ABSTRACT

Since the critical turn in rhetoric, much has been said about the ways in which identification is accomplished. Not least among those studies concerned with identity, Maurice Charland’s constitutive rhetoric has been widely influential in the field of communication. Charland’s notion of the origins of identity in discourse has not been significantly challenged since he first described constitutive rhetoric as a process. At the same time, the reemergence of nationalist causes has suggested that we might return to the theory in order to understand the discourse that is influencing debates about the sovereignty of people groups. This study examines conceptions of Scottishness both in contemporary and historical discourse to gain a better understanding of how Charland’s constitutive rhetoric functions. However, it also points out crucial flaws in Charland’s concept and seeks to reconstruct constitutive rhetoric to be consistent with a more dynamic conception of society and rhetoric’s role in it.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom and to all of those people who, like me, are passionate about trying to understand the complex ways in which we humans relate to each other.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people without whom this thesis would have been impossible. Without being too exhaustive, I must begin by thanking my mother, who taught me how to read and write as well as all those people who, over the course of my education made me familiar with new concepts and ideas. More immediately, I must thank my advisor, Dr. Beth Bennett, whose constant, sobering editorial work has provided the necessary antidote to my own eristic and polemic approach to writing. Additionally, I must thank her for her role in helping me develop as a scholar; her advice is always of immense value to me personally as well as professionally. Dr. Jason Black steered me toward this topic and provided valuable insight in early and later drafts for which I am grateful.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The advent of a referendum on Scottish independence, in 2014, invites many difficult questions for the people of the British Isles as well as for communication scholars interested in studying identity. Andrew Bolger remarks that identity has emerged as an issue in debates over the referendum, which was previously focused mostly on pragmatic, rational reasons for independence (4). These conditions create a ripe opportunity for reexamining Maurice Charland’s highly influential and virtually uncontested work on the construction of identity through constitutive rhetoric, published in the late 1980s.

Charland’s study examined the rhetoric of the Parti Quebeceois as they sought to gain independence for Quebec from Canada and broadly concluded that the identity of the Quebeceois subject was constructed through discourse. Applying his position that the constitution of identity occurs through discourse to many other situations, various rhetorical scholars have followed in his wake, either openly or tacitly accepting his conclusions.1 I am similarly interested in applying Charland’s concepts to discourse that might be broadly construed as rhetoric of Scottish nationalism. Moreover, in what follows, I not only use Charland’s theory to conduct a case study, but also use the results of the case study to reexamine the theory and the premises it assumes, including Charland’s view of society.

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1 See, for example, the work of Helen Tate, Katja Thieme, and Peter Zhang.
In terms of this case study, the emergence of identity in the debate over independence prompts a reexamination of what the terms Scottish, British, and English mean. And it is worth noting that these terms are not merely significant to scholars, but also to the people who refer to themselves as Scottish, British, and English. For instance, in their essay in Nations and Nationalism, Susan Condor and Jackie Abell identify a multitude of perspectives that exist within Scotland regarding its relationship with the British Empire. They conclude that there is not a monolithic sense in which the historical empire is understood by people; rather, there are many, often conflicting, narratives describing the relationship (469). The disparate understandings of this single aspect of Anglo-Scottish identity show that, on the ground, individual people struggle with the meanings of these terms, even as scholars also grapple with them. Thus, in a sense, the debate over independence is a debate over the meaning of the terms British, Scottish, and English. Indeed, the side which offers the most credible definitions of them will have a significant advantage in the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence.

Justifications for the Study of Scottish Constitutive Rhetoric

In 2014, Scots have an historic opportunity to vote on the issue of their independence from the United Kingdom. While rhetoric about Scottish independence is not a new phenomenon, the fact that the Scottish National Party has successfully employed nationalist rhetoric to engender support for a referendum on independence seems to justify a reexamination

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2 ‘British’ is often used to describe persons from England, Scotland, and Wales; whereas, ‘Scottish’ and ‘English’ are more specific identifiers.

3 The referendum, to be held in October 2014, will offer Scots a choice between remaining part of the United Kingdom or forming their own country. It is the first time the issue has been brought to an official vote in nearly three hundred years.
of the character of such rhetoric by communication scholars. Certainly, the role that rhetoric has played in this process should not go unexamined. More specifically, as Douglas Bicket notes, in an age where national identity in the English speaking world is blurred by media that know no boundaries (5-6), we need to examine the efforts of groups such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) to distinguish themselves from perceived others. Moreover, because the focus of this study is historical, it gives us the opportunity to examine rhetoric’s role in the historical process of building and destroying nation states.

The theoretical frame of this study is Maurice Charland’s concept of constitutive rhetoric, which provides us with a critical lens for examining the manner in which a particular ‘people’ may be constituted by nationalist discourse (138-9). For the most part, Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric has been accepted at face value by scholars who have employed it to demonstrate the ways in which messages create identities that reinforce or attack hegemonic structures and validate or de-legitimate power relationships. As Kenneth Chase points out, such rhetorical scholarship makes assumptions about ethics and the nature of what is desirable without defending those assumptions vis-à-vis philosophy (239-40). Charland’s work itself relies heavily on the French Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser, but often without critically engaging Althusser’s arguments. Thus, those who have employed Charland’s theory, by extension, participate in an uncritical dissemination of Althusser’s philosophy. This study acknowledges the importance of Charland’s theory but seeks to alter the philosophic assumptions on which it is

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4 The SNP is a left-of-center political party that was founded in the early nineteenth century. For an introduction to its past, see Peter Lynch’s SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party.

5 See, for example, Peter Zhang’s Corporate Identity Metaphor as Constitutive Discourse in Miniature.
grounded; the study’s examination of Scottish independence rhetoric aims to provide grounds for reconstructing the concept of constitutive rhetoric and enhancing its function as a critical theory.

But rather than moving deductively toward such an end, this study proceeds inductively as I examine certain texts, the inventional processes that created them and their afterlives, in order to create a grounded theory of constitutive rhetoric based on how the texts function. In so doing, my goal is to escape the traditional process, whereby humanistic scholars typically speculate rationalistically that a text, a people, or a group functions in a particular way and subsequently search for evidence to support their theory, often conflating textual interpretation with documentation of evidence.

The texts in which this study is grounded are the following: “The Declaration of Arbroath,”6 Robert Burns’ poems “Scots Wha Ha’e” and “For A’ that,”7 “The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the United Nations Organization,”8 and “Choice” and “Re-Elect a Scottish Government Working for Scotland”.9 Deliberately, these texts were selected to span a substantial difference in time and represent different discursive genera. That is, “The Declaration of Arbroath” was composed around 1320, while “Scots Wha Ha’e” dates from the late eighteenth century, and “Choice” was published in 2012. Two of the documents are poems by a single author, Robert Burns, while two are letters and two are manifestos produced by a modern political party. These variations in date and genre were selected to strengthen the study,

6 The author of the “Declaration of Arbroath” is unknown; for ease in reference, the text has been included in Appendix A. It is listed by its title in the bibliography.

7 These poems are included in Appendices B and C respectively.

8 This letter was probably composed by a committee and can be found under the name of its lead author, R.E. Muirhead in the bibliography.

9 Both “Choice” and “Re-Elect…” are publications of the Scottish National Party and can be found under that name in the bibliography.
by demonstrating that the constitutive process is not a phenomenon unique to modern eras and that texts from widely differing genera can function constitutively. In any case, I am aware that a study which is focusing on theory as much as it is on documents situated in historical contexts cannot make any claim to representing an authentic ‘Scottishness.’ Indeed, that is far from my purpose. Instead, I am approaching ‘Scottishness’ on the assumption that it is not to be found in any one text (if it is to be found there at all) but in multiple texts. That is, to use McGee’s term, discourse on Scottishness is ‘fragmented’ into individual texts and I view my task as sifting through these fragments to identify both common and discordant themes (McGee, “Text, Context” 279).

Individually, each document included in this study is significant in its own right. According to Grant Simpson, “The Declaration of Arbroath,” has been repeatedly described “as a manifesto of Scottish liberty,” despite the fact that it also served a persuasive function, as a letter to the Pope (22). Aside from its status as an important political document identifying the Scottish people during the Middle Ages, it also attained significance in its afterlife. Simpson argues that its most substantial contribution to a Scottish sense of identity comes in the form of the numerous re-publications it underwent after its rediscovery in the sixteenth century (16). This cycle has culminated in its popular translation, not the Latin original, being enshrined in the National Archives of Scotland.

Burns’ two poems are significant sources for a variety of reasons. First, Burns himself is a major national figure in Scotland. Nigel Leask comments that Burns is, perhaps, the major national literary figure for Scots because he is regarded, even by contemporary commentators, as the last visible embodiment of the old Scottish way of life (127). Burns’ career as a writer occurred at a moment in history when Scots, at least the upper and middle classes, were acculturating themselves to become British. The popular view of scholars, though not all agree,
is that his writing provided a framework for resisting this change. Moreover, there is substantial evidence to show that the poems continued to be read, performed, and even sung for many years after Burns’ death. Thus, an analysis of each of these poems, published at the end of the eighteenth century (“Scots Wha Ha’e”) and the early to mid-nineteenth century (“For A’ That”), gives us critical insight into how a prominent and popular figure envisioned Scottishness, as well as how his vision was co-opted, adapted, and employed by other Scots.

“The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the United Nations Organization,” a letter to an international mediating body, represents a movement in embryo. At the time it was composed, according to Murrary Pittock in his book, *Scottish Nationality*, the desire for nationhood or independence was experienced only by a minority of Scots living in Scotland at the time the letter was written (115). This letter was composed as a result of a convention on Scottish independence, rejected by the United Nations, and published only in a party broadside. Nonetheless, it aptly illustrates that a document need not have massive effects in order to be worth studying. While it undoubtedly has had little direct effect on how Scots come to perceive themselves, this letter paints a picture of the internal workings of the movement for Scottish independence before it became a force to be rivaled with in politics. A study of this document permits a comparison of its constitutive rhetoric with later documents, such as “Choice,” possibly enabling the development of insight into why more recent constitutive rhetorics have been more successful. The final documents “Choice” and “Re-elect a Scottish Government Working for Scotland” are the Scottish National Party’s manifestos related to independence produced as part of their 2011 and 2012 campaigns. They represent the discourse of the modern Scottish National Party, illustrating its views on who Scots are and on what kinds of arguments should appeal to them.
Method and Research Questions

Methodologically, this study proceeds by applying Charland’s concept of constitutive rhetoric to the phenomenon of Scottish independence rhetoric. Charland’s concept is an especially appropriate means for analyzing Scottish independence rhetoric because it was constructed as a means of understanding how identities are constructed rhetorically. More specifically, it was constructed to explain how the rhetorical identity of the peuple Quebecois came to identify those citizens of Quebec who favored independence from Canada (Charland 134-5). The rhetorical situation, as it were, is somewhat analogous to that faced by the Scots. In preparation for a referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the Parti Quebecois issued a white paper on independence describing the people of Quebec as a separate people deserving of their own state and urging their support of the party in an upcoming election (135). The Scottish situation is one where a nationalist party, the SNP, is urging Scots to support their party in a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom. For the most part, my application of Charland resembles that of studies, such as the work of Helen Tate and of Katja Thieme, that use it to analyze power relationships in society. Given the extensive historical work which views Scotland as a colony of the British Empire, the theory is particularly useful as a tool for sifting through such discourses of power.

My application is not, however, identical to Charland’s application to the rhetoric of Quebec sovereignty. The main difference is that I use the theory to examine multiple historical artifacts, in order to unearth historical continuities; in this way, my aim was to shed light on the

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10 Thus, in contrast to radical applications of Charland, such as the case studies of Sarah Stein and Peter Zhang, my application of the theory is to a political situation which closely parallels the circumstances out of which Charland formulated his theory.

11 For more discussion of these particular studies, see the Literature Review section below, 12-13.
depth of identity as a phenomenon deeply rooted in the public memory. This extension in no way invalidates or compromises the use of the theory. In fact, it may allow the second portion of the theory which Charland describes as the positioning of a “transhistorical subject” to be understood in greater detail (140). My application, for the most part, examines the same kind of documents that Charland examined, with the exception of Burns’ two songs which are different kinds of rhetorical texts. Yet, this application to a different genre promises only to demonstrate the ways in which the theory is more applicable to the study of identity across arbitrary categorical distinctions of genre.

On the whole, my project proceeds in the same vein as Charland’s work, lacking any serious problems that would inhibit the theory from being a useful methodological tool. This approach is designed as a means of answering the following questions, which form the main lines of inquiry in the study. First, what ‘British’ identities are described in the texts that constitute the artifacts for the study? Second, is Charland’s theory of how the subject is constituted through discourse consistent with the way in which these texts function?

Literature Review

The notion of a rhetorically constructed identity existing in Scotland is not new. Indeed, scholars have addressed the question before, often through historical lenses which point to the material or ideological conditions that impacted or led to the creation of an identity. Literary scholars have examined the embodiment of the identity in texts and movements of texts, most notably, the impact of the romantic literary movement on Scottish identity. But rhetoric, as a discipline that deals with public texts or the public properties of texts, has not been brought to bear on the question. Because of the lack of rhetorical scholarship, this study is per force an interdisciplinary study. This aspect is strongly reflected in the literature review that follows,
which draws from literary history, political and economic history, as well as some modern social science in its effort to construct a picture of how Scotland has been identified at various times. For the purposes of organization, the literature review is divided into two broad categories: research related to the constitutive frame and research related to the historical background of Scottish identity.

Much of the evidence regarding a historically defined Scottish identity leads one to conclude that the definition of the term Scottish has been contested since at least the thirteenth century and that the contest has never fully been settled. For purposes of structure, the first section of the literature review is divided into two sections. In section one, I discuss Maurice Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric, the tradition in rhetorical theory of which it is a part, and the links between Charland’s theory and other work on nationalism in the British Isles. The second section of the literature review is divided into three sub-sections, organized around the historic periods during which the documents that form the artifacts of this study were composed: the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We need to review these periods for the purpose of establishing some scholarly context for the artifacts of the study. Some effort has been made to fill in the historical gaps between the periods in question, but only insofar as it contributes to the understanding of later periods. For example, I do not attempt to fill in the gap between the early fourteenth century and the late eighteenth century. As such a division suggests, I treat the scholarship related to a historical Scottish identity in a somewhat chronological order, making this section a narrative that depicts the way in which scholarship has treated the subject.

*Constitutive Rhetoric*
Charland’s constitutive rhetoric is a part of a tradition to which several other theorists contribute, most notably: Michael Calvin McGee, Kenneth Burke, and Louis Althuser. In his contribution to this tradition, Charland outlines three apparent ideological effects of constitutive rhetoric, which are rooted in the work of the scholars previously mentioned. In what follows, I review Charland’s ideological effects and link them to other theorists writing in the same tradition, before examining how others contribute to the tradition by following in Charland’s footsteps.

First, according to Charland, the identity constituted by a narrative “transcends the limitations of individual body and will” and “offers an ‘ultimate’ identification permitting an overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class interests and concerns” (139). Constitutive rhetoric appeals to a deeper sense of individual identity which is rooted in the individual’s understanding of his or her relationship with the collective, transcending the usually divisive identities of class and other uniquely individual concerns. Here, Charland echoes the work of McGee who contends that there are in the public memory “seeds of collectivization” or “aphorisms, maxims and commonplaces” that can be organized into “incipient political myths, visions of the collective life dangled before individuals in the hope of creating a real ‘people’” (“In Search of ‘the People’” 243).

Second, constitutive rhetoric positions a “transhistorical subject” and describes the past “as an extension of the present,” with the end result that “time is collapsed as narrative identification occurs” (140). The identity thus constructed by narratives of constitutive rhetoric is deeply embedded in the past and especially in the subject’s sense of the past with which he or she is temporarily reunited in the world invoked by the narrative. This aspect of the theory also relies heavily on McGee’s notion of the seeds of collectivization in that these ‘seeds’ are often
rooted in history of a people or their shared experiences as a people (243). Moreover, McGee insists, the subject is necessarily transhistorical because “objective reality” is only an “ontological construct” (245). That is, for rhetorical purposes, history functions as an invention resource for narratives that enable people to identify themselves, meaning that what ‘really happened’ does not matter. Far more important to the rhetorical scholar studying history is how people imagine history to have happened and how they view themselves in relation to history. Thus, the seeds of collectivization which are rooted ‘in history’ are really only rooted in the public imagination of history, enabling the subject to imagine a past that bears an explicit relationship to the present.

Finally, Charland argues that constitutive rhetorics offer the illusion of freedom. He says, “Freedom is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written. Furthermore, because the narrative is a structure of understanding that produces totalizing interpretations, the subject is constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative’s consistency” (141). Althuser, a Marxist philosopher, argues that subject positions or identities are not entered into volitionally but that individuals are interpellated or hailed by ideological messages that offer them the illusory choice to identify with a subject position. That is, individuals are faced with a hegemonic force that seeks to define them, and upon being hailed or interpellated by it, they are powerless to resist it.

Kenneth Burke, on the other hand, whom Charland purports to draw on, argues in his Rhetoric of Motives that “the audience feels as though it were not merely receiving, but were itself creatively participating in the poet or speaker’s assertion” (58). Thus, the process of identification is a discursive one that at once seems to permit audiences to define themselves

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12 Of course, he contends that this choice is not real; for more discussion, refer to Althuser, 174-5.
while also compelling them to define themselves within certain boundaries. Charland summarizes: “The freedom of the character in a narrative is an illusion, for narratives move inexorably toward their telos” (141).

It is this process of interpellation, happening over and over again, which permits a notion of “the people,” previously only a fiction, to become a reality. In this sense, Charland is drawing on Michael Calvin McGee’s point that “individuals must be seduced into abandoning their individuality, convinced of their sociality” in order to make real the fictive notion of “the people” advanced by a leader (“In Search of the People,” 242). In essence, rooted in Althusser’s understanding of the subject and McGee’s understanding of how we come collectively to identify ourselves, Charland suggests that narratives make alternative choices impossible and move (un)willing subjects toward new identity positions without their knowledge.

As a theory, constitutive rhetoric has spawned a tradition of scholarship that is focused on applying the theory to new situations. As Kenneth Chase discusses in an essay that attempts to shore up the foundations of critical rhetoric, constitutive rhetoric may be linked to other social constructionist accounts of the relationship between individuals and language or language and society (239–40). While Charland did not describe the process of constituting a subject, as a process with explicit moral implications, the process he describes has been used to describe situations which certain scholars regard as immoral.

In her application of Charland’s theory, Katja Thieme argues that “texts attempt to shape the responses they receive; they do so by interpellating their readers” (37). She also correctly summarizes this concept: “Charland criticizes the idea that audiences are free to choose, free to be persuaded” (42). In her analysis of Canadian suffragette texts, Thieme suggests that the constitutive rhetoric of the texts addresses and thus calls into being “‘gentle’ or ‘idle’ ladies” through its constitutive function (43). Applied in this sense, it is easy to see close connections
between constitutive rhetoric and theories of social constructionism which claim discourse to be constructive of identity positions.

Other scholarship confirms that Charland’s theory functions in a manner similar to social constructionism. Sarah Stein, for instance, provides the following summary: “Audiences are not considered to exist outside rhetoric as the subjects of its address, but rather ‘live inside’ the rhetoric that constructs them” (173). In discussing her findings regarding the application of the theory to a Macintosh advertisement, Stein argues: “Advertising discourse constitutes viewers as deficient in some quality, attribute, or value such as happiness or liberty, a deficiency constructed as happily remedied through the consumption of material objects” (174). Thus, constitutive rhetoric becomes a means through which to shape and mold unwitting consumers of media messages by positioning them as broken.

The theory has also been applied to organizational rhetoric and the metaphors used to construct corporate identity. Peter Zhang argues that metaphor functions in a constitutive way when a collectivity or individual is compared to something abstract entity. The comparison suggests a deficiency, interpellating the subject(s) of comparison, which can only be remedied by attempting to adhere to an ideal identity. In this manner, the subject’s behavior is disciplined by suggesting that certain behavior is unacceptable and other behavior is acceptable. Identification then becomes a tool of power to retain control over others by comparing them to unachievable ideal personas vis-à-vis metaphor (388-9).

Perhaps the farthest extension of Charland’s theory comes from feminist scholar Helen Tate, who suggests: “rhetorical effect [is the] process of subjectivity, how we come to see ourselves as social and political collectives” (6). For Tate ‘the people’ “are conjured into objective reality by the rhetorical process and remain as long as the rhetoric that defined them has force” (6). Tate also remarks: “In the struggle to name and rename, define and redefine who
we are and who others are, we are likely to find an identity constituting narrative, one implied by the act of naming and renaming” (7). Thus, the very act of speaking is an act of constructing an identity.

The contention that the people “are conjured into objective reality” is perhaps the most succinct demonstration of how Charland’s theory has been used as a means of explaining how rhetoric functions to serve the ends of dominant groups. While there are other examples of how the theory has been applied, the essays I have described in the aforementioned demonstrate that as a process, constitutive rhetoric is both understood to be closely related to social constructivism and usable as a means of subjugating or disciplining non-dominant groups with (often implicit) moral implications.

*History and Identity in the British Isles*

Scottish nationalism is a phenomenon that is deeply indebted to the past. Moreover, the connection between the past and identity is extensively studies by scholars concerned with history, literature, and identity. Social scientists Murray Leith and Daniel Soule argue in their work on modern Scottish nationalism that ideological narratives sometimes function by invoking “the past […] for the purposes of the present” (114). The Scottish medievalist Roy James Goldstein also comments: “historical writing played a constitutive role in the development of national consciousness” (6). Of course, Leith and Soule are investigating the present situation and Goldstein, medieval Scotland, but both studies are investigating the same phenomenon – a narrative of identity deeply rooted in conceptions of the past, perhaps more so in the Scottish situation. Certainly, that conception of the past need not be rooted in an objectively understood account of what took place in the past, the ‘public consciousness’ is not so fastidious about such things. As literary theorist John McGavin argues, the past is often imagined in a theatrical sense, that is, it is retained in the memory and subsequently represented to the imagination when
remembered (1). He further points out that one need not actually have witnessed an event for it to pass into the public memory and thus be transmitted to others (1-2). Thus, the public version of history seems to be the matter from which Scottish identities are formed.

Because it is such an integral part of the Scottish sense of self, it is important to get some sense of the public version of history that informs a Scottish sense of self. While not being undisputed, a significant group of historians view Scotland’s past as analogous to the experience of a colony, controlled by a mother country. As Susan Condor and Jackie Abell stress, this view is not universally accepted by the Scottish public (465). Nevertheless, because this view of Scotland’s past is current in public thought about history and because some groups do emphasize the existence of centers and peripheries of power, it is a view that cannot be dismissed as a mere scholarly concern. Indeed, a great deal of scholarship on Scotland is devoted to defining Scotland as peripheral to the power center based in London.

Cairns Craig’s *Out of History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and British Culture* is exemplary of this trend. Craig argues, in the tradition of Edward Said that history is driven by a dynamic that is a “dialectic in space […] between those who dominate space and those” whose space is dominated (113-4).13 Furthermore, Craig contends that it is largely the goal of postcolonial theory to “define and maintain a cultural space” in the face of imperial domination (114). He is not alone in thinking of Scotland as a colony; numerous examples from popular and scholarly histories of Scotland are decidedly in favor of viewing Scotland as a colonized place. The medieval historian Michael Prestwich declares that Edward I’s intentions toward Scotland were colonial in the Middle Ages. The historian William Ferguson agrees; he states, the problems faced by ex-colonies “striv[ing] to establish valid national identities are paralleled by

13 Anyone interested in Edward Said’s postcolonial theory should start with his seminal work: *Orientalism.*
the Scottish attempt at doing so” (301). William Dickinson declares “religious houses were colonised from England” by the placement of Anglo-Normans in positions of power (123).

These are arguments advanced by reputable scholars. Less reputable and arguably more influential popular histories are not so constrained. For instance, according to Murray Watson, extremist groups in late twentieth century Scotland declared it a “colonial outpost of a putative English empire” even referring to non-natives as “English white settler[s]” (7). Ludovic Kennedy’s popular history of the union entitled In Bed with an Elephant calls Scottish artifacts in the British museum in London “imperial loot” (189-91).

In opposition, the historian Colin Kidd has argued vehemently against this kind of portrayal, pointing out that nineteenth century Scots saw themselves as participants in the British Empire (876). We cannot ignore this view because it is also current in modern Scottish attitudes toward history and the empire (Condor and Abell 465). Indeed, it seems that in their efforts to frame Scotland as a colonized place, historians turn to the periods marked by struggle and marginalize eras marked by peaceful acceptance of ‘English’ ideas and culture. The very notion of England “as Scotland’s ‘other’” is a development of the twentieth century, or rather a revival of pre-imperial sentiments (Kidd 891-2). As much as scholars might sympathize with a more nuanced view of Scottish history, the absolute accuracy of historical writing is not relevant insofar as a piece of popular history reflects even a minority view of the public’s understanding of history. Furthermore, because the popular sense of history depends in some cases on popular histories and the documents used to validate them, it is the rhetorical effect of such documents and histories that is of concern here, not their relationship to an objectively defined past. We cannot think of “the nation as ‘invented tradition’” or an identity built by popular historians that the masses had no part in creating (Leith and Soule 122). Instead, we must both examine the identity that such writers attempt to popularize and to note identities that become accepted or
rejected. We cannot assume that the identity has been accepted automatically. Such an assumption vastly oversimplifies the relationship between identity and the past.

I cannot proceed without attempting to contextualize the documents that form the basis for this study. The need for context does not stem from the need to establish a baseline, to know what ‘really’ happened. Whether or not the past is objectively describable or an ontological construct is unimportant. To the extent that people make use of notions of the past, real or constructed, as though they were real, then such notions take on a life of their own in the public memory. Thus ensconced, ‘history’ impacts identity. In what follows, I both contextualize the Scottish past, as it relates to the study’s artifacts, and the ways in which the past has impacted and continues to impact identity through the documents in question.

Medieval Period

The primary text from this era which functions as an artifact for this study is the “Declaration of Arbroath,” an early fourteenth century letter to the Pope from the landowners of Scotland. Perhaps the most neutral description of the letter from Jonathan Hearn’s Claiming Scotland calls it a statement of “historical political autonomy from England” (102). The Declaration is situated during the historical period usually called the “wars of independence,” a phrase identified by the leading Scottish medievalist G.W S. Barrow as a “misleading modernism,”14 which nonetheless reflects the deep connection between the present and this moment in Scottish history (113).

The wars of independence were fought as a result of the death of the Scottish king without a clear heir to the throne. Edward I of England was brought in to arbitrate, and it seemed that at first he would become the Scottish king by marriage to a distant heir (119). In any case,

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14 A modernism, as Barrow is using the term, is a term invented to describe the past which people who lived at the time would not have used or understood.
the marriage did not occur, and Edward’s claim very quickly became disputed. Another king was selected and was, thereafter, defeated by Edward, during an invasion of Scotland. As Barrow argues, the high nobility of Scotland accepted the defeat in a manner consistent with the dictates of feudal honor, many of them pledging their allegiance to Edward I as the Scottish king (119-20).

Thus, it was not the nobility who were behind the subsequent uprisings against Edward I’s control. Barrow reports that it was “the lesser lairds, gentry and substantial freeholders” that formed the bulk of the resistance to Edward I in the coming years (119). This class of people formed a higher percentage of the population of medieval Scotland than in feudal kingdoms, and as a group, they exercised formidable influence over the course of national events. Barrow also points out that among those groups deeply dissatisfied with the course of national events was the Scottish church (121), which had some influence on the composition of the Declaration. Within this scene, Robert Bruce began his series of campaigns against Edward I, ultimately wresting control of the nation from him.

The “Declaration of Arbroath” dates to 1320, when the wars were, broadly speaking, nearing a conclusion and Bruce desired to have his kingship legitimated by the papacy. Thus, as Grant Simpson claims, we should look at the Declaration as a document written for diplomatic reasons, not motivated by “a sudden outbreak of patriotic feeling in the breasts of certain Scottish barons” (18). Simpson, a textual scholar who has done substantial work on the Declaration, further points to a certain “eagerness to hail the document as a manifesto of Scottish liberty,” which subsequently distorts attempts to treat the document objectively in historical accounts (22). While inclined to accept Simpson’s view concerning the sobriety with which the document must be approached, it cannot be denied that it is a manifesto calling for “national
unity and [desire for] freedom” (31). The full text of the Declaration is provided in Appendix A. Here I examine how various scholars have treated its rhetorical impact.

Clearly, the Declaration is regarded as a rhetorical kind of document or as a functional document designed to accomplish a specific rhetorical purpose. Simpson suggests that it may have been written by “someone in the king’s service” who was “a first-rate Latin rhetorician” (26). Its authorship is uncertain, but some have suggested it was written by a clergy person or an otherwise well-educated person. For instance, Simpson indicates that the rhythm of the text indicates that the author was familiar with Latin prose style (11). The historian J. R. Phillip notes that the author quotes from Sallust’s history of the Catiline conspiracy, indicating a familiarity with the corpus of classical literature available at the time (75). Aside from its obvious rhetorical qualities as a letter composed by a highly skilled writer, it is certainly a piece of writing that is first and foremost designed to accomplish something, giving it the quality of a public document rather than an artistic one.

Embodying the old view of the document, the historian Phillip calls it a “Declaration of Scottish Independence” (78). More recent scholarship reminds one to take a more sober view of it. Stephan Hall, a scholar of medieval Scottish poetry, argues that the “Declaration of Arbroath” was the “first written self-identification of [Scots] as a nation” (25). The first charge levied against the Declaration as such is that it self-identifies the nobility and no one else. This charge has not been entirely refuted. As Barrow demonstrates, the wars of independence were wars which involved not only the upper classes of Scottish feudal society, but also the lower orders as well (121). This is the argument typically advanced by those who wish to call the document an expression of popular feeling. Indeed, as Christopher Harvie views it, the document itself speaks of the calamities faced by the peasantry at the hands of Edward’s
invading armies, not exclusively of the violation of feudal privileges, arguing for a “freedom from unfreedom” for all classes (23).

Hall indicates that while it is inappropriate to disregard the contributions of the lower orders to society, it is almost inevitable when conducting textual analysis of identity in a premodern society. He argues, “Illiterates would have participated in [cultural] processes as well through the oral traditions and oral transmissions of stories and ideas in folk culture” (29). But these contributions are somewhat invisible because they were oral and not written. In any case, in examining the Declaration it is possible that one may have a glimpse into the popular mind by examining a seminal document of an otherwise oral culture. Simpson makes the point that the document lived on in popular memory in the form of pamphlets, works of popular history, and through fresh translations, all of which enabled it influence a Scottish sense of identity as much as the Pope at Avignon for whom it was written (16).

According to P.H. Scott, there are also those who view the Declaration as an early expression of the doctrine of popular sovereignty (7). Hall suggests that it is a “fine example of nationalist ideology,” which subsequent writers drew upon for ideological purposes. To say that it is an ideological document does not exclude it from also being a functional, rhetorical document which constructs a Scottish identity. There may in fact be a strong link between the ideology of the text and the identity expressed, but the argument that the text expresses a somewhat popular identity does not rise and fall with the argument that it expresses the political doctrine of popular sovereignty. Regardless of the ideology motivating its writers, most of the scholarship on the document suggests that the text embodies a popular sentiment and thus a popular sense of the Scottish self. Noting the important reservations of some scholars, I operate from the view that the Declaration is a popular text which influenced and continues to influence a Scottish sense of identity.
It is with this latter point in mind that I must briefly defend my choice of translations. The translation from Latin which I employ is the copy maintained by the National Archives of Scotland, translated by Sir James Fergusson. While Simpson criticizes this text as a popular corruption, there are at least two good reasons for accepting this translation as representative. First, it is the popular translation of record referred to in modern pamphlets and other political and cultural expressions, which means that it is this text, and not some dusty scholarly copy, that is ‘alive’ and functioning within society. Since this afterlife is a rhetorical function of the text, it is fitting to use the text used in popular sources in an analysis concerned strictly with the identity which the text embodies. The second reason is that the Fergusson’s text has been reviewed by other scholars and edited in the places where it was most egregiously lacking.

**Romantic Period**

In moving toward an examination of what might be loosely termed the romantic period of literature, we need to recall a few of the well-known events that occurred leading up to this period, for the sake of establishing a context. Scotland and England remained separate throughout the remainder of the middle ages, until 1603, when a regal union was reached as the crown of England passed to the Scottish King James IV and I. This regal union was only palatable because of the reformation, which had effectively split Scottish society between the Catholic Highlands and the Protestant Lowlands, a division which some popular sources blame for ‘derailing’ the course of Scottish history (Craig, 13). In any case, the common Protestantism of the Scottish Lowlanders and the English made such a union possible. But to say that religious differences made the union possible is to understake the role that religion played in the

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15 Simpson complains that the Fergusson translation is unmindful of the complex problems related to reconstructing the text faithfully, the original copy of which is lost (16).

16 For further details, please refer to the document itself and the notes appended to it by archivists, in Appendix A.
maintenance of the union. The union was not only possible but, in many cases, was seen as desirable. The union was the means by which Lowland Protestants could stave off any attempt to return the country to Catholicism through a formal alliance with a regional protestant power. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, religious identity played a much more substantial role in national politics than a ‘Scottish’ national identity did, in the sense that it was not a longing for Scottish nationhood that defined the era, but a desire for religious freedom. But as literary scholar Stephan Hall advises, we cannot consider one aspect of identity more important than another because national identities exist alongside other categories of identification and rarely does one eclipse the others completely (24-5).

In 1707, a union of the Scottish and English parliaments was effected through means regarded at the time as underhanded and which have since been validated by the historical record as such (Devine Scotland’s 49). The union was not entirely popular, especially with the lower classes and the highland clans. Subsequent ‘risings’ occurred in 1715, and in 1745, when the dispossessed Stuart Kings of the United Kingdom attempted to regain their thrones with Scottish help. These risings were not successful, but they did succeed in painting for the English public a picture of Scots as dangerous and barbaric, as real threats to the stability of the kingdom, or as sources for reintroducing the Catholic Church to the island. According to T.M. Devine, this identity position would eventually transform itself from barbaric to heroic, dangerous to virile, as the Scottish eventually became more deeply involved in the British Empire (Scotland’s 358-9).

Some fourteen years after the last military rising of the Scots, Robert Burns was born. As Henry Grey Graham explains, Burns’ poems, two of which are subjects of my analysis in Chapter 2, revived the rural patois of Scotland through their language and reintroduced it to polite society at a time when it was regarded as a mark of uncouthness (382). While his style gained a great deal of respect for Scots as a literary language, Nigel Leask acknowledges that the arguments
advanced by his poetry and his subjects of composition were often considered distasteful by the upper classes (132-3).

A great deal of the scholarly literature surrounding Burns is devoted to trying to place his work as part of the early romantic period in Anglo-Scottish literature. The question of Burns’ place in this extremely diverse period is worth examining because his place in the Scottish romantic movement affects to some extent how we might come to understand his own sense of Scottishness. Burns has also become a key element of the national identity because his own identity as a national figure is bound tightly with the identities of various individuals (Leith and Soule 113-14). Thus, it is insufficient and probably disingenuous to say that it is only the effect of Burns’ work that is important, that Burns’ expressed views are unimportant. Some attempt should at least be made to reconcile the two, and as a precondition of my attempt to establish a coherent, reconciled account of Burns’ views and the effects of his writing, I proceed to outline the movement of which he was a part, the debate that surrounds his contributions to it, and the afterlives of the texts which function as artifacts in this project.

It is helpful in establishing the context of Burns’ work to mention another well-known Scottish writer of the same time period, Sir Walter Scott. Surveying the whole movement of Scottish romanticism, the literary historian Murray Pittock argues that generally speaking the works of Scottish romantics functioned in a close relationship with the histories of Scotland written during the enlightenment in such a way that the former validated the latter (Edinburgh, 8). Any modern reader of Scott’s novels will note the numerous footnotes and parenthetical explanations of history made by the author. These histories, Pittock continues, were part of a

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17 Walter Scott was a Scottish novelist known for Waverly Place, Ivanhoe, and other romantic novels set in medieval and early-modern Scotland. Scott’s entry, in Trevor Royle’s The MacMillan Companion to Scottish Literature, 2625 is a good starting place for the interested reader.
broader effort to define Scotland as a portion of Britain and to enable the Scots to “find their place” in the new British nation (8-9).

The movement was also driven by the sense that the union, while politically and economically benefiting Scotland, was destroying its own sense of uniqueness and turning it into “North Britain.” As T. M. Devine suggests: “The very threat of annihilation of the historic identity triggered a reaction. Sir Walter Scott himself […] helped to pioneer major collections of Scottish ballads and folk tales” (“In Bed with an Elephant,” 7). Of course, Scott also encouraged upper class interest in the cult of tartanry, the traditional dress of Scotland, which was outlawed following the last rising in 1745. Scott’s contributions seem only to have encouraged political anglicization, while attempting to preserve a unique identity for Scotland that was aesthetic and cultural but not political (Newman 15). Steve Newman also notes that as a member of the aristocratic set, Scott considered Burns’ work plebeian (19-20).

Many scholars nevertheless link Burns and Scott and consider them both to be working to make Scottishness more palatable to a wider public. For instance, Juliet Shields argues that the romantic writers, which includes Burns, “responded to Scotland’s loss of independent sovereignty by seeking in sentiment […] a compensation for political dispossession” (1). She also points out that the highland masculinity which had been understood as threatening was made compatible with Britishness by the romantics as they transformed it into a quality which would enable Scots to be of value to the empire (5-6).

Devine claims that, jacobite sentiment during the romantic period was understood to represent support for the monarchy. This support was much needed at a moment in history when monarchy was beginning to be threatened by egalitarian forces such as the French revolution. Even if that devotion to monarchy had once been misplaced in the wrong object, it was at least opposed to republicanism (Scotland’s, 359-60). And indeed, material evidence seems to suggest
that Scots on the whole were devoted to the concept of monarchy; Devine points to the fact that most Scots remained loyal to the crown during the American Revolution as evidence supporting this argument (6). Others argue that the object of Burns’ scorn was not the union itself, but the system of government that controlled it. That is, according to John D. Brims, the aristocratic nature of the British government drew Burns’ ire and not the union between the two nations (255).

While these perspectives on Burns’ views are not without backing, there are other scholars who are more keen on arguing the opposite point of view. Most scholars see Burns as the inveterate radical in favor of Scottish independence and having sympathy with political reform movements (Brims 250). It is perhaps valuable to separate the effect of Burns’ work from its intent. For while the effect may have been to appropriate the term ‘Scottish’ and make it more compatible with ‘British,’ it is difficult to reconcile such an effect with Burns’ wider views. Devine contrasts Burns’ sympathy with jacobitism with the wider reasons for sympathizing with it as a defense of monarchy: “Burns sympathized with jacobitism for patriotic reasons, seeing it as a movement that had fought for Scottish independence rather than for the restoration of an absolute monarchy” (Scotland’s, 358-9). William Ferguson argues that while Scott was “keen not to strike an anti-English or anti-unionist note,” Burns was not similarly fastidious (313).

Christopher Harvie describes Burns as a kind of spokesperson for enlightenment republicanism (25); Pittock calls him “the individuated spokesmen of a radical and progressive poetry” (Edinburgh, 8), and Leask labels him “ultimus Scoturum,” the last Scot (127). None of these descriptions, except perhaps the last, would have been entirely palatable to mainstream society of his time, just as they were not palatable to the Scottish author of a short biography of him nearly one-hundred years later who wrote, in 1901, concerning Burns’ political views “his good sense and prudence sometimes failed him” (Graham 412).
While Burns’ work may have been appropriated by a wider Scottish public seeking to integrate itself into British society, his legacy as a radical is intact in his writing. That is, we must distinguish between the expression and its effect. As the literary historian Steve Newman argues, Burns’ expressions helped to develop “an alternative Scottish romanticism” (20). Indeed, his alternative romanticism is shared by the somewhat Scottish author George Gordon Lord Byron.\(^{18}\) As Nigel Leask argues, the two share a love of “colonised small nation and trenchant opposition to empire” (137). Leask also points out that Burns’ influenced several Irish poets and songwriters whose melodies often show sympathy for the rebels who rose in favor of an Irish republic in the 1790s (130). Only the most constrained reading of Burns’ work can place him in a camp with advocates of the union.

Having considered the relationship between Burns and the wider romantic movement, it is fitting to move on to describe the afterlives of his texts in the nineteenth century. Most scholars agree that there was no concerted independence movement in Scotland during the nineteenth century. While there were certainly associations like the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights,\(^{19}\) as Graeme Morton suggests they cannot be considered part of movements in favor of independence (138-40). Indeed, most lowland Scots identified themselves as racially linked to the English by virtue of their Germanic, non-Celtic heritage (Kidd 884). Moreover, Kidd argues, the prevailing sentiment throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that Scotland benefited economically from the union (876). This was the case for the upper classes, which remained for the most part in control of the nation. But as Morton

\(^{18}\) Byron’s reputation as a poet is much more well-known than his political leanings, which led him personally to support the Greeks in their fight against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s. Royle’s The MacMillan Companion to Scottish Literature contains a similarly useful entry on Byron (52-3).

\(^{19}\) The association consisted largely of members of the upper class and was mainly concerned with minor issues. Graeme Morton, for instance, cites their concern with Scotland’s lack of representation on the national heraldry as an example of such a minor issue (139).
confesses: “national identity can be linked to an ethnic past” which is independent of political manifestations (133). Andrew Monnickendam asserts that for the upper classes, Scotland’s national identity was shaped by conservative romantics such as Scott who had attempted to shore up Scottish culture by making it palatable (100). While it would be inaccurate to suggest a strict upper and lower class divide concerning nationalism in the nineteenth century, Christopher Whately argues that there are instances that indicate that if not possessed of a strong political sentiment regarding independence, the working class Scots of the industrial revolution used the same kind of rhetoric of nationalism to describe their plight that was used by Burns (147-51).

The two poems of Burns analyzed in this study lived on as songs, set to popular tunes in a rhetorical afterlife that has persisted into the present day. This afterlife is documented in the form of reports that Scots complaining about working conditions joined together in the singing of “Scots Wha Ha’e” before meetings (Devine, “In Bed with an Elephant,” 8). The piece is an apocryphal poem written by Burns which purports to be the speech of Robert Bruce to his army before the famed battle of Bannockburn during the wars of independence (P.H. Scott 88). In his lifetime, Burns suggested that this poem be set to the music of a popular tune that was supposed to be the marching tune played at Bannockburn.

The second poem that I consider in this work, “For A’ that,” is a poem of a highly egalitarian nature describing Burns’ discontent with the upper classes. The poem in its entirety was not published by Burns’ publisher until many years after Burns’ death, in 1822, for political reasons (Robb and John 19). Moreover, there is evidence to show that Burns employed a form for the poem that was deliberately incendiary because of its long history of association with antiEnglish sentiments. That is to say, the chorus or refrain of the poem had been previously employed by other authors to ridicule political figures of English origin, including the monarch. Indeed, we know that the song lived on because the tune, which Burns originally suggested be
employed, is the same tune that accompanies the song today. Robb and John report with considerable interest that the song was employed, in translation, by the German workers’ movement in the 1840s (27).

We should not be surprised to find Burns’ nationalist and egalitarian work resurfacing in labor disputes that bear little relation to nationalist sentiments or desire for independence. Indeed, as Whately argues, the eighteenth century was a time during which all classes of Scottish society participated in a musical culture (143). To find that this musical culture persisted well into the nineteenth century is not be surprising. Edward J. Cowan argues that such ballads were not monolithic cultural documents but were permitted to live on because their meanings were not tied down to a specific set of stable referents but were transcendent, and only once a tradition of application had developed was there any relative stability concerning their meaning (20). The musical culture was a kind of antidote for the “appropriation of tradition” by the upper classes of Scottish society through the works of Scott and other enlightenment historians who purported to establish an exclusive interpretation of the Scottish past (Cowan 30).

It is impossible to document the full afterlives of Burns’ poems in the nineteenth century because afterlives as take place in folk culture, not high literary culture. But there is sufficient evidence to show that they were employed as rhetorical expressions of lower class grievances, living on and being applied to new and varied circumstances that were not the same as the ones under which they were written. It is their afterlives that make them characteristic aspects of Scottish identity and thus necessary elements of any attempt to define the term Scottish.

The Modern Period

There were some echoes of a desire for separation in a proposal by the British liberal party to grant Scotland home rule in the 1880s, but it was not a policy that came to fruition (Devine, Scottish Nation 305). For the British political system, which was once more or less
divided between the Liberals and Conservatives, was fractured during the First World War by
the rise of the Labour party in Britain (306). The new movement for home rule, the “Young
Scots” movement, which had gained some ground, was split by the same ideological forces that
ripped the liberal party apart. Some liberals in the movement thought the left wing’s desire for
social welfare and the association of social welfare with home rule policies prompted a
realignment of the movement that divided it (308). In any case, the movement accomplished
very little because, as Tony Dickson argues, the Marxist left in Scotland was more concerned
with labor rights than achieving home rule for Scotland (323-5).

In fact, the political left in Scotland demonstrated throughout the twentieth century that
home rule, or devolution, was only important when it was possible that some gain in terms of
social welfare might be made by separating Scotland from the United Kingdom. This
characteristic illustrates the point that the identity of Scots as workers was more important to the
party than their identity as Scottish (Devine, Scottish Nation 607). Furthermore, while there was
some sympathy with the Irish cause in the first decades of the twentieth century (Pittock, Road
55), the left wing nature of the Scottish polity prohibited the development of a “Sinn-Fein
nationalism” (Pittock, Scottish 104). By the 1930s, the modern Scottish National Party
(hereinafter SNP) had been formed.

The Second World War dealt an equally stout blow to nationalist movements in that it
split them yet once more between the hardliners and the periphery of the party. Mainstream SNP
members supported the war on the grounds that it was being fought to defend the rights of small
nations, while radicals refused to become involved in “England’s war” (Pittock, Road 56). After
the war the nationalist movement as a whole progressed, at first in fits and starts and eventually
became a force to be rivaled. Whereas we may safely characterize the movement before the war
as having been “on the margin of British politics,” the movement after the war started entering the mainstream of political life in Britain (Harvie 22).

Interestingly, this post-war nationalism began in 1947, with a letter addressed to the newly formed United Nations by a convention of Scottish nationalists asserting Scotland’s historical autonomy and status as an independent nation (Pittock, *Scottish* 115). While the letter elicited no substantial response, it closely parallels the “Declaration of Arbroath” written some centuries earlier as an appeal to an international body to mediate between a large nation and a small one. Of course, the authors of the twentieth century letter had no official standing to author such a letter, which is probably why it was so easily dismissed. Nevertheless, an examination of this letter might reveal interesting parallels and give us some insight into the development of the SNP as a party during the twentieth century.

The SNP first began to realize substantial success in the late 1960s, with the election of its first representative to parliament; the party members had decided to stop cooperating with allied parties despite the potential of short-term benefit (Pittock, *Road* 57). Indeed, as demonstrated in a contemporary study, “Change and Stability in the Ideology of Scottish Nationalism,” the SNP of this period started operating with discourse that was increasingly mainstream and less typical of a radical movement (Farbey, Mitchel, and Webb 420-1). In the 1970s, the SNP argued that the oil discovered in the North Sea was “Scotland’s oil” (Pittock, *Road* 58). A 1979 referendum on a Scottish legislature did not succeed. The 1980s saw the rise of what Pittock calls “culturalism” or the use of poetry and other art forms to inspire nationalist sentiment (Pittock, *Scottish* 109). Burns’ songs were a fundamental element of this movement, with folk groups performing his music and other cultural expressions on numerous tours.

During the late 1980s, the British Labour party solidified its hold on Scotland (Hearn 51). Subsequently, Labour became sympathetic to the SNP because of fears that despite a complete
takeover of Scotland by Labour, the Conservatives would still be able to dominate the British parliament because of their hold over England (Devine, *Scottish Nation* 607-8). The 1990s saw a new referendum on devolution in 1997, which resulted in the creation of a devolved Scottish parliament, in 1999 (Prentice 411). The referendum being considered, in 2014, is the result of an SNP takeover of the Scottish devolved parliament in a 2010 election. It is this last moment in Scottish history that has given birth to the last artifact under consideration here, the SNP’s political manifesto on the independence referendum, in 2014.

As this narrative review of Scottish history approaches the present, increasingly more studies become available concerning the state of a Scottish identity. In what follows, I briefly outline some of the more important modern studies on Scottish identity. For instance, Douglas Bicket argues that the Scottish sense of identity is grounded deeply in the “realm of the imagination” (3). As he notes, modern day Scotland lacks distinct cultural boundaries that make it distinct from the other ‘British’ countries. Thus, the Scottish identity expresses itself solely in the realm of imagination, a realm that is molded by fictional constructions, such as film and literature. While Bicket is concerned with constructions of Scotland in film and literature, rhetorical or political artifacts might also guide or influence the development of this identity. Other authors, such as David McCrone, argue that Scotland’s sense of identity is underexpressed because the nation as a whole is “culture lite”. In keeping with Bicket, McCrone is not arguing that Scotland lacks a distinct culture, but rather that its cultural expression is not always explicit.

In his essay “Constituting Scotland,” Cairns Craig describes Scotland as “a country in limbo, a hypothetical rather than a real entity, one which [can] neither cease to exist nor emerge

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20 McCrone (p. 67) uses the term “culture lite” to mean that Scotland is not very different from its immediate exterior, that is, England and Wales.
out of the world of Romanticism to become fully a part of reality” (1). Curiously, Craig identifies the cause of the problem as Scotland’s lack of a political constitution, identifying it as an unconstituted country that was at once part of Britain, yet not fully synonymous with England. Social scientists have also weighed in on the problem. Sheryl Prentice argues that there are cultural forces at work attempting to differentiate Scottishness from Britishness by a reliance on distinct historical references (430). Meech and Kilborn point to the increasing independence of the Scottish press as a possible factor in the reconstruction of a Scottish identity (245-50). Their research is plausible in the light of content analyses of Scottish newspapers, conducted by Alex Law, which suggest increased attempts to identify with distinctly Scottish readers (310-2). Ferguson claims that the barrier to the emergence of nationalism rests in attempts to hammer the people of Scotland “into [an] admass of Anglo-American conformity”. Other studies, such as “Being English in Scotland” by Murray Watson, note that there is a confirmable “Scottification of English migrants” (164, 173).

Both historical and contemporary evidence seems to point toward the notion that there exists a Scottish sense of identity, but it seems to be an identity that is often experienced more than described. The goal of this study is in part to fill in this gap in description by examining what it has meant across various time periods by looking at artifacts which were current in those periods or which subsequently became of interest to the public in later eras. While it would be inaccurate to characterize this study’s contribution to scholarship on the subject as a final representation of Scottish culture, the goal is to note identity markers that describe what it means or has meant to be Scottish and which are common to all eras examined and thereby note

21 Fergusson 315; “admass” is a British term meaning the type of people who are easily controlled by the media.
continuous themes in identity, not to promote a monolithic conception of the Scottish historical identity.

Outline of the Study

This thesis proceeds through five chapters. After introducing the study, this first chapter offers a justification for it, provides research questions, describes the methods used, and reviews relevant literature. In the second chapter, I engage in a descriptive analysis of each artifact designed to uncover the identities invoked by the texts. In the third chapter, I further analyze these identities and describe them in terms of Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric. In the fourth chapter, I explore the theoretical limitations of Charland’s concept and offer an alternative approach. In the fifth chapter, I summarize my conclusions and discuss the limitations of the study.
CHAPTER 2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ARTIFACTS

The texts which I analyze in this section are discussed in a loosely chronological order. Although I do offer some contextual information for each text, my purpose is not to contextualize each piece. Rather, I am attempting to read each text and understand the various ways in which it frames the identities of the Scots and the English. The identities which reoccur throughout the series of texts are discussed in the next chapter.

The Declaration of Arbroath

As a document constitutive of Scottish identity, the “Declaration of Arbroath” concentrates its constitutive force in three main directions. The letter identifies Scots collectively as model citizens in the Christian political community, as a separate people with a distinct national history and as a people with certain rights and privileges. Previous analysis of the document has largely focused on one of its paragraphs. As the historian Edward J. Cowan argues, we cannot dismiss the section of the work which states that the Scots would dismiss Robert Bruce as king should he subject Scotland to English rule (62-3). Nonetheless, the importance of that paragraph should be considered relative to the document in its entirety; the paragraph in question comprises less than one-tenth of the letter’s total material. Thus, I proceed to analyze the document in its entirety.

The entire first paragraph of the letter is devoted to listing the names of prominent nobles, bishops and freeholders in Scotland. ²² This section of the document seems unimportant, but it

²² Paragraphing is a feature of the document’s status as a curated artifact, however, it facilitates textual references for this discussion.
establishes from the beginning that the document has been endorsed by the people, even going so far as to claim that it speaks for “the whole community and realm of Scotland” (2). While we may doubt this claim and question how much the lower classes were involved in its composition, the claim functions to establish the author as their legitimate representative. From its beginning thus, the document purports to be concerned with the condition and identity of Scots of all levels of society.

Let us first consider how the document identifies Scots as model citizens of Christendom. Its author claims that the Scots were among the first Christians and as such were placed under the special protection of their patron saint, St. Andrew, whom they stress was the brother of St. Peter, who established the papacy (2). In at least two passages, the Scots are compared to the biblical ‘Israelites.’ In one passage, the comparison is make indirectly by referring to Robert Bruce as “another Maccabeus or Joshua” (2). A more explicit comparison is made in describing the Scots’ journey from “Greater Scythia,” across the oceans toward Scotland to that of the Israelites from Egypt across the red sea to Palestine (2). As a historically good Christian kingdom, the Scots’ present behavior therefore merits the Pope’s favor. They have “live[d] in freedom and peace” until the English began the current trouble (2). Moreover, they regard this behavior and their identity as Christians as superseding their identity as Scots pointing out that there ought to be no “distinction of Jew and Greek, Scotsman or Englishman” (3). Yet again, through parallelism, they depict themselves as the ‘original’ Christians. Just as Christianity historically originated in an ethnically Jewish community, and then subsequently spread to Greece and Rome, in the British Isles, the document asserts that Christianity was first adopted by Scots and then spread to the English. The text also claims that the real enemy of both the Scots and the English is “the heathen raging against the Christians” (3). In conclusion, the Declaration suggests that Scots will be obedient to the Pope because of his authority as Christ’s vicar.
Alongside this identity as Christians is the Scots’ identity as a people with a distinct history, that is, as “Scottish people”. These two identities are actually described simultaneously. The purpose of the claim aforementioned, that these people descended from those who travelled to Scotland from “Greater Scythia” through Spain and the Mediterranean, is to assert a historically unique origin which differentiates them from other groups, in the British Isles. While living in peace as good Christians, the text reminds the Pope, the Scots have gained the right to live in peace by virtue of their might:

The Britons it [the Scottish nation] first drove out, the Picts it utterly destroyed, and, even though very often assailed by the Norwegians, the Danes and the English, it took possession of that home [Scotland] by many victories. (2)

Moreover, the Scots are identified in the well-known paragraph of the letter as fighting “not for glory, nor riches, nor honours […] but for freedom alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself” (3). The cause of their belligerence is thus identified as their own nobility and refusal to suffer the indignity of a foreign monarch. Indeed, in an earlier passage, the writer stresses the that the nation consists of a ‘pure’ race, stating: “In their [the Scot’s] kingdom there have reigned one hundred and thirteen kings of their own royal stock, the line unbroken by a single foreigner” (2).

At a linguistic level, it is worth noting that the description of the Scots as a good Christian people occurs in the present and future tenses and in the first person plural. For instance, in the following excerpt, the text avows that the Scottish people will support their chosen King: “To him […] we are bound both by his right and by his merits that our freedom may still be maintained, and by him, come what may, we mean to stand” (2). This characteristic of the letter is of special significance because it is the second part of a shift from the use of the
past tense and the third person plural. For instance, the shift is illustrated in the passage previously cited: “The Britons it first drove out, the Picts it utterly destroyed, and, even though very often assailed by the Norwegians, the Danes and the English, it took possession of that home by many victories” (2, emphasis, my own). This passage refers to the Scots as a historically belligerent people, capable of maintaining their own rights through the use of war. Moreover, the past tense is complimented by the usage of the third person. Although earlier in the same paragraph the antecedent of ‘it’ is identified as “our own [nation] the Scots,” a distance is created between the Scots of the present ‘we or us’ and the Scots of the past. In this manner, the agent of the violent invasion is distanced from the Scots of the present, who want only to “live in this poor little Scotland” (2).

Finally, by means of comparison, the text implies that because Scottish people have been historically good citizens of Christendom they deserve special privileges much as the people of Israel were deserving of the same. The text provides the promise to “make some other man who was well able to defend us our King” if Robert Bruce proves unsatisfactory, implying that because the Scots are endowed with a unique status that they have this authority (3). Even the Pope himself is not really capable of abnegating these rights. Thus, the text avers boldly that “the Most High” will blame the Pope if he sides with the English, and the papacy will receive blame for any further calamities the English commit as a result of the Pope “put[ting] too much faith in the tales the English tell” (3).

The letter concludes with the date, given in two forms: “in the year of grace thirteen hundred and twenty and the fifteenth year of the reign of our king aforesaid” (3). The first form is standard and shows merely that Christ is placed at the center of time. The second form is more insidious. Just as Christ is at the center of time in the first form, a king whom the Papacy
considered illegitimate, but whom the people had espoused, is at the center of time in the second form, further implying that the people of Scotland are those who give the king legitimacy.

Burns’ Songs: “Scot’s Wha Ha’e” and For A’ That”

Burns’ poems “Scots Wha Ha’e” and “For A’ That” describe a number of rhetorical identities which Scots may embody. In what follows, I first describe the identities and strategies employed in “Scots Wha Ha’e” before proceeding to describe the identities described in “For A’ That”.\(^{23}\) Burns’ “Scots Wha Ha’e” was originally imagined by the author to be a speech addressed from the Scottish King Robert Bruce to his troops on the eve of the battle of Bannockburn, a well-known Scottish victory in the wars of independence.\(^{24}\) And Burns even went to some effort to see to it that the song was put to a tune which was popularly believed to be the marching tune of the Scottish army on its way to the battlefield (Burns 235). The speech/song describes three chief identities, as it prepares the soldiers for battle.

The first identity is that of good Scots who have previously suffered in battle, “Scots who have with Wallace bled / Scots whom Bruce has often led” (Burns 1-2). Moreover, the good Scots are depicted as having no options outside of victory or total annihilation “Welcome to your gory bed / or to victory” (3-4). Burns describes the present as the scene on which good Scots will take action. Should they fail, “chains and slavery” await them (8). Moreover, Burns, through the fictive voice of Bruce, enjoins good Scots to fight, not only for their own freedom, but also for the

\(^{23}\) With exception of the title, I have modernized spellings to make the reader’s task easier. For original spellings, see the appendices B-C.

\(^{24}\) Bannockburn was a battle fought between the forces of Robert Bruce and Edward II of England. As a victory against the English, it has a kind of iconic position in Scottish history. It is of course no coincidence that the 2014 referendum on independence is scheduled to coincide with its 700th anniversary. For more on this latter point, see Maria Golvina, “Scotland Seals Terms of Historic Independence Vote.”
freedom of their “sons in servile chains,” suggesting that they must take action now to prevent the future from being worse. Indeed, the good Scot has nothing to fight for except freedom and prefers death for freedom to the slavery of subjection to a foreign monarch (13-6). The second identity is of the foreign monarch, “proud Edward,” as a synecdochal archetype for England in the song. He is the agent whereby “chains and slavery” will befall the defeated Scots (7-8). Elsewhere, he is described as a “proud usurper” and a “tyrant,” becoming the direct antagonist of the good Scots of the poem (21-2). The third identity position is of those Scots who are unworthy of freedom. The unworthy Scots are variously described as “traitor knaves,” “cowards,” or worthy of being slaves and are exhorted to “turn and flee” (9-12). The arrangement of the poem also suggests something about the relationship between these identity positions. The initial stanza exhorts or calls upon the good Scots to listen and to prepare for battle. The second stanza sets the stage, describing the time of action and the relationship of the good Scots to the foreign monarch. The third stanza introduces the unworthy Scots and berates them for being “so base” (11). In the fourth and fifth stanzas, the good Scots are reminded of the justice of their fight and exhorted to follow the speaker for the sake of liberating posterity. The final stanza calls for direct action against the foreign monarch. The presence of good Scots and foreign oppressors is not surprising. But Burns’ insertion of unworthy Scots into the middle of the song suggests that there is a tension or dispute between two different groups who are competing for a claim to the title of “Scottish.”

Similar tensions are at play in “For A’ That.” But unlike “Scots Wha Ha’e,” there is no foreign power oppressing Scots in this song. As Robb and John point out, the song was extremely incendiary and underwent a lengthy process of revision and republication until it was finally published, complete with all of its lyrics, to the tune Burns intended for it in 1822, some 27 years after his death (19). There are two main identities at conflict in the poem, the honest poor man and the unprincipled wealthy man.
The song begins by describing the man of “honest Poverty” who is yet not reduced to slavery (Burns 1-3). Throughout the song, the honest poor man is described as one who lacks some mark of status, but who revels in his freedom and his independence from the influence of society. For instance, the honest poor man is described as dining on “homely fare” and wearing unattractive clothing (9-10), but nonetheless “the honest man though ever so poor, is king of men” (15-6). In other words, the song asserts that the honest poor man is at the top of the social stratum. His place there is assured not by his possession of material goods, but by his moral honesty. He is not the recipient of inherited wealth but participates in “toils obscure” to be worthy of his bread (6). Elsewhere, the song celebrates “the pith of sense and pride of worth” as “higher rank” than the trappings with which society bedecks the rich and powerful (31).

In sharp contrast, Burns describes the unprincipled wealthy man. The unprincipled wealthy man has a “rank,” but it is merely a “guinea stamp;” that is to say, it is a reward given to the wealthy (7). The social prestige enjoyed by those of high rank does nothing to invalidate the fact that the unprincipled wealthy man is a fool, “though hundreds worship at his word, / he’s but a [fool] for all that” (19-20). In contrast to the honest poor man, the unprincipled wealthy man is corrupt and the “ribbons, stars and all that” which society has heaped upon him deprive him of his independence of mind (22-4). The final stanza of the poem, exhorts its hearers to a kind of action, asking them to “pray that come it may […] that sense and worth” will be universally recognized as the marks of high status (33-6). Burns predicts that, following such a recognition, men “the world over, / shall brothers be” (39-40).

The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the United Nations Organization

The artifact, “The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the United Nations Organization,” constructs a Scottish identity centered on three facets. First, it argues that Scots are a people
with a long and proud history, a history for the most part distinct from that of England. Second, it positions the English as the antagonists of Scots and attempts to reframe the meaning of the term ‘British.’ Finally, it describes the Scots as a peaceful and wronged people who deserve the aid of the United Nations.

Throughout the text, the letter emphasizes that the Scottish people deserve independence. Although, as Murray Pittock has argued, the letter was more or less ineffectual, it offers us a glimpse of how the early Scottish National Party (SNP) viewed the nationalist struggle with relation to identity (Scottish 115). Given that much of the official communication of the modern SNP tends to avoid identity as a subject of direct discourse, analysis of this document offers more potential for examining the relationship between politics and identity and the case for an independent Scotland.

First, in a manner similar to the “Declaration of Arbroath,” “The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right” strongly emphasizes Scotland’s prior status as an independent nation. The previous military might of the Scots is emphasized by noting that the country successfully repelled Roman, Danish, and Norse invaders over the course of its history as an independent nation (1). But historical might is not the only reason offered. The nation’s tradition of “national independence and of popular liberty” are also emphasized as reasons why the Scots ought to be independent (1). In other words, the historically responsible government, which the Scots maintained for themselves, is also an aspect of their identity that merits consideration. A reference is also made to the “Declaration of Arbroath,” which is referred to as “that celebrated Declaration of Independence.” Moreover, the text claims that the present letter is “submitted in a similar spirit” to the Declaration (1). In a section devoted to analyzing the gradual unification of Scotland and England is the argument that while the two nations share a monarch, they did not
historically share a judiciary or a parliament, until the Treaty of Union effected this change, in 1707 (1). Thus, for these Scots, the monarch is not presented as a representative of the people.

The other side of this historical coin is the manner in which the letter frames the English. The text states, “The Scottish nation [has] been for two centuries politically submerged through an unequal union with the State of England” (1). Moreover, although the Scots are given representation in the parliament of the United Kingdom, the letter argues against them truly being represented there for, as the letter states, the British Parliament is “predominately English” (1-2). On many occasions, the British parliament has made promises to give the Scots selfgovernment, none of which have ever been fulfilled (2). This domination by the English is presented as an extension of the historical “continual aggression by the ruling class of England” toward the Scots (2).

Finally, the English are presented as having caused significant harm to the Scots. The Treaty of Union itself was effected “by undemocratic methods” and “in defiance of the wishes of the Scottish electorate” (1). In any case, the letter notes, the treaty has been violated: Scotland’s church has been harmed, its ancient laws tampered with, the civil rights of individual citizens abolished, and its economy and natural resources have been exploited. The letter expands more fully upon these last two grievances.

As a result of “outrages committed by the United Kingdom Parliament” economic calamity has befallen Scotland while England, which has poorer natural resources, has benefited (1). The letter here recounts the forced migration of many Scots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and also that during various wars fought on behalf of England: “Scottish manpower has been exploited to an extent far in excess of English, proportionately to population, and with no benefit to Scotland” (1). The general tone of this section frames Scots as a wronged people who deserve justice. Moreover, the letter posits, since the British government has repeatedly refused
to permit plebiscites, the United Nations has a mandate to intervene: “the principle of the
equality of rights of all nations, large or small, the fundamental principle of the United Nations,
is violated and brought into contempt” (2). The letter ends with a plea for Scottish membership
in the United Nations.

Contemporary SNP Literature on Independence

Broadly speaking, the Scottish National Party describes four identity positions in its
manifesto on Scottish independence, *Choice: An Historic Opportunity for our Nation*\(^{25}\) and in
related literature on independence from the election which gave them control of the Scottish
Parliament in 2011. The Scots are described as a people who are coming of age, as subjects in
need of protection from a foreign power, and as a people with a specific past guiding their
action. In contrast, England, or Westminster, is described as a controlling, coercive other which
seeks to harm Scotland. Much of *Choice* is devoted to defining who the Scots are in a positive
way.

Scots are variously described as: “the people who care most about Scotland,” “your family,”
“our nation,” “the people who live here,” “all of us,” and “the people of Scotland” (1). All of
these identifiers suggest the existence of a distinct cultural group that could potentially constitute
a new nation should voters choose to make it so. Scotland is the place of families, caring people,
and simply “the people who live here.”

This discourse implies, therefore, that a Scottish family of individuals exists and is part of
a geographically situated polity all working to sustain the collective. Furthermore, the letter

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\(^{25}\) The title of this work betrays its employment of McGee’s ideograph. “Choice” and “Opportunity” are both strong
ideographs that suggest rhetorical forces are at work. For more on McGee’s ideograph, see his essay, “The
Ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology.”
suggests that its readers are informed decision makers who must prioritize the “issues that are most important” and make “decisions about Scotland's future” (Choice 1). Statements, such as “Independence will allow us to take decisions on all the major issues” (Re-elect 28-9), and “There is so much more we could do with the powers of any other nation” (Re-elect 40), suggest that Scotland must be allowed to make decisions for itself.

MSP Angela Constance argues:

At home you and your family are responsible for your own priorities and your own choices. But as a nation we currently let other people make those decisions for us. In all parts of life people aspire to independence. Our young people want the freedom to make their own decisions. (Re-elect 28)

The Scottish electorate is thus described as both a young person coming into his or her own and collectively as a nuclear family, already living on its own, but still reliant upon its parents to manage its money. In short, the Scottish people have arrived at the end of their own youth and are ready to start making their own decisions about their future. Generalizing statements function to define those new responsibilities for which the Scots are prepared and to render explicit metaphors that juxtapose family life with the desire of an adolescent to enter into their own. In this manner, the SNP suggests that Scotland has come of age and the time has come for the Scottish people to leave the care of their parents, presumably the English.

The second identity described in the SNP’s party literature is that of the Scottish people as subjects who deserve protection from their overlords. Particularly in Re-elect a Scottish Government Working for Scotland, this identity is developed around the notion that the SNP is protecting Scottish people from harm. Early in the document, the SNP argues: “Scotland’s parliament should have more job creating powers so we can do more to create and protect employment” (7). In the section on independence, the SNP argues that if independence is achieved: “We can protect NHS budgets […] we can protect our students and graduates […] we
can protect families and protect the most vulnerable members of our community” (28). A graphic at the end of the document features regional issues imprinted in bold text over a centered map of Scotland. Some of the issues are as follows: “rural schools protected, free bus travel protected, small post offices saved, Ayr[shire] A&E saved, Monklands A&E saved”.

These phrases presume the existence of an alternative power which, if trusted, will not protect the interests of the people of Scotland.

The third identity described is that of the English, the “Tory government in Westminster that most of us did not vote for” (Choice 7). Thus, the Scottish people are depicted as distinct from the government of the United Kingdom, represented by the metonym Westminster and the English people who control it. Just as the metonym Westminster is understood to be the governing body of “them,” the (Scottish) governing body of “us” is construed through the metonym “Holyrood,” that being the location where the Scottish Parliament sits. Elsewhere, the identity of the Scots, as a people to be protected from this English other, is described accordingly: “The Scotland Bill […] does nothing to protect us from the worst of the Tory cuts […] we can protect our students and graduates from tory tuition fees” (Re-elect 28).

Although Westminster is geographically the location of the United Kingdom’s government, rhetorically, Westminster is an invasive force which interferes with Scottish matters in a hostile manner. Simultaneously, the use of the term “Westminster” externalizes the blame for Scotland’s problems and places it at the feet of an invasive power. This is exactly the kind of scapegoating and alienation that Burke has so famously described. By using “Westminster” to describe the source of Scotland’s problems, the SNP “use[s] the other as […] the unclean vessel

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26 Re-Elect, 41; A & E stands for “accident and emergency.” These hospitals were “saved” by the Scottish Parliament, that is to say, prevented from being closed down, in spite of the budget cuts to the National Hospital Service initiated by the British Parliament.
upon which can be loaded the dyslogistic burdens of vocabulary” (Burke 141). The effect of summoning up the spirit of “Westminster” is to make the reader feel that “Westminster” is in a place it does not belong, that while Westminster belongs there, it is presently here and its presence is disruptive. “Westminster” and “Tory” thus become ever-present ciphers which can be readily used to describe any problem experienced by the Scots. “Westminster” surrounds the Scots and the “Tories” harass them constantly. Moreover, the use of terms such as “Westminster” and “Tories” enables the SNP to identify an English other without doing so in explicit terms that might cause some readers to be disaffected.

The final identity described is that of the Scots as a people with a past that guides their decisions about the future. In a section that describes “Our Journey,” the SNP manifesto *Reelect a Scottish Government Working for Scotland* quotes Winnie Ewing, who opened the first Scottish devolved parliament, in 1997, with the words: “The Scottish Parliament adjourned on the 25th day of March of 1707 is hereby reconvened” (40). One other direct invocation of history occurs in *Choice*, where the document quotes from Scotland’s Claim of Right, a popular declaration signed in 1989, by delegates to a Scottish Constitutional Convention: “We do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of government best suited to their needs” (8). That declaration is historically significant because it is linked to a similar declaration passed, in 1689, affirming the power of the Scottish parliament. Thus, Scottish voters are explicitly asked, to some extent, to call upon their knowledge of history and to act as representatives of the dead, just as Ewing and other Scottish politicians did in their statements.

There are however more subtle ways in which the Scottish electorate is positioned at the crux of history. The decision about independence is described as a choice, “an historic opportunity,” “the decisions about Scotland's future,” “an informed decision,” and “the issues
that are most important to you” (*Choice* 1). Not only is the decision which the Scottish people are to make one regarding independence, but also about a myriad of other decisions. The independence referendum is represented by “choice,” “informed decision,” “historic opportunity,” and may be described by “the decisions about Scotland's future.” By portraying the referendum as such, the SNP portrays Scottish history as a continuum that begins whatever history the reader is aware of and ends in the present where the reader must make a decision that will impact the course of the future. Thus, Scottish voters are asked to identify themselves as actors on a historical stage when making a decision about the future.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF THE IDENTITIES DESCRIBED IN THE ARTIFACTS

Consistent and Conflicting Attempts to Identify Scots

A number of narratives of Scottish identity emerge from the analysis of the artifacts, including descriptions of the Scots as a people with a history, descriptions of England as a hostile foreign power, and descriptions of the Scots as a people who have been wronged. Not all of these identity narratives are embodied in all of the artifacts being analyzed, but two are consistent in all five texts. The two major identity narratives of Scottishness described in all of the artifacts are: 1) to be Scottish is to have a sense of the shared history of the Scottish people and 2) to be Scottish is to not be English. Minor aspects of Scottish identity described in some documents seem to conflict with aspects of Scottish identity described in other documents. For instance, the Scottish National Party’s narrative of noblesse oblige directly conflicts with the narrative of class-antagonism described in Burns’ poetry. Also, Burns’ view of the enemies of Scotland indirectly conflicts with the more general tendency to blame the English. Thus, there are both narratives of Scottish identity that transcend the different eras under analysis and narratives of Scottish identity that are more specific to certain periods and authors.

Present in all of the artifacts is the description of Scots as a people with a shared history. This narrative first appears in the “Declaration of Arbroath” and is consistently reified in almost all of the other artifacts examined. The Declaration stresses three aspects of Scottish history: 1) the journey of Scots from the ancient world to their new home in Scotland, which they gained by right of conquest, 2) the purity of the Scottish race as exemplified through the history of their monarchy, and 3) the history of the Scots as good members of the Christian community (2-3). In
Burns’ song, “Scots Wha Ha’e,” a similar description of Scottish identity is employed. The good Scots addressed by the song/speech are called upon to remember their own historical military prowess and association with military leaders early in the song (1-2). Burns’ “For A’ That” does not employ a similar description, but perhaps this choice may be explained by the different character of the song, which does not address a crisis of identity related to conflict with other people so much as a conflict between two groups in contemporary Scotland.

“The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the U.N.O.” draws heavily on the material of history in identifying the Scots as separate people. Much as in the other descriptions of Scottish identity, the military prowess of Scots, in the past and in the present, is stressed as an important factor identifying the people of Scotland. The Scots of the present are framed as historical heirs of the same people who produced the “Declaration of Arbroath,” and Scottish history is presented as having been dominated by the English (1-2). The Scottish National Party’s documents on independence also use shared history as a common means of identifying Scots.

For the current leadership of the SNP, the history of the Scottish people is described as a process of coming of age (Re-Elect 28), as well as proof that the Scots have reason to believe they will be successful on their own (40).

A second consistent identity narrative is the depiction of the Scots as not English. Although the “Declaration of Arbroath” is at pains to emphasize comity would be proper between the Scots and the English, based on shared Christian identity even in this document are traces of evidence that the concepts of Scottishness and Englishness are not the same thing. In the passage describing the historical enemies of the Scots, the English are third on the list (2). Moreover, a well-known passage reads: “for, as long as a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English” (2). Burns’ “Scots Wha Ha’e” similarly describes the English as the historical antagonists of the Scots. But instead of directly
labeling them as the antagonists, the English are represented by their monarch, Edward II, the leader of the invasion (7-8). Certainly one may hear Burns’ “For A’ That” and come away with the impression that it is anti-English, but such a sentiment may be a latent characteristic of the song, which depends on the extent to which one associates wealth, rank, and privilege with Englishness.

“The Scottish Claim of Right to the U.N.O.” is also quick to depict the enemies of Scotland as being English. The central argument of the piece is that the Treaty of Union (1707), which brought about the union of the two countries, was an English device for gaining control of Scotland (1). The “ruling class of England” is also framed as the chief antagonist of the Scots people (2). In addition, the English are also present in contemporary SNP literature on independence. The English are closely identified with the Tory party and the seat of English power in Westminster, which are used much as the monarch Edward II is used in “Scots Wha Ha’e,” to identify the English as antagonists without actually doing so (Choice 7).

As revealing as it is to look at how Scots have been described in various texts, it is also compelling to look at ways in which Scottishness is contested in the same texts. For examples, there are conflicting depictions of the role of the nobility as well as of whom Scotland’s enemies are. Although the chief differences concerning the identity and role of the nobility are manifested in Burns’ works and that of the Scottish National Party, there are also inconsistencies between the “Declaration of Arbroath” and both of the former. In the most well-known passage of the Declaration, the head of the nobility, the king, is described as replaceable in the event that he proves an unsatisfactory defender of the people of Scotland (3). Regardless of how much one takes this assertion of the people’s sovereignty to imply about the state of political ideology in medieval Scotland, the assertion that the King holds his office at the pleasure of the people does
suggest that to some extent, the king exists to represent the people and that should he fail in this task, he can and should be replaced.

Burns’ view of the nobility in “For A’ That” is remarkably different. The nobility of Scotland are unilaterally panned as unworthy of their ranks and titles and as antagonists of the honest man. Moreover, Burns does not urge for new nobles to be appointed, but for hereditary privilege to be completely abolished and for a kind of meritocracy to replace it (33-6). In contrast, the SNP describes the Scottish political classes as present to protect the Scottish people, in a narrative of noblesse oblige (Re-Elect 28). The three depictions of the role of the nobility cannot be fully reconciled, but it seems safe to say that the SNP’s view of the nobility is more consistent with the view embodied in the “Declaration of Arbroath” than with the view that Burns takes of them.

Among other inconsistencies, the conflicting depictions of the enemies of Scottish people are also worth noting. The “Declaration of Arbroath” depicts two sets of enemies: the English invaders symbolized by their King Edward II and “the heathen raging against the Christians” (3). Burns’ song, “Scots Wha Ha’e,” identifies two sets of enemies: Edward II (7-8) and the unworthy Scots who would surrender to the English (9-12). Similarly, “For A’ That” identifies the enemies of the Scottish people as the unprincipled wealthy nobles who have control of the state and the respect of society (22-4). One may identify them as anglicized Scots, but one need not necessarily do so based on a straightforward reading of the text.

“The Scottish Nation’s Claim of Right to the U.N.O.” follows in the tradition of identifying the English as the primary adversaries of Scottish people (1-2). But it also identifies a historical internal enemy, who when the Treaty of Union was signed, sold out Scotland. This “corrupt minorit[y],” in their own words, voted for the treaty against the “wishes of the Scottish
electorate and people” (1). But it is important to note that this enemy is historical and not
depicted as a problem that is currently besetting the Scottish people.

It is more difficult to gauge how the contemporary SNP identifies enemies of the Scottish
people. The phantom of the English makes an appearance here again, though, through the
political parlance of “Tories” and “Westminster” (Choice 7). Indeed, the SNP also identifies the
Scottish Labour Party as a group that has failed to protect the Scottish people from budget cuts
and hospital closures (Re-Elect 14-5). But there is a strong caveat to be made. The identification
of Labour as a political adversary within Scotland is not made frequently or anywhere in the
sections discussing independence. The pamphlet Choice, which is wholly devoted to the cause of
independence, makes no mention of Labour in a hostile context. On the surface then, there is
only a little evidence that the current leadership of the SNP has sought to depict the Scottish
Labour Party as a kind of fifth column in Scotland. This rhetorical choice may of course be a
deliberate strategy, employed to draw in voters who would normally side with the Scottish
Labour Party.

In any case, both Burns and certain SNP documents describe internal enemies who exist
within Scotland, enemies who call themselves Scottish but who are not regarded as worthy of the
name. In contrast, neither the “Declaration of Arbroath” nor Choice mention any internal enemy.
Although the differences between the narratives are subtle, they reveal the extent to which the
term ‘Scottish’ is part of a contested, ongoing discussion.

Scottish Identities and Charland’s Ideological Effects

Having examined extensively the kinds of identities depicted in the rhetoric of Scottish
nationalism, it is now fitting to look at them through the lens of Maurice Charland’s ideological
effects of constitutive rhetoric. Charland posits that constitutive rhetoric 1) “transcends the
limitations of the individual body and will,” 2) positions “a transhistorical subject,” and 3) offers the subject the “illusion of freedom” (139-41). I begin here with the question, do the narrative identities described in the artifacts mentioned transcend the individual? In part, the answer seems to be yes. As Charland claims, “‘peoples’ in general, exist only through an ideological discourse that constitutes them” (139). To the extent that a shared perception of ‘Scottishness’ exists in the artifacts examined, Charland’s theory applies. As I have shown, there are many shared conceptions of what it means to be Scottish, including most notably the identification of Scots as sharing a history and as being not the English. These are the transcendent identifiers of which Charland speaks, but these are very limited and simplistic foundations on which to construct a sense of Scottishness given the enormous complexity of the rhetorical artifacts surveyed.

If then, we consider the ways in which Scottishness is contested, including the depictions of the role of Scottish nobles, or the political classes, and depictions of a fifth column or internal enemy, Charland’s point is challenged. If indeed Scottishness were a completely transcendent, monolithic identifier, it would be difficult to point out such contested definitions of the term. The contestations suggest that the Scottish people are not all the same. While many Scots, at least the Scottish authors of these artifacts, may share certain definitions of the term Scottish, outliers not represented by these texts may use the term to signify something entirely different from what others mean when they use the term. And to the extent that any one person’s definition of the term is different, he or she is an outlier. When Burns says, “the rank is but the guinea’s stamp” (“For A’ That” 7), he is making an assertion that fundamentally differentiates his definition of the nobility, e.g. the political classes, from that of the SNP, which asserts in its 2011 election manifesto that the political classes exist “to create and protect employment” (Re-Elect 7).
One might say that it is unfair to compare two eras that are so radically different, but to make that argument one must point to material evidence to suggest why they are so different. If indeed ‘peoples’ are brought into reality through discourse, it is discursive evidence that should be preferred, not material evidence. Moreover, the fact that there are contested definitions of Scottishness suggests that the definitions are contested by certain people. And any person who is contesting the definition has a personal role in identifying his or herself as Scottish, some role in sorting through the different definitions to produce a definition that he or she believes is ‘genuine.’ So returning to the initial question, we must equivocate, to the extent that a shared definition of Scottishness is shared by many individuals, the answer is yes, we may say it transcends the individual. But to the extent that such a definition is not shared, we may say that the definition is personal for each individual who uses the term.

My second question is, does the narrative position a “transhistorical subject?” This effect is more or less verified by this investigation. As noted in my analysis of the artifacts, all of the artifacts lean to some extent on history as a means of identifying Scots. The purpose, Charland argues, of the positioning of the transhistorical subject is to provide a “concrete link between” the current members of a society and their ancestors. Moreover, it is the “occupancy of the [same] land” that establishes the connection between the two groups (140).

The “Declaration of Arbroath” is a particularly suitable example here as it relies on a description of a story of origin and conquest of the land by Scots that is independent of the origin story of the English (2). Even though the parallels are strong, the narrative in the Declaration creates a temporal distance between the Scots of the present and the Scots who conquered Scotland. It is a distance established by the use of pronouns. The Scottish nation that drove out the Picts, Britons, Danes, and English to settle Scotland is described in the third person as “it,” and the Scots of the present are described as “we” (1-2). This exception is only notable because
Charland argues that it is the use of the pronoun “our” as a description of “both eighteenth century settlers […] and those living in Quebec today” that links the two groups into a single, discursively constituted group (140). So where the Scots establish a link between the two groups by claiming a right to inherit the land from their conquering ancestors, they create a distance from them by identifying their ancestors in the third person; that is, the Scottish nation is referenced as “it”. Thus, the chronological gap between ancestors and Scots of the present is not completely collapsed as they identify with their ancestors. On the other hand, Charland’s position would suggest that a more concrete link could be established by referring to their ancestors as ‘we’ or ‘us’ thus collapsing the gap completely.

But similar parallels between Scots of the present and Scots of the past are also drawn in “The Scottish Claim of Right to the U.N.O.”, which presents the Scots of the past as having analogous experiences to Scots of the present. The most illustrative seems to be the complaint of the authors that in all of the ‘English wars’, “Scottish manpower has been exploited to an extent far in excess of English” (1). Such ‘English wars’ could presumably include any war after 1745, up to the time the letter was actually written, shortly after World War II (Pittock, *Road* 56). Thus the identification of Scots in the present who may have participated extensively in the recent war is collapsed with the identification of Scots from other eras who also took part in war.

Charland also claims that the identity established “transcends the limitations of individuality at any historical moment and transcends the death of individuals across history” (140). The “Declaration of Arbroath’s” creation of distance between Scots of the present and Scots of the past by the use of different pronouns seems to suggest that, at least within its narrative, this minor aspect of the point is not validated. It is not validated because the distance is established within the narrative, and it is precisely the individuality of the Scots at that
historical moment which enabled them to create the distance between themselves and their ancestors.

My third question is this; does the narrative offer the subject the illusion of freedom? Charland contends that freedom within the narrative “is illusory because the narrative is already spoken or written” (141). The individual, he claims, who identifies with the narrative is “constrained to follow through, to act so as to maintain the narrative’s consistency” (141). My investigation suggests that this portion of Charland’s theory is not validated. Consider, for instance, the relationship between the two texts, “The Declaration of Arbroath” and “Scots Wha Ha’e.” Both texts claim that those who identify as Scottish will reject English rule of Scotland. Both texts understand that Scottish identity is based on a shared experience in history. Yet, they disagree on a key point. While the “Declaration of Arbroath” identifies the Scots as a people united in war against an English enemy, “Scots Wha Ha’e” identifies them as divided into two classes: those worthy of freedom and those unworthy. That is, while the Declaration offers the chance to identify with a unified Scotland and reject an English enemy, Burns’ song which is nominally about the same period offers the Scottish listener the opportunity to identify with either the worthy Scots or those who are unworthy, not with a unified Scotland. The difference is key because at different historical moments, it seems, it has been more important to emphasize certain aspects of the Scottish historical narrative. If indeed the individual has no choice but to identify with the monolithic, discursive definition of Scottishness, how is it that Burns was able to resist the power of that discourse as embodied in the text of the Declaration and divide Scots into two classes, worthy and unworthy, which are not mentioned at all in the Declaration? I answer that question later.

Here, though, I must point out that regardless of how Burns was able to do so, contemporary readers of these two artifacts have some degree of choice concerning how they
identify themselves when they approach a narrative. For instance, contemporary Scottish politicians, and perhaps many Scottish people, would undoubtedly choose to disassociate themselves with the “Declaration of Arbroath’s” assertion that the real enemies of the Scottish people are non-Christian heathens (3). The fact that the conception of Scottishness in the historical artifacts is not monolithic but dynamic, necessarily implies that someone, indeed many people, in Scottish history made some decision about how to identify their ‘people,’ subsequently constructing a text that corresponded to their own definition of the term.

The power to construct such a narrative also suggests that those reading it also have the power to interpret it and decide with which aspects of it they identify. And individuals who have access to history must necessarily make the choice to identify with certain historical people and events or not to identify with other events. Suggesting that a person must accept everything that has ever been included in discourse about Scottish identity in order to consider his or herself Scottish is absurd. Identity is contested, but the arbiter remains the individual. Suffice it to say that the evidence does not appear to support Charland’s final ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric.

Summary of Findings

As I have just suggested, the picture that emerges for us is that Charland’s theory does not entirely hold together when it comes to the Scottish situation. I do not speculate here about why that is the case, but rather, I think it necessary to summarize my findings thus far in response to the research questions posed at the beginning of the study.

Question1: What British identities are described in the texts that constitute the artifacts for the study?
There are definitely common identifiers which reoccur in all of the artifacts examined. These are depictions of the Scots as not English and depictions of the Scots as a people with a shared experience or history. But there are also substantially contested aspects of Scottish identity. The most important of these are the depictions of the Scottish nobility and the depictions of a fifth column within Scotland.

Question 2: Is Charland’s theory of how the subject is constituted through discourse consistent with the ways in which these texts function?

The theory seems to be partially validated, but there are definitely ways in which the functions of the texts in question transgress Charland’s theory. His first ideological effect of constitutive rhetoric is partially validated, that is, the individual will is partially transcended by an overarching sense of Scottishness but not completely. His second ideological effect is mostly validated; the subject is positioned transhistorically, but this positioning is made by the individual in such a way that the entire weight of Scottish history does not rest on the shoulders of each Scottish person or even each text that describes Scottishness. His third ideological effect is not validated at all. There is a definite freedom of choice that is not illusory; it is a choice that is not only within each narrative but also between different narratives.
CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Having indicated some theoretical problems suggested by the textual analysis in the previous chapter, let me now offer to construct some resolutions for these problems. In what follows, I outline first what seem to be the major problems that emerged from the application of Charland’s theory, before attempting to resolve the contradictions that appeared. In particular, two problems deserve some sort of attention: 1) my analysis suggests that there is a different relationship between the individual, the discourse, and the identity constructed than what is described by Charland, and 2) my analysis concludes that material conditions might have a role in influencing the development of identity narratives, one that Charland’s theory does not address.

Fault Lines in Constitutive Rhetoric

One of the central problems with Charland’s theory rests with his account of how “the people” come to identify themselves. Charland offers this explanation:

Subjects within narratives are positioned and so constrained. All narratives have power over the subjects they present […] The freedom of the character in a narrative is an illusion, for narratives move inexorably toward their telos. (141)

If one is speaking purely of a constructed narrative, a text so to speak, this obviously holds true. Characters within narrative texts are creations of their authors and conform to the authors’ ideological perspectives, lacking any kind of self-identifying volition. Characters may need to
behave consistently in order to be realistic or rational in order to be relatable, but the character is fully at the mercy of the author creating the narrative. Charland, though, is not writing about characters in novels. He makes it clear that texts are more than fictional constructs: “To be an embodied subject is to experience and act in a textualized world” (141). He warns that to be an “embodied subject” or character does not preclude the possibility of living in multiple texts and experiencing contradictions between the texts (141). Subjects thus may inhabit a ‘Scottish’ text and an ‘English’ text, and the tension between those two textually defined identities might create the need for a third text, that is to say, a ‘British’ text.

Identity then is textual, in Charland’s formulation, and we have no choice but to inhabit texts as subjects, as characters. A subject might be liberated from the curse of contradictions by “successful new constitutive rhetorics […] that resolve, or at least contain, experienced contradictions” (142). Thus, there is no real freedom for the subject with regard to selfidentification. The subject’s interpellation, Althuser’s term, renders identification a process that happens to subjects, rather than one in which they actively participate.

In McGee’s essay, “In Search of ‘the People’,” on which Charland relies extensively, McGee suggests that ‘the people’ should be defined neither as a mass of individuals behaving similarly nor as the Platonic mob incapable of the use of reason (“In Search of ‘the People’” 2367). And thus, McGee attempts to formulate a conception of “‘the people’ based on an organic conception of human society” (237). But, McGee also views the people as “mass illusion […] conjured into objective reality” by the discourse of the rhetor (242). This formulation, along with Althuser’s insistence that the subject is “always already […] interpellated” by ideology and identifying narratives, seems to describe a situation where individuals have no control over their own identity (175).
My essential argument against this depiction of ‘subjects,’ ‘characters,’ or ‘the people’ as variables in a discursive experiment is the existence of the rhetor. The assumption that a rhetor exists who is controlling and guiding the formation of a people’s identity is an assumption implicit to Charland and Althuser and explicitly described in McGee’s essay. McGee uses Adolph Hitler, the infamous German dictator of the twentieth century, as an example of such a rhetor who “organize[d] dissociated political myths, visions of the collective life dangled before individuals in hope of creating a real ‘people’” (243).

In theory, at least, someone who became a successful rhetor using such appeals would have to be a person of considerable knowledge and training, and history seems to support this conclusion. Where McGee, Charland, and Althuser all fall short is in their failure to describe the origin of texts within the individuals who create them. McGee’s rhetor is merely a secretary who is [re]organizing and deciding how to make use of existing texts with “seeds of collectivization”. Charland’s rhetor is a kind of automaton who develops “new subject positions […] at particular historical moments” (141). Althuser’s rhetor lives a fragile existence as a subject who is defined and controlled by an ideology of which he may be unaware. These descriptions are insufficient conceptualizations of the rhetor.

Three assumptions about the role of the rhetor should be addressed here because they are linked somewhat together. The first is Althuser’s assumption that the rhetor is created and dominated by ideological texts. The second is that the rhetor is guided only by reaction to material conditions. The third, related assumption is that the rhetor is merely an intermediary,
between existing texts and new material conditions, who can abuse his or her power to control other people.\textsuperscript{27}

**Individuals, Material Conditions, and Texts**

As my analysis of the artifacts demonstrates, there are two aspects of Scottish identity which were found in all of the artifacts analyzed: the notion that to be Scottish is not to be English and that to be Scottish is to have some awareness of one’s shared history. That these identities endured across time could be described as an effect of certain texts which had power over the minds of subsequent readers. The “Declaration of Arbroath” and its high opinion of the Scottish King Robert Bruce and its low opinion of the English King Edward II could be said to be the origin of the anti-English sentiment that prevails in almost all of the other documents. Similarly, we could say that the Declaration’s depiction of Scots as a people with a history closely guided subsequent texts in their descriptions of Scots as a people with a history. There might also be a whole myriad of other texts, which this study could not analyze, which could be said to have influenced those describing Scottish identity.

But, there are also the paradoxes in the texts to consider, which Charland and other theorists explain as the result of people living in or being interpellated by multiple texts. The problem is that if we hold that texts “always already” interpellate people, and people subsequently form texts, we must by necessity look for an original text that first interpellated a person. And, if there were such a text, how could we then explain the paradoxes, the discrepancies between different texts? It is possible to try to point toward textual corruption or a

\textsuperscript{27} Dana Cloud has addressed the assumption that ideology alone guides the construction of rhetoric but has not weighed in on the centrality of the rhetor to the creation of discourse; refer to her essay, “The Material Construction of Discourse as Oxymoron” for more on her perspective.
similar idea, but in the absence of an original text, this view is unfounded. This problem gives rise to what I describe as the paradox of invention. If there are only texts that identify and control humans and humans who create texts, i.e. rhetors, then we have no way of understanding how texts come into being, how they gain their ability to control and to identify us. Thus, this view of humans and their relationship to texts falls afoul of a self-created contradiction. But Althusser is not completely wrong. His view that humans are “always already” interpellated is a corruption of something that is true about the ways in which humans identify themselves. At no point after humans begin to sense the world around them is their mind tabula rasa. Epistemological debates and concerns aside, the assertion that no active mind is blank means that no individual as an adult can ever completely erase his or her mind when approaching a piece of discourse. It is perhaps why narratives that have been accepted by individuals retain their power over them for long periods of time. The only example I can offer at this point is Burns, because he is the only author of whom I have studied multiple works. Although I noted key differences between “Scots Wha Ha’e” and “For A’ That,” there is also a key similarity. That similarity is that both works identify the existence of a tension between multiple groups that describe themselves as Scottish. In “Scots Wha Ha’e,” it is the tension between those willing to fight for their country and those who are unwilling to do so. In “For A’ That,” it is the tension between the unprincipled wealthy man and the honest poor man. None of the other documents examined exhibits a similar tension. So, we can speculate that the existence of this tension was a result of a narrative that influenced Burns, a narrative that he could not divorce whenever he approached a new subject. A possible origin of such a narrative I describe below.

Perhaps then, the answer is that individual rhetors and their audiences, for that is what we mean when we say ‘subjects,’ are all acting in concert and responding to the development of new material conditions. More evidence for this point of view exists than does for the position that
texts control and dominate the minds of those who become aware of them. Indeed, Burns’ poems could be viewed as documents that responded to and were grounded in certain material conditions. His “For A’ That” embodies the spirit of working class antagonism toward the privileged classes (Robb and John 27). This antagonism was not an attitude imagined in Burns’ texts, but a sentiment that was born of the dominance of a class of wealthy people who had by and large inherited their wealth over other people who found themselves somewhat less fortunate. It is perhaps a sentiment inspired by the forced migration of peasants by their overlords from Scotland to colonies such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

The “Declaration of Arbroath” could also be viewed as a document grounded in material concerns. As I have previously noted, this letter was designed to accomplish a diplomatic purpose, to respond to the Pope’s declaration of the English King’s sovereignty over Scotland and the attempted invasion of Scotland by England. In graphic detail, it describes the conditions which inspired its composition:

The deeds of cruelty, massacre, violence, pillage, arson, imprisoning prelates, burning down monasteries, robbing and killing monks and nuns and yet other outrages without number which he committed against our people, sparing neither age nor sex, religion nor rank, no-one could describe nor fully imagine unless he had seen them with his own eyes. (2)

Without some awareness of these conditions, the authors of the Declaration would have little about which to complain. The depiction of two groups of Scots in Burns’ poem, “Scots Wha Ha’e,” those willing to resist English invasion and those unwilling to do so, may have arisen from his knowledge of a similar phenomenon that occurred during the Jacobite rising of 1745, when the Protestant lowlanders sided with the English and the Catholic highlanders constituted the Jacobite army’s main troops. Here, it is worth noting that even though a narrative or text has
some enduring power, it only maintains that power because it points to something real, experienced, and known.

Thus, there is substantial evidence for the role of material conditions in guiding the formation of rhetorical arguments or even identities. We might even go so far as to say that the existence of material conditions is a necessary factor for the creation of a rhetorical message; that is, there must be something to which rhetoric responds. Rhetoric does not simply create messages for its own sake. But how much influence do material conditions exert over the rhetor? For example, was Burns blinded by his awareness of the recent past when constructing a poem about a more distant period? Possibly, but the evidence which we have from that period suggests that it was not altogether unlike the experience of Burns’ Scotland.

The best evidence that material conditions only exert a limited influence over the rhetor comes from the fact that there are numerous cases where multiple individuals experience the same material conditions, but construct different rhetorical messages to address them. In Burns’ case, we might compare him to a contemporary figure, with whom I have already drawn comparisons, Sir Walter Scott. Both Scott and Burns had access to the same kind of narrative of Scottish history, and yet, Burns’ reaction seems to have been to heap scorn on those who had ‘betrayed Scotland,’ while Sir Walter Scott sought to redefine Scottishness to make it more palatable to the Anglican elite (Newman 15).

Perhaps more compelling evidence would describe the relationship between the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish National Party. The SNP is and has been, since the 1970s, a leftwing, socialist party (Pittock, *Road 70*). Although they certainly do not agree on everything, it is fair to say both the SNP and the Scottish Labour are socialist, left-wing political entities. And yet, the political groups have different agendas. They deal with some similar problems, such as employment, healthcare, and transportation. But in the discourse of SNP, the party’s goal is
described as protecting these crucial government services from the Tories at Westminster 
(Reelect 28). On the other hand, the Scottish Labour Party does not describe a necessary conflict 
between the maintenance of such services and continued participation in the political union of 
Scotland, England, and Wales. Thus, we can gather that while material conditions exert a great 
deal of influence over the subject of discourse, they do not dominate or control the rhetor who 
constructs a response to them.

Finally, there is the much more insidious view that the rhetor is controlled by both texts 
and material conditions. That is, texts which McGee calls ‘seeds of collectivization’ provide the 
material that rhetors use to construct discourse that identifies the people, while the prevailing 
material conditions dictate the kind of discourse the rhetor will construct. The view is much 
closer to reality than the view that one of the two factors, either material conditions or texts, 
dominate the rhetor. Where it errs, it seems to me, is in supposing that the process is one guided 
by the two factors and not by the rhetor.

If, as I have shown, neither material conditions nor texts absolutely control rhetors, it is 
not possible that together they could control that which they could not control alone. Moreover, 
it is the rhetor, the author, who must decide how much either factor will influence the 
construction of a piece of discourse. As I pointed out in my analysis of documents related to the 
Scottish National Party’s attempt to gain independence for Scotland, the writers of the special 
election manifesto (Choice) seem to have made a deliberate choice not to ground the argument 
for independence in historical animosities toward others in Scotland. Instead, they have chosen 
to focus on the material conditions in contemporary Scotland. They cannot fully escape the 
influence of previous texts because they still exhibit anti-English sentiments, but suggesting that 
they have been influenced is far from asserting that they are being controlled. Thus, in my view,
the rhetor is the essential element in the creation of discourse. Texts and material conditions may be very important factors, but neither is sufficient to create discourse in and of themselves.

But, why is it important to understand the rhetor’s role in the creation of discourse? Traditionally, the role of the rhetor in the process seemed self-evident, but in the wake of the “critical turn” of the scholarly field, the power that our discipline has attributed to texts necessarily finds itself in conflict with the power which was previously attributed to rhetors. If texts identify and control humans, then they must control rhetors; this conclusion leads inevitably, as I have pointed out, to the tautology and the paradox of invention which I described earlier wherein it is impossible to locate the origin or locus of discourse.

What I contend is first, the power of discourse does not rest in texts, but in individual people as it rests with rhetors; second, the text does not create identity, nor is it the seat of identity; instead, the individual is both the creator and the embodiment of identity. In turn, these premises suggest that a rhetor cannot ever conjure “into objective reality” a people without the consent of many individual people (McGee, “In Search of ‘the People’” 240). Accepting that individual people have some control over the identity they embody and the identities they ascribe to other people does deny rhetoric the power to identify people without their consent. But it does not deny that rhetoric influences people to share similar goals or to think of themselves as belonging to a larger group. Proving that texts have limits using texts is very difficult, this may be the reason why a discipline centered on the study of texts attributes so much power to them.

In order to determine the real extent to which texts are powerful, one must turn to an inartistic source of proof, that is, proof that is not rooted in the study of texts themselves but in the study of their effects. Since I am dealing with eras in history for which objective knowledge of the effects of texts is not available, the only source of proof is history or the contexts of texts.
Certainly, this study provides grounds for suggesting that texts are indeed powerful. The identities which remain constant across all of the texts analyzed might suggest that ‘ancestral texts’ such as the “Declaration of Arbroath” were extremely powerful means of defining the Scottish people, especially because they had such a great influence on the texts that came after them, occurring as they did in a vacuum of other texts. But, to claim that the Declaration had so much influence is to commit two fallacies, the fallacy of causation, *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, and that of assuming the text occurred in a vacuum. Texts do not occur in vacuums, even in the absence of other written texts. Oral cultures function to provide alternate sources of identity when illiteracy is common. But as for the positive proof of my assertion, it rests on examples from history where identities have been contested by different groups both claiming to be a definitive embodiment of the identity.

Burns is the most poignant example of such a resistance fighter in the wars of identity. As others have argued, the contest over Scottish identity was primarily fought between those seeking to preserve Scottish identity by rearticulating it and writers such as Burns who romanticized it (Devine, “In Bed with an Elephant,” 7). First, Burns is deeply conscious of history, rooting “Scots Wha Ha’e” in a struggle that dated back to the fourteenth century. Second, as a writer, Burns encountered political, literary, and rhetorical forces that sought to redefine Scottishness to make it more palatable to the Anglican establishment, forces led by writers such as Sir Walter Scott (Newman 15). As a substantial body of scholarship suggests, Burns’ writings do not attempt to establish Scottishness as compatible with Englishness (Ferguson 313). In both “Scots Wha Ha’e” and “For A’ That,” there are narratives that either overtly or indirectly identify the English as enemies. In the former work, it is overt; the English are the invaders following on the heels of their tyrant, King Edward II. In the latter, it is covert; the English are only implicated if one associates them with nobility and wealth. Finally, Burns
did not portray all Scots as united against the English. In both poems, there are enemies within Scotland who are subverting it, who are not worthy of being called Scottish. Perhaps, this is reflective of the very struggle in which he was caught up as a writer or more recent conflicts where certain Scots had sided with the English.

But we may infer that the texts and cultural forces which sought to control definitions of Scottishness did not exert control Burns. In the case of his own writings, it is Burns who mediates history, contemporary material conditions, and his own position related to other authors of texts. There is no narrative of identity driving Burns; instead, the narrative is the output of a conscious mind, aware of certain information, certain material on which it could act through writing. The presence of an individuated mind acting to create texts is an obvious conclusion once all other sources of a text’s invention have been eliminated. Yet we should be cautious; these alternative sources are still important. But material conditions and other texts are not sufficient conditions of the creation of narrative identities; they may perhaps be necessary conditions, but they are not sufficient. There must be awareness of these factors in order to create a narrative of identity, and it is the author who possesses awareness. Burns, as the source of awareness, then, is the ultimate source of the narrative of identity constructed within his poems.

Texts then do not control writers; writers control texts.

This conclusion might establish a critique of writers and speakers as a class with hegemonic privilege, using it to control the identification of other people. A writer such as Burns might be said to control modern people seeking to identify as Scots. The same could be said for writers of other texts that purport to define Scottishness. But to move in this direction is simply to assert that powerful people through texts control powerless people. It is really not so different
an argument, patterned as it is on the assumption that discourse controls people, whether created by master narratives or a class of masters. But this approach is also flawed.

The same consciousness or awareness possessed by an author or speaker, which enables him or her to create a text, thereby making the author the source of the very identity he or she seeks to elaborate, is also possessed by other humans. Aristotle calls this capacity “deliberative imagination” (*De Anima*, III.11.2); in common academic speech, it is frequently mentioned as the view of humans as ‘rational animals.’ The *capacity* for deliberative imagination is what enables humans to speculate about what something might be, to confer a single definition on a term, i.e. Scottishness, that has a great deal of significance but also many competing definitions. As Aristotle implies, it is not a capacity that is exercised by everyone consciously, but it is a capacity which all humans share and, in some degree, have the ability to exercise (III.10.2). 28

Arguments that emphasize the power of texts fall afoul of the essential ability of humans to identify themselves. If a writer such as Burns can exercise such an ability, other humans can, too. Perhaps the ability is uncultivated in some, perhaps it is present to a lesser degree in others, but the seed of individualization is present in every human, and it is this seed that is the source, the fountainhead of identity. To return to my assertion, I summarize as follows. First, discourse has no power over humans; it is given power by them. Second, texts do not create or embody identity; humans both self-identify and create textual descriptions of identity positions. Third, no human, no matter how powerful, can conjure into objective reality an identified people without the tacit permission of many individual people. It is with these assertions in mind that I proceed

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28 Aristotle distinguishes between the speculative intellect which speculates about immaterial, abstract considerations and the practical intellect which speculates about how to bring about changes in the material world. Both use the same mechanism but aim at different ends.
to rebuild a theory of constitutive rhetoric that recognizes the role that humans play in identifying themselves.

Rebuilding Constitutive Rhetoric

While I stand by my own assertions about the power of the individual and their ability to create texts and mediate the influence of texts, I do not deny that rhetoric is a powerful tool through which a rhetor can attempt to persuade others to identify with a particular identity position. The very rule which suggests that humans have the capacity to identify themselves suggests that from the moment of consciousness, all humans have an identity, however unsophisticated. Thus, neither rhetor nor any individual, Althuser’s ‘subject,’ comes out into public life *tabula rasa*. The individual who is aware of texts necessarily orients his or herself toward texts in a certain way, just as the individual is surrounded by material objects against which he or she must orient his or herself. Realizing that a text is powerful and persuasive requires more abstract thinking than recognizing that a fire is hot and dangerous but the two involve the same mechanism of consciousness. In both cases, that mechanism is being used to fulfill discreetly different functions, but at different stages of development. Thus, to be a human is to some extent to be identified, not by an external force that is hailing or interpelling one, so much as by an internal force that answers the hail. Thus, if I appear to have dismantled Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric, it is with the aim of reconstructing it as a discoursecreating instrument at the rhetor’s disposal. I recognize that texts, rhetoric and rhetors are powerful; thus, instead of giving rhetoricians a means of identifying constitutive rhetoric, I aim to describe how rhetors might use constitutive rhetoric.\(^{29}\) If rhetoricians can subsequently

\(^{29}\) It is, of course, important to note that distinguishing between rhetors and rhetoricians is not always necessary. As Klumpp and Hollihan argue, these are somewhat arbitrary distinctions that alienate rhetoricians from the impact of their work. For more on this perspective, see their essay, “Rhetorical Criticism as Moral Action.”
identify any of these tools being used in practice, they may be able to identify constitutive rhetoric at play.

The aim of any rhetoric that attempts to constitute masses of people into a people, is to encourage individuals to identify with what Charland has described as an “ultimate identifier” (139). Such an identifier goes beyond individuals in the sense that it seeks to encourage individuals to see in themselves some quality that might also be present in other people and which serves as an aspect of the ultimate identifier. If we turn back to Burns’ “For A’ That,” we see an attempt on Burns’ part to encourage people to identify themselves with the honest poor man and so with the better definition of Scottishness. There are numerous aspects of this identity that one might seize upon, one might identify as an honest man who has worked for his wealth and reject Burns’ attempts to link poverty with honesty. On the other hand, one could accept both honesty and poverty as traits of a good Scot and identify with the song in its entirety. The ultimate identifiers are aspects of the described identity which are not unique to the individual and which might be accepted by a wider group of people. An individual might respond to any similar identifier in such a manner. One might attempt to associate Scottishness with any number of adjectives, e.g. hard-working, wealthy, privileged. Such associations can be especially persuasive because all people aspiring to association with the term ‘Scottish’ might be pushed or pulled toward adopting the qualities that a rhetor associates with it in discourse. These ultimate identifiers can be used in such a way as to make it seem that, within the discourse, the auditor either has to accept the rhetor’s definition of Scottishness, for instance, or otherwise not be Scottish. But the rhetor must be careful of playing for such high stakes because if the audience

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30 But let me be clear. I am not describing the term as Charland used it. I am describing it for my own purposes, consistent with my own premises.
recognizes that the dichotomy is false, and it usually is, then the ultimate identifier articulated by
the rhetor might be widely panned as not representative of most people’s perceptions.

The previous technique is frequently employed by politicians and other speakers seeking
to substitute identification for persuasion but it is all too easy to link two terms together in
discourse. As I previously suggested, auditors who have experience already have a sense of their
own identity and whether they know it or not are resistant to attempts to detach adjectives i.e.
hard-working from ultimate identifiers i.e. Scottish or to reattach new adjectives to the same. But
this is not always the case. Auditors are often vulnerable to attempts to redefine their identities
when they experience difficult material conditions. Thus, the rhetor who seeks to redefine a
people must do so when they are at their most vulnerable.

Most historians of literature agree that if there were a dispute between writers such as
Robert Burns and writers such as Sir Walter Scott over what the term Scottish meant, Scott’s
party won. It is impossible to say why thousands of individuals succumbed to the appeal of a
new Scottishness that was more acceptable to the English, but one factor might have been the
ample economic rewards bestowed by the union which was not only political but also economic
and social upon the upper classes (Monnickendam 100). Effective rhetors should recognize that
there are conditions which the art itself cannot directly bring about e.g. economic conditions that
present opportunities for discourse to be more successful. Thus, we might say that the ability of a
rhetor to constitute a public is dependent in large part on inartistic factors.

The rhetor must also consider that most audiences will not only be aware of the existence
of associations between terms and their own material conditions but will also have some sense of
how those terms have historically been associated and the experience of material conditions in
previous eras. This contention holds true for reasons which Charland has already articulated,
such as association with the same land and biological descent from earlier peoples (140). But we
might also suggest that, at some level, people have some sense of the beliefs and ideas advocated by their ancestors. This addition is important because it demonstrates that history is not only important to audience members for purely subjective reasons, e.g. because it links them to the land or their ancestors experienced it, but also for more objective reasons such as a sense that their ancestors held some beliefs, attitudes, or values which they might also hold. Thus, the rhetor must be conscious of both the material conditions prevailing in prior eras and the historical definitions of the ultimate identifier to which audiences have access.

Audiences and rhetors can both employ history, as far as they are aware of it, to resist redefinition even in times of distressful material conditions. History may be at work in Burns’ employment of the Battle of Bannockburn in “Scots Wha Ha’e,” where he could be said to be using history to show that there have been times when material conditions were poor, but when the better sorts of Scottish people stood together against a common enemy. The role of history in discourse is not unambiguous; it depends to a large extent on what the audience can recall when the rhetor attempts to redefine a people. In any case, history is a source both for the rhetor who is attempting to encourage an audience to identify and for the audience seeking to resist the rhetor’s advances.

Thus, in summary, I have reconstructed constitutive rhetoric as a set of tools which are at the rhetor’s disposal. The three interrelated means of encouraging an audience to adopt a new identity are as follows. First, a rhetor can use ultimate identifiers in association with certain universal qualities to encourage people who consider themselves ‘Scottish’ to become more ‘hard-working’ as well. Second, a rhetor must recognize that certain inartistic, material conditions may affect the likelihood of audience members accepting the rhetor’s attempt at redefinition of a people; these conditions make certain moments more opportune for redefinition than others. Third, rhetors should be aware that history can both reinforce and work against their
attempt to redefine people’s understanding of their own identity. In the chapter which follows, I attempt to generate wider conclusions for the study of rhetoric from the implications generated above.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter, I was concerned mainly with rearticulating the role of the individual in the process of identification and generating a new set of tools that might explain how constitutive rhetoric can be successful at redefining the identity of people(s). In describing the functional means of bringing about identification, I only briefly considered the wider social implications of using constitutive rhetoric as a tool for manipulating audiences. There is, of course, a great deal of potential for constitutive rhetoric to be used disingenuously or abusively, and the fact that audiences can resist the advances of rhetors seeking to redefine them does not mean that we should not be critical of those who attempt to use the powerful tools of rhetoric toward inappropriate ends. But there are aspects of our critical approach that must change. It is all too common for rhetoricians to criticize ‘social constructs’ as embodied in texts and enacted by people as though they exist as solid, real entities that have been “conjured into objective reality” (McGee, “In Search of ‘the People’” 242).

As I have argued, one cannot conjure any identity into objective reality without the consent of those who embody the identity. But there is more at stake. If an ultimate identifier can be used to describe a mass of people, because they would consent for the term to be used in a description of themselves, does that mean that the term describes something real in the same way that the term ‘table’ describes a certain object? Semantics aside, owing to the subjectivity of politically tainted terms such as “Scottish,” “English,” or “American,” a person in the inner city of Glasgow might use ‘Scottish’ in a very different way, with very different associated terms in mind, than a person from the Western Isles. In that sense, then, even if a scholar or a computer
were to make a life’s work of tracking down all of the adjectives that were ever used in association with an ultimate identifier, it seems doubtful that it could ever be completely quantified in purely objective terms. This study found only two consistent aspects of Scottish identity to be present in each of the representative texts examined. This finding should raise some doubt regarding the objective reality of ‘the people’ – even when large masses of people have consented to similar usages of a term such as ‘Scottish.’

My insistence on positioning the individual as the source of identity narratives and the locus of identification appears to have set up a paradox for those wishing to study identity. One can either embark on a massive quantitative expedition to ‘find’ the ‘real’ meaning of an ultimate identifier or else reject my conclusions in favor of continuing to examine the embodiment of identity in texts. The problem in this situation is not with my premises, but with the metaphors through which we understand social reality.

McGee seems to have been unwilling to part with the notion that the people somehow become a part of objective reality and offers a solution to the problem which is encapsulated in the following:

An alternative to collecting the votes of ‘persons,’ therefore, may be to conceive ‘people’ as an essential rhetorical fiction with both a ‘social’ and an ‘objective’ reality. This notion of dual realities is specifically ‘nonrational’ in traditional terms. Contrary to the law of identity, the assertion is explicit that ‘the people’ are both real and a fiction simultaneously. (“In Search of ‘the People’” 240)

Herein, I am specifically concerned with being rational, and hence, I have a problem with admitting that a thing exists and does not exist at the same time. The limitations which McGee imposes on his approach are twofold. The first and chief problem rests with his conception of ‘the people’ as a static entity, given expression by a specific text or set of texts, which may fade away “when [the] rhetoric which defined them [no longer] has force” (242). The second problem
rests in his persistence in asserting that a people as a collectively-identified mass are something more than each individual person sharing certain definitions of a similar identifying term.

I would like to propose an alternative to McGee’s view of ‘the people’ as a somewhat static entity composed by a group that has been collectively identified by a rhetor. My view asserts that ‘the people’ never exist in objectively definable terms as a static, identifiable mass. On the contrary, ‘the people’ are not a thing, but a dynamic process. Stepping back from McGee’s term, i.e. ‘the people’, and speaking metaphorically, we might say that society, or ‘the people’ writ large, is some kind of river and human beings its constituent isotopical elements. In what follows, I briefly sketch the fountainhead of my metaphor before describing the metaphor in more detail and drawing out the most immediate implications it has for rhetoric as a critical discipline and as a practice.

Heraclitus and Flux

For a new metaphor for understanding society, it is necessary to return to some of the same Greek writers whom McGee claims limit our understanding of rhetoric (“In Search of ‘the People’” 235-6). Heraclitus, an Ionian pre-Socratic philosopher, has been made famous for a disputed quotation31 which has been handed down to us in a fragmented form: “As they step into the same rivers, different and still different waters flow upon them.”32 When Plato got his hands on it, he paraphrased the saying into its more familiar form in his dialogue Cratylus: “all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream” (402a). The saying is attested again in

31 I ascribe to Guthrie’s view that we can attribute this saying to Heraclitus; for more, see his History of Greek Philosophy, I, 488-9.
32 From T. M. Robinson’s translation of Heraclitus’ fragments, 17.
Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “[Cratylus] criticized Heraclitus for saying that one cannot enter the same river twice, for he himself held that it cannot be done even once” (1010a). There have been numerous attempts to reconstruct Heraclitus’ philosophy, but all of them have only his fragmented sayings, which however numerous, do not constitute a thorough statement of his own worldview. But we can say that Heraclitus’ understanding of the world seems to have been predicated at least in part on the notion that all things are in flux (Guthrie 449-50).

Although in what follows I intend to transgress Heraclitus’ metaphor and to make use of it for my own purposes, I think it is only fair to be very clear about how his premises differ from my own, as far as we can ascertain what his premises were. In her essay, “The Task of the Bow,” Carol Poster argues that Heraclitus’ view of rhetoric has been ignored by contemporary rhetorical scholars who tend to impose current disciplinary boundaries on thinkers from the past (1). Heraclitus then is ignored by rhetorical scholars, she argues, because he appears to them a natural philosopher, even though he himself would not have appreciated the difference between philosophy and rhetoric. This issue has a more specific application to the way in which I intend to reuse the metaphor. While I am operating from the perspective that there is a distinct difference between the natural world, i.e. the metaphysical world, and the social world, i.e. the world controlled directly by humans, Heraclitus would not have recognized such a difference. In fact, the evidence suggests that he perceived the physical world and the human world to be interrelated, to be affected by the same processes of motion and constant change (Guthrie 464). As far as I can tell from the available evidence, he did not explicitly come to the conclusions I am drawing.33

33 Jim Kuyper has used Heraclitus’ river image to describe the field of rhetoric as a stream consisting of multiple strands. My use of the river image is similar to Kuyper’s but applies it more broadly. For more on his use of the river as a metaphor, see “The Rhetorical River” (350-1).
Another key difference is in my insistence on maintaining the law of identity. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle, who undoubtedly had more access to Heraclitus than any modern scholar, listed him as an opponent of the law of contradiction: “for it is impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine that Heraclitus says” (1005b). If there are sides in such an argument, mine is with Aristotle. As Guthrie very aptly summarizes, concerning Heraclitus:

To himself he was one who had discovered the divinely-appointed truth, and was therefore divinely charged to proclaim it. He had not Aristotle’s severe eye for the law of contradiction, and uttered his paradoxes with relish. (462)

Moreover, although it seems certain that Heraclitus uttered the phrase about the river, it also seems that he preferred to compare the process of constant change to the waxing and waning of fire, not the surging of water (459-63). Thus, I wish to make clear that while I am cognizant of the history of interpreting Heraclitus, my use of his metaphor of the river and the concept of flux is a transgressive usage that repurposes the terms and images he used to describe new phenomena.

A New Metaphor for Society

In returning to my original aim, I wish to begin with the image of the river, constantly changing, constantly flowing. Whether or not this is an apt metaphor for the physical world, about which I profess to know little, it seems to me an excellent metaphor for the social world in which all humans exist. There are two essential components of the metaphor which require discussion: the river as governed by certain laws and the river as consisting of individual elements. All other aspects of the metaphor are but extensions of these two and will be spelled out as I proceed. In beginning, I should also briefly defend my use of a metaphor. A metaphor
does not produce a complete, fully-explained worldview and that is not my aim. A metaphor shows the relationship between different concepts, in this case, individuals, rhetoric, and society. Thus, my use of a metaphor here is designed to shed light on the relationship between these concepts by comparing and contrasting ‘society’ and ‘a river.’

The first broad aspect of the metaphor is that society consists of a river that is governed by certain laws, some of which are changeable and others which are not. With regard to the latter, I mean that just as the individual elements of a physical river are influenced by the universal factor of gravity, the individual components that constitute the river of society are guided by certain unalterable factors. At the most basic level, an example of this is the human need for food and certain material goods that determine an individual’s survival. At a more complex level, this includes the human need to self-identify. But unlike elements in a natural river, the individual components of the river of society have the capacity for self-direction and self-fulfillment of these basic needs. It is this difference which points us in the direction of the second set of laws, those changeable, human-made laws which also govern society. Because the individual has the capacity for self-direction, although certain needs must per force be met, the direction to be taken in the fulfilment of these goals is optional. This premise suggests that just as humans have a choice concerning what food to eat, they also have a choice concerning how to identify themselves. We might speak of this metaphorically as the choice of individual elements in the river of society concerning the direction they will take.

Moreover, rhetoric has a role to play in the human river. At the level of identity, rhetoric is a factor that has the capacity to influence the direction taken by individual elements. It does not control the individual elements per se, because of their autonomy, but rather is a force but not a method of forcing that has the potential to draw them into its wake. It is often difficult to resist certain rhetorical forces, and those who wish to think of the metaphor as pure will say that
humans are dragged along by the force of rhetoric. Such a perspective within the world of the metaphor might choose to portray rhetoric as a boat or submarine, drawing elements with which it comes into contact along in its wake, or as a dam holding up progress. But rhetoric is not an outside factor, controlled by a god-like caste of river-shapers. Rhetoric is a force that is controlled by individual elements within the societal river – a river in which we are all caught up because we all have the same need to self-identify. Instead of thinking of rhetoric as an external force that acts upon the river of society, it is more productive to think of it as a force used by individual elements to accelerate themselves, to push forward, and to draw other elements along in their wake. Of course, each rhetor’s attempt to draw in other elements, or individuals, answers an essential human need to self-identify, but it is the choice of each individual whether or not to follow in the wake of a rhetor.

The second and perhaps equally striking aspect of the metaphor is that both natural rivers and the river of society are composed of individual elements. It was this quality that enabled Heraclitus to use it as a metaphor for flux in the first place. Suggesting that the river of society is composed of individual components begs the further question: How do we account for the comparison between a river which acts almost completely in unison and society which sometimes does not? The answer is of course the sovereignty of each individual element in the river of society. Nevertheless, this aspect of the metaphor also sheds some light on a further aspect of the metaphor that is worth considering. How do we account for the seemingly monolithic, powerful institutions that define the great masses of society within the metaphor? Institutions do exist, but not apart from the millions of individuals that comprise them. Just as ‘the people’ are no more than millions of individuals acting together, an institution, as a current in a river, is no more than all of its constituent elements acting together to move in a particular direction. We cannot point to any one piece of rhetoric as defining an institution. The individual
components of an institution are often drawn in by the force, i.e. rhetoric, of at first a single element and later by the massive rhetorical force exerted by the millions of elements that have followed in its wake. Nonetheless, as always, it is possible for a single element to extricate itself from the current. The process of extrication is not easy or painless. There may in fact be a great deal of metaphorical friction exerted upon elements that seek to withdraw from an institutional current, but withdraw they can.

There are of course unique advantages to allowing oneself to be drawn in by an institutional current. The chief advantage is that institutions carry their constituent elements in a particular direction. They also offer rewards, either of the tangible kind, i.e. material goods, or of the intangible but nonetheless necessary kind, i.e. identities. Institutional currents allow each individual element to actualize all of the potential energy it has, rather than remaining a part of a stagnant, inactive pool. Now this is no argument for progress qua progress, for institutions qua institutions. Just as a river has a particular telos, so too each human river has a telos defined by its individual members and the institutional currents which they form. Sometimes, whole portions of the river choose to stagnate themselves, choose not to move toward a particular end. These might be called quagmires or even icy patches, but movement is both possible and necessary even within these rigid societies. Usually it is easier to move into a different portion of the river, into a different current, if an individual element is at the edge or on the boundary of the present portion, where the current or stagnating factors exerts the least pull.

There is a third component of the metaphor, which grows out of the other components as a conclusion from two premises. This third component shows that, as a natural river, the river of human society is in a state of apparent flux. Since the river is governed by certain laws, change is constant. That is, the need of humans to identify themselves and to acquire material goods requires them to be in motion, though the direction of each element is not predetermined. Since
the river is composed of millions of individual particles, it is extremely difficult to track. These two factors combined yield the assertion that the river of society as a whole cannot be fully defined or delimited within conceptual boundaries. But we must provide one caveat. If the state of flux was truly constant and there were no way to identify the position and direction of other elements of the river, it would be either virtually impossible or extremely difficult for any one element to identify or know itself.

Instead, I assert a social equivalent of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which is basically that one cannot identify the precise position and momentum of an electron at the same time. It is possible for a single individual to approximate the position and direction of other individual elements, i.e. individual people, based on general knowledge of institutional currents and other contextual factors, but this knowledge is not so precise as to form a ‘map’ that categorizes and confines individual elements to certain portions of the river. Rather, our knowledge of the position and direction of other elements is limited and not very precise since individual people possess the potential to change how they identify. Moreover, the corollary is that all individual elements of the river have more potential to know their own position and direction than they do the position and direction of other elements.

There are no doubt many directions in which scholars could carry this metaphor, but for my purposes, its utility has been exhausted. To summarize, there are two essential areas of comparison between the human river and the image of a natural river: the river as governed by certain laws and the river as being composed of individual components. The first of these comparisons implies that rhetoric has the capacity to exercise influence over the direction that

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34 The uncertainty principle “tells us that there is fuzziness in nature, a fundamental limit to what we can know about the behaviour of quantum particles and, therefore, the smallest scales of nature” (Jha 1). For more on the subject I recommend, Alok Jha’s essay, “What is Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.”
the individual components of the river will take. The second of these factors yields the point of
counterpoint that in the river of society, each individual element has the capacity for self-direction.

Additionally, this second aspect of the metaphor also explains how humans function and identify
in groups based on the comparison between currents and institutions. In the following section, I
describe what I see as conclusions for rhetoric as a critical discipline and a social practice.

Society and a New Constitutive Rhetoric

In looking for a conceptual as opposed to a metaphorical definition of society, that is
compatible with my metaphor, the best place to look is at a paper from more than half a century
ago by a sociologist name Friedrich Baerwald. The paper appears to have been ignored, although
it is possible that there are more current theories in sociology related to it. Baerwald asserts that
society should be viewed as a dynamic process as opposed to something that exists and can be
studied as a static object. He defined society as follows: “Society is the process of widening and
deepening the range of individual existences into systems of extended frameworks of time and
space” (240). This highly abstract definition nonetheless asserts that society is a process that is
happening, not a tangible entity that can be circumscribed if only we analyze the right texts. To
make the definition a little less abstract we might say: ‘Society is a process as part of which
many individuals coordinate their actions to secure specific ends.’ As Baerwald explains:

[S]ocial reality […] is embodied in all concrete processes and
institutions which factually or intentionally aim at extending
individual time and space horizons […] it is the reality behind the
manifestations of the social process and its innumerable concrete
forms. (240)

Furthermore, Baerwald claims that social groups, from units as small as the family to
large political entities, all have the goal of “time and space extension of the participating
individuals. What distinguishes them is the direction of their frameworks” (241). He argues that
direction, or movement and change, is implicit to the notion of a social group; it is different orientations that set groups apart from each other. Although Baerwald is not concerned with rhetoric, it is easy to see how it easily fits into his definition. One of the functions of rhetoric is to be the means by which societal groups, indeed individual people, coordinate their own actions and self-identify.

But the whole purpose of my brief excursus concerning a new metaphor for society was to describe the relationship between rhetoric, individuals, and society. Rhetoric’s place in such a society is still a powerful one, but the metaphor and Baerwald’s definition of society beg both scholars and practitioners of rhetoric to question the extent to which rhetoric can be said to define society or ‘the people’ if society is more of a process than a definable entity. Thus, in what remains, I have two objectives. The first is to point to my own reconceptualization of constitutive rhetoric as compatible with this new view of society. The second is to point out general conclusions and directions that the field of rhetoric might take, given this new view of society.

In my reconceptualization of Charland’s constitutive rhetoric, I identified three components of constitutive rhetoric. The first is that constitutive rhetoric attempts to persuade auditors to accept the validity of a relationship between “ultimate identifiers” and particular adjectives i.e. Scottish and hard-working. The second is that the effectiveness of constitutive rhetoric depends largely on material conditions which are beyond the direct control of the rhetor. The third component is that history strongly influences the relationship between “ultimate identifiers” and adjectives, limiting the number of possible new relationships between the two which auditors can be persuaded to accept. Each of these assertions is compatible with my view of society and I wish to explain how they work in regard to it.
The relationship between “ultimate identifiers” and individuals is very nearly a necessary one. Each individual usually has an imprecise set of adjectives which they associate with themselves and with their “ultimate identifier.” They may of course not choose to use the same adjectives in relationship to others around them, but such a choice would very likely become a source of social friction. Burns for instance did not use the same adjectives that Scott did in his literary work. For Burns, in the works we have examined, to be a good Scot is to be brave, as in “Scots Wha Ha’ie,” and to be poor, as in For A’ That. This use of the term Scottish was a source of friction for Burns, as he encountered other people who were attempting to associate an entirely different set of adjectives with the word Scottish, even earning him the distinction ‘plebian.’ Thus, we return to the conclusion that human society is composed of many individual people, who all exercise volition and have the ability to self-identify. Moreover, this view suggests that not all of the elements may be moving in the same direction.

Asserting that material conditions affect the audience’s willingness to accept new associations between “ultimate identifiers” and adjectives is the equivalent of saying that there are unchangeable laws of human nature that require individuals to be in constant motion. Just as people must identify, they must eat or else die. Thus, while material conditions in no way govern or control the individual’s decision to identify themselves and others, they exert a great deal of influence on that decision. The SNP’s rhetoric of noblesse oblige is designed to encourage individual people to identify as Scottish and vote SNP based on their assertion that to be Scottish is to be protected from harm, to have one’s material needs met by one’s overlords. The SNP’s rhetoric is a direct appeal to voters to consider their own material conditions as much as their identity when voting on independence. And while these material conditions do not exert control over either the rhetor or the audience, they are factors in making decisions about what rhetoric should be employed and accepted.
Finally, just as the momentum of elements within a river influences their direction, history exerts some influence over the individual’s self-identification. The two common themes that were associated with ‘Scottish’ in all of the documents I researched that Scots were not English and that to be Scottish was to have a sense of one’s history both suggest that history is a factor that is present in decisions about identity. It is not only history in the sense of something experienced by one’s ancestors, but also the history that one has experienced oneself, namely, experience. At more advanced stages of human development, to identify as something is also to know that one was something else before. This process of identification also extends to the institutions, the currents and streams of which one is a part. Even at the most basic, misunderstood level, most people have a sense that being “American,” “Scottish” or “English” has some historical connotation. Their perception may be wrong, but for purposes of identification it is a factor.

Conclusions for Rhetoric

Given my new view of society, one general conclusion related to rhetoric and identity and one direction which I think the field must take remain to be discussed. First, much of this work has been devoted to asserting that individuals make choices in regard to the ways in which they self-identify. If we think of society as a map, on which territories are staked out by different social groups and individuals subsumed within larger groups and institutions, the kind of agency I am ascribing to single individuals is incomprehensible. It is with such a monolithic\textsuperscript{35} view of society in mind that Charland proclaims: “subjects within narratives are positioned and so constrained” (140). The role of identity with relation to such a view of society is to tell a person

\textsuperscript{35} I am aware that most scholars would use the term “essentialized” here, but that term has moral and political implications that I do not endorse. My use of monolithic describes an unchanging, stereotyped view of society without asserting that to hold such a view is necessarily to be morally suspect.
where he or she is, to *position* him or her in a wider system over which he or she exerts little control.

My view of society substantially affects our understanding of how individuals come to identify themselves. With the image of the river of human society in mind, it is easy to see how a single element, an individual is not positioned and constrained, but directed and moving. Instead of the individual’s identity being controlled by outside factors, in my view, individuals are the mediating point between outside pressures and their own choice of direction. It may be true that great masses of people do not choose wisely or even consciously, but choose they must because motion is an absolute and direction is not. Thus, we should think of rhetoric that seeks to ‘reidentify’ people, not as repositioning subjects, but as redirecting individuals. The difference is critical because subjects who are repositioned have no choice concerning where they land.

Individuals who are redirected have several choices. They can refuse to accept the redirection, that is they can decide that a speaker’s association of the adjective ‘hard-working’ with the ultimate identifier ‘Scottish’ is not true and decide instead that ‘entitled’ or any adjective they can imagine is more preferable. Redirected individuals can also refuse to accept that the speaker has any authority to redirect or reidentify them and reject altogether the speaker’s attempts. And of course, they can also accept the speaker’s authority and their redirection. But it is also critical to recognize that the fluid nature of society means that at virtually any point, they can retract their acceptance of the redirection and begin moving in a new direction. It is not what individuals accept or reject in a moment that identifies them, it is the heading toward which they focus their efforts and the degree to which they are successful in reaching it that define them. Moreover, the abundance of currents, eddies and undercurrents apart from the mainstream means that not only do individuals have the potential to move
solitarily in their own directions, but they also have many directions that other people have taken from which to choose.

The second issue I must raise is in regards to the issue of texts. Texts both literal and figurative form the material of the discipline of rhetoric. It is thus understandable that scholars of rhetoric who wish to study identity view the text in all its forms as the locus of identity. The prevailing view of texts is convenient because it suggests that rhetoricians, who have the critical tools to investigate and to understand the creation of texts and their meanings, are best poised to understand the identities people choose to adopt. As Charland notes, “narratives move inexorably toward their telos,” and individuals caught up in those narratives are pulled along by them (140). Charland’s constitutive rhetoric, along with a great deal of scholarship in the field, depends on the assumption that texts are the source and locus of identity, but as my study has shown this position is suspect, even in theory.

In another essay where he describes a speech delivered by Peter Wentworth to the English parliament during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, McGee suggests that, “his speech is nothing more or less than a reflection of the ‘consciousness’ of his generation,” and McGee concludes that Wentworth “was forced into lines of argument which accounted for the peculiar psychology of his audiences” (“Origins” 30). McGee argues that Wentworth’s speech is an ‘artifact of consciousness’ which can shed some light on the kinds of arguments which would have been palatable to his contemporaries. This view means that the speaker’s immediate projection of how his audience would receive a message should function as a ‘map’ of the positions of everyone around the speaker. If we apply this view to texts concerned with identity, we are left with the conclusion that the kinds of identities which speakers assume their audience already embody represent the audience’s actual identities.
But that kind of ‘map,’ which is formed based on the speaker’s ability to exercise good judgment, is not useful as a permanent guide to his or her society; rather, it is a functional tool that may or may not aid the speaker in persuasion. Treating the speaker’s ‘map’ as a nautical map of a treacherous shoreline, laced with rocks, shoals and reefs is inappropriate. Depending on one’s perspective, human society, even at its most stagnant or stable does not remain the same from one minute to the next. By definition of the fact that it is composed of individuals who constantly change, society too is constantly changing. One might instead understand the author’s ‘map’ as a path traced instinctually through flotsam and jetsam, that one minute appears here and another there, and of which even the most watchful captain might run afoul. To look at it as a permanent guide, or even as a quickly snapped photograph of human society, is to treat a copy of a rough sketch as a high definition photograph.

Moreover, a further danger of this kind of textual study of identity is that it almost inherently marginalizes individuals from the study of identity. It is very similar to the problems that develop from studying groups as the locus or source of identity and not individuals. Both attempts to study identity distort their own vision by focusing on the wrong object and subsequently obscure the ways in which individual people differ from either groups or other people who might be responsive to an identity narrative. The proper view of texts is to look at them as the forces which act, but do not control, which influence but do not construct the identities of people who are exposed to them. Taking such an approach necessitates that narratives of identity be studied not for their content, but for how their content works to redirect sovereign, individual people who have the capacity to resist their attempts at reidentifying them. What is absolutely precluded from rhetorical studies of identity that focus on texts is a study of effects. It is not possible to assert, simply from an analysis of a text that it has had certain effects. If one wishes to do this kind of study, there are plenty of disciplinary methods which
would permit one to do so, but rhetoric, insofar as it is a discipline focused on analyzing texts, is not that discipline.36

Texts do not create identity; at best, they beseech people to embody certain identities. Individuals, being both the seats of identity and the sources of texts, are the largest single element within society. There is no ‘people’ outside of individuals, and to assert that there is such a thing as a people apart from individuals is to run afoul of several contradictions. Just as Heraclitus’ river, we might say of our own society that ‘everything flows’ that ‘everything changes’ and ‘nothing remains the same.

36 By other disciplines, I mean not only psychology and related disciplines within the broader field of communication, but also disciplines that study the experiences of individual people such as ethnography.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

“THE DECLARATION OF ARBROATH”\textsuperscript{37}

To the most Holy Father and Lord in Christ, the Lord John, by divine providence
Supreme Pontiff of the Holy Roman and Universal Church, his humble and devout sons Duncan,
Earl of Fife, Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray, Lord of Man and of Annandale, Patrick Dunbar,
Earl of March, Malise, Earl of Strathearn, Malcolm, Earl of Lennox, William, Earl of Ross,
Magnus, Earl of Caithness and Orkney, and William, Earl of Sutherland; Walter, Steward of
Scotland, William Soules, Butler of Scotland, James, Lord of Douglas, Roger Mowbray, David,
Lord of Brechin, David Graham, Ingram Umfraville, John Menteith, guardian of the earldom of
Menteith, Alexander Fraser, Gilbert Hay, Constable of Scotland, Robert Keith, Marischal of
Scotland, Henry Sinclair, John Graham, David Lindsay, William Oliphant, Patrick Graham, John
Fenton, William Abernethy, David Wemyss, William Mushet, Fergus of Ardrossan, Eustace
Maxwell, William Ramsay, William Mowat, Alan Murray, Donald Campbell, John Cameron,
Reginald Cheyne, Alexander Seton, Andrew Leslie and Alexander Straiton, and the other barons
and freeholders and the whole community of the realm of Scotland send all manner of filial
reverence, with devout kisses of his blessed feet.

Most Holy Father, we know and from the chronicles and books of the ancients we find
that among other famous nations our own, the Scots, has been graced with widespread renown. It

\textsuperscript{37} Fergusson, The Declaration of Arbroath 1320 (1970) pp. 5-11, with reference to A A M
Duncan, The Nation of Scots and the Declaration of Arbroath (Historical Association pamphlet,
compiled by Alan Borthwick June 2005.
journeyed from Greater Scythia by way of the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Pillars of Hercules, and dwelt for a long course of time in Spain among the most savage peoples, but nowhere could it be subdued by any people, however barbarous. Thence it came, twelve hundred years after the people of Israel crossed the Red Sea, to its home in the west where it still lives today. The Britons it first drove out, the Picts it utterly destroyed, and, even though very often assailed by the Norwegians, the Danes and the English, it took possession of that home with many victories and untold efforts; and, as the histories of old time bear witness, they have held it free of all servitude ever since. In their kingdom there have reigned one hundred and thirteen kings of their own royal stock, the line unbroken by a single foreigner.

The high qualities and merits of these people, were they not otherwise manifest, shine forth clearly enough from this: that the King of kings and Lord of lords, our Lord Jesus Christ, after His Passion and Resurrection, called them, even though settled in the uttermost parts of the earth, almost the first to His most holy faith. Nor did He wish them to be confirmed in that faith by merely anyone but by the first of His Apostles - by calling, though second or third in rank - the most gentle Saint Andrew, the Blessed Peter’s brother, and desired him to keep them under his protection as their patron forever.

The Most Holy Fathers your predecessors gave careful heed to these things and strengthened this same kingdom and people with many favours and numerous privileges, as being the special charge of the Blessed Peter’s brother. Thus our people under their protection did indeed live in freedom and peace up to the time when that mighty prince the King of the English, Edward, the father of the one who reigns today, when our kingdom had no head and our people harboured no malice or treachery and were then unused to wars or invasions, came in a guise of a friend and ally to harass them as an enemy. The deeds of cruelty, massacre, violence, pillage, arson, imprisoning prelates, burning down monasteries, robbing and killing monks and
nuns and yet other outrages without number which he committed against our people, sparing neither age nor sex, religion nor rank, no-one could describe nor fully imagine unless he had seen them with his own eyes.

But from these countless evils we have been set free, by the help of Him who though He afflicts yet heals and restores, by our most tireless prince, King and lord, the lord Robert. He, that his people and his heritage might be delivered out of the hands of our enemies, bore cheerfully toil and fatigue, hunger and peril, like another Maccabaeus or Joshua. Him, too, divine providence, the succession to his right according to our laws and customs which we shall maintain to the death, and the due consent and assent of us all have made our prince and king. To him, as to the man by whom salvation has been wrought unto our people, we are bound both by his right and by his merits that our freedom may be still maintained, and by him, come what may, we mean to stand.

England or the English, we should exert ourselves at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of his own right and ours, and make some other man who was well able to defend us our King; for, as long as a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English. It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself. Therefore it is, Reverend Father and Lord, that we beseech your Holiness with our most earnest prayers and suppliant hearts, inasmuch as you will in your sincerity and goodness consider all this, that, since with Him Whose vice-gerent on earth you are there is neither weighing nor distinction of Jew and Greek, Scotsman or Englishman, you will look with the eyes of a father on the troubles and privations brought by the English upon us and upon the Church of God. May it please you to admonish and exhort the King of the English, who ought to be satisfied with what belongs to him since England used once to be enough for seven kings or more, to leave us Scots
in peace, who live in this poor little Scotland, beyond which there is no dwelling-place at all, and
covet nothing but our own. We are sincerely willing to do anything for him, having regard to our
condition, that we can, to win peace for ourselves.

This truly concerns you, Holy Father, since you see the savagery of the heathen raging
against the Christians, as the sins of Christians have indeed deserved, and the frontiers of
Christendom being pressed inward every day; and how much it will tarnish your Holiness’s
memory if (which God forbid) the Church suffers eclipse or scandal in any branch of it during
your time, you must perceive. Then rouse the Christian princes who for false reasons pretend that
they cannot go to the help of the Holy Land because of wars they have on hand with their
neighbours. The real reason that prevents them is that in making war on their smaller neighbours
they find a readier advantage and weaker resistance. But how cheerfully our lord the King and
we too would go there if the King of the English would leave us in peace, He from Whom
nothing is hidden well knows; and we profess and declare it to you as the Vicar of Christ and to
all Christendom.

But if your Holiness puts too much faith in the tales the English tell and will not give
sincere belief to all this, nor refrain from favouring them to our undoing, then the slaughter of
bodies, the perdition of souls, and all the other misfortunes that will follow, inflicted by them on
us and by us on them, will, we believe, be surely laid by the Most High to your charge. To
conclude, we are and shall ever be, as far as duty calls us, ready to do your will in all things, as
obedient sons to you as His Vicar, and to Him as the Supreme King and Judge we commit the
maintenance of our cause, casting our cares upon Him and firmly trusting that He will inspire us
with courage and bring our enemies to nothing.

May the Most High preserve you to His Holy Church in holiness and health for many
days to come.
Given at the monastery of Arbroath in Scotland on the sixth day of the month of April in
the year of grace thirteen hundred and twenty and the fifteenth year of the reign of our King
aforesaid.
APPENDIX B

“SCOTS WHA HA’E”

1. Scots wha ha’e wi’ Wallace bled
2. Scots wham Bruce has often led
3. Welcome to your gory bed
4. Or tae victory
5. Now's the day and now's the hour
6. See the front o' battle lour
7. See approach proud Edward's pow'r
8. Chains and slavery

9. Wha will be a traitor knave?
10. Wha can fill a coward's grave?
11. Wha sae base as be a slave?
12. Let him turn and flee!
13. Wha, for Scotland's king and law,
14. Freedom's sword will strongly draw,
15. Freeman stand or Freeman fa',
16. Let them follow me!

17. By oppression's woes and pains,
18. By your sons in servile chains,
19. We will drain our dearest veins,
20. But they shall be free.
21. Lay the proud usurpers low!
22. Tyrants fall in ev'ry foe!
23. Liberty's in ev'ry blow!
24. Let us do or die!
APPENDIX C

“FOR A’ THAT”

1. Is there for honest Poverty
2. That hings his head, an' a' that;
3. The coward slave-we pass him by,
4. We dare be poor for a' that!
5. For a' that, an' a' that.
6. Our toils obscure an' a' that,
7. The rank is but the guinea's stamp,
8. The Man's the gowd for a' that.

9. What though on hamely fare we dine,
10. Wear hoddin grey, an' a that;
11. Gie fools their silks, and knaves their wine;
12. A Man's a Man for a' that:
13. For a' that, and a' that,
14. Their tinsel show, an' a' that; 15. The honest man, tho' e'er sae poor,
16. Is king o' men for a' that.

17. Ye see yon birkie, ca'd a lord,
18. Wha struts, an' stares, an' a' that; 19. Tho' hundreds worship at his word,
20. He's but a coof for a' that:
21. For a' that, an' a' that, 22.
    His ribband, star, an' a' that:
23. The man o' independent mind 24.
He looks an' laughs at a' that.

25. A prince can mak a belted knight,
26. A marquis, duke, an' a' that;
27. But an honest man's abon his might,
28. Gude faith, he maunna fa' that!
29. For a' that, an' a' that,
30. Their dignities an' a' that;
31. The pith o' sense, an' pride o' worth,
32. Are higher rank than a' that.

33. Then let us pray that come it may,
34. (As come it will for a' that,)
35. That Sense and Worth, o'er a' the earth,
36. Shall bear the gree, an' a' that.
37. For a' that, an' a' that,
38. It's coming yet for a' that,
39. That Man to Man, the world o'er,
40. Shall brothers be for a' that.