural instinct. In an ideal situation for Donaldson and Kymlicka, this dog may also opt to participate in other activities (139-140). The authors are very clear that clear regulations, for working conditions and care, must be in place for nonhuman citizens to participate in these work activities.

Zoopolis evaluates training that they believe to be exploitative. First, the authors remind readers that “one of the worst forms of injustice is manipulating or brainwashing the oppressed” into believing that their state of oppression is natural. Donaldson and Kymlicka present a nuanced and important argument (Donaldson 140). One example illustrates a competitive agility
dog and a child learning to play the piano. They allow that some animals, like humans, will thrive on learning and activities. This creates a space of the flourishing canine agility competitor and child learning the piano. The authors accept some “stuck with it” pressure from either the canine’s guardian or the child’s parents to encourage and guide practice. The authors allow this influence because both the canine guardian and parent have interest of their charges at heart (Donaldson 140-141). This model demands that the motivating factor must be in the interest of the child or the dog. At first, Donaldson and Kymlicka model seems reasonable, practical, and just. However, I am concerned when this example equates a child and the “co-citizen” companion animal. In later chapters, I return to this problem of the comparing animals and human children.

Donaldson and Kymlicka proclaim that “much training of domesticated animals is exploitative” (141). Here they name therapy and assistance animals, horse riding, animals in entertainment, and “most other kinds of animal work” as animals jobs that are only created to serve human ends. They assert that these practices suppress animal agency (Donaldson 141). Donaldson and Kymlicka draw a line between the sheep dog who spends time in the pasture to “the seeing eye dog who undergoes months of intensive training in order to spend most of his life serving as a tool for others” (142). However, this line is difficult to trace. Donaldson and Kymlicka conclude that in “general times, that lines are crossed when we bring domesticated animals into the community and then fail to treat them as full citizens. The problem is not that we benefit from animals, but that we almost always do so at their expense” (Donaldson 142). My following chapters I consider the implications of nonhuman animals at work and working for humans.
**Sovereign Wild Animals.**

In addition to human relationships with domesticated animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka give considerable thought to human engagement with both wild and liminal animals. Wild animal are those individuals and communities who exist largely outside of the human sphere of influence. Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that it can be reasonably assumed that these creatures wish to continue doing so. Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest granting sovereignty to these animals over their communities, and respecting their communities in a similar manner to other human nation-states. Like human nation states these nonhuman nation states may respond to challenges as they see fit. This includes, but is not limited to, respecting the physical borders of their territories, avoiding direct and intentional violence, such as hunting or trapping, purposively avoiding habitat destruction, and avoiding “spillover harms” (Donaldson 156-157). Spillover harms include “the countless ways in which human infrastructure and activity impose risk on animals (from shipping lanes, skyscrapers, and roadways, to spillover effects like pollution and climate change,” (Donaldson 157). A just body politic including all creatures must prohibit these practices. Donaldson and Kymlicka heavily consider all animals and their “right to place” (“A Defense” 148). In an important step, they reject the notion that humans have the innate right to transverse and occupy the entirety of the globe. However, wild animals still posses universal rights. Therefore as humans offer humanitarian aid to other human nation-states, human nation states would be morally correct in offering limited intervention to the inhabitants of these sovereign entities.

**Liminal Animals as Deitizens.**
Donaldson and Kymlicka attend to the types of animals that are often left out of theories of animal rights. Liminal animals are creatures from a large variety of non-domesticated species who live, and thrive, near humans. These animals adapt, over time, to human communities as sources of food, shelter, or protection from predators (Donaldson 210). This type of animal, including rats, pigeons, raccoons, and many others, are often categorized as pests. Regularly, human inhabitants chase away liminal animals from human dwellings. This process often destroys or limits access to the dwelling places of these liminal animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka assert that the often popular ideology that these animals do not belong in contact with humans is deeply flawed. In addition to being an unrealistic goal of removing or exterminating all liminal creatures, this view of “no contact” necessarily sees liminal creatures as trespassers or foreigners. Donaldson and Kymlicka disagree and assert that a cohesive theory of animal rights requires guidelines for interaction because these animals dwell and thrive in urban places (Donaldson 212). Coexistence necessitates developing terms of rights and responsibilities for these animals (Donaldson 250). While appropriate to accept an attitude of “let them be” for wild animals, a just body politic must recognize liminal animals as a key component to areas of human settlement. Human communities and governments must allow for these creatures to take up residence amongst humans (Donaldson 213).

To create set of normative behaviors for sustaining relationships with liminal animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest naming these creatures as “denizens.” Denizenship would recognize their residency but restrict some of the rights and responsibilities carried by co-citizens. Donaldson and Kymlicka acknowledge the nature of denizenship as a slippery slope. They evidence that the practice of denizenship has yet to be effective in human communities.
Further, they illustrate the possibility that fairness may disappear quickly. However, they assert that if both rights and responsibilities are reduced in a reciprocal manner, “and done in order better to accommodate the distinctive interests of denizens themselves, then decitizenship can serve as a vehicle for just relationships” (Donaldson 214). The authors view this innovation of political relationships as theoretical work which may lead to just relationships in both human and multi-species communities.

In practice, Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that denizenship entitles liminal animals to a secure residence, fair terms of reciprocity and protection from being stigmatized by the public. Currently, liminal animals rarely access all of these protections. In a similar way, humans who hold residence, but not citizenship, within some nations also lack these protections. The current failure of denizenship suggests and extreme difficulty in eliminating stigmatize associations with liminal groups.

3.4 Reviews of Zoopolis as a Political Theory

To examine the possibilities for growth within Donaldson and Kymlicka’s theory, I explicate three peer-reviews of Zoopolis. All three reviews praise Zoopolis for its thoughtful approach and “fascinating” content, while pointing out specific details as well general conceptions that require further development (Cochrane 127). The first commentary considers the special positioning of companion cats, or domestic felines, within the authors’ suggested practice of co-citizenship. In this commentary, Clare Palmer raises the unique consideration with living with one of the most popular companion species and developing an appropriate political and praxis on routine sterilization and outdoor access. Next, I address two critiques published alongside a direct response from Donaldson and Kymlicka. Oscar Horta and Alasdair Cochrane
level reviews providing considerations for coexistence with nonhuman animals. Horta demonstrates that wild animals do not exist in a health body politic, and, instead, contends that they should be engaged as “irretrievable failed state” (127). Last, Cochrane objects to the model that determines differentiated treatment based on group membership. As each of these arguments are developed in the following pages, I indicate Donaldson and Kymlicka’s direct or implied response to each new claim.

Palmer.

Palmer asserts that a thriving human-animal praxis must include the specific needs of domesticated cats. As one of the most popular companion species, Zoopolis must consider the needs of cats. Palmer morally and ethically rejects Zoopolis’s argument for routine sterilization. For Palmer, the practice of spaying and neutering cats positions co-citizens in continuously paternalistic relationship. Yet Donaldson, Kymlicka, and Palmer agree that continuous and unregulated reproduction by cats places much too large a burden on humans. The practice is inconsistent with co-citizenship statues. Palmer argues that “better health” benefits do not out weigh the costs of routine sterilization for all house cats. Although in special cases this argument may be feasible (Palmer 763). Supporters of neutering and spaying practices convey that sterilized cats are nearly always better indoor companions. While Palmer agrees that sterilization helps the temperament of indoor cats, she attests that this practice requires unnecessary rights violations. She states this argument “relies on the claim that it’s permissible for me to violate your rights if that means I will, generally, treat you better than if I did not violate them” (763). Palmer demonstrates concern over confining cats to an indoors only existence. Currently, animal welfare and conservation organizations suggest this practice for two reasons. First, indoor cats
avoid perils such as “cars, dogs, other cats, and disease”). Second, limiting access to the outdoors protects the interest of others, including potential prey (Palmer 764). *Zoopolis* is very clear that allowing cats to be predatory is “not much better than killing the birds and mice ourselves” (150). Palmer asserts that grappling the with large paternalistic imposition of confining feline bodily movements leads to questions on what a “good life” may be for a domesticated cat (765). Ultimately, Palmer asserts that it is seemly “impossible” to include cats in *Zoopolis*’ current system of coexistence. And, for Palmer, political theory must include the praxis of living with companion cats.

**Horta.**

In the second review, Horta asserts that *Zoopolis* inaccurately presents the circumstances of wild animals. Instead of sovereign nation-states, Horta asserts that wild animal communities must be approached as continuously catastrophic failed states. Horta attests to the continuous threat of violence and death experienced by wild animals. Therefore, wild animals must be offered continuous aid and intervention to in a consistent praxis of coexistence. Horta asserts that within the praxis developed by *Zoopolis*, sovereignty occurs only instrumentally, not intrinsically (Horta 117). Horta sees the removal of sovereignty from domestic animals as sufficient evidence. *Zoopolis*’ claims that humans unnecessarily diminish the preference of wild animals to be left alone through continuous intervention and aid. In contrast, Horta asserts that currently most animals do not survive until adulthood. Horta shows that most species have adapted *r* reproductive practices, where many young are produced but given little or no parental care. In contrast, few species have adapted *K* reproductive practices that invest a great amount of parental support into very few offspring. Horta cites the overwhelming ratio of species that use *r*
reproductive practices as evidence that few animals flourish in comparison to the number born. As failed states, Horta asserts, these animals are unable to rule as sovereign directors and face insurmountable challenges without major intervention (120-121). Horta’s second claim is not contingent on the first. If animal communities could show that they do not exist in a failed state, for Horta, their communities, still, do not create sovereign communities. Horta contends that nonhuman animals are not political actors in a body politic. He maintains that while wild animals may exist in communities, these communities are not political, even if groups demonstrate family of kinship bonds (120-121).

Donaldson and Kymlicka rebut this critique through an important explanation of sovereignty. They assert

“Sovereignty is not a prize that is given to pre-existing communities who achieve some level of affiliation or cooperation or institutional coordination. It is not a reward for some sort of communal achievement. Rather, to repeat, sovereignty is a tool we use to protect fundamental interests against certain standard threats (“A Defense” 153). In this way even if animals exist in a catastrophic battle against the rage of wild nature, or exist in solidarity lives, humans still owe wild animals the recognition that sovereignty grants them (“A Defense” 153). Therefore, repeat and routine intervention, even for the assumed good of health care, is inconsistent, and, thus, not permissible. Donaldson and Kymlicka dismiss Horta’s assertion that a flourishing life must exist within a well ordered state.

Cochrane.

The third review concerns the model’s assumption of differentiating rights on the basis of group distinctions. Cochrane problematizes the nature of treating humans differently based on
characteristics. He asks does “a political theory which gives such important weight to the
relational and group-based distinctions of animals make sense?” (128). Cochrane takes specific
issue with recognizing both wild animals and foreigners as holders of political rights. In this
recognition, the state may enforce “correlative duties” (130). Cochrane argues to recognize
political agency in wild animals and that from the right of political agency, the rights of
residency and protection from predation quickly follow. In recognizing these rights (political
concern, political agency, residency and protection from predation) in domestic animals, based
on their membership in domesticated species, too much concern is given to these creatures over
other creatures. Like Horta, Cochrane also takes issue with the validity of Zoopolis’ conception
of communities of wild animals. Ultimately, Cochrane concludes that while group-membership
can be relevant to determining political rights, it is not of primary importance (129). Cochrane
offers a reframing of coexistence through an idea he terms cosmozopolis. Cosmozopolis stems
from the cosmopolitan traditions of political theory. Cosmozopolis designs a system of
coexistence primarily based on the capacities of individual creatures for determining rights and
responsibilities (129).

In a published response to Cochrane, Donaldson and Kymlicka validate the group-
differentiated approach because the theory determines the universal rights owed to members of
bounded communities (“A Defense” 144). Donaldson and Kymlicka assert this claim does not
accurately portray Zoopolis when focusing on the issues of territory and health care (145).
Donaldson and Kymlicka emphasize that although a cosmozopolis approach allows all creatures
more mobility, it fails to robustly protect the right to place for nonhuman creatures. Donaldson
and Kymlicka illustrate that human imperialism acts as a “vast steamroller” and requires
protecting nonhuman creatures’ investment in a specific habit (“A Defense” 149). Donaldson and Kymlicka contend that the argument for health care as a right owed to wild animals fails any legitimate test. Donaldson and Kymlicka further name Cochrane’s claim as speceist. They assert that more than health care interventions, wild animals acutely need sovereignty over their territory to create flourishing lives. Donaldson and Kymlicka emphasis that these differences in rights, particularly between domesticated and wild animals, does not “reflect a pernicious moral hierarchy” (“A Defense” 150).

**Additional Contributions.**

In many ways, *Zoopolis* grounds a new baseline for political theory. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s attention to liminal animals generates news ways of thinking and being with creatures regularly named as pests. From designing buildings that invite birds to nest on rooftops to reducing human expansion into wild territories, *Zoopolis* provides a starting point for thinking about political subjectivity and a daily praxis of living with many types of creatures. Donaldson and Kymlicka demonstrate that creaturely rhetorics must become a part of human political rhetoric in pursuit of justice. In this way, *Zoopolis* affirms a compelling case for owing rights to nonhuman creatures in all political systems. However, I contend that the issues of training relationships, transitioning out of factory farming, and considering insects need more development.

In later chapters, I explicate further considerations on training relationships. There I contrast other conceptions of training and nonhuman animal work with Donaldson and Kymlicka’s unique approach illustrated above. For the moment, I take issue with the Donaldson and Kymlicka’s difference between socialization and training. As I will explore in the next two
chapters, training is translation between species. The socialization practices listed by Donaldson
and Kymlicka are most often the basics of training programs. The lines between socialization,
training, and work rest on uncertain differences for Donaldson and Kymlicka.

*Zoopolis* grounds the theoretical in practical application in every chapter. As I illustrated
in the previous chapter, the problem of the meat-industrial complex, or factory farming, plagues
human and nonhuman animal interaction to a staggering degree. Donaldson and Kymlicka name
factory farming as “enslavement, abuse, exploitation, and murder” (76) and certainly extend the
rights of co-citizens to domesticated species, such as cows, pigs, chickens, and sheep. Further,
Donaldson and Kymlicka illustrate how our interconnected lives may look once we have
demolished factory farming. However, the text fails to present a tangible way to transition away
from this pernicious practice. Donaldson and Kymlicka never promise to offer such a path, but
the critical mass of suffering present within the meat-industrial complex, I assert, necessitates
more attention than brief mentions. The lack of struggling with this problem evidences a hole in
achieving a sustainable daily praxis of flourishing with all creatures. Theorizing paths away from
factory farms is absolutely needed in future research.

Last, I was hoping to see Donaldson and Kymlicka consider insects as they discussed
liminal animals. It is hard not to picture “pests” without picturing roaches, ants, and many other
“creepy crawly” bugs. Consider that that the biomass of insects greatly exceeds that of the rest of
the animal kingdom combined. The United States “is home to some 400 pounds of insect
biomass per acre, compared with our 14 pounds of flesh and bone” (Pedigo). The United States
does not top the list for highest biomass diversity and density. Ants alone make up about “one
third of the Earth’s insect bio” (Wilson). Donaldson and Kymlicka need to consider how insects
are viewed and how they pay participate in a creaturely body politic. The strength of Donaldson
and Kymlicka’s work lies in recognizing the impossibilities of independence from other species
and name this interconnectedness as a political concern. But, failing to consider the “biggest”
part of nonhuman creatures illustrates another task for future research.
CHAPTER 4: EMBODIED RELATIONSHIPS, PERFORMANCE, AND AGENCY IN EQUINE TRAINING

4.1 Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, I use two particular texts to illustrate a connection between political identity and horsemanship training. First, I interpret a widely distributed video of an international level dressage performance. Next, I analyze Podhajsky’s *The Complete Training of Horse and Rider in the Principles of Classical Horsemanship*. In this way, I begin with the end in mind. Before extracting possibilities of tension presented in Podhajsky’s text, I ground my analysis in one possible outcome of dressage training. Similar to Haraway’s narratives about agility competition, I use this performance to illustrate the complexities of human centered goals and the performative nature of species. Next, I use Podhajsky’s text to illustrate rich insights to the human horse relationship through a prescribed method of being with nonhuman animals. In doing so, I extract and question the power dynamics of riding. Ultimately, I reveal that riding based in honest training subverts the strict binary of human and animal.

Critical animal studies scholar Kari Weil argues that nonhuman animal training exceeds the lone purpose of re-inscribing human authority and exceptionalism. She speaks directly about three possibilities of horseback riding. First, riding facilitates a method for the horse and rider to literally and figuratively transform one another. Through a training program, the horse and rider literally change the shape of one another’s bodies through muscle and fitness development.
Second, riding and training give the human partner the tools to ask “who are you?” of their equine partner. In this way, training creates an avenue for horses and humans to know one another. Last, Weil contends that training may act as a mode of “translation” between species (Weil). Weil speaks to Haraway’s engagement with training, as well as Derrida, Patton, and Haas from my earlier chapters. Training as vehicle for cross-species relationships and as translation engages feminist and posthuman theories in my next chapter. Human-horse relationships within the context of dressage training particularly implicates and questions embodied relationships, performativity, and agency.

4.2 Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné

2006 World Equestrian Games Performance.

To create clarity for reading Podhajsky’s text it is necessary to tease out the questions of embodied relationships, performativity, and agency. To do so, I explicate the story of one particular dressage performance to ground this theory in a real lived experience and its narrative. At the 2006 World Equestrian Games, Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné transformed the dressage arena into a pop concert. Under bright stadium lights, Helgstrand and Matiné performed their technically advanced musical freestyle\(^4\) to a quickly enthralled crowd. The Danish Olympian and nine-year-old mare danced to music specially designed to highlight Matiné’s energetic piaffe and passage\(^5\). The sold out crowd quickly began to clap along to an instrumental montage of “Lady Marmalade” and other popular rock anthems. As the crowd joins the performance, Matiné appears to further engage in the show. Most noticeably, the mare swishes her tail, relaxingly flops her ears, and demonstrates calmness during a short walking break between difficult movements. At the end of the ride, Helgstrand quickly removes his hat,
salutes the judges, and punches his hand triumphantly into the air before falling forward to hug Matiné’s neck with both arms. This performance illustrates what must be the human and equine equivalent to Haraway’s experience of a “good run” on the canine agility field.

This particular performance takes center stage in this project for two reasons. First, the YouTube video of the performance experienced unprecedented popularity. Through viral internet dissemination, the public viewed the footage of this performance over twelve million times. This rate of observation for an otherwise obscure non-Olympic performance demonstrates the performance’s ability to attract spectators. Second, the narrative of Matiné’s life following this pinnacle performance illustrates what Donna Haraway terms the “sticky dynamic openings and closures in finite, moral, world-making, ontological play” (87). Living creatures, then, transcend their existences to engage one another in many ways. Creatures both play off, or build from, one another as well as play with, or engage with, one another. This play, in both senses, creates our world in a non-linear and far from clean method, navigating ontological play between species requires a free form and messy creativity. Serious intellectual investigation on all types of human-nonhuman relationships requires considering this play at work. For example, the joy observed by Haraway and others in her canine partner, Cayenne, grounds her investigation and illustrates the goodness in agility training and living with dogs. In this chapter, I seek to show that the power of a “good run” is not exclusive to canine-human relationships. This horse named for her lineage (Blue Hors) and an afternoon theatre performance (Matiné) illustrates the messy, complex, and nuanced ways human-equine relationships navigate training and communicating with one another.
First introduced as a method of teaching riders rhythm and tempo, horseback riding to music dates to the 1500s in Italy. However, the modern musical freestyle is a new addition to international competition. The Atlanta 1996 Olympic games awarded the first olympic medals for these highly technical, athletic, and artistic performances. Largely included in international competition to enhance the spectator experience and attract fans, musical freestyle final nights are regularly the only evenings to sell out at dressage competitions. The World Equestrian Games mark the highest level of international dressage competition during non-olympic years (Slade and Netzler).

Most dressage commentators talk television audiences through continuous analysis of each performance. This analysis verbally interprets the movements and mistakes of each competing horse and rider. During Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné’s 2006 WEG ride no such commentary was needed. While understand the nuanced rules of scoring an international dressage event, the commentators could have offered a detailed analysis, explaining the performance’s technically advanced aspects. However, both commentators allow the television audience to visually interpret the ride’s quality. To begin the test, the commentators do verbalize some technical elements of the test. For the television audience, they narrate the pair’s “double pirouettes and one tempis” and “positioning and the bend in that half pass” (video). In the movement called “one tempis” the horse changes her leading leg at the canter every stride. In this way, the horse looks like she is skipping. About Matiné’s one tempis the commentators exclaim, “Jeesh, look at how strait they are! You can almost just see the two front legs and thats it” (video). Besides the straightness, which signals correct execution of the movement, viewers also see very little movement from Helgstrand. Even with Helgstrand and Matiné moving
directly to the camera, Helgstrand’s cues to Matiné are nearly indiscernible. He holds hands and legs still, denoting that he calmly gives Matiné directions through shifting his weight in the saddle and light leg pressure to her sides. Just before the rhetorical turn, the commentator states “surely there are some tens coming out for that [slight laugh] passage” (video). The commentator’s slight laugh during this remark emphasizes the quality of Matiné’s movement and the enjoyment experienced by observers.

The rhetorical turn happens as Helgstrand and Matiné perform the passage. The first commentator declares “The mare is just absolutely dancing! Fantastic! Now, this has just shot the competition into another gear!” (video). Here, the tone of the commentary changes, largely evidenced through the reduced amount of technical analysis. In this way, the interpretation of the horse and rider’s conversation no longer requires specific details. The commentators abandon technical language to enjoy the performance. Halfway through the test, the first commentator declares “Well, its not often that I’m lost for words, but its one of those moments now. I think this is absolutely sensational!” Immediately, a second commentator follows stating “You just sit back and enjoy it!” (video). In the next chapter I will illustrate how posthuman studies scholar Donna Haraway emphasizes the joy of her canine partner observed by onlookers. The commentators do the same here for Matiné. I suggest that the excellence of this performance illustrates that something more than human domination over the horse exists.

The commentators reveal the idea of “something more,” perhaps Matiné’s agency, through descriptions of her movements. First, they call attention to Matiné’s piaffe and passage movements. They declare “just look at the height and the freedom in front but still with plenty of spring in the hind legs” (video). The commentators use of “freedom” indicates a lack of
restriction and constraint placed on Matiné by Helgstrand during these athletically, technically, and artistically difficult movements. Shortly thereafter, during the team’s half-pass across the diagonal, the commentators state “Now, that a lovely bend to the right. And, look at the flow there! Wow.” Like “freedom” in the previous example, here “flow” suggests that coercion alone could not create the stylized nature of Matiné’s movements. Later the commentators give a simple “ah!” to another set of canter pirouettes.

When praising performance, the commentators give all positive credit to Matiné while they hold Helgstrand responsible for any errors. The first mistake is brought to the audience’s attention, happening about four and a half minutes into the six minute long performance. The commentators highlight an incorrect start to the team’s one tempi changes or “one times.” This is the same skipping movement, which Matiné performed so well at the test’s beginning. The commentator states “Whoops! A little mistake, the only mistake so far, starting the one times off so far. He may even have a chance to repeat those.” Using the pronoun “he” indicates that Helgstrand was the team member who committed the error. Quickly, the commentator returns the praising Matiné’s ability, perhaps in spite of Helgstrand’s mistake. He asserts, “Quite frankly, if he doesn’t, who cares! It’s just been an absolute privilege to watch this horse!” This sentence directly illustrates the shift in responsibility for the fault. After acknowledging the crowd clapping along with music, he states “Well, Like me, I don’t think they’ve seen anything like it. It is absolutely unbelievable. And, only nine years old.” Here, nine year’s old refers to Matiné’s relatively young age for a such a successful international competition horse. Again, this rhetoric highlights her success.
The commentators create a narrative that illustrates Matiné as not only exceptional at this sport but also as a willing team member. They state “And we saw it in the Gran Prix Special but this horse just gives everything and just seems to love every minute of it.” It is important that “seems” is used in this description. This word implies that although humans cannot know, for certain, if some horses enjoy dressage or some dogs enjoy agility. However, the evidence of their excellence and joy suggests that nonhuman animals can willingly participate in training activities. This does not end my analysis of Helgstrand and Matiné. Beyond the short performance, I assert, it is reasonable to look at the narrative surrounding the rest of the mare’s life and partnership with Helgstrand.

**Matiné’s Narrative Following the WEG.**

When speaking about the competition, Helgstrand emphasizes the performance aspect of the musical freestyle ride. Helgstrand and his team heavily considered the spectator experience when preparing the performance, similar to a gymnastics floor routine designed to enthrall the crowd. After the performance Helgstrand addresses why he chose rock music from the 1980s and 1990s. Speaking about the spectators, he stated “It had to be something that would pick them up— they should think it was fresh and not too slow.” In this way Helgstrand names part of the music’s goal as engaging the spectators and disrupting the narrative of dressage riding as old and slow. “People were really happy, and they started to clap at the end of the freestyle and stand up,” said Helgstrand demonstrating that he felt the crowd respond positively to his choice. He emphasized this positive response as he states “So we knew it must be something good” (Lieser and Sorge). Helgstrand takes on the plural “we.” During the performance, the camera pans to Helgstrand Danish teammates and a commenter states “team supporters with a
smile on their face, they know they are delivering” (video). In using “we” and “they” two interesting rhetorical moves happen here. First, Helgstrand’s “we” illustrates the nature of dressage as a team sport. The visual presentation of Helgstrand’s teammates and trainers emphasizes dressage as a team sport beyond the horse and rider. The commentators second use of “they,” in “they know they are delivering,” speaks to both Helgstrand and Matiné actively presenting an outstanding performance. In this way, the commentators rhetorically acknowledge Matiné’s agency through her participation in the team.

The performance's video clip only gives the viewer access to six minutes of this horse and rider’s relationship. *The Chronicle of the Horse*, the longest continuous running equine sport centered publication, gives additional minimal, but important, insight to Matiné’s life following the performance. Here, I contend, the relationship becomes messier. At the 2007 World Cup Finals in Las Vegas, Matiné injured herself stepping off a trailer. Initially reported as a minor injury, Helgstrand stated “The veterinarian said that she might recover by tomorrow and be able to compete, but we didn’t want to take any chances.” Further, he shares “It is very sad because I thought we had a chance to do well, but this can be my top horse for a long time and I am not prepared to take any risks with her” (Sorge and Lieser, “Blue Hors Matine Withdrawn”). Initially withdrawn from the competition as a conservative precaution, Matiné never fully recovered. In 2009, she officially retired from international competition to become a broodmare.¹⁸ Broodmare is the industry's term for female horses used in breeding. *The Chronicle* reports that “Owner Blue Hors Stud made every effort to restore the 12-year-old gray mare back to her winning form, but eventually they made the decision to breed her.” The article covering her retirement noted the “mare’s lofty piaffe and passage, expressive gaits and signature flying tail,” directly recalling
Matiné’s 2006 performance (“Blue Hors Matine Retires To Broodmare Status”). To announce her retirement “to stud,” the director of Blue Hors Stud, Esben Møller, said “Last time we treated her in the spring and we decided that if it wouldn't work now, that would be it. It's not a respectable horse's life” (“Struggle for Fitness is Over, Blue Hors Matiné to Become Brood Mare”). The barn director went on to state, "Enough is enough. We've had fantastic results with her and now she can be a horse in the herd...It was quite exciting to see Matiné's first time in the herd, but it looks like this temperamental mare has really settled in quickly in her new surroundings" (“Struggle for Fitness is Over, Blue Hors Matiné to Become Brood Mare”).

The following January, while in a field with an equine companion, Matiné broke her right forelimb at the knee. Subsequently, she was euthanized. While not completely unheard of in horse communities, this type of accident is largely considered unpreventable. The details of her accident are unclear and it is most likely that her fall was not seen by human caretakers. She could have been cantering freely with her pasture buddy, Blue Hors Cavan, or simply stumbled while walking. While the Chronicle’s narrative does not offer these suggestions, the periodical does employ the term “pasture buddy” to give a sense that Matiné would have enjoyed this at liberty pasture time (Beatty). The article announcing Matiné’s accident and death includes a picture of her 2006 performance with the caption “Blue Hors Matiné and Andreas Helgstrand captivated the audience with their joyful performance at the 2006 World Equestrian Games” (Beatty). Here, again, joy comes forward as an important descriptor of the moments of performance between Matiné and Helgstrand.

Many months prior to the 2006 World Equestrian Games, Helgstrand was scheduled to ride another steed, Blue Hors Don Schufro, at this competition. Many months before the start of
the 2006 World Equestrian Games, Helgstrand “substituted” Matiné’s after Don Schufro suffered an injury, leaving him unfit for the performance (Sorge and Lieser “Fantastic Freestyles”). This practice is not unique to Helgstrand as most international riders train with more than one horse and substitute when the need arises. The messiness reveals the horse-human relationship here. Within the context of riding, showing, and traveling with her human partners, Matiné was not ill treated. Her initial injury did not occur under great duress. She simply tripped. Following this, I believe, Helgstrand both responded to and was responsible for Matiné. If Matiné was only a replaceable commodity there would be no reason to respond by removing her from the competition, attempting to aid in her recovery, or arranging for her “retirement.”

While the argument could be made that the potential earnings from Matiné’s offspring would outweigh the cost of her retirement, it is hard to believe that Møller, Helgstrand, and others working with Matiné are insincere in their hope to facilitate a comfortable existence for their equine charges. The implications of Matiné as a broodmare cannot be overlooked, but there must be some sort of reciprocity here. Both humans and horses are responding to individual others through a system of training.

4.3 Contextualizing Scholarship

In light of the tension between training as cross-species communication and training’s human centered goals, it is worthwhile to investigate previous scholarship on similar topics. Rhetoric scholar Mary Trachsel investigates the process of cross-species communication and social action without words. She contends that language without words may “negotiate interspecies relationships of mutual intentionality” (Trachsel 51). She engages the philosophy of animal “whispers” or individuals who train and work with animals in “methods that subscribe to
the virtues of intimacy, respect, soft-spokenness, and nonviolence” (Trachsel 34). Through these methods humans

“expand our conceptual understanding of voice beyond human speech, and language beyond words, as whispers urge us to do, then these cognitive behaviors emerge as the opening speech acts of interspecies dialogues, plotting a rhetorical route of escape from the prison house of words and into the company of nonhuman animals” (52).

Trachsel presents an important point about “the inevitable dynamics of dominance and submission” between humans and nonhumans. Trachsel suggests that “unequal power relationships are not necessarily morally objectionable” (47). Instead, these relationships can be ethically approached through “alternative channels of ethic and care” (47).

In this way, Trachsel joins Haraway in seeking ways to approach and partner with nonhuman animals for a better life for all kinds of creatures. Expanding Burke’s understanding of language, as only accessible to humans, repositions communication in Emmanual Levians’ theory of conscience. Levians redirects attention from the audible words and voice to the ability of the human face to silently convey meaning (Levians 62). Likewise, Trachsel also advances past the detached rhetoric of animal ethics and rights movements, to promote an ethic of care that coexists with the history and techniques of rustic whispers. Trachsel, like Haraway, seeks to find avenues to live with and to become with nonhuman animals.

Like Donaldson and Kymlica in Zoopolis and Haraway, Trachsel struggles to understand relationships between humans and nonhumans in terms of dominance and submission. This ongoing struggle highlights the tradition of the human and animal binary and plagues many key ideas within my project. Her discussion of the power differential is reasonable and defensible
She asserts that through nonviolent training methods whisperers navigate these rocky waters. She denotes several techniques of “gentle persuasion” used in nonviolent training methods. For example, Monty Roberts, of *The Man Who Listened To Horses*, presents that “a rider or training should never say to a horse, ‘You must.’ Instead the horse should be invited to perform because, ‘I would like you to.’” (Roberts 77). In this way, whisperers use communication and relationships to invite, suggest, and request behaviors and actions from their nonhuman animal partners. Notice that within the context of his nonviolent training and relationship building, Roberts uses “perform” to name behaviors done without coercion.

Lynda Birke gives additional insight to the outcomes and possibilities surrounding horse whisperers. Birke focuses on natural horsemanship as a new narrative that challenges the histories of keeping and training horses. Birke synthesizes that natural horsemanship advocates for training centered on individual human-horse relationships rooted in trust. Birke conveys that horse training history, reaching to the ancient Greek trainer Xenophon, “retained that traditional belief that the relationship and the skills of riding must be firmly based on something called “horsemanship”—an ability to understand what the horse is thinking and feeling and to act accordingly, with sensitivity” (“Learning to Speak Horse” 219). However, since the 1970s using the trope of the western cowboy, natural horsemanship style trainers have rhetorically separated their methods from traditional viewpoints. In doing so, natural horsemanship trainers and followers have created a multi-million dollar market for training seminars and instruction, including branching into corporate management training (220, 234).

Birke illustrates that the natural horsemanship industry widely varies in their commitment nonviolence, similar to traditional methods. She illustrates individual experiences with amateur
horse owners who both embraced natural horsemanship methods of nonviolence as well as others who experienced natural horsemanship trainers using force (224-225). While these experiences differed, she does present a common theme centered on romanticizing the human-horse relationship. She states, “What there is in the NH interviews, however, is a yearning, a longing for a romanticized ideal of horse/human union and partnership, a longing that seems to drop out of many technical books and courses in the conventional horse-world” (233). Birke also finds similarities in the trope of human and horse partnership in both natural horsemanship and tradition riding. Birke cites Podhajsky to illustrate the long standing connection between traditional riding and partnership. In conclusion, Birke asserts “horse whispering did not begin with particular novels or films any more than did the art of horseman/womanship” (236). In horse training there continues to be a trope of breaking away from past cruel methods to use new methods seeking to engage the horse without coercion (Birke 236). This trope reappears in Podhajsky’s text.

Birke joins Joannah Hickhull and Emma Creighton to assert that human interaction with horses has drastically shifted over time. These relationships evolved from a labor oriented relationship to a relationship focused on “leisure” activities or companionship. Using free response comments from a self reported survey on the practices of horse management given to horse owners across the UK, the authors “explore how owners think about their horses and how to provide care for them within their local context” and “how these owners talk about their horses’ well-being” (333). This qualitative analysis of the written narratives found six categories of narratives present in these responses: “comments on the questionnaire itself; personal details; practicalities; explanations of the animal’s behavior; horses’ needs, and ‘telling the horse’s
tail” (334). Across these categories the authors emphasized the social and public nature of horse keeping, particularly in the human social relations and associated pressures to conform to a particular type or standard of horse keeping at the livery yard or boarding stable. The strongest theme was “telling the horse’s tale” which included minimizing behavior problems or recounting an individual horse’s story of rescue from abuse or abandonment. The authors also assert that “through the stories horse owners tell is also importantly a moral discourse.” For these owners, it appears that behavior problems or mistreatment reflects negativity on the moral character of the horse owner (343).

As a sociologist, Keri Brandt provides an important connection between women and horses. In her 2005 dissertation, as well as later published work co-authored by Lynda Birke, she explores the gendered connection between human women and horses. Birke and Brandt illustrate that while women have been prominent in media and myth portrayals of horses, it is always the man who dominates the horse. Most often woman’s affection or affinity for the horse is, instead, portrayed as misplaced desire for a man or child (Birke and Brandt 190). Societies regularly associate this story of domination “to the high levels of skills required to know and manage horses,” again connecting knowledge to men rather than women (or both genders) (191). Birke and Brandt show that for women and girls, who engage in the modern sport or hobby of riding use the physical place of the barn as a space to challenge normative rules of femininity.

Consider the following passage for the article’s conclusion:

People and horses create a kind of intimacy when connected through embodiment, an intimacy which is both enacted through, and brings about change in, the body. That
intersubjectivity may be narrated or practiced differently by participants in different communities, but all seek that elusive oneness with the horse. (Birke and Brandt 196).

This research support the artistic rendering of the young girl gaining agency from Haas’ poem in my first chapter. This consideration of connection through an embodied means of communications is further considered by Una Chaudhuri, a performance artist.

Chaudhuri demonstrates that interactions with and around animals come into question in many different, but connected, fields of study. Similar to my use of Haas’ poetry in the first chapter, I consider this connection salient in light of the emphasis of performance in dressage. She states, “If language is indeed a barrier, then the quest for a deeper, richer mode of understanding the animality we share with nonhumans might logically lead one to the embodied arts of performance” (520). Helgstrand and Matiné and the sports commentators illustrated the impact of this aspect of performance within the sport of dressage. Below, I indicate how Phodasjki refers to the relationship between the horse and rider as artistic. Chaudhuri offers an important point; “Determinedly material and immanent, performance animalizes philosophy” (522). In this way, performance, or intentional use of the body, gives life, shape, and an organic material reality to theoretical adventures. I assert the same goes for training, particularly dressage training that prepares both rider and show to participate in show, be it a regulated competition or, simply, an unwatched ride.

This understanding places the woman’s body as intelligent in response, action and communication (Brant 69). This displaces the traditional Cartesian connection over mind over the body into a framework that melds the mind as body and, additionally, creates a site where the dualism between man and woman can be evaluated (Brandt 71). I assert that these moments
merit further attention. In these moments, our bodies become the site of discourse and discourse itself. Rose Braidotti shows that these discourses, scripts, and understandings of the body become “forms of knowledge, modes of normativity and normalization that invest the political and scientific fields simultaneously” (45). For Braidotti the body, as the center of the living organism, becomes not only the site of these discourses but becomes the discourse itself and is, therefore, “co-extensive with the dislocation of the classical basis of representation of the human subject” (Braidotti 45). I assert that use of bodies within horseback riding and training create the sustainable possibilities of shifting and developing subversive representation of the personal identity and, therefore, the human subject. Considered in this way, riding becomes a form of protest.

4.4 Podhajsky and the Spanish Riding School

This project now turns to a discourse that instructs human behavior around non-human animals. Podhajsky illustrates that “the horse teaches us the self-control, consistency, and the ability to understand what goes on in the mind and feelings of another creature, qualities that are important throughout our lives” (20). Thus, I assert that evaluating the mechanisms, realities, and implications of the ways humans “should” interact with non-human animals gives insight, to the rhetor, rider, and larger nature of identities. I use Podhajsky’s The Complete Training of Horse and Rider In the Principles of Classical Horsemanship to show the ontological play at work in these relationships. In the next chapter, I assert that Podhajsky’s system of training can be read in a Foucaultian worldview through it’s application of knowledge and power.

As this research question developed it became particularly suited to take methodological direction from grounded theory studies. I enacted a two step coding process based “on
immersion in the data and repeated sorting, codings, and comparisons that characterize the grounded theory approach” (Creswell 289). After reading Podhajsky’s text, I reviewed key passages and developed a list of themes through an open coding process, allowing Podhajsky’s language to guide my organization and list. In my next coding process, I utilized axial coding, or the process of putting data “back together in new ways” through creating new connections and categories within categories according to Strauss and Corbin. During this process, I simplified and grouped several of my original coded themes. Last, I applied selective coding to the manual, focusing on my previously highlighted passages. In my axial coding step, I allowed myself to interpret and organize themes considering my previous interaction with Helgstrand and Matiné’s performance. To contextualize the presentation of my thematic results, I have, first, included some historical information below.

At great personal risk, Podhajsky evacuated the Spanish Riding School stallions and mares from their breeding facility to St. Martins in Upper Austria during World War II. During their evacuation, the Lipizzaners had to be protected not only from the immediate threat of the war but also from starving people who viewed the animals as meat (Walker, 2010). In 1945, the stallions came under the protection of the United States Army following a performance given by Podhajsky, his students, and remaining stallions for US Army General George Patton. Both Patton and Podhajsky competed together in the 1912 Olympics, the first Olympic Games to include equestrian events. Following Patton’s orders, United States Army protected the stallions and mares and rescued additional stallions, which had been captured by German forces, from behind enemy lines (Walker).
In 1963, the Walt Disney company turned this compelling narrative into a live action movie entitled “The Miracle of the White Stallions.” The Disney film emphasizes the personal risk undertaken by Podhajsky and his students to save not only the white stallions but the system of training preserved by the Spanish Riding School (Hiller). In 2005, the School traveled to the United States to perform and celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the safe return of the stallions to Vienna in 1955 (Walker). The narrative of the great lengths that Podhajsky undertook to save the horses of Spanish Riding School during World War II supports an important connection between being a good rider and performing well in other aspects of life.

Podhajsky begins his detailed instructional text with a historical review that establishes his opposition to other normative training systems. While nostalgic towards the 2400 year old Xenophon, the horse trainer of Ancient Greek, Podhajsky positions his system of training as different from systems developed in the Middle Ages. He laments of Xenophon’s training: “His training was based on intuition and kind treatment, a policy that, unfortunately, was not always followed by riding masters in the later years” (Podhajsky 17). He directs the reader to examples of Grisone, from the sixteenth century, who, despite study of Xenophon’s text, believed in controlling the horse by force as evidenced “by the numerous severe bits he used” (Podhajsky 18). Podhajsky also condemns the Duke of Newcastle, who largely “failed to create a durable basis for the art of riding in England,” because of his cruel methods (Podhajsky 18). From the very first pages of the text, Podhajsky positions his process of working with horses as different from the normative, often brutal, standard. This trope of breaking from past tradition by presenting new training methods continues today. Birke’s text on natural horsemanship
demonstrates that narrating a rebellion from past methods still appears in contemporary training literature.

During my first reading and analysis of this text, I cultivated eleven themes from the text. These themes include: beauty of the performance or horse, presence of relaxation or balance, willingness on the part of the horse, goals of training, human-horse relationship or interaction in terms of kindness, human-horse relationship or interaction in terms of control or domination, riding affecting interaction with other humans, communication between horse and rider, commentary on previous methods, using or preserving traditional approaches, and the thinking rider. This list begins to illustrate the detail and depth of Podhajsky’s text in connection to political identity.

To present an analysis within the scope of this project, I considered how these eleven themes may connect to the topics of embodied relationships between the horse and rider, performativity, and agency. I contend that an understanding of embodied relationships between the horse and rider develops from Podhajsky’s statements and instructions on both human kindness and control of the equine partner and the necessary presence of relaxation and balance in riding and training. Next, I illustrate that Podhajsky speaks to the performatative nature of the human-horse relationship through statements and instructions on the goals of training and the beauty of the horse or horse and rider pair. Last, I demonstrate that Podhajsky considers the agency of the horse through statements and instructions on communication between the horse and rider and his assessments of the horse’s willingness to participate. In each of these three themes, I hope to show the unclear boundaries of the horse and human training relationship. It is not my objective to clearly assert that all training relationships for horses and riders are alike.
Instead, as Podhajsky helps me demonstrate, each individual relationship is, and should be, unique. I contend that Podhajsky’s system of training allows for spaces of protest and dissension.

*Embodied Relationships.*

Podhajsky rhetorically establishes the relationship between horse and rider in a language of domination. However, Podhajsky creates tension within his own work by also asserting the importance of kindness towards the horse and the rider’s duty to ensure physical and mental balance for the team. In this way, Podhajsky illustrates a complex relationship between horse and rider. To tease out this relationship, I begin with language of control and domination in Podhajsky. I view this aspect of equine-human relationships, similar to human-canine relationships, to be the most difficult to process intellectually and emotionally.

Podhajsky appears very selective in how he instructs riders to control their horses. In part, he demonstrates understanding some of the equine-human relationship in terms of opposition. For example, he states, “The rider must always show himself superior to the horse in mental and physical self-control. Submission to his will should not be sought by force but by his superior intelligence” (68). Using the language of ‘superior,’ ‘submission,’ and ‘force’ clearly establishes this relationship within a web of power relations. Additionally, Podhajsky is direct and clear about how, when, and why a rider or instructor should deliver a punishment to the horse. In his short initial discussion of punishments, he asserts that punishments must only be delivered “justly” and in “appropriate” doses.

Specifically, Podhajsky gives the “thinking rider” three questions to consider before administering any punishment. He instructs “[1] Is punishment necessary? If there is any doubt
it is better to postpone it then to be unjust. [2] What kind of punishment is appropriate and to what degree it should be applied? [3] When should punishment be applied?” (Podhajsky 64). In further explanation Podhajsky makes an analogy between horses and children. He states “with children and horses the punishment must immediately follow the disobedience or its effect will be lost” because “unless the punishment is immediate the horse will not realize what it is for” (Podhajsky 65). This quotation starts an important additional thematic layer in Podhajsky’s text. He oscillates between using rhetoric that presents the horse as childlike and rhetoric that presents the horse as a intelligent individual.

In Podhajsky’s most extreme case, he asserts that if the rider absolutely, as “a last resort,” sees it necessary to administer punishment by use of the long whip, a tool normally using as a only driving aid, he must do so with unquestioned authority over of the horse. Podhajsky states, “Its use [of the long whip] is the declaration of war, and the trainer should begin this fight only if he is sure of victory. Once he has started the fight he must carry it through to a successful end” (67). Again, using language of “war,” “fight,” and “victory” places this described relationship as clearly in the middle of a web of power relations. However, Podhajsky does not wish the horse to be afraid of the whip. If the horse becomes afraid, the tool will lose its effectiveness as a riding aid. Instead, the whip “should give the horse energy and make him move briskly, but never make him jump away and in fear” (59). No part of this interaction can be swept aside in any serious analysis of riding and equine training. However, this rhetoric of dominance alone does not share the complete picture of the complex relationship that Podhajsky hopes for between rider and equine partners.
Podhajsky further emphasizes the rhetorical connection between justice and use of punishments. He explains, “No punishment is better than a punishment that is unjust or not understood” (65). Illustrating how a rider may engage in an unjust punishment suggests that there is a just way to punish, for Podhajsky. In conjunction with Podhajsky’s possibilities of justice within a training relationship, consider the importance of the following statement. Podhajsky asserts “From the manner in which rewards and punishments are administered, interesting conclusions can be drawn to the character and minds of the rider” (69). While Podhajsky does not use the term identity, “character and minds” must be closely related to the human conception of the self.

Podhajsky demonstrates that within his presentation of a just equine-human relationship, the horse should be treated so that he or she has no cause to realize their own incredible strength compared to the rider. He states “The horse must never be allowed to become conscious of his power and the possibility of defense, so every effort must be made to prevent him from throwing his rider” (84). He also states, “At this stage every effort should be made to avoid a fight as it is so important that the horse should not realize his power and be encouraged to dispute the will of the rider” (73). Additionally, “Throughout the entire training the rider must develop his horses mental and physical proficiency so that he will not only obey but also wants to obey to the limit of his powers” (71). All three of these examples illustrate the importance of refraining from putting the horse in a situation where he would want or need to rebel.

Through the entire text, Podhajsky gives instructions of moments, techniques, and riding positions that the rider should avoid to upset his horse. For example, the rider must be mindful of how he or she mounts and his or her leg position (59). In describing specific movements or skills
for either the horse or rider, Podhajsky also emphasizes that a horse should never be punished for misunderstanding or not executing a new skill (273). In a similar manner, Podhajsky instructs that the rider must not mistake “gaiety” or “fear” for disobedience (78). In each case, Podhajsky instructs the rider to facilitate the horse’s comfort. When any horse, particularly young horses, demonstrate gaiety through “playful bucking,” the rider must not punish the horse on any account (74). In the case of fear, resulting in shying, the rider must calmly and with a relaxed body and riding position encourage the horse to approach the frightening object while speaking to the horse in a soothing tone (73). In another example, he later asserts, “Much use should be made of the voice in order to calm the young horse and gain his confidence” (78). In this way, Podhajsky emphasizes the importance of using both touch and voice to communicate with the equine partner.

Podhajsky also emphasizes that the rider must have control of him or herself prior to attempting to work with the horse. He states, “Absolute self-control is the basic requirement for every rider. He must not only be able to control his body but also his temperament. Only then will you be able to make other creature submit to his will and develop his natural abilities” (211). In this way, Podhajsky connects the rider’s self control and developing the natural abilities of the horse. This connection between control and developing abilities within a relationship uses similar rhetoric as Mill’s meditation on equitable marriage illustrated in my third chapter. To illustrate the importance of the rider’s self control, Podhajsky concludes his chapter “On the Training of the Rider” with the following: “there is one principle that should never be abandoned, namely, that the rider must learn to control himself before he can control his horse” (236).
Podhajsky instructs riders to demonstrate this important characteristic of self-control through kind, fair, and individual treatment of each equine partner. Throughout the whole text, Podhajsky repeatedly highlights the importance of patience for the rider. He instructs that the horse may never be rushed. For example, “When training his horse, the rider must repeat over and over again: ‘I have time.’ It takes time – a great deal of it – for a horse to develop and understand what is required of him” (119). During this time, the rider must allow horse’s physical and mental development to guide the pair’s advancement in the training program. For example, Podhajsky asserts that “after one year of training the young stallions will be ready for the second stage, but every horse must be be considered individually” (97). In nearly every specific instruction for each new skill set, Podhajsky emphasizes that if mistakes regularly appear, the rider should take several steps back in the training program and continue to develop the previous skills. To assess these needs, Podhajsky demonstrates that the rider needs “practical ability with theoretical knowledge” (23). For example, Podhajsky insists that in determining the time a young horse should stay in the early stages of training should be based on the individual temperament, ability, and conformation of each horse.

Likewise, Podhajsky’s method of training insists that developing correct “carriage” or how a horse holds his head while under saddle, must be specific to each horses body and mind. Carriage takes an important place in Podhajsky’s text. Over several chapters, Podhajsky insists that carriage must be developed slowly through developing the fitness of the entire horse. Using the reins in a “seesaw action” to lower the horses head is “one of the greatest mistakes” that a ride can make (101). Instead "these horses must be given plenty of time to become accustomed to carrying the weight with a lowered head and arched back. On no account must attempt be
made to lower the head by pulling at the reins, or by any other incorrect method” (42).

Podhajsky tells his readers that the seriousness of his approach to carriage comes from his observance of other systems of training that permit such methods (52).

A lack of pulling on the horse and developing mental and physical strength should result in a relaxed horse and rider team. Podhajsky repeatedly emphasizes the importance of relaxation and balance. For Podhajsky, “It is the complete relaxation of both horse and rider that develops riding into an art” (226). This balance and relaxation must be present in both the horse and rider. The rider must sit upright and tall when mounted but she must not be “stiff” (213). A correct position allows for the rider not to disturb the balance of horse (274). The rider facilitates relaxation and balance in the horse through fair and just treatment, as described above. Podhajsky gives many examples where relaxation is paramount to the success of the horse and rider. In a general statement about riding, he asserts “Besides physical balance, mental balance is necessary in order to allow the horse to work consistently and quietly” (41). Later, he describes the correct execution of a transition between paces, from the trot to a canter. In this description, he insists, “This will be possible only when the horse is sufficiently relaxed and in physical and mental balance” (115). He further highlights the importance of relaxation when he states, “Not just in the canter but throughout all stages of training, it is of the utmost important that the horse be completely relaxed before commencement of any exercise” (115).

The rhetorical presence of embodied relationships through themes of control, kind or fair treatment, and the importance of relaxation and balance within Podhajsky’s text highlight several important items. These three themes contextualize the modes by which humans and horses, particularly in dressage training, come together and interact. My analysis demonstrates that even
within one training text tension surrounds human-horse relationships mediated by power. Next, I look at performance in Podhajsky’s text and illustrate the rhetorical emphasis placed on the beauty of the horse and team as well as the goals of training.

Performance.

I find that Podhajsky negotiates the performance of dressage through rhetorical emphasis on beauty and the goals of training. Podhajsky emphasizes beauty in the horse’s body and movements as well as the aesthetic appearance of the rider and horse together. Beauty is used to evidence correct training, harmony, and enjoyment of both horse and rider. The goals of training articulated by Podhajsky, further, illustrate the tension in power dynamics between horse and rider. These articulations give additional insight to how training may be navigated. Specifically, the rider must treat “the horse as an individual” so that “he will get the best out of him without destroying his character” (72). Through guidelines for interspecies communication, Podhajsky’s attention to creating individualized approaches shows riders the instability of human and horse relationships.

Podhajsky connects the importance of relaxation and balance with a beautiful performance. He states “Just as the most perfectly made human being may appear as a puppet without a soul is not moving correctly and with grace, so a horse can only display his full beauty when able to move correctly with impulsion and suppleness” (99). Suppleness, or the characteristic of not being stiff, illustrates that relaxation is necessary for a beautiful performance. A tense horse simply cannot “display his full beauty” (99)!

To elaborate his conception of a beautiful and well trained horse, thus well developed and fit, Podhajsky uses analogies of an artist sculpting and graceful dancers. To emphasize the correlation between
dancers and horses, Podhajsky quotes Xenophon; 'if the dancer was forced to dance by whips and spikes he would be no more beautiful than a horse trained under similar conditions.’” (Podhajsky 17)

The importance of beauty and grace, this quote above also demonstrates Podhajsky attention to showing his readers the importance of only executing just punishments. This comment adds to how seriously Podhajsky considers use of the whip within his text. In this way, ensuring that a horse is not afraid of any riding aids, or cues, is essential to creating a beautiful ride. Podhajsky articulates what Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné, did so well. He declares “The rider must have the feeling that he is part of his horse – this is the aim of the classical art of riding – and the onlooker will be captivated by the harmonious movements of the horse and rider” (104).

Podhajsky furthers the analogy of riding and dancing when he considers the time required to develop both equine and human athlete. To emphasize, once again, the importance of avoiding the tendency to rush the development of the horse, Podhajsky references George Balanchine, a famous twentieth century classical ballet master. Like Podhajsky, Balanchine rejects the use of modern methods or techniques that aim to speed up training. Balanchine exclaimed “Humans being have the same two arms and two legs as former times!” in response to the suggestion to speed up his training methods! In this way, Podhajsky further connects the training of horse and rider to the training of ballet dancers.

Similar to ballet dancers who make leaps and spins look effortless “the horse and rider and horse should always be a pleasure to look at” (57). Riders must aim to create relaxation, impulsion, and suppleness in their partner. These traits create beauty in the horse and rider pair.
In one of his most philosophical moments, Podhajsky further emphasizes the responsibility of the rider to produce and show the beauty of his or her horse. He states:

This thinking rider should understand the influence of each exercise on the entire training and eradicate any fault the moment it appears as a training progresses. Profound knowledge and experience together with understanding and sympathy towards this four-legged partner will make the rider mature into a professor, and he will blossom out from an ordinary workman into an artist. An artist he will be on a by the creations of nature, will honor the beauty of his horse and all movements as a gift from heaven, and despise any form of artifice. He will realize that nature can exist without art, but that art cannot exist without nature. (163)

Podhajsky commitment to creating and demonstrating the individual beauty of each horse becomes a solemn responsibility from heaven. The last sentence of the above quote begins to reveal that Podhajsky believes that riding and horse-human relationships influence life beyond the stable grounds.

In contrast to somber tone above, Podhajsky also uses a bit of humor to express the importance of valuing the connection between training and beauty. In one of Podhajsky’s cheeky moments, he states “I would like to add that if the horse does not become better looking in the course of his training, it would be a sign that the training was incorrect” (97). This humorous highlights two important points. First, if the rider has failed to develop in fitness the trainer and rider failed to tactically carry out a correct program of training. And, second it illustrates that beauty can be used as a measurement of success for a training relationship.
In the text, Podhajsky names several important overall goals of training. I assert that these non-skill related goals speak to how and why a training relationship may be used in human and horse interaction. Three times in the text, Podhajsky speaks to the importance of riding your horse forward and straight (46, 62, 103). He asserts “The importance of straightness is emphasized in one of the most fundamental rules of equitation: straighten your horse and ride him forward” (46). Later, he reiterates this statement with an important clarification:

“All serious books on riding stress this point: ‘Straighten your horse and ride him forward.’ I should like to amplify this sentence with: ‘Only when your horse is straight he can go forward with him impulsion and harmony’” (103).

Podhajsky’s clarification emphasizes both the power (impulsion) and grace (harmony) necessary to create a successful human-horse relationship.

Harmony, or continuous agreement maintain importance as Podhajsky illustrates another goal of riding. He states “The ultimate objective of training must be to guide the horse with invisible aids. Two creatures, the one who thinks and the other who executes the thought, must be fused together. This is the ideal of classical riding” (55). Podhajsky language choice of “fused together” emphasizes that the horse and rider must be in so much agreement that they look like one body. The last goal connects performance and obedience. This usage adds to the tensions and power relations I described above. Podhajsky asserts, “Whether it is a dressage horse, a jumper, a hunter or charger, he should always be quiet, supple, and obedient. These qualities are the basis for every kind of riding. Performances of the greatest brilliance can be built up only on this foundation” (29). This quote is different in tone than two previous goals I illustrated. Within this context, “quiet” does not only mean silent. This usage includes a calm demeanor for
the horse. It Podhajsky surrounds “supple” with “quiet” and “obedient.” In this way, the control of human over the horse is emphasized. In this rhetorical framework, the human takes control of both the horse’s voice and body. However, if we understand the term “quiet” to also mean a calm demeanor, perhaps this calmness requires relaxation on the horse’s part. The examples above on balance and relaxation, and the forthcoming examples below, interrogate the connection between relaxation and agency.

Agency.

I assert that Podhajsky contends with agency within the horse-human relationships through two themes, willing participation by the horse and communication or language. Throughout this chapter, I use the term “aids” to refer to the cues given by the rider to the horse. These tools serve as one means of communication between the horse and rider. The natural and main aids for dressage riding include the rider’s seat, legs, and hands. Horses and riders in dressage training become so attentive to one another that a shift of weight from the left to right seatbone may be felt by the horse and enough to request a change of pace. Through training, horses will “gradually learn to concentrate on his rider and to react immediately to the lightest of aids. This is the language between the horse and rider which appears to be so mysterious to the onlooker” (109). In this way, Podhajsky connects performance and communication.

Podhajsky gives a short meta analysis of equestrian languages. He states

“Equestrian language has coined the word ‘aids’ to give it a deeper meaning than orders. The rider should aid his horse to understand him; this means that the horse should never be afraid of the aids and that the rider has sufficient patients to be sure his horse understands what is demanded of him” (54).
In this way, Podhajsky discusses the way riders articulate speaking to their horses. He describes the use of the noun “aids” within the equestrian community to take on both the first and second meaning of “aid” as a verb. In using their seat, legs, hands (through the reins), or a spur, the rider must contribute and give to the horse as the horse comes to understand the instructions. The rider must also promote and facilitate clear communication between the two partners (“aid” oed.com). From the previous quote, Podhajsky continues to illustrate that the rider must actively work to build confidence in his or her horse to facilitate cross-species understanding. This aid must be a process of mindful assistance to the horse. Podhajsky speaks directly to this importance; “The rider must have an exact understanding of his aids and their effect, and must make use of them intelligently; he must not allow himself to be influenced by his feelings. To follow this policy must be the constant aim of every good and successful rider” (54). Here, Podhajsky employs an uncharacteristic normative term to illustrate that makes a “good” rider. The call to remain unaffected by feelings calls attention to my previous thematic investigation of human control in the training relationship. Here, it can be surmised, that Podhajsky’s concern stems from fear of upset riders projecting negative feelings onto their horses. This implication suggests that self control of the rider, for Podhajsky, is connected to just actions within a human-horse relationship. In my next chapter I further interrogate this possibility.

Additional instructions on horse-rider communication further develops Podhajsky’s struggle with comparing horses to children. In his chapter “The Training of the Horse,” he speaks about aids, punishments, and rewards as the “elements of communication between the horse and rider, and being the language between the two, they must be clear and simple. As the child is taught single words
before full sentences, so must the horse gradually learn what is demanded from him by
the different aids” (53).

In this way, Podhajsky names the cues given and received by horses and riders as a language.
Podhajsky logically calls this embodied conversation a language because he has vigorously
illustrated the importance of the “feel” of riding and the necessity of allowing each individual
horse to set training program timelines.

Podhajsky emphasizes the reins as a point of contact between the horse and human so
much that I must return to this example to offer an analysis of communication. Above I illustrate
Podhajsky’s strong warnings against using the reins to pull the horse’s head up or down. Instead
the desired placement of a horse’s head must be achieved through development of overall fitness,
including building strength in the back, chest, and neck muscles. While pulling is unacceptable,
Podhajsky describes a correct method of rider-horse communication through rein contact. Rein
contact refers to the connection, even the feel, between the horses mouth and the riders hands.
Podhajsky illustrates that contact, thus communication, is closely related to balance. He states
“Balance and contact are complementary to each other: the better the balance the better the
contact on the other hand, correct contact will improve the balance in suppleness of the
horse” (42). Balance and contact aid one another. However, if a horse is unbalanced it becomes
difficult for the rider to maintain appropriate rein contact and if contact is not maintained it is
difficult to maintain balance of the horse or rider. Now, consider Podhajsky’s comments on
improving contact:

Improvement of the contact will coincide with the general progress. The training will be
successful only if the horse’s ability is improved and increased by suppleness and
proficiency. Attention must be drawn to a common fault: the rider should not try to seek contact with the horses mouth by pulling at the reins, which would check impulsion. The horse should seek the contact from the rider’s hands (43).

Eventually, it is the hope that “the horse should seek contact from the rider’s hand,” that is, the horse will take agency in reaching for an elastic feel of the reins between his mouth and the rider’s hands (Podhajsky 43). Podhajsky believes that in this system of translation “both horse and rider must contribute an equal share to the work of art which is the goal” (209). Only in creating a conversation that allows and encourages this agency, can the rider progress through basic training to advanced movements with his equine partner.

4.6 Conclusion

To heed Podhajsky’s words again, he instructs “Although the importance of attention to detail is recognized, the rider must never allow himself to be so absorbed in any one factor that he forgets the whole” (52). I extract this statement from the stable yard into this project by returning to Andreas Helgstrand and Blue Hors Matiné’s performance. I suggest that Helgstrand and Matiné’s performance-narrative is brought into new life when considered with Podhajsky’s text. First, this analysis gives context to the amount of work necessary to train and compete at such a high level. Second, my analysis of Podhajsky illustrates the many levels of communication between Helgstrand and Matiné. And, this analysis give additional context to Matiné’s relaxation and observed joy.

Podhajasky ties the rider’s ability to successfully translate for his equine partner to a normative value of being good. For Podhajasky, being a “good” rider is not simply a matter of achievement in the arena but instead links riding to “culture” (63). Specifically, he illustrates a
decline in culture presents itself through a decline in riding (63). Thus, the normative value placed on the “good” rider speaks not only to his ability to successfully manage his equine partner but to also his ability to partake, add to or detract from a larger culture as well as the art of riding (63). It is the end goal that the patient and constant application of a good rider to a horse will create beauty in the horse, as well as create a willing partner who “enjoys his work and does not become sour” (29). Eventually, it is the hope that “the horse should seek contact from the rider’s hand,” that is the horse will take agency in reaching for an elastic feel of the reins between his mouth and the rider’s hands (43). Only in creating a conversation that allows and encourages this agency, can the rider progress through basic training to advancement movements with his equine partner. Clearly, this quest to instill the type of agency and communication in his horse does not absolve Podhajasky’s rider from declaring war with the long whip. But, it does create a moment, a gap, or a space where a contradiction between the normatively established position of the rider as the all powerful sovereign and the horse as a machine existing in the form of live property.

In the next chapter, I interrogate my findings on embodied relationships, performance, and agency though connecting political identity, feminist theory, critical animal studies, and posthuman scholarship.
CHAPTER 5: RECOGNIZING AND RESPONDING TO THE POWER OF DISCOURSE WITHIN TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS

5.1 Chapter Introduction

My last chapter illustrates the prevalence and importance of embodied relationships, performativity, and agency within one human-equine training methodology. In doing so, I highlight the tensions and inconsistencies rooted in these relationships. These tensions illustrate the complexity of these relationships and their power dynamics. Before my analysis of Podhajsky’s text and Helgstrand and Matiné’s performance, I spent considerable time unpacking Donaldson and Kymlicka’s new conception of a body politic that includes many different creatures. I emphasized Donaldson and Kymlicka’s contribution because it represents a distinct turn in political theory literature. Instead of using animals in metaphors to describe how men may rule one another, this work starts with the needs and rights of nonhuman animal others alongside human needs and rights.

My analysis of Zoopolis also offers reviews from other scholars as well as my own criticism. The presence of these reviews stress considering and reconsidering the rights and needs of nonhuman animals and human animals when theorizing and implementing governing bodies and regulations. This turn, which considers nonhuman animals, indicates growth towards a body politic that takes on the difficult work of attempting to understand many different creaturely rhetorics. In this chapter, I illustrate foundations and possibilities of this growth. To
consider why rhetoric surrounding the political assessments of nonhuman animal others might change, I further connect power and identity to the embodied relationships, performativity, and agency. Within this assertion I understand the gaze to beget language and language to facilitate the power of recognition.

In light of Podhajsky’s text and Helgstrand and Matiné’s performance, I understand the relationships between embodied relationships, performativity, and agency as well as the gaze to exist in spaces framed by power dynamics. To unpack these relationships and the gaze, I start with reorienting normative assertion about power through Michel Foucault. In *The History of Sexuality Volume I* and secondary literature focused on Foucault in rhetorical analysis, I present the lens to review the training text and performance from the last chapter. Immediately following, I engage posthuman scholarship to examine embodied relationships, performativity, and agency. I examine Donna Haraway’s scholarship on training, focusing on her relationships with agility dogs.

In sum, I utilize this chapter to reveal another layer of significance to my previous engagement with Podhajsky’s text, Helgstrand and Matiné’s performance and Donaldson and Kymlicka’s book. I navigate this path with help from Foucault and Haraway. These texts create and illustrate a political praxis that recognizes cross-species relationships in the political arena. It is my hope that I do this by engaging through messy ontological play. This messy ontological play illustrates that identities, including species, are constantly in a state of fluid transition. This fluid state of change necessitates the engagement of the nonhuman animal other as a part of the discussion of identity and, then, illuminates the crucial need to expand the terms of discourse and access to justice.
5.2 “Banging on the Divide”

While collecting data for a study on the rhetoric of zoo exhibits and tours, Tema Milstein observed a cross-species interaction that informs my writing and everyday experiences with nonhuman animals. In her article, “Banging on the Divide” she gives a transcript of this particular cross-species interaction mediated by the zoo’s exhibit barrier, a glass wall. During a visit to an unspecified zoo, Milstein observes a routine guided tour for young school children that becomes unique. Akenji, a two and a half year old gorilla, repeatedly bangs on the glass window of the exhibit. To demonstrate the uniqueness of this moment Milstein asserts the gorillas “generally ignore” the zoo visitors (170). However, during this tour Akenji stood on his two hind legs with his stomach touching the glass and repeatedly pounded on the glass divider with both fists. The tour guide calls attention to this action when the tour guide states, “this baby over here’s just playing up a storm on the window” (171). This is met with laughter from the children, until one child states “Maybe he wants to be let out” and another asserts “So, she’s trying to get the lock undone” (171). The guide responses to these suggestions with “Yeah you think so I think she’s just playin’” and “I think she’s just showing off for you” (171). The child responds to Akenji and says “Hi” (171).

Below, I share Milstein’s findings from her study. However, I use this example as a starting point in this chapter to illustrate a concern that must be regularly interrogated. I regularly ask myself “maybe they do just want to be let out?” The article encapsulates so many aspects of cross-species relationships that interest me. Power is at play in all directions between the guide, the children, and the gorillas. These relationships are mediated by the physical place of the zoo. The construction of the exhibit of the reveals how humans, at least zoo directors and
designers, understand nonhuman creatures. In this way, the moment the child says “Hi” speaks to a want to connect with nonhuman creatures but quickly becomes tenuous as the child walks away from the exhibit.

Milstein focuses on “ways communication functions to construct human relationships with animals at the Zoo” through a critical discourse analysis of a guided tours in the gorilla exhibit at a nationally prominent zoo (163). Milstein begins her analysis on the assertion previously made by Norman Fairclough that all practices of language are open to “ideological investment” (162-163). While that is true to Fairclough’s statement, Fairclough also contends that this openness “does not mean that all types of discourse are ideologically invested to the same degree” (Fairclough 91). However, Milstein reasonably suggests that discursive practices at zoos, such as guided tours, construct the animals in terms of human control. Most tours do, after all, create a specific narrative of well cared-for residents who exist as happy ambassadors for their non-captive or “wild” counterparts. Thus, Milstein asserts that zoological institutions are “deeply ideologically invested” in the praxis of these discursive practices (163).

Milstein uses analysis of her key text and her two year study of the gorilla exhibit to develops data from the “lexicon, syntax and particular logics” of the rhetoric. This data reveals the zoo’s presentation of a normative narrative that depicts the human and gorilla relationship as harmonious. Several events disrupt this narrative providing, instead, a narrative of human mastery over the gorillas (167). For example, Milstein shows the tour guide as framing Akenji as “playful” while banging on the glass windows while young school children gaze at him. Identifying this moment as “playful” imposes a clear sense of harmony within the captive situation. A child, and tour participant, suggests a counter-narrative that the gorilla wanted “to be
let out,” that speaks to the position of human mastery over the captive gorilla (172). In another example, the tour guides asserts that the gorillas “liked” the food items we “give them” (173). However, the construction of the exhibit confines and prohibits foraging. This lexicalization erases the destruction of natural gorilla habitat which leads to many captive situations and the individual violence done to gorillas through poaching. While centering humans in an us and them dichotomy, these word choices present humans as mindful stewards harmoniously providing for the gorillas. In this way, the centering of humans and re-inscribing the necessity of keepers serve to erase subjectivity and agency of nonhuman animals (172-3).

The construction of the zoo exhibits reveals the dichotomous narratives. For example, the tour guide explains the heat lamps in the exhibit as a provision of comfort for the inhabitants, but best practices for zoological parks assert that these lamps must be placed within the exhibit for the health and survival of the gorilla population. Moreover, Milstein learned that the zoo strategically places lamps so the gorillas will be easily visible to the human observer (172-4). Modern zoos have also constructed exhibits with thick glass or clear plastic as the divider between the zoo’d animals and humans. This practice, as well as other disguised habits in construction practices, has largely replaced the use of bars on animal cages in zoos. In addition to lessening the visual reminders of the animals captivity, best practices for zoo facilities encourage glass dividers to reduce strong, unpleasant odors from reaching the viewers. Milstein asserts that this part of the exhibit’s construction again centers the experience of the zoo around humans and, at the same time, torments the zoo’d animals through another sensory deprivation (177). In addition to support of this harmony or mastery narrative, Milstein finds two additional recurring
and important binaries; (listed as dominant-narrative/counter-narrative) including othering/connection and exploitation/idealism.

Each year zoos across the United States attract 150 million visitors “more than the combined U.S. annual attendance of professional football, basketball, baseball and hockey” (165). Such high attendance and patronage at places designed for humans to look, view, and, literally, gaze at nonhuman animals re-enforces the implication that the gaze between the human and nonhuman animal is a part of an ongoing social and political praxis. Then, in providing specific narratives, the zoos present a particular view of both the zoo’d animals and humans. The discourse, which inscribes on and around nonhuman animals, is centrally and continually focused on the best practices for humans. This discourse also consciously obfuscates human mastery, othering, and exploration of zoo’d animals. Simply, this discourse shapes animals on both sides on the zoo glass.

5.3 Reorienting Understandings of Power

When speaking of binaries including othering/connection, exploitation/idealism, and mastery/harmony it is important to see that these binaries function within a framework of power. Our conception of power affects our analysis of power. Then, our analysis of power affects our conception of power. To fully explore the moments of tension and cooperation between equines and human illustrated in the last chapter, I turn to Michel Foucault’s work to find instructions to define and analyze power.

Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* dramatically illustrates power through analysis of the modern penal system. He focuses on torture, punishment, discipline, and prison in this 1977 work. Within this project, I utilize *Discipline and Punish* to ground the connection between
bodies and power. Foucault names “discipline” as a series of techniques by which the body's operations can be controlled. In riding, the different styles of riding are called “disciplines.” Each riding discipline works to maneuver the both the bodies of the horse and rider in particular and precise ways. In my last chapter, I illustrated the precise bodily control required in dressage. In this work, Foucault begins to illustrate power in a specific way. Through the analysis of the modern penal system, he shows that “power is exercised rather than possessed” (Discipline 26). This interpretation allows for a nuanced read of the texts I presented in the last chapter. Within this understanding of power, Helgstrand and Matiné may both exercise power on one another in their “good run”. Foucault gives further clarity to this understanding of power. He states

“power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them” (Discipline 26).

For Foucault, and for human and nonhuman animal relationships, power is no longer one thing held by one person over another.

In his discussion of torture Foucault returns to the Hobbesian connection between the sovereign and protection that I explored earlier. Instead of considering this link within the confines of what the sovereign may do in order to include or exclude individuals from protection, Foucault focuses, here, on how the sovereign may punish individuals under his rule (Discipline 27). In this way, Foucault illuminates that the sovereign continuously engages in the moment of choosing to protect or reject individuals. Further, his examples illustrate that within sovereign
protection, the sovereign uses disciplines, or modes of transmitting power, to mark bodies with his superiority. Foucault illustrates an important point here:

"It [torture] assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the secret on the public, the procedure of investigation on the operation of the confession; it made it possible to reproduce the crime on the visible body of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to be manifested and annulled. It also made the body of the condemned man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces" (Discipline 55).

Foucault’s example of torture directly links power and the body. For Foucault, power is exercised on bodies by the sovereign. I do not contend that all riding is torture. Instead, the close connection between bodies, power, and torture, illustrated here concerns the prominence of embodied relationships within riding. In addition to torture, Foucault also gives the example of exercise to illustrate the connection between bodies and power. Through disciplined exercise the body is transformed. Through this example, Foucault shows that human bodies are disciplined in many different ways beyond imprisonment (Discipline 128). Through regulatory norms, all of habits are disciplined into standards.

Following Discipline and Punish, Foucault continues to theorize power in his History of Sexuality. Through chronicling the history of sexuality and its repression, Foucault illustrates that power is a diverse range of “force relations” (The History 92). In this way, power is not something that can be held by one individual. Foucault’s conception illustrates that no individual may hold or build power. Instead, “power is everywhere” and it “comes from everywhere” (The
Foucault demonstrates that “Power” (he uses a capital ‘P’ and quotations in this one instance) is the sum or “overall effect” of all force relations. This use of “Power” speaks to power traditionally viewed as systematically applied by one group to another. Foucault insists that an individual or group may not hold power. Instead, individual force correlations create looping series, where each force is empowered by one another. Force relations, then, create the “complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault The History 93). This previously held view of power can lead to only to two “contrary results” (Foucault The History 83). These results may be “either to the promise of a ‘liberation,’ if power is seen as having only an external hold on desire, or, if it is constitutive of desire itself, to the affirmation: you are always-already trapped” (Foucault The History 83). Neither of these outcomes give a sufficient mode of analysis.

Foucault distinctly dispels what power is not. Power is not a structure, institution, or “a certain strength we are endowed with” (Foucault The History 93). Further, power is resource poor. Foucault explains that power is “incapable of invention” and is “in no condition to produce (85). Power may only restrict. Consider “restriction” within Podjahsky’s text. In the last chapter, I highlighted the commentators declaration “just look at the height and the freedom in front but still with plenty of spring in the hind legs” (video). I asserted that the commentators use of “freedom” indicates a lack of restriction and constraint placed on Matiné by Helgstrand during these athletically, technically, and artistically difficult movements. Considering this moment with Foucault’s understanding of power further corroborates that Matiné’s performance arose from more than simple compulsion.
Foucault also demonstrates that power has few abilities or tactics at its disposal, making it “monotonous” and “seeming always doomed to repeat itself” (Foucault *The History* 85). Foucault explains this idea through a paradox. He states “This is the paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do” (Foucault *The History* 85). In this way power is severely limited and must “mask a substantial part of itself” to be acceptable and tolerated. To cloak itself and subsequently continue in all parts of existence, power must “hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault *The History* 86). Through this method, power become acceptable as “a pure limit set on freedom” (Foucault *The History* 86).

The notion of masking or hiding is particularly important to a discussion of cross-species relationships. Consider Foucault’s link between power and obedience, a term used by Podhajsky. Foucault declares, “All the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience” (*The History* 85). In this way, obedience may be a submission to power. In this moment it is not clear is all moments of obedience must be submissions to power. In tandem to examining power as the effect of obedience, inspect Foucault’s notion of resistance. Because power is everywhere and held in no particular thing or being, resistance may also be everywhere. He illustrates that resistances are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior (96).

In this way, resistances can also be anywhere and a part of any interaction. The simultaneous existence of resistances and power everywhere highlights the messiness of our
ontological play. Foucault’s understanding of power elucidates the myth of dichotomies. Recognizing this definition allows access to transform spaces and relationships through moments of resistance (Phillips 96).

Kendall R. Phillips suggests a new use of Foucault as he calls scholars of rhetoric to apply Foucault to discourses of the present. Phillips sees his approach as faithful to Foucault’s body of work and Foucault’s initial resistance to intimately address a praxis of political revolution (Phillips 342, 339). Phillip reads Foucault to illuminate the transformative spaces before instances of dissension, freedom and thought (Phillips 329). These spaces, or gaps, create contradictions within Foucault’s conceptualized nexus of knowledge, power and subjectivity. Phillips asserts that these contradictions “can be seen as compelling the creation of new discourses” (Phillips 334). These contradictions must be “‘translated’ and ‘overcome’ through the invention of new discourses” to be resolved (Phillips 334). By looking to my analysis of the previous chapter, I carry out Phillips call to overlay Foucault’s critical lens on a discourse of the present while pushing Foucault into a new arena.

Phillips reestablishes the well accepted reading of Foucault that power exists “as a fine web of relations interwoven with the conditions of social action” and illustrates that attempts at resistance are simply absorbed into this complex web (The History 96). For critics of Foucault, this idea fails to establish proper “ground for emancipatory politics” and is, thus, a site of dissent and rebellion (Phillips 330). However, this evaluation fails to see the subtlety or nuance of Foucault’s theory, Phillips offers, supported by Biesecker. Instead, “[i]n Foucault’s conception...power establishes a set of relations that enable social interaction and understanding” (331). The use of “understanding” is key. This indicates that discourse may be positively
motivated through or by power. Within power’s complex web, gaps exist between relations of power and it is from these gaps, these un-circumventable spaces, that resistance may arise. Foucault implicates these gaps within his understanding of power as a web. Foucaultian illustrates:

Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities (The History 96).

It is from similar gaps in webs of knowledge and the politics of subjectivity that dissension and thought arise, respectively. Phillips calls for the tradition of scholarship to refocus from the end goals of dissension, freedom and thought to these “antecedent gaps from which they emerge” (351). Thus, to approach knowledge, power, and subjectivity, the Foucaultian must first travel to these spaces of dissension, concrete freedom, and thought. In this way, Phillips clarifies Foucault’s statement that power comes from everything. By returning to the spaces of dissension, freedom and thought, Phillips rhetorically demonstrates and creates power within these spaces. These gaps are and cultivate resistance to normative power structures.

In his last lectures at the College de France, Foucault calls his audience to consider the study of experience and the study of knowledge in a moment that, I assert, pertains my investigation today. Foucault shares

“It seemed to me that if one really wanted to study experience as the matrix for the formation of forms of knowledge, one should not analyze the development or progress of particular bodies of knowledge, but rather one should identify the discursive practices
which were able to constitute the matrices of possible bodies of knowledge, the forms of verification in these discursive practices” (4).

In this way, Foucault gives readers insight on how one might approach systems of power. And, this is important because I have previously made the case Weil’s assertion that training is translation. Therefore, training is also the understanding of a language, a discourse. The above quote echoes a statement from *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*:

“Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (101)

Discourse both reinforces and undermines power. Tensions and cooperative action are inherent in discourse, just as they are in cross-species training. I assert that Podhajsky produces and records a method of training that acts from and takes into account the gaps that Foucault views as necessary to transformation. Spaces of dissension within the web of knowledge are the places where the normative discourse becomes disjointed, incoherent and disconnected. The creation of a new discourse, in this case a new method of training, becomes possible when these momentary instabilities are recognized (Phillips 334).

Spaces of freedom similarly arise from within many, overlapping webs of power relations. Phillips urges the readers of Foucault to see power as both limiting and as well as enabling, thus showing these many different powers as each dual functioning (334-5). Thus, Phillips reads Foucault as viewing domination and freedom as “fluctuations” between power and resistance (335). Importantly, it is “in the moment of possibility which precedes” implementing a new relation of power that Foucault imagines as freedom. This is the point of production for anything new (336).
5.4 Something New: Posthuman Scholarship

Posthumanism produces a new response to cross-species discourse and enriches the political praxis of appreciating many political identities. Previously, political identity scholarship centered on understanding and deconstructing sexism, racism, and classism. This humanist investigation into political theory is evaluated by posthumanism scholars. Importantly, posthumanism offers an alternative. By de-centering humans from the center of inquiry, posthumanism affirms agency and identity within consciousness and the human condition as a mere “evolutionary upstart.” Katherine Hayles makes this point by suggesting that this rhetorical and contextual de-centering is similar to repositioning a theatre’s main act as a sideshow. Precursors to contemporary posthumanist scholars, including Nussbaum and Oyama, demonstrate through Developmental Systems Theory that accentuating the “processes of transcorporeality and in which human beings are not (in) the centre of the universe: human and nonhuman bodies are in constant exchange with each others and with their environment; they constitute each other through relationalist and dynamic interactions” and “insists that a (re-)combination of genes within a system and environmental factors that impact on the system from without, co-produce a unique and, above all incalculable result” (Rossini 9) Understanding the human as not central to existence allows scholars to think beyond previous limits. Recognition of our own immense and continuous vulnerability opens possibilities rather than limits solutions.

This de-centering connects the process of theorizing to modern and daily experiences. Posthumanism is, in part, a descriptive process of the current world that we must engage.
Therefore, I understand posthumanism as the logical extension of studying political identity. Posthumanism sees the value in deconstructing binaries and associated pernicious practices. In doing so, this deconstruction process values identity as grounded in material constructedness. This investment in material constructedness and bodies does not indicate a want or predict of the end of the human species. Rather, posthumanism

“signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice” (Hayles 286).

In this way, the posthuman recognizes many new subjects and disrupts the mechanisms where minorities, women, and other oppressed groups have been pushed into spaces of a bare or precarious life.

Through recognition of new subjects, the posthuman also recognizes many bodies as political participants. Halberstam and Livingston’s text *Posthuman Bodies (Unnatural Acts: Theorizing the Performative)* enriches this point. Many different kinds of creaturely bodies arise from the “nodes where bodies, bodies of discourse, and discourses of bodies intersect to foreclose any easy distinction between actor and stage, between sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context” (Halberstam and Livingston 2). These sites of intersection and overlap make creaturely bodies recognizable beyond a linear conception of time and history (Halberstam and Livingston 3-4). For Halberstam and Livingston, the posthuman changes the way subjects experience and reflect on time and meaning, as well as meaning within time. The practice legitimizes creatures (Halberstam and Livingston 9). This is truly revolutionary.
Halberstam and Livingston validate that the posthuman does not delete or make obsolete the human subject. Instead as a line of academic inquiry posthumanism “participates in re-distributions of difference and identity” (Halberstam and Livingston 10). This re-distribution powerfully disrupts many normative and pernicious practices. In a similar way, Hayles also asserts that the posthuman lens acts as a powerful site of exploration. For Hayles, the consequences of the embracing embodiment are “so deep” that this recognition transforms “the liberal subject, regarded as the model of the human since the Enlightenment, into the posthuman” (Hayles xiv). This transformation of the subject ruptures narratives from thousands of years of human history.

This rupture releases the constraints of both nature and humanist ideology placed on the body and, simultaneously, forms the human subject into a multitude of subjects. Within this sphere, humans become free to roam and engage with many other creaturely subjects (Seaman 248). At its core posthumanism creates “multiple viabilities” or many ways subjects may be recognized (Halberstam and Livingston 18). The posthuman creates a literal opening of sites that value and seek justice for all kinds of creatures. Like the blooming flower, this opening gives new life and roots itself in an organic understanding of embodiment.

Posthuman scholarship highlights the materially constructed nature of bodies through examinations of the engagement between humans and technology. The investigation of humans and technology expands to inquiry on the shared nature of humans and nonhuman animals. Haraway gives posthumanism the cyborg as the first new center. The cyborg is both an organic and mechanical being at the same moment. It is “creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,” a site of resistance that exists outside of a salvation history and the foundation of an
ontology and politics. It is the “illegitimate offspring” of militarism, patriarchal capitalism, and state socialism. Haraway asserts that the illegitimacy of the cyborg (as both bastard and unlawful) gives the cyborg power to ignore its own origins and craft a powerful discourse in which gender is not only a thing of the past but non-existent in its history\textsuperscript{23}. Haraway would eventually declare the cyborg to be only a part of “much bigger, queer family of companion species” (Haraway CSM 11).

Much of the transition from the cyborg to the animal grew from Derrida’s line of inquiry illuminated in my first chapter. Katherine Hayles embellishes a genealogy of posthumanism in her 1999 work, \textit{How We Became Posthuman, Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics}. Her four critical and radical assertions ground posthumanist thought. Hayles illustrates the foundations of posthuman thought here:

“Think of it as a point of view characterized by the following assumptions… First, the posthuman view privileges information pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second the posthuman view considers consciousness regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as in epiphenomenon, as evolutionary upstart trying to claim that is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman view thinks the body of the original prosthesis we all learned to manipulate the extending replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth, and most important, by these and other means, the
posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines” (3).

Since Hayles presented these assertions, scholars regularly utilize these four pillars to examine and explore the possibilities of finding and creating justice through a posthuman lens. For example, Manuela Rossini illustrates the use of Hayles pillars and the connection, or growth, of feminism into posthumanism. She declares

“that a feminism that focuses almost exclusively on the sociocultural construction of gender and gender roles similarly impoverished as a posthumanism that can only imagine the hybridity of human existence in the figures of the cyborg and endeavors to separate the material body from the immaterial mind to gain heroic invulnerability, perfection and immortality” (3).

I assert, similar to Rossini, that posthumanism and feminism most effectively navigate a relationship that values the symbiotic nature of their existences. In this way, Hayles similarly shows the symbiotic nature of feminisms embracing posthumanism’s focus on material constructedness and posthumanism’s openness to feminisms’ distinct attention to gender roles. Both Rossini’s work and this project, answers Hayle’s original call for

“a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes stands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival” (Hayles 5).

5.4 Barking up the Right Tree
As mentioned previously, Donna Haraway presents scholars with the cyborg and the companion animal as new modes of considering embodied experiences. Haraway’s reflections on living with cyborgs and companion animals provide a new platform for scholarship and daily lived experiences. On this new platform, humans no longer take center stage. All the world may still be a stage, but humans must now recognize themselves as a part of an all star ensemble cast. From this new position, humans must consider actions in light of and in response to nonhuman animals. Haraway’s illustrations of daily living with, eating with, and flourishing with animals draw the multitude of lines named and explored by Derrida in my first chapter. In sum, Haraway advances a cosmopolitical conversation where animals are no longer just on the table, but also sitting at a table that engages in serious discussion. By positioning animals in this play, humans attempt to adapt to a multitude of creaturely rhetorics. Haraway makes an argument for significant otherness with companion species, reconsidering the notion of how bodies are made killable, and the impact of training on relationships between species.

In exploring significant otherness, Haraway repeatedly declares her *Companion Species Manifesto* to be feminist theory and a claim of kinship. Haraway grounds the work in discovering “how worldly actors might somehow be accountable to and love each other less violently” (Haraway CSM 7, 9). This goal takes center stage even in her description of dogs, Haraway’s companion animal of choice. She defines dogs in this way;

“They are not a projection, nor the realization of an intention, nor the telos of anything. They are dogs; i.e., a species in obligatory, constitutive, historical, protean relationship with human beings. The relationship is not especially nice; it is full of waste, cruelty,
indifference, ignorance, and loss, as well as joy, invention, labor, intelligence, and play” (12).

It is important to note that love in not present in this description. Here, Haraway asserts that trust and skill enable a praxis of positive coexistence between humans and companion species (39). This trust and skill grounds Haraway’s approach to living and working with dogs in the present physical moment. These are important goals. For Haraway, “Love, commitment, and yearning for skill with another are not zero sum games” (61). These games, this praxis of training, allows individuals to become more coherent in many creaturely rhetorics, more fluid in the “joint dance of being,” and more respectful and responsive at all levels and with all partners, including fellow humans (62). Cross-species training attunes individuals to the necessity of significant otherness within the worlds we choose to make livable (61).

Podhajsky's text emphasizes the importance of trust and skill in his system of working and communicating with horses. I previously illustrated his focus on ensuring that the rider never frighten the horse with the whip or any other inexact use of the aids. Podhajsky’s does not directly employed the term “trust,” but he does focus on gaining the horses confidence. Podhajsky states that “absolute confidence between the horse and rider is the basis of successful training and this confidence must be established from the beginning” (87). Podhajsky also directs the rider to use his voice to "gain his confidence" and to be clear in the rider's use of aids to gain the confidence of his horse (78, 59). These elements build trust so that the horse will actively seek contact from the reins in the rider’s hands. Here, skill are trust also build a foundation for cross-species, equine and human, communication and community.
Lived experiences are mediated by an ever present metaphysical consideration of our shared histories. In this way, significant otherness shows itself through experiences where partners “come to be who we are in flesh and sign” together (25). Haraway gives an example of the domestication of wolves/dogs as a process of coevolution. She emphasizes that coevolution, instead of the traditional narrative of domestication, places wolves/dogs as an actor within this shared experience. Instead of a narrative centering on men capturing wolves, a narrative of coevolution endorses that “wolf wannabe dogs” participated in the process of coming to live with humans. These modern dog ancestors capitalized on the food resources available near humans (CSM 29). Our bodies further suggest significant otherness by the heavily interspecied history of the flu virus and the resulting molecular record of pathogens to the cultural emergence of herding societies (CSM 31). Recognizing and reciprocating significant otherness appreciates a mutuality where creatures recognize “there is ‘someone home,’ someone so like ourselves that we can co-create a shared reality as equals” (WSM 236, 228). For Haraway, this is an essential part of creating ethical relationships within or between species. She asserts that all ethical relating “is knit from the silk-strong thread of ongoing alertness to otherness-in-relation” (WSM 50). A flourishing life and a live-able world hinges on our ability and commitment to recognize and relate to others.

I assert that Podhajsky’s system of training illustrates Haraway’s ”alertness to others -in-relation” (50). Podhajsky specifically addresses the need for the horse to be “alert” to the rider (Podhajsky 118, 153). These examples reveal that correct training will enable the horse to be “alert and ready to continue any moment” from the halt (Podhajsky 118). Podhajsky’s means of creating this alertness comes from “a light contact” that, again, can only happen when the horse
seeks this communication from the rider. Through this praxis of training, a horse and rider may develop significant otherness.

Significant otherness becomes particularly difficult when required in the presence of nonhuman animal death. This way of life does not necessitate a ban on killing nonhuman animal lives. However, significant otherness does require that we “kill responsibility” and, moreover, learn to be killed responsibility (WSM 81). Killing responsibility requires opening ourselves to “the capacity to respond and to recognize response” (WSM 81). In this praxis, Haraway asserts must be mindful of our actions and stop the processes that currently hide killing and slaughter. In doing so, we take responsibility and share in suffering. Haraway insists that we are unable to “nurture living until we get better at facing killing” and get “better at dying instead of killing” (WSM 81). Haraway terms the process of becoming better at facing killing as “killing well” (WSM 81). This praxis moves beyond “bare calculation” in considering who lives and relocates all creatures into a space that enables connections and response (WSM 70-71).

Foucault speaks to the relationship between power, death, and life his examination aids in illuminating Hardaway's implication. To illustrate “the power of life and death” Foucault engages the sovereign and emphasizes the sovereign’s power. Previously, the sovereign’s power “conditioned” the presence of life and death. In this way, Foucault returns to Hobbes. Similar to my discussion in my third chapter, Foucault describes the power of the sovereign as enacting both life and death. He describes “The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidences power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring” (Foucault The History 136). However, Foucault illustrates that wars are no longer fought for an individual sovereign. Instead, modern states have amassed this
power. This power is now “situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (Foucault *The History* 137). Within this new situation “death is so carefully evaded” and “linked to a new anxiety which makes death unbearable” (Foucault *The History* 138). This masking or removal of the presence of death speaks to Haraway’s call to become better at dying and killing.

The humans of modernity are “an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault *The History* 143). We have shifted away from “learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world” (Foucault *The History* 142). Instead, “man” has a “mode of relation” where the techniques of knowledge and power” have placed man inside and outside of history in another paradox (Foucault *The History* 142). This positioning is important because Foucault, similar to Haraway, is working to “show how deployments of power are directly connected to the body” (Foucault *The History* 151). In this way, Haraway adds a substantial contribution to Foucault’s call to create a “history of bodies” (Foucault *The History* 152).

Haraway urges her reader to consider the outcome of calculating who is made “killable” for biomedical advances. She states “sometimes a ‘cure’ for whatever kills us is just not enough reason to keep the killing machines going at the scale to which we (who?) have become accustomed” (Foucault 82). Humans must disrupt the logic of human exceptionalism. Currently, this exceptionalism excludes not only nonhuman animals, but as I illustrated previously in this chapter, but also excludes human bodies marked as deviant. Haraway’s parenthetical question of “who” linguistically reminds the reader of the fluid nature of defining who “we” may be as a group, culture, or species. For Haraway sharing decisions leads to sharing of nonhuman animal
pain. This pain sharing opens up a new site that lays out “an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an ontological opening. Sharing pain promises disclosure, promises becoming. The capacity to respond may yet be recognized and nourished on this earth” (84). Here Haraway’s use of “ethical obligation” and “ontological opening” speak to a new and ever changing conception of kinship. Kinship, or the way and how being relate to one another, is deeply connected to understanding and analyzing peer, particularly when power is defined as relations of force.24

Haraway illustrates that in killing well, we must consider the material construction of our histories and envision responsible sharing of suffering even within factory farms and animal experiment labs (72). Much like Haraway’s commitment to trust and skill in understanding dogs, she emphasizes that animals may still be included in human activities. We must now consider the daily life of all participants, including apes. She encourages us to consider how enriching practices may create acceptable work environments (and retirement plans!) for both humans and apes (89). Haraway sees real value in working together. She clarifies

“that human beings are not uniquely obligated to and gifted with responsibility; animals as workers in labs, animals in all their worlds, are response-able in the same sense as people are; that is responsibility is a relationship crafted in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects come into being” (71).

In this way, laboratories must value nonhuman and human lives. If a lab only demonstrates a calculation of suffering, rather than a sharing of pain, the lab should be closed (WSM 71). Haraway’s acceptance of death and killing gives more value to life. In this worldview individuals and kinds (or species) are equally and importantly valued. She states “Individuals
and kinds at whatever scales of time and space are not autopoietic wholes; they are sticky
dynamic openings and closures in finite, moral, world-making, ontological play” (WSM 87).

Killing well and significant otherness function within the gaze as key to Haraway’s understanding of respect. She defines respect as “looking back, holding in regard, understanding that meeting the look of the other is a condition of having to face one’s self” (WSM 88). This point is critical. In recognizing the other, the nonhuman animal cannot be used as a mirror or reflection of the human self. Haraway escapes the mechanism of the mirror by embracing significant otherness. In recognizing the other, even at the point of sacrificing ourselves and our standards of living, we critically disrupt the narrative of the mirror. We embrace our existence through face to face contact with others, including nonhuman animals. This idea is not romantic, it is dirty and full of the “mundane and consequential in the little that make lives” (WSM 93).

Similar to Podhajsky’s individual attention to each horse, Haraway illustrates this face to face contact in training. Juxtaposing Haraway’s notion of making bodies killable next to her commitment to training illustrates the wide and varied nature of relationships within and between species. This comparison recalls the complex nature of the relationship evidenced in the stories of human cockfighters and consumers of chicken produced by the meat-industrial complex. Haraway’s comparison reveals the connection between Matiné's life, performance, and death. Engaging in an honest training relationship requires a response to non-human death. If Haraway’s model of responding through responsibility is followed, human open ourselves to the vulnerability of being with and becoming with others. From this vulnerable state, humans may directly engage and reveal interaction with nonhuman creatures outside of training relationships. In this way, human can come to accept and reveal what Agamben calls “central emptiness” of
that space that previously separated man and animal (*The Open* 92)\textsuperscript{25}. Through these engagements we may change out ontological positioning to create a world that is more live-able. However, coming into a training relationship that opens these far reaching political abilities requires dedication from both partners.

Exacting training programs demand focus, skill, and commitment from both the human and canine. A “cross-species team of skilled adults” creates each canine-human team (WSM 225). This assertion disrupts the narrative of pets as substitutions for children. Instead of parent and child, Haraway and Cayenne become together as partners. For these two partners, training is “interesting, hard, full of situated difference, and moving” (WSM 213). Through this fluid process the partners actively “co-shape” one another (WSM 208). The human must learn “how to see who the dogs are and hear what they are telling us, not in bloodless abstraction, but in one-on-one relationship in, other-ness-connection” (CSM 45). When participating in training the “human being actually has to know something about one’s partner, oneself, and the world at the end of each training day that she or he did not know at the beginning” (WSM 214). The engagement is tangible and intellectual and this tangible and intellectual experience must be honest.

Haraway is insistent that honesty is essential to this process and all other aspects of training. Speaking to the human side of cross-species engagements she explains “that dog people like me have to lie to ourselves about the conflicting fantasies we project onto our dogs in our inconsistent training and his honest evaluations of what is actually happening” (WSP 46). Training only begins when both partners recognize one another. Haraway illustrates this use of the gaze as she describes the process of teaching her young godson to train her agility
competition canine partner, Cayenne. While her godson was able to give the “sit” command and Cayenne, who practiced training skills regularly with Haraway, offered the correct behavior in response to the command. However, Haraway finds the correct response without engagement through the gaze to be insufficient. She asserts “that these two youngsters had to learn to notice each other” and that they first must “be in the same game” before engaging in play (CSM 40). Haraway recalls telling her godson “Until you can find a way to teach her (Cayenne) how to collect her galloping puppy self calmly and to hold still and look you in the eyes, you cannot let her perform the ‘sit’ command” (CSM 40). This is similar to Podhajsky’s instructions for the rider to build confidence in his horse. This process of training engages the gaze between human and animals and works to benefit both the human and nonhuman animal.

It is the face to face contact, and the recognition that follows, that makes training powerful. Haraway shares:

“Training together, a particular woman and a particular dog, not Man and Animal in the abstract, is a historically located, multispecies, subject-shaping encounter in a contact zone fraught with power, knowledge and technique, moral questions -- and the chance for joint, cross-species invention that is simultaneously work and play” (WSM 205).

Just as work takes an important role in Haraway’s approach to living with animals, play is critical to building co-constructive relationships. Play facilitates curiosity and allows for non-compulsory interspecies engagement. Haraway speaks to the nature of training as human centered, focused on human defined and set goals. Similar to Patton in this project’s first chapter, Haraway sees the focus of human centered goals as an important part of critically evaluating training interactions. Training in the human-canine team sport of agility “puts the
participants inside the complexities of instrumental relations and structures of power” (WSM 207). In this way, training confronts struggles of power. In the day to day interaction of training and living with her dog Haraway experiences the “sticky dynamic openings and closures in finite, moral, world-making, ontological play” (WSM 87). Play as an aspect of training demonstrates itself through joy experienced by both partners. Here, Haraway defends Cayenne’s joy in competing in and practicing for agility events. Haraway argues that “such good runs” can only come from a team that is highly motivated, trusts one another, and in a continuous form of communication (WSM 44). Here Haraway finds Cayenne’s agency through her observed joy, determination, and curiosity just as I suggest Matiné’s agency through her performance.

Haraway gives an interesting note on the difference in methods in dog training. She states “But ‘method’ is not what matters most among companion species; ‘communication’ across irreducible difference is what matters” (CSM 49). Coupled with the call to consider the joy, determination, and curiosity of the nonhuman partner in training, this statement contrasts Donaldson and Kymlicka’s approach to training.

Donaldson and Kymlicka’s approach to training and living with dogs is, at best, unclear. Their text, Zoopolis, contends that like a parent forcefully encouraging a child to practice the piano, a dog’s guardian may offer similar demands to help either the child or dog “stick with” an activity that is beneficial to the child or dog. Here, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s position precariously balances their intended practice of granting co-citizenship to companion animals. The use of the child in comparison weakens this position. Podhajsky’s also presents contentious rhetoric on the horse as a child and as an individual. As I illustrated in my last chapter, Podhajsky uses the analogy of the child to explain how just punishments may be applied but also names the
horse as intelligent. Haraway positions herself, and Cayenne, as adult partners in their agility work together. Haraway does not shy away from embracing working with animals or living with them in a real and messy way that much more clearly encapsulates interpersonal relationships. In contending that working with animals does not work within *Zoopolis*, Donaldson and Kymlicka turn away from the responsibility of learning to kill and to be killed well. This is best illustrated in Donaldson and Kymlicka oversight of tangible engagement with the meat-industrial complex within the context of their current work.

Haraway’s comment on method seriously considers to how her conception of training translates into human-horse relationships. Like Haraway’s interest in the entanglement in human and nonhuman animal lives, this project requires critical examination of agency within a horseback riding training program. This search for agency is deeply connected to the material construction of bodies engaged in riding. In riding, unlike canine agility events, humans literally sit on horses and direct all of their movements. In the best riding, bodies communicate in nuanced and subtle ways to produce beautiful results. In the worst riding, violence tarnishes the experience. More of what Haraway says than what she does not resonates as transferable across nonhuman animal species. I illustrated in my last chapter that riding also calls human partners to be honest, be open to significant otherness, and struggle towards communication in dynamic ways. Human-horse relationships are also “co-constructive relationships in which none of the partners pre-exist the relation, and the relation is never done once and for all” (CSM 12). Riding intensifies Haraway’s contact zone to many part of the human and horse bodies. Consider Haraway’s additional thought on the contact zone:
“The point is that contact zones are where the action is, and current interaction change interactions to follow. Probabilities alter; topologies morph; development is canalized by the fruits of reciprocal induction. Contact zones change the subject --all the subjects-- in surprising ways” (219).

Riders also become into being through interaction and training with their equine partners through touching and being touched by horse bodies. This touching physically, emotionally, and intellectually changes both horses and riders. This change is far from trivial. Haraway weighs the importance of working within contact zone. Thinking about living and working with dogs, Haraway asks herself “in a world full of so many urgent ecological and political crises, how do I care?” Luckily, she gives an answer as well. She contends “I experience agility as a particular good in itself and as a way to become more worldly; i.e., more alert to the demands of significant otherness at all the scales that making more livable worlds demand” (61).

5.6 Connecting Discourse, Identity, and Agency

Feminist scholar Judith Butler emphasizes Foucault previous statement “show how deployments of power are directly connected to the body” when she connects the discursive nature of identity and agency for those working towards a new set of politics (Foucault 151). She shares “The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them” (Gender Trouble 201). In this way, Butler disrupts subversive or negative boundaries created and reinforced by language. Butler calls readers to engage a daily praxis of struggling with and challenging divisions, limits, and margins. In this
way, Butler and contemporary feminists demonstrate “to be constituted by discourse is to be determined by discourse, where determination forecloses the possibility of agency” (Gender Trouble 195). Creation of identities comes from the speaking and naming of those identities27.

The important connection between the body and experience, then, sustains more than one type of feminism and focuses my lens of power and identity on horsemanship texts. This recognition connects the interpretation of surrounding environments to the world at large and our daily praxis within the world. To further emphasize the importance of experience in developing, struggling with, and living a particular praxis, Elizabeth Grosz understands and shows experience not as material to or made of truth. She argues, instead, that experience is mediated through the body (20).

The experience of the body is Grosz’s main consideration. Grosz’s asserts “the body is in no sense naturally or innately physical, sexual, or sexed” and demonstrates that it is through processes of social constitution and construction that bodies are placed into particular types. This idea, of course, grows from Mill and, later, Butler’s understanding of the body. This typology, designed, enforced, and edified by patriarchy, creates a system where “female bodies and sexualities must be socially produced” (Groz bodies that matter 60). In this process of creation, both female bodies and sexualities are lacking both literally and “at an imaginary and symbolic level” (60). From this creation springs the appearance of mutilated bodies and body images, appropriated behaviors and, even, expected sexual positions all the while the female body is continuously re-scripted and inscribed with messages of the patriarchy (Groz bodies that matter 60).
The linear deconstruction of gender, and other assignments given to the body, gives further support to understanding gender and bodily comportment as social constructions. And, it is from this deconstruction that species can also be understood as a social construction. Just as in the case of gender and race, understanding categories of difference does not negative scientific observations of physical experiences. Theories of gender as a social construction, generally, do not hope to advocate for an erasure of understandings of biology or medicine. Instead, theories of gender as a social construction effectively demonstrate that the normative significance and definitions come from constructions that give subjective meaning to all traits. Thus when I state “human is a construction,” I do not mean “there is no such thing as a human” or “there are no differences between human and nonhuman animals.” Instead, I mean that specific and normatively valued differences inscribe categories that lack fluidity to fully explain, and participate in, the experience of embodied creatures.

Grosz furthers the literature by emphasizing the importance of the experience of body, particularly as studied and observed by phenomenological descriptions, and analyzes Merleau-Ponty’s work in order to do so. However, she is clear that Merleau-Ponty does not offer a perfect set of terms or a perfect way of approaching experience. Grosz ends her work that largely builds on Merleau-Ponty’s work with a cautionary statement,

“The feminists need to seriously question whether phenomenological descriptions are appropriate for women’s experience and, if they are not, whether it is desirable that they should be or whether, instead, altogether new and different theoretical terms are necessary -- and how such terms may be developed” (111).
In this way, Grosz warns that current terms may be deficient in explaining experiences. Here, Grosz is speaking to Merleau-Ponty’s use of phenomenological descriptions. Grosz utilizes three important parts of Merleau-Ponty but is wary that his original writings do offer terms to discuss and illuminate “what other types of modalities of perception, what other relations, subjects may have with objects” (110). This utilization creates an opportunity to study posthumanism and critical animal studies. Such a study aids in developing terms and means of discussing these other modalities that build from Merleau-Ponty’s work. His work lays the foundation for offering a method and set of terms that can be used to “rethink the body outside of dualism” through an intense focus and appreciation of embodiment and corporeality.

Specifically, Merleau-Ponty offers three “crucial insights” on the understanding of the lived experience, which has enhanced feminist scholarship and, subsequently, enhanced posthumanism and critical animal studies. Grosz takes a particularly direct approach to pointing out these three important points. For clarification here, I will use Grosz’s understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s larger contributions. First, Merleau-Ponty questions experience as a direct or ultimate source of truth and insists that experience, like so much else, must be interrogated as constructed and synthetic. However, Merleau-Ponty still takes experience seriously and insists that experience must be struggled with and explained (Grosz 95). For Merleau-Ponty, and later feminist scholarship as well as posthumanism and critical animal studies, it is not enough to explain away experience as only untrustworthy or ideological, as has happened in poststructuralism and antihumanism. And, last, Merleau-Ponty positions experience as existing somewhere between the mind and body, demonstrating that experience is always embodied and “located in as as the subject’s incarnation” (Grosz 95). For Merleau-Ponty, as well as Grosz and
many scholars who follow, the body and mind must be considered in conjunction. This, considering the mind and body simultaneously is paramount to understanding the posthuman worldview and, thus, understanding and meditating the actual lived experience of human and nonhuman creatures.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Chapter Introduction

My body is not always intelligent when riding Yvette, my equine partner. Many days I am unable to sit level, unable bend my elbows and, most often, unable understand her side of the conversation. Or, she is distracted, stiff in her ribcage or hocks, or misunderstanding me. On the worse rides, I fail to notice what is at issue. But some days our bodies are intelligent and powerful. In these moments, Yvette and I are more powerful together than we are apart. In these moments, I can feel all 1,500 pounds of her athletic body rocking back and springing forward to cover more ground. I am sure that she can feel each ounce of my body urging us to stretch, bend and arc through complex movements. This pace is powerful, but not rushed. She blows with enthusiasm, and uses her electrically charged body -- ears, neck, rib cage, back, legs -- to gain insight to my own body. We use an embodied system of communication that is far from flawless, but transcendent in its abilities to create a new way of experiencing one another. In a rare instant, we are alert to the slightest whisper of conversation, a shift of weight, a change of direction, a repositioning of a leg, or a slight tug on the reins all elicit a response from both the horse and woman.
Because of these moments, and the rest of time when we are much less fluent, I’m not worried about throwing like a girl or living up to any other set norm. I am free to use my body to its full messy, sweaty, grounded, and real lived potential. I only have to worry about my partner, this a 14 year-old *Selle Français* mare. Our friendship and kinship is real and follows Simone deBeauvior calls to move past idealizing the other. deBeauvior simply illustrates, “The more relationships are concretely lived, the less they are idealized” (de Beauvior 244). Our partnership creates tension between the imagined and the observed and offers access points to a new dialogue.

Podhajsky, Helgstrand, and Matiné’ illustrate the reoccurring nature of this narrative and nuanced interpretation of power and identity that surround the dialogue. I began this project asking “can training allow for a praxis of equity and justice between horses and humans?” Through the theoretical and rhetorical investigations above, I have illustrated that training does open site and possibilities for creating just practices between particular horse and human pairs as well as open humans to accept our vulnerable positions in the world. With this acceptance we may enter many contact zones with other creatures to both respond and be responsible with the end goal of creating a daily praxis. This daily praxis enhances the possibilities of improving the quality of existence and embraces contact zones where we may use many creaturely rhetorics to look at one another as individuals.

### 6.2 Clarifying Human and Nonhuman Animal Relationship as a Political Praxis

The gaze begets language which facilitates the power of recognition. Thus, I have illustrated we must name and describe cross-species relationships as a first step to developing a body of scholarship, as well as a political praxis, which validates these relationships. Identity,
even species, is constantly in a state of fluid transition. This fluid state of change requires the engagement of the nonhuman animal other as a part of the discussion of identity and, in doing so, illuminates the crucial need to expand the terms of discourse and access to justice. Grounded in embodied beings, traveling with identities, the relationships enable new approaches to considering and analyzing power.

The nonhuman animal gaze is interactive. As Merleau-Ponty illuminates, the sight is not simply limited to the viewer and the viewed. Instead, like the sense of touch, the process of seeing is always interactive. Thus, I illustrated that agency exists in both directions within a gaze from a nonhuman animal to a human. This assertion rests on the assumption that non-human animals have the ability and power to judge human animals. The interaction of the gaze and the power to judge are significantly marked by human response.

Butler utilizes gay marriage in modern America to demonstrate widely belittled and ignored relationships. A progressive political praxis responds to pernicious normative practices through queering kinship, which seeks to recognize previously ignored relationships. In *Undoing Gender*, Butler presents the emotional, political, and social power, as well as the utility, of recognition of identity through interaction. For example, homophobic and transphobic prejudices deter the recognition of non-normative human relationships, attempt to position them outside the limits of social order, and refuse these relationships as “humanly recognizable” (*Undoing Gender* 112). However, this argument rests on a paradox. Butler explains, “if one does not want to recognize certain human relations as part of the humanly recognizable, then one has already recognized them, and one seeks to deny what it is one has already, in one way or another, understood” (*Undoing Gender* 112-113). In this way, interaction
between individuals is so powerful that actively ignoring a relationship eventually leads to meaning, discourse, and normalization. Therein lies the political power of cross species training that acts as translation. This precedent leads to possibilities for human-nonhuman relationships as sites of political resistance.

Scholar Richard Iveson further illustrates the liberating possibilities of Butler’s work for nonhuman animals and cross-species relationships. He asserts that a cohesive system of ethics, including a system predicated on Butler’s body of work, requires the considerations of the nonhuman animal. Iverson evaluates Butler’s analysis of the documentary film “Paris is Burning” to substantiate his claim that “if one wishes to even begin to approach the complexities of contemporary power, one cannot not include the question of speciesism” (27). Failing to recognize and decipher nonhuman animal bodies creates a space which allows for “an apparently ‘morally legitimate’ putting to death” (22). The disguise of killing affects not only nonhuman animal bodies but also human bodies. The same process that destroys nonhuman animal bodies also marks human bodies as unreal and illegitimate. For Iverson, then, speciesism is a mechanism by which some bodies are excluded from fair treatment. Iverson’s critique focuses on Butler’s depiction of the film’s main subject, Venus Xtravaganza, a transwoman and drag ball performer. Butler speaks directly about the body of Venus Xtravaganza, and the discourse which surrounds and inscribes her body (22). Iverson shows that only by recognizing “that ‘the animal’ is always the least of the less” in a humanist teleology does “it become possible to understand how the machinations of power legitimize the slaughter of human animals by way of the prior ‘animalization’ of a specifically targeted human or human grouping, a reconfiguration that strips its target of a fully human status
and, in so doing, constitutes a non-subject that can thereafter be killed with impunity” (Iverson 28).

Instead of accepting species as an *a priori* category, it is necessary to recognize human as “the aggregate effect of regulatory reproductive power” (23). That is, the constitution of “humanness” derives from all other norms passing though in the process of reproducing “themselves as ‘natural’”(23). In this way, Iverson speaks to both Butler’s subject with agency and Grosz’s assertion of identity as change, as well as Hayles’ insistence that identity cannot be theoretically recognized prior to its embodied existence. Iverson asserts that “‘humanness’ is a regulatory norm constituted through species difference, just as ‘whiteness,’ for example, is a regulatory norm constituted through racial difference” (23). As noted above, Butler’s account of gender and identity politics attempts to recognize and decode the expanding scope of personal identity claims while creating a site for subversive repetitions. Therefore, Iverson calls on Butler to take one more step in deconstructing the discursive underpinnings of species.

To engage in the subversive process of deconstructing species Iverson attempts to destabilize normative ideals and regulations. Iverson affirms the disruptive power of interspecies kinship. He states that to

“affirm one’s kinship with that which hegemonic norms habitually foreclose is, in other words, to risk the withdrawal not only of a viable subject status, but also the withdrawal of one’s race or gender, one’s class or sexuality, even one’s membership of a species - a withdrawal that marks the effective neutralization of any such “crossings: within and by a given state of affairs” (35).
Subversive, destabilizing action occurs in confirming kinship with nonhuman animals, similar to the kinship formed in the families of the New York City drag balls where Venus Xtravaganza found a home. Just as the drag balls brought Venus Xtravaganza into community with individuals who accepted her literal and figurative metamorphoses, the next chapter will explore if, indeed, *dressage*, or training, can do something similar for a horse and rider. Perhaps the relationship developed through a program of training is enough to “interrupt the process by which life is withdrawn from the living” (Iverson 33). To break apart or even halt the process by which bodies are made killable initiates the creation of a space infused of justice.

To further examine the processes by which bodies are marked or made killable, James Stanescu identifies the importance of and connection between living with animals and slaughtering animals for food or other human use. In this comparison, he illuminates the generally prohibited process of mourning the pork chops and beef steaks in the meat section of any grocery store. By drawing attention to this prohibition on grief, Iverson recognizes both the abject violence in the slaughtering process and the erasure of this violence from human consumption of nonhuman animal products. The current model and function of the slaughtering process and modern grocery store prohibits shoppers from grieving while looking at hundreds of corpses in the meat section. This prohibition on grief demonstrates that mourning is a political privilege, which is only allowed in particular ways and spaces. Such restrictions maintain control over the lives, agency, and identity of others.

In his meta analysis of Butler’s work on animal lives, Stanescu demonstrates that her understanding of grief and mourning, should and, more importantly, can be applied to human engagement with nonhuman animals. In *Frames of War*, Butler clearly states that “the human
animal is itself an animal” (Butler 19). Stanescu asserts “Nietzsche had it wrong; we are not human, all too human, we are animal, all too animal” (576). The difference between what is human and what is animal is largely indistinguishable, because humans are animals (Stanescu 572). Any attempts to make such a distinction hinges on exclusionary logic. This exclusionary logic “depends upon the depolarization of life and, once again, writes out the matters of gender, menial labor, and reproduction from the field of the political” (Stanescu 574). The objection to exclusionary logic allows for Butler’s support of including nonhuman creatures as politically recognizable subjects.

Mourning initiates “connections and reaches out for relation” (Stanescu 580). In addition to starting relations, mourning also celebrates power and memories embedded in important political practices and privileges (Stanescu 580). Sanitizing the meat aisle away from this political privilege systematically re-inscribes animal slaughter. Butler repeatedly asserts that mourning is not a private act, but truly a political endeavor which sits at “the heart of social intelligibility” (Stanescu 568). However, grieving has both been regulated to the private sphere and feminized. Stanescu connects grieving, sexism, and the question of the animal. He states “Mourning is stapled to womanhood, and womanhood to the home. Thus, the same politics of sexism that sought to isolate women also worked to isolate our feelings of grief” (578).

Mourning is prohibited for the lives who are turned into corpses, sanitized, and packaged for sale. This prohibition on mourning, Stanescu argues, is aligned with the practices and outcomes of sexism. In this way, Stanescu synthesizes Butler’s understanding of grief and mourning with the hope of creating “ontological, ethical, and political concepts that resist the violence of the
present” (Stanescu 567). Like Iverson, Stanescu also calls Butler to explicitly open her system of ethics to include nonhuman animals.

With Hayle, Stanescu asserts that the pernicious practice of human exceptionalism grounds the disavowal of nonhuman lives by humans. Human exceptionalism creates a continuing pattern of illuminating what separates humans from animals, rather than what humans have in common with nonhuman creatures. The process which names “the animal” as less than human repeatedly advances events which most egregiously “betray human dignity most completely,” including slavery, colonialism, and genocide (570). Therefore, “human” has come to exist as a term that is constructed not simply to name a species but also to codify the recognition of individual lives.

I illustrated that scholarship on the posthuman, the subject need not be a cyborg or a nonhuman animal. Instead, the posthuman gives scholars and members of the body politic a new way to approach identity. Most significantly, Hayles asserts that “there is no a priori way to identify a self-will that can be clearly distinguished from an other-will” (Hayles 4). Butler acknowledges the embodied subject’s ability to deflect or reject the interpellation of socially constituted bodies. The inherent agency in Butler’s subject helps Grosz develop her assertion that both change and environments fashion identity. And, this statement from Hayles further demonstrates that identity cannot be theoretically distinguished before its existence.

6.4 Implications and Future Research Possibilities

In chapter three, I revealed rhetorical moves and tropes from the commentary of Helgstrand and Matiné’s 2006 performance. This analysis was enriched by narrative about the rest of Matiné’s career and life. I demonstrated that the commentators named Helgstrand
responsible for errors in the performance while they praised Matiné for the highlights. In further research, I plan to continue investigating this line. I suspect that many training programs use similar rhetorical moves to blame human partners for incorrect cues but highlight the animal partner for training achievements.

Considering how humans talk about successes and failures in training arenas affects more than scores within competitions. The scope of this current research cannot fully document my next claim. Even so, I suggest that the human rhetorical process of taking and assigning blame for failures in human-nonhuman animal communication attempts to take responsibility for the domestication process. Domestication, or the process of breeding specific characteristics into and out of kinds of animals, centers fully on human goals. Over time humans have constructed new lineages and entirely new kinds of animals. This process significantly affects the rules of the ontological play between all creatures. This rhetorical blame, in some ways, takes responsibility for this effect. Through these individual moments of small blame and acceptance, humans open themselves into a vulnerable position. In these moments we become both responsible and response-able.

Consider taking responsibility for domestication in light of the rest of Matiné’s life. Had Matiné innocuously stumbled while performing, surely the commentators, and perhaps even Helgstrand, would have commented on ways the rider could communicate more clearly to avoid such a fault. Thoroughbred horse racing fans and much of the public must still vividly remember the Eight Bell’s 2008 second place victory in the Kentucky Derby and immediate collapse on the track. While slowing after the race, Eight Bells collapsed and fell because of compound fractures of both her front legs at the fetlock joints, or ankles. The on-call veterinarian deemed
her injuries so severe that she could not be moved from the track, and she was immediately
euthanized. A *Washington Post* sports commentator wrote the following day about Eight Bells
and the moral crisis of Thoroughbred racing. Of Eight Bells she said “She ran with the heart of
a locomotive, on champagne-glass ankles for the pleasure of the crowd” (Jenkins). In the
following paragraphs, Jenkins later asserted “Horses are being over-bred and over-raced, until
their bodies cannot support their own ambitions, or those of the humans who race them.” In
future research, I plan to examine rhetoric surrounding human-equine interaction with
Thoroughbred racing. I suggest that the high stakes of money and lives, both human and equine,
will amplify the negative possibilities of human and equine relationships. Future research may
consider how rhetoric surrounding this industry reflects power and identity.
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The Hyracotherium is an extinct horse-like creature that was the size of a dog and had three toes, instead of the modern single hoof.

Author Eva Hayward also speaks to the use of premarin by transwomen and grapples with how the hormone is produced. She states “Hormones are a complicated business, and they're just one plot line in the relentless narrative of sex.” (Hayward, para 11). See Haraway’s work “The subtle process of transformation” for more information.

This choice also speaks to issues of class and race more effectively than bands on horse slaughter or the racing industry. Because of the expenses of boarding, feeding, training, and medical care for the modern horse (or at least in America) access is limited to individuals with substantial time and resources. I noted in the analysis of Haas’ poem, the rider and horse hold privilege that cannot be overlooked.
Part of this lack of recognition develops from media portrayals of nonhuman animals. Humans learn and are encouraged to disregard nonhuman animals by the portrayals of animal bodies represented by animated figures in cartoons. These cartoon animal bodies affect children and adults. Consider the example of Steve Baker’s analysis of political cartoons discussed in the last chapter. In Baker’s example, hybrid human and nonhuman animal bodies were created and used to negatively represent political opposition. To further demonstrate the trend of human disregard for mediated animal bodies, I look to Heinricy’s explication of Spongebob Squarepants. This example shows that animated representations encourage both children and adults to disregard the systematic violence that regularly occurs to unmediated animal bodies. Additionally, these depictions of animal bodies enable animal characters to mask racial and sexist stereotypes and subsequently allow for deniability of racist or sexist allegations (Heinricy 83). Heinricy asserts that this use of animal bodies perpetuates “speciesism in the interest of perpetuating capitalism” (89).

It is important to note that here my assertion is about process, not about outcomes. How humans use their reflections from animals varies in circumstance, often influenced by nationality, class, race, gender, and time. And, the positioning with or against animals accessible to humans of many different circumstances vary in the extreme. Many thanks to Dr. H. Weaver for pushing me to further consider intersectionality within this context. Thinking with intersectionality helps reaffirm the possibilities of responding to animals in many different ways. While outside of the scope of my training focused project, I believe that intersectionality enhances rather than detracts from the current project.
6 Also see:


7 This movement speaks to the risk that we place ourselves in revealing or accepting Agamben’s emptiness (Agamben 92).

8 This is carried through Derrida’s texts as explicated in the previous chapter.

9 Here it is important to note that I am not suggesting using Mill’s consideration of marriage as a response or answer to modern injustices. I am, however, illustrating the way that mill approaches and develops a path for justice is worth model. Additionally, I do not see liberalism as an end goal of justice, but I see it as really important to theorize about its possibilities for change.

10 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) exemplify this view through their policy campaigns and initiatives to stop the reproduction of all domesticated pets. Their policy asserts that the possibility of pets should no longer exist and assert that animals in captivity should be killed rather than continue to exist and breed future generations for captivity. These arguments exemplify the abolitionist and extinctionist position (Francione 2008, 2000 and Dunayer 2004). Donaldson and Kymlicka see this potion as unsustainable and unhelpful to the larger project of improving animal lives, particularly because so many humans become open to the possibility of relationships not based in exploitation through domesticated companion animals.
Disability studies also demonstrates that this view of striving towards self-sufficiency and independence produces an ongoing difficulty to encourage and allow individuals with disabilities to employ agency and independence. See Tobin Siebers’s *Disability Theory*, Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s *Extraordinary Bodies*, Kathy Davis’ *Dubious Equalities and Embodied Differences*.

Donaldson and Kymlicka do not view themselves as posthumanist scholars. In their rebuttal to critics of *Zoopolis*, they misconstrue a reasonable interpretation of posthumanism to state that posthumanism is concerned with drastically prolonging human life through computer technology. It was will be made clear in the following chapter that this goal is not a primary concern of the posthumanism. Donna Haraway directly contradicts this notion of prolonging human life at the expense of creatures.

It is important to note that Donaldson and Kymlicka allow for temporary, individual paternalistic intervention, even at the cost of confinement, if the intervention “preserves the possibility for the individual to enjoy liberty, and to develop and flourish as an autonomous being” (“A Defense” 156).
A note on terms referring to a particular horse and rider performance at dressage competitions.

The individual sessions were a judge scores a rider and horse pair may be called a “ride” or “test.” Each performance is made up of a particular set of required movements that the judge scores. In the musical freestyle, the rider may perform the movements in any sequence she chooses. In all other tests, the movements are proscribed in a particular pattern set by the Fédération Equestre Internationale for tests above fourth level and the United States Dressage Association for lower levels (http://www.usdf.org/about/about-dressage/newtodressage.asp). Tests below fourth level given in other countries are regulated by separate national governing bodies.

Piaffe and passage are two of the most advanced movements executed by a dressage horse and rider. They are closely related but not the same. The piaffe is a lofty two-beat gait without any forward movement or an elevated trot in place. The passage is an elevated trot while the horse moves forward.

The Gran Prix Special is a standardized test ridden by all competing teams prior to the musical freestyle. Each pair rides the same pattern, without music, and the teams with the top scores continue to the musical freestyle competition round.
Dressage is often considered to be “gymnastics for horses” illustrating the technical and athletic difficulty of the movements for the horse. This comparison also speaks to the intense level of athletic fitness required by both the horse and rider for success in training and showing. Both events are scored on a scale of 0-10 for individual movements. Additionally, both dressage and gymnastics competitions are first athletic events but are unique in the intentional application of artistic interpretation. While other sporting events are most certainly performances, meets, games, and matches are not readily called performances. I hope to further query this dissonance in further research. I suspect there is a connection with the overwhelming predominant interest of girls and women in both horseback riding and gymnastics that create a space for these athletic competitions to be rhetorically described as performances.

It is important to note that injuries in horses, much like people, cover a wide range of degrees. While an athlete may injure him or herself just enough so that they can no longer compete but still enjoy a relatively pain free life outside of strenuous endeavors, so too can horses.

It is important to note that some animal rights activists do believe that any use of animals, from meat production to the most innocuous leisurely horseback riding are solely means of oppression. I hope I have and will continue to make it clear that I see that this view, which excludes nonhuman animals from human life, is unacceptable. I believe that this view only reinforces human exceptionalism and attempts to abscond from duties of responding to and being with fellow creatures.
If money was a main goal for Matiné’s owners, they could have collect eggs from Matiné and used surrogate mares to carry additional foals to term. However, Møller spoke about this directly. DressageDaily.com reports "We won't flush any eggs from Matiné. We just want her to be in foal and have the foal on the ground herself. I believe it'll be good for her mind," said Møller. He also stated "Hormone treatments for embryotransfer are very stressful for mares." ("Struggle for Fitness is Over, Blue Hors Matiné to Become Brood Mare"). Additionally previous analogies have been made between breeding practices and institutionalized rape. Currently, I do not have a answer or response to this charge.

NH is Birke’s term for Natural Horsemanship

Milstein uses the term “zoo’d animals” instead of “zoo animals” in attempt to change the discourse that presents animals in zoos as passive.

As Haraway claims in “Cyborg Manifesto”: “Their fathers, after all, are inessential”

David Eng’s The Feeling of Kinship further explores this connection between power and kinship. Eng encourages readers to rethink kinship and recognize that kingship is linked to race and (neo)colonial exploitation. He uses examples of Asian transnational adoption, Asian diaspora, and Japanese internment to disrupt the normative narrative of the nebular family as a private space. While outside the scope of this project, the connection between race and kinship made by Eng is a powerful addition to posthuman and queer theory scholarship.

I discuss Agamben contribution in my third chapter.

While I have used “method” to describe Podhajsky’s system of training, I hope I have only done so for clarity. Additionally, I hope that I have systematically revealed Podhajsky’s “method” as communication.