PLEDGE FULFILLMENT IN GERMANY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
SCHRÖDER II AND MERKEL I
GOVERNMENTS

by

MARK JOSEPH FERGUSON

TERRY J. ROYED, COMMITTEE CHAIR
BARBARA A. CHOTINER
STEPHEN BORRELLI
HARVY F. KLINE
DANIEL RICHES

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2012
ABSTRACT

Past scholarly research has indicated that campaign pledges are important. This research has led scholars to examine the various institutional differences between states. For instance, single-party majoritarian system, the British Westminster (UK), the American federal system for pledge fulfillment, coalition and minority systems, e.g., Ireland, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden have been examined and compared. Combined, these scholars have presented academia compelling evidence that the rates of pledge fulfillment are a function of the individual institutional designs of the states examined.

This dissertation expands on existing research by including the German system to the expanding understanding of pledge fulfillment and institutional design. This work examines the Schröder II (2002-2005) and Merkel (2005-2009) governments. I argue that there are several substantial questions that need to be addressed in relationship to Germany and pledge fulfillment. First, to what extent does the mandate model apply to Germany? Second, to what extent do parties in a grand coalition fulfill pledges, compared to normal coalition governments? Lastly, to what extent does the German case compare to previous research?

I argue that pledge fulfillment under German coalition governments should be consistent with existing research; pledge fulfillment under grand coalition governments should be lower than previous research. By adding Germany to the already extensive work on pledge fulfillment, we are better able to make stronger inferences on the impact of institutional design on pledge fulfillment.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to everyone who helped me and guided me through the trials and tribulations of creating this manuscript. In particular, my family, friends and professors who stood by me throughout the time taken to complete this work. Your support is greatly appreciated.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. CDU/CSU…………………………………... Christian Democrat Party of Germany
2. FDP……………………………………….. Free Democratic Party of Germany
3. Govt.…………………………………….. Government
4. Linke.PDS………………………………. The Left Party
6. PDS………………………………………. Party of Democratic Socialism of Germany
7. Schröder I……………………………….. SPD-led government, 1998-2002
8. Schröder II……………………………….. SPD-led government, 2002-2005
9. SPD……………………………………….. Social Democratic Party of Germany
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am pleased to have this opportunity to thank the many colleagues, friends, and faculty members who have helped me with this research project. I am most indebted to Terry Royed, the chair of this dissertation, for sharing her research expertise and wisdom regarding pledge fulfillment. Without her guidance this work would not be possible. I would also like to thank all of my committee members, Stephen Borelli, Barbara A. Chotiner, Harvey Kline, and Daniel Riches for their invaluable input, inspiring questions, and support for both this dissertational work and for my overall academic progress. Each member of the committee took a keen interest in me personally and professionally, encouraging and pushing me to excel in the doctoral program during my time at the University of Alabama. I will be forever grateful for their encouragement and guidance.

I would also like to thank my wife, Heidi, and family for their assistance and patience. With Heidi’s assistance, I was capable of focusing on the completion of this work. Heidi was also instrumental in proofreading and correcting any translation errors from English to German of the coding rules used in this work. Additionally, my in-laws and parents were also very supportive of me in too numerous ways to note here everything. Liebe/r Oma, Opa, Ingrid und Johannes, Ich will mich persönlich bei Euch bedanken. Ihr habt uns sehr geholfen und wir bedanken uns herzlich für alles.
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and siblings for their assistance and encouragement. My parents spent untold number of hours reading this manuscript to bring about a better work, often on short notice. They were willing to spend their valuable time on this project when I was mentally and physically exhausted. Your assistance and encouragement are greatly appreciated.
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION ......................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................ xiii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................. xvi
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
  1. Pledge Fulfillment Research ......................................................... 3
  2. Adding the German Case to the Literature ................................... 4
  3. Research Design ........................................................................... 6
  4. Expectations ................................................................................. 8
  5. Case Studies: Economic and Social Welfare Policies in Germany .. 10
  6. Organization of Dissertation ...................................................... 14
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................... 15
  1. Do Elections Matter? ................................................................. 15
  2. Do Parties Matter for Policy? Methodological Approaches
     and Findings ............................................................................. 18
  3. Comparative Manifesto Project .................................................. 20
  4. The Pledge Fulfillment Approach ............................................... 21
a. Early Studies .................................................................22

b. Comparative Party Pledge Group...........................................23


ii. Semi-Presidentialism: France .................................................26

iii. Majority Coalitions: The Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy....27

iv. Minority Governments: Sweden, Spain, and Ireland...........29

v. Ministerial Control and Pledge Fulfillment...........................30

5. Closing the Gap in the Literature: Adding the German Case ......32

a. German Federalism and the Bundesrat.................................33

b. Grand Coalitions in Germany ..................................................41

c. Negative Perceptions of Grand Coalition Governance ..........46

d. Positive Perceptions of Grand Coalition Governance ..........51

e. Grand Coalition Governance Perceptions: Lacking Systematic Evidence.................................................................53

6. Summary .................................................................................55

CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF GERMAN MANIFESTOS ..................................................56

1. Research Design......................................................................56

a. Case Selection .......................................................................56

b. Defining and Testing Pledges ..................................................57

i. The Process of Pledge Identification ......................................57

ii. Intercoder Reliability ..............................................................59

c. Testing Pledge Fulfillment ......................................................60

d. Questions and Hypotheses ......................................................61
i. Question 1: Will the Mandate Model Apply?...............................61

ii. Question 2: How Will Grand Coalitions Compare to Coalition Governments? ............................................................62

iii. Question 3: How Does the German Case Compare to the Literature? ............................................................................64

2. Analysis of German Party Manifestos .................................................................65
   a. Breakdown of Pledges by Policy Areas ...........................................65
   b. Breakdown of Pledges by Type of Change......................................68
   c. Examples of Pledge Coding.............................................................70
   d. Relationship Among Pledges...........................................................74

3. Organization of Dissertation ..................................................................76

CHAPTER FOUR ECONOMIC PLEDGES.............................................78

1. Economic Policies in Germany: Budget Process .................................79

2. Economic Development of Postwar Germany, 1945 - 1990:
   East and West.........................................................................................81
   a. The West German Wirtschaftswunder, 1949 - 1990.................81

3. The German Economy, 1990 - 2002........................................................83

   a. Schröder II: 2002 - 2005 .................................................................88
      i. Schröder II Results: Government Parties’ Results .................96
      ii. Schröder II Results: Opposition Parties’ Results...............96
      i. Merkel I Results: Government Parties’ Results...............104
ii. Merkel I Results: Opposition Parties’ Results

5. Summary

CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL WELFARE PLEDGES

1. What is the Sozialstaat?

2. Social Welfare Policies in Germany

3. The Development of the Sozialstaat after Bismarck
   a. West Germany’s Sozialstaat, 1949 - 1990
   b. East Germany’s Sozialpolitik, 1949 - 1990
   c. The Sozialstaat After Reunification, 1990 - 2002

   a. Schröder II: 2002 - 2005
      i. Schröder II Results: Government Parties’ Results
      ii. Schröder II Results: Opposition Parties’ Results
      i. Merkel I Results: Government Parties’ Results
      ii. Merkel I Results: Opposition Parties’ Results

5. Summary

CHAPTER SIX REMAINING POLICY AREAS AND COMPLETE FINDINGS

1. Remaining Policy Areas Results: Civil Rights, Crime, Environment & “Other” Policy
   a. Schröder II: All Remaining Policy Areas, 2002 - 2005

2. Full Results: All Pledges Combined
1. Intercoder Reliability: Introduction and Instructions..........................193
   a. Introduction Letter .........................................................................194
   b. Wahlversprechen............................................................................195
2. Relationship Among Pledges, Cont. ....................................................197
LIST OF TABLES

3.1 Intercoder Reliability Results ..............................................................60
3.2 Average of Government Parties’ Election Promises Fulfilled..............64
3.3 Percentage of Pledges by Policy Area ...............................................67
3.4 Number and Types of Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005 ...............70
3.5 Examples of Pledge Fulfillment (2002) .............................................71
3.6 Examples of Pledges Fulfillment (2005) .............................................72
3.7 Relationship Among Pledges in Germany ........................................75
4.1 Number and Types of Economic Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005 ......................................................................................87
4.2 Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Schröder II Governing Parties .................................................................89
4.3 Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Schröder II Opposition Parties ...............................................................90
4.4 Economic Pledge Fulfillment, 2002-2005 ........................................97
4.5 Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Merkel I Governing Parties ............................................................99
4.6 Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Merkel I Opposition Parties ...........................................................100
4.7 Pledge Fulfillment for Economic Pledges, 2005-2009 ......................105
5.1 Number and Types of Social Welfare Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005 ........................................................................117
5.2 Social Welfare Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Schröder II Governing Parties ....................................................120
Appendix Table 3: Relations among Social Welfare Pledges in Germany.................................................................205

Appendix Table 4: Relations among Civil Rights Pledges in Germany.........................................................................208

Appendix Table 5: Relations among Crime/Security Pledges in Germany.................................................................211

Appendix Table 6: Relations among Foreign Policy Pledges in Germany.......................................................................214

Appendix Table 7: Relations among Environment Policy Pledges in Germany..........................................................218

Appendix Table 8: Relations among Other Policy Pledges in Germany.........................................................................220
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Susie MacNelly, Shoe comic strip, July 4, 2011............................................1
As parodied in this *Shoe* comic strip from July 4, 2011, a common perception that exists among voters and the public is one of politicians making promises in order to win elections and later breaking those promises. In a sense, campaign promises lack the importance to be kept by politicians. One may also conclude that voters do not expect politicians to keep their promises and continue to vote for them anyway. From this pessimistic view, many voters may begin to doubt the trustworthiness of political promises, if, as the comic strip seems to suggest voters are not, voters are abreast of campaign promises.

However, this raises the question: why make campaign promises at all if campaign promises do not matter for politicians and the electorate? What purpose do campaign promises serve? There must be a reason why parties and politicians make campaign promises; otherwise, if they do not matter, campaign promises would not be compiled and made public. More
importantly, if one accepts that campaign promises carry some weight among politicians and the electorate alike, do politicians, once elected to office, actually keep the promises they make?

In the field of comparative politics, scholars have attempted to answer the latter question on promise keeping. These scholars have examined a wide spectrum of consolidated democratic systems for pledge fulfillment. Previous researchers on party pledge fulfillment have revealed strong evidence that politicians/political parties keep their promises, thus challenging this pessimistic view.

These scholars have also examined the linkages between institutional design and pledge fulfillment, and have found some evidence that the rates of fulfillment may be a function of the political system, or institutional design, in which politicians and parties exist. They have come to this conclusion by examining pledges in party campaign manifestos or platforms to determine the extent to which they were enacted.

These scholars have approached pledge fulfillment by applying the mandate model, or responsible party model, as the basis by which pledge fulfillment scholarship is conducted. The mandate model theory is one approach to better understand the linkages of voters’ choices and political actions in a democratic system. Its name implies that voters’ electoral choices provide elected officials or parties the mandate to enact policy pledges as stipulated in any given election. By voting, the electorate is, in essence, giving a green light to elected officials to implement policies as promised to the electorate.

By its very nature, the mandate model is a prospective argument about voting; that is, voters select elected officials by the policies they propose for the future. However, the mandate model also has retrospective components. Under the model, it is not enough for voters to look into the future to see what potential policies elected officials will pursue; voters also examine the
overall legislative record of the politicians or parties to determine to what extent pledges were kept. If the electorate feels that the politicians or parties did a relatively good job in fulfilling their pledges, the electorate, in theory, continues to vote for the politicians and parties. However, if voters feel otherwise, then they will support the opposition. In essence, this is a basic description of the way democracies function.

The linkage between campaign promises and politicians’/parties’ kept promises, particularly those controlling the instruments of government, can be considered central to democratic practice. Elections are viewed as the means in which the electorate can express its policy preferences by selecting parties that espouse their preferences. Parties are able to express their support or opposition for a particular policy through the release of campaign manifestos. Parties become the vehicle by which preferences are translated into action in government settings. Thus, parties are given a mandate to govern and enact these promises to the electorate.

1. Pledge Fulfillment Research

The literature on pledge fulfillment has examined the various democratic governing institutions that exist. The types of government examined have included the U.S. party system and parliamentary systems with a variety of types of governments (single-party majoritarian systems (Westminster Model) to coalition governments and minority governments). Scholars have examined the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United States, Sweden, Italy, Spain, and France. These states, with their differing institutional designs and number of veto points have been found by these same scholars to have differing levels of pledge fulfillment. For instance, the U.K., a Westminster system, which has few, if any, veto points that prevent the
passage of legislation or that will significantly modify the proposed bill, derived from the campaign manifesto, has the best fulfillment rates.¹

However, in normal coalition governments, it is argued, parties are more prone to policy compromises or to scrapping a policy altogether, which affects pledge fulfillment.² Thus, campaign promises are less likely to become legislation in the same form as advocated by the manifesto in these governments than Westminster systems. Resulting legislation is a mixture of inter-party compromises and negotiations. Finally, minority governments are thought to be disadvantaged in implementing campaign promises because the government’s policies could be blocked from becoming law by a unified opposition, which occupies a majority of legislative seats in parliament.

Despite the variations in institutional design, these systems have a very strong record of providing politicians and parties the vehicle to achieve pledge fulfillment. Some systems are better capable of fulfilling promises than others. This dissertation adds the German case to the pledge fulfillment literature. The German case has a number of institutional features that make it different from the countries studied thus far, and thus make it an important addition to the literature. First, Germany has a powerful upper house. Second, for part of the studied period, they experienced grand coalition governments, rather than “normal” coalition.

2. Adding the German Case to the Literature

Germany is a strong, consolidated democratic state in the heart of Europe. The German constitution, das Grundgesetz, created a federal parliamentary state. Germany has a bicameral

¹ Veto points are any institution or person that can significantly modify or prevent the passage of legislation, e.g., the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the U.S. President. Veto points are important to fulfillment success because the more veto points that exist in a political system, the more difficult and less likely it is that parties can fully control the policy formation process and its final policy outcome (Tsebelis 2002; Immergut 1990; and Pierson 1994).

² The term normal coalition is defined to distinguish minimum-winning two-party governing structures with parliamentary majorities from that of a grand coalition. Normal coalitions may also be minimum-connected, but that is not always the case. For instance, the SPD governed in a coalition with the FDP from 1969 through 1982.
parliament that does and does not necessarily follow the mold of other parliamentary systems. First, as is traditional in parliamentary systems, the government is formed based on elections to the lower house, the Bundestag. Second, Germany also has a federal system. The main impact of a federal system for national policy making is that federalism goes along with a relatively powerful upper house that represents the states.

In most parliamentary systems, if an upper house exists, it is a weak political institution, with few legislative powers to prevent the passage of legislation. The archetypical example of this type of weak parliamentary institution is the United Kingdom’s House of Lords. However, there are non-parliamentary systems, which have strong upper houses, e.g., the United States Senate. Institutional approval from the Senate is required before legislation leaves the Congress and is presented to the president for signatory consideration.

In terms of importance to the legislative process, the Bundesrat mirrors the U.S. Senate in constitutional strength and importance. Bundestag legislation that directly affects the states must receive approval from the Bundesrat. According to the German constitution, in the area of education policies, for instance, the states have outright constitutional right to control, formulate and administer education policies at all levels. States have been generally protective of this prerogative and have sued the government.

In general terms, the process of granting legislative approval can be a relatively smooth process in times of united government. However, this is not always ensured if the government is experiencing a divided government. In this scenario, the Bundesrat is dominated by the Bundestag opposition. Ideological differences could serve to hamper Bundestag pledge

---

3 This author defines united government in the German case as a situation where the government parties have a majority in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Divided government, then, is when the Bundesrat majority differs from that of the Bundestag. For example, Schröder II was a period of divided control, with the coalition of the SPD and Greens in control of the Bundestag, but the governing parties were in the minority in the Bundesrat, which was controlled by the Christian Democrats.
fulfillment. In fact, German history has shown that even with a unified government, party
loyalty in the Bundesrat will often take lower priority when Länder priorities conflict with the
government’s policy priorities. For example, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) secured tax
cuts from the CDU/CSU-dominated Bundesrat in 2000 after Schröder made several concessions
to the states. The Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, in contrast, opposed the tax cuts.

The German case adds to the literature by examining another case of normal coalition
governance within a federal system with a strong upper house, the potential for divided
government, and a grand coalition. First, as stated earlier, Germany has a strong tradition of
normal coalition governments. Second, Germany provides us the opportunity to explore pledge
fulfillment in a grand coalition system. We will be able to compare how a normal coalition
behaves as compared to a grand coalition. Additionally, we will be able to compare the German
results with those of the prevailing literature on pledge fulfillment.

To evaluate the performance of Germany, this work compares the recently ended Merkel
I government between the CDU/CSU and SPD parties (November 2005 until September 2009),
with that of Schröder II (September 2002 until October 2005). Each government faced serious
questions about the viability of Germany’s economy and the long-term survival of their social
welfare system and how best to address each problem.

3. Research Design

The institutional and political dynamics of Germany provide us with an excellent
opportunity to expand our understanding of pledge fulfillment. Research on parliamentary

---

4 J. Blondel (1968, 192) identifies two types of coalitions: the “small” coalition, or normal coalition, and the grand
coalition, or the “Austrian solution,” which is a rare political phenomenon. A grand coalition in Germany is defined
as the governing union of both of the people’s parties, the Volkspartien. The Volkspartien consist of the SPD and
the CDU/CSU parties. Please note that the use of Volkspartien in German is plural. Chapter Two explains this in
greater detail.

5 For the purpose of this work, each government will be simply referred to either as Schröder II or Merkel I.
Schröder II is the second government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and was in office from 2002 to 2005.
Merkel I is the first government under Angela Merkel and was in office from 2005 to 2009.
systems indicates that the United Kingdom, a Westminster Model parliamentary system, fulfills a higher percentage of pledges as compared to coalition governments. In both cases, governing parties were better capable of fulfilling campaign promises than opposition parties.

In line with previous research, I examine pledge fulfillment in Germany by conducting a content analysis of all legislative parties’ manifestos represented in the Bundestag in two governing periods. These two governing periods include the last Schröder-led government, 2002-2005, and the latest grand coalition, Merkel I, 2005-2009. Moreover, in line with previously conducted research, this work applies the mandate model to Germany and these two governing periods.

This dissertation also uses Royed’s (1996, 79) definition of pledges. Pledges are defined as commitments to carry out some action or produce some outcome where an objective estimation can be made as to whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced. Pledges contain two clauses: 1) a phase indicating a level of commitment or support for an issue and 2) a phase indicating an action/outcome on the part of the party. Pledges can indicate a firm commitment of support (we will) or a soft commitment (we support, must, and should). This author will follow Royed (1996) and treat both firm and soft pledges as potential pledges, with the specificity of the proposed action or outcome as the criterion for determining a pledge.

To determine if a pledge has been fulfilled, I consult numerous sources that should indicate fulfillment. These sources include newspapers, books on each government, magazines, and the governments’ and the political parties’ websites. These sources are rich with background and information that allow researchers to reasonably conclude whether a party successfully fulfilled a pledge.
4. Expectations

This dissertation presents several hypotheses. *(H1)* It will be argued that government parties, in both normal coalition and grand coalition governments, should be better capable of fulfilling pledges, compared to opposition parties under similar governing structures. This hypothesis is based on the question: To what extent do German governing parties fulfill their pledges, thus fulfilling the mandate model?

To reiterate the previous discussion, the literature indicates that governing parties fulfill a higher percent of their pledges than parties in opposition do. The explanation for these findings is that governing parties, having a legislative majority, are capable of controlling the legislative processes in the governing parties’ favor. Research indicates that pledge fulfillment rates are higher in the United Kingdom, a Westminster system, than in coalition systems. Institutionally, the field will be additionally enriched by examining how pledge fulfillment is conducted in a federal-parliamentary system.

Since the early 1960s, German governments have consisted of normal coalition parliamentary structures.\(^6\) In accordance with the findings on coalitions, we would expect Germany to perform like other parliamentary systems in this respect. Government parties are expected to fulfill relatively higher levels of pledges than the opposition parties do. The periods of study for this work will cover the Schröder II and Merkel I governments.

Second, this dissertation examines the pledge fulfillment differences between traditional coalitions and grand coalition governments. Here, the existing literature offers no clear expectations; and two alternative hypotheses will be presented. First, *(H2a)* We should expect higher fulfillment rates for German normal coalition governments, compared to grand

---

\(^6\) From 1949 until 1963, Germany had single-party governments, led by the Christian Democrats. After that, German governments consisted of coalitions between the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and the FDP (and in 1998, the Greens).
coalitions. Hypothesis 2a is based on the question: To what extent do the results from the German normal coalition and grand coalition governments differ? Second, (H2b) *Merkel I should be better capable of fulfilling its pledges than Schröder II.* There is historical evidence that shows grand coalitions are not simply condemned to governing gridlock, rather they are able to function and address pressing issues.

With strong ideological differences between the two grand coalition partners which can create gridlock, we should expect it will be more difficult for the government to fulfill its pledges. Additionally, with each party possessing a strong veto over the other, each party’s ability to fully control policy formation and aspects of each governing parties’ ideology would permeate in any resulting legislation. On the other hand, the German historical evidence shows that grand coalitions can function and pass legislation. The 1966-69 German grand coalition is often credited for enacting legislation that eased the socio-economic strains of the period (Turner 1987, 91-94; Orlow 1999, 251; and Conradt 2009, 198). Additionally, several commentators argued that the Merkel I government would not automatically be consigned to a pessimistic governing future.

Finally, this dissertation will answer how well the German case matches the findings of other scholars on pledge fulfillment. In other words, how well does the German case compare with existing pledge fulfillment findings? There are several possibilities we might consider. It is possible that the aggregate results of both governing periods of this study will place Germany close to the fulfillment results of other coalition systems. In periods of normal coalition governance, pledge fulfillment results should be similar to the findings on coalition systems. Preliminary work on Germany suggests that German governments have the capability to fulfill pledges at rates similar to other coalition systems (Ferguson 2009, Ferguson 2010 and Ferguson
We must note, however, that these results examined only portions of the legislative parties’ manifestos.

On the other hand, the German grand coalition could drive pledge fulfillment rates down. The political union of the two largest and ideologically distinctive parties should serve as a harbinger of gridlock between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. The ideological differences between the two parties, their differing policy approaches, and their desire to maintain political support from their base make it more difficult for the governing parties to arrive at a policy agreement, thus hurting each party’s ability to secure pledge fulfillment success.

5. Case Studies: Economic and Social Welfare Policies in Germany

To better understand the dynamics of German politics and pledge fulfillment, this dissertation will examine two substantive policy areas: economics and social welfare policies and their respective subcategories. In many democratic states, the political discussions typically revolve around these two salient issues and political parties present to the general public their proposals on how to reform and improve policy in both areas, meaning that the left-right conflict is likely to be strongest, and Germany is no exception. These cases, therefore, illustrate the dynamics of party conflict: how parties compromise, which party is better able to influence the policy formation process, especially in a political system like Germany where both center-left and center-right parties may influence policies at the same time. This is accomplished via grand coalitions and even via “divided governments,” or when the Bundesrat is controlled by the other party.

---

7 I recognize that in 2002 foreign affairs were of extraordinary importance. With the increased tensions between the United States and the Saddam regime, the prospect of war was overwhelmingly unpopular in Germany. However, foreign policy did not play as strong of a role in previous and in successive elections.
The majority of German campaign manifestos are dedicated to these two issues. It is possible that these two issues are particularly intertwined in Germany because of the historic development of the post-war economy and the expansion of the social welfare state. Extra attention is given to these policy areas because of the large proportion of the manifesto dedicated to these policy areas. Another rationale to focus on these two policy areas is that they are salient policy areas. They are areas that involve left-right conflict more than some policy areas.

Germany has economic and social welfare systems that are the envy of many countries. Germany possesses the European Union’s largest economy, and one of the world’s strongest, in terms of GDP. Germany’s economy is among the five largest in the world. At the conclusion of World War II, the reconstruction and reorganization of the West German economy was a monumental task accomplished in a short time. The rapid recovery of the West German economy after the war is often referred to as the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). As the West German economy recovered, annual economic growth remained high, with near zero unemployment. Since the formation of the West German state, German governments have worked to maintain low budget deficits and inflation, which have been seen as causes of the rise of the Nazis during the 1920s and 1930s.

Germany has some of the oldest social welfare policies in the world, designed to provide assistance and protection to individuals or families when required. The first social welfare policies were developed under Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s, which became the foundation of the Sozialstaat, or the social welfare state. Bismarck and succeeding governments introduced and expanded social welfare policies, e.g., unemployment insurance, pension insurance, family/childcare policies and health insurance. Additionally, the West German state developed the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) principle during the late 1940s and early
1950s. This principle allowed for market forces to guide economic decisions; however, the state would be responsible to provide social protections for those individuals who did not benefit from the economic boom and “fell through the cracks.” Presently, Germany is renowned for providing an extensive array of social welfare protections.

However, over the past forty years, the German economy and social welfare structures have faced challenges. Strains to the economy came from several sides. One particular strain emerged with the reunification of Germany. When the already economically depressed East German economy was added to Germany, eastern Germany was structurally unable to compete, either internally in Germany or internationally. As formerly state-owned eastern German factories closed or workers were laid off, unemployment in the east rose to high proportions. With additional unemployed from the east, the German state struggled with rising social welfare costs. By the early 2000s, the national unemployment rate rose to nearly twelve percent.

To fund the generous welfare state, personal and corporate taxes were relatively high, in some cases exceeding fifty percent of one’s income. This had a dual effect on the economy. According to German businesses, the combination of high taxes and labor costs were discouraging businesses from hiring (Bernstein March 27, 2005). Also, benefits from the generous social welfare state have long been accused of not providing incentives for individuals to seek ways to exit from government assistance (Leonhardt June 7, 2011). For instance, the unemployed would continue to draw unemployment assistance at rates close to their salaries in the workforce. Coupled with other programs, many individuals choose to remain at home.

Increasing demands on the German state to provide social welfare benefits and assistance contributed to the increased fiscal strains on the German budgets. In response, German governments attempted several approaches to reduce the government’s financial obligations
while providing a highly developed social welfare system and encouraging economic growth. One approach sought ways to control the rising costs. In health care, for instance, German governments used a corporatist approach to negotiate lower costs while shifting the burden of paying for health care to the citizens.

To encourage economic growth, the German governments of Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, and Angela Merkel have sought reforms to both the tax codes and the labor protections. We also see in these cases where divided government or the governing structure influenced policies. During the 1980s and 1990s, the conservative Kohl administrations argued that high taxes were burdensome to economic expansion. Under the social democratic governments of Schröder, taxes were also reduced to spur economic growth and hiring and additional economic incentives were included through the Hartz Commission’s recommendations, which became part of the Agenda 2010 legislation from 2003 through 2005.

Additionally, the passage of the Agenda 2010 legislation was intended to reform the labor market by reducing unemployment benefits and protections. Among these examples, the Bundesrat was pivotal in the passage of legislation as a) the Bundesrat blocked tax cuts (1997) or b) secured compromises from the Bundestag (2000 and 2003). The Merkel I government illustrated the impact that the governing structure had on policies as more extensive reforms were more difficult to achieve; however, the reforms initiated by Schröder were continued.

The impact of the reforms was mixed. Unemployment continued to rise under Schröder, while it declined to nearly seven percent under Merkel. However, the German government’s financial obligations to fund the social welfare system continue to be high and to concern German politicians.

---

6. Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter Two delves into the theoretical underpinnings of existing pledge fulfillment research by first examining the evolution of this subfield of comparative politics and the approaches and findings of similar scholars. Additionally, the discussion focuses on the political systems and the historical government composition, e.g., governing normal coalitions, and then progresses into a discussion on the importance of the German case to the overall literature. In Chapter Three, the research design of this work is discussed.

In Chapters Four and Five, the discussion will highlight two substantive policy areas: social welfare and economic pledges. These two are not only significant policy areas: they have traditionally occupied a significant portion of the political discourse in Germany in the previous election cycles. During this time, rising unemployment rates also placed more demand on the government’s social-welfare programs, increasing, in turn, Germany’s budget deficits. Revamping the German economy while reducing the government’s obligations were the primary policy goals for both governing periods examined for this work.

In Chapter Six, the results of all remaining policy areas and the aggregate findings of pledge fulfillment of the Schröder II and Merkel I governments are introduced. The results of both governing periods are compared not only to each other but also to existing research and findings. In Chapter Seven, this dissertation will conclude with a recap of the research on pledge fulfillment and the German results. Additionally, a recap of how Germany fits within the existing research and findings is provided. Lastly, a discussion on what the scholarly world can take from these findings and where future research on German pledge fulfillment can proceed is provided.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Do Elections Matter?

A general question with which to begin this work is: “Do elections matter in the types of policies governments create?” Over the past 50 years, scholars have tried to address this question and formulate plausible explanations. For instance, Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes (1999, 9) attempt to answer in part this question when they argue that a “[g]overnment is ‘responsive’ if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by citizens.”

How do parties or politicians remain responsive to their constituents’ demands? How do parties and politicians know exactly what voters want? These questions can be answered in one word: Elections!9

On one hand, there is cynicism about whether elections matter, which has origin in the perception that politicians break their promises. The comic strip at the beginning of Chapter One illustrates this cynicism quite well: a politician was questioned about breaking the promises he had made during the previous election, to which he replied that he “can use them all again,” as if voters are naïve and/or do not entirely care. This implies, contradicting Manin et. al. (1999), that elections carry no weight in deciding policy directions and outcomes if politicians and parties make promises only to break them. This also means that any ideological differences between the parties are practically meaningless as it would not matter which party/politician controls office.

9 Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2006, 421) highlight the perception that election results should dictate how governments are formed and how the country is managed.
On the other hand, why hold elections if elections carry virtually no weight in policy matters? Why go through the trouble to form political parties based on ideological differences to put forth candidates in any given election? Why go through the façade of making campaign promises, knowing full well that they will not be kept?

The mandate model is one theory that explains how democracy functions. The mandate model, or the responsible party model, posits that during an election candidates and/or parties express policies for the electorate to consider. For example, in a two-party system, there are two candidates, A and B. Candidate A and the candidate’s party support policies ABC, while Candidate B and the party support policies XYZ. In the election, voters choose between the two candidates and their proposed policies. The candidate or party that wins the election also wins the right, or mandate from the electorate, to govern and enact its or his/her campaign promises.

Voters then evaluate the performance of the winning candidate and/or party on how well the candidate and/or party were able to keep his/her or its promises. Voters then decide whether to support the candidate and/or party during the next election cycle. These voters examine the policies, determine the impact of those policies on them, decide how the party(ies) or politician(s) will govern, vote for the best policies, and evaluate performance once parties are in office.

The model thus has elements of two other important theories of democracy: retrospective and prospective voting. The literature on retrospective voting posits that the electorate evaluates past governing performance of its representatives by voting for or against the politicians.\textsuperscript{10} V.O. Key (1966), Anthony Downs (1957), and Morris Fiorina (1981) are early scholars who examine

\textsuperscript{10} In the final Presidential debate between President Jimmy Carter and then Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, Reagan appealed to the voters’ personal situations under the Carter Administration by simply asking, “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” Reagan hoped the voters would evaluate President Carter’s performance as negative and give their support to Reagan.
past governing performances and voting. Scholars such as John Ferejohn (1986), Robert Erikson (1989), Richard Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck (2001) and Christopher Wlezien and Robert Erikson (2004) expanded this focus by examining how past economic conditions affect one’s vote, e.g., pocketbook voting.

The theory of prospective voting argues that voting behavior is intrinsically linked to the electorate’s perception of how politicians will behave once in office. Authors, such as James H. Kuklinski and Darrell M. West (1981, 444) found “a significant relationship between citizens' expected financial well-being” and citizens’ employment status in predicting their vote for or against the incumbent Senator. However, they did not observe this behavior in congressional elections. Prospective voting is not singularly confined to economic conditions; other scholars are examining other possible explanations, i.e., foreign policy (Aldrich et. al., 1989).

The mandate model argues that voters exhibit both retrospective and prospective traits when voting. However, the voters do not focus only on economic conditions and foreign policy. The mandate model’s focus is on the actions or lack thereof of political parties in power. Since the focus is on what parties do or do not do, the logical question to ask is: To what extent do parties fulfill their campaign promises?

Among researchers, there is debate about the importance of parties in public policy and the application of the responsible party model. Since the 1950s, scholars have argued that party systems are central to the functioning of democracy and that without strong, functional parties, of which America was experiencing a decline, democracies would fail (White 1992, 167-169). Parties, according to Downs (1957), are designed to seek public office and draft policy goals (pledges) to gain voters’ support; voters, in turn, weigh the potential costs with the potential benefits to determine for whom they will vote. This is the very essence of the mandate theory.
How, therefore, can we investigate whether or not parties behave in accord with the mandate model? The following section explores the multiple approaches to this question.

2. Do Parties Matter for Policy? Methodological Approaches and Findings

There are numerous approaches to answering whether parties impact policy. One approach uses case studies where changes in government yield changes in policy. Examples of this approach are to be found in Immergut (1992), Steinmo (1993), and Pierson (1994). All of these works take a "historical institutional" approach, looking at the impact of institutional design on policy. Immergut (1992) illustrates how certain institutional designs tend to have a retardant effect on the expansion of social welfare policies, e.g., bicameralism and presidential systems. Steinmo’s (1993) arguments on institutional design and taxation systems in the U.K., U.S., and Sweden are another example. Steinmo (1993, 195) finds that the differences in tax policy structures is not as much a result of differences between citizens’ values or the attitudes of elites; rather, taxation structures are most “directly the result of differences in the structure and design of each nation’s political decision-making institutions.”

Paul Pierson (1994) examines welfare reforms in the U.K and U.S.A. Pierson argues that social welfare policy passed by previous governments create policy legacies, making it difficult for both Thatcher and Reagan to enact their retrenchment policies. He finds that Thatcher was better able to carry out her desired welfare reforms than was Reagan, particularly programmatic retrenchment. On the other hand, systemic retrenchment in the U.S. was easier to achieve under the Reagan Administration (Pierson 1994, 160-163 and 170-173).

11 An example of this type of research would be looking at the impact of Thatcher on economic policy in Britain, Privatization of British government-owned businesses would not have occurred without parties -- in this case the Tories under Prime Minister Thatcher -- supporting privatization efforts (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006, 424). One can additionally see the influence of parties in the aftermath of the 2004 Spanish elections, in which the left-of-center party voiced support for withdrawing troops from Iraq and fulfilled that promise.
A second approach uses statistical analysis to determine whether government types affect policy outcomes in predictable ways. For example, Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephen’s (2001, 2 and 82) work shows that states with multiple veto points tend to slow welfare policy changes, as compared with systems with few or no veto points. A related study by Markus Crepaz (1998) examines collective versus competitive veto points. Crepaz (1998, 75) finds that collective veto points are associated with consensus political systems and have higher expenditures on welfare systems. In contrast, competitive veto points are more associated with systems of federalism and bicameral institutional designs and are more likely to have smaller welfare programs (Crepaz 1998, 75).

A third approach analyzes the relationship between party manifestos and government actions. Scholars argue that manifestos are important indications of future actions. For instance, Ian Budge (2001), and earlier Richard Hofferbert and Ian Budge (1992), give us several reasons. Budge’s (2001) first reason is somewhat intuitive. Manifestos provide the populace the best material “on which to run such checks” (Budge 2001, 211). A second reason Budge (2001, 211) gives us as to the importance of manifestos is the special nature of the platform – it is the “only collective policy statement that parties as such ever make.” Richard Rose (1984, 56-66) argues a “party’s manifesto is immediately important as an exercise in party management,” rarely seeing a party directly contradict their manifestos.

Gerald Pomper (1967, 320) makes the following observation about platforms:

If platforms are indeed meaningless, it seems odd that they should occasion, as they have, severe intra-party disagreement, as well as the attention of interest groups, mass media, and practical politicians.

Steven Borrelli (2001, 429) makes perhaps the best argument for the use of party pledges when he writes, “for better or worse, party platforms are the only authoritative statement of
national party positions available, so political scientists have frequently used them as a basis for studies of party policymaking.”

There are two broad schools in the literature that utilize this approach: the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG).

3. Comparative Manifesto Project

The first approach to aid in the understanding of the linkages between government policy programs and party manifestos is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), whose work was first presented in Budge et al. (1987). The first work from this group to look at the impact of manifestos/platforms on policy was Budge and Hofferbert (1990). Their study examines the relationship between a party’s emphasis on pledges, party control of the presidency, and expenditures. They find a strong relationship between these variables, which the authors call the “party mandate,” even accounting for challenges to the responsible party model, e.g., federalism, divided government, etc. Hofferbert and Budge (1992) applied the same method to the U.K. case. The authors find that party platforms do influence the level of spending and conclude that party platforms are indeed important.

Klingemann et al. (1994) expand this approach to many more countries. They assume that a party emphasizes policy areas that are important to it, while ignoring issues that are not important, which they call the “saliency theory of party competition.” Klingemann et al. (1994) name three models to conceptualize how parties are important in policy outputs. First, the agenda model states that the agendas of all parties affect policies, regardless of whether a party is in or out of government. Second, the mandate model states that the party in power will enact its priorities and other parties will not be able to. There could be institutional challenges to this model: divided government or coalition government. Lastly, the ideology model states that the
general ideology of the party(ies) in power will matter in the policy formation process. Parties are inherently ideological, run on ideologies and represent the electorate of ideological choices. It would only be natural that a party’s ideology is reflected in legislation.

Klingemann et al. (1994) test these models on 18 countries, presenting us with mixed results. They conclude that in almost all countries some of the models work and that some models work differently for specific countries (Klingemann et al. 1994, 266-269). The authors present evidence for the agenda, mandate, and ideology models. For instance, Klingemann et al. (1994, 257) find that the United Kingdom and Sweden fit the agenda model. In addition, Klingemann et al. (1994, 268) find that in almost all countries, the left-wing parties moved further to the left until the 1970s or 1980s when parties started to move toward the center. Klingemann et al. (1994, 268) also find that certain parties have advantages in different policy areas. Left-of-center parties have the advantage in social welfare policies while right-of-center parties are more business oriented.

The work of Klingemann et al. (1994) raises an important question: If all parties have influence on policy, do elections matter? Elections are generally based on left-right competition. It is expected that right of center parties should produce right-wing policies when they win and vice-versa. Klingemann et al.’s findings tend to call into question this important assumption of the democratic process.

4. The Pledge Fulfillment Approach

While the CMP approach looks at the correlation between manifesto emphasis on particular policy areas, and spending on those areas, another approach to looking at party influence on policy is to identify specific pledges in manifestos, and determine whether they are fulfilled.
Early Studies

Early pioneers examining the US system and government actions, such as Paul David (1971), were able to recognize that the mandate model works well in the U.S. According to David (1971, 304), “[f]ulfillment (of pledges) has occurred in about 85% of the cases from 1944 to 1966 …. “when the major parties agree.” When agreement cannot be found between the two parties and there is opposition from the smaller party, the “winning party was somewhat better, [and] the losing party (smaller party) much worse” (David 1971, 304).

Gerald Pomper and Susan Lederman in Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics (1982) examine a thirty-two year period of American pledges. The authors obtain slightly different estimates than David (1971): 72% of Democrats’ and Republicans’ pledges were fulfilled between 1944 and 1966 and 63% of pledges between 1968 and 1978 were fulfilled (Pomper and Lederman 1982, 161-166). Pomper and Lederman (1982, 161) find that controlling the presidency aids a congressional party in achieving pledge redemption, while the opposition party is faced with more challenges. However, this is not true in all cases. They find parties that do not control the presidency may also perform well as the Democrats under President Nixon performed better than the Republicans.

Richard Rose (1984) and Colin Rallings (1987) contribute to our early understanding of pledge fulfillment by examining the UK and Canada. Rose (1984, 65) examines the UK and finds that the Heath government, 1970-74, fulfilled a majority of its pledges. At least 80% of the Heath government’s pledges were fulfilled (Rose 1984, 65). In contrast, the Wilson government, controlled by the Labour Party, at least fulfilled 54% of its pledges (Rose 1984, 65). Rallings, on the other hand, examines both the UK and Canada. In both countries, pledge fulfillment was
high. Rallings (1987) finds that 64% of British pledges were redeemed between 1945 and 1979, while 72% of pledges were fulfilled in Canada between 1945 and 1978.

b. Comparative Party Pledge Group

When we examine the approaches of the previous research, we find that there are variations in how pledges are defined and recorded as fulfilled. The Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG) attempts to establish systematic pledge fulfillment research and ally this standard cross-nationally. If, as the mandate model posits, parties and politicians are fulfilling their pledges once in office and continue to do so, they are fulfilling part of the democratic criteria that those in power are responsive to the demands of the electorate. Support is expressed by voting for a party’s or politician’s platform. Royed (1996) and other scholars seek to investigate how responsible parties are in keeping their campaign promises in various institutional settings; and, if promises are broken, scholars look for the causes of the broken promises. These institutional settings range from single-party majority systems and majority and minority coalitions systems.

To create further uniformity of this approach, Royed (1996, 79) develops a definition of pledges as being “a commitment to carry out some action or produce some outcome, where an objective estimation can be made as to whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced.” Royed (1996) codes pledges as fully or partially fulfilled, and a fulfillment percentage is calculated from the total number of pledges identified. Royed (1996) applies this method to her cases and compares the results to the responsible party model.

---

12 This is the term used by a group of scholars who are coordinating efforts to apply the same pledge-testing methodology to a number of countries. The group first met at the University of Gothenburg in 2009. Participants include: Terry Royed (University of Alabama), Robert Thomoson (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland), Elin Naurin (University of Gothenburg, Sweden), Petia Kostadinova (University of Illinois at Chicago), Catherine Moury (Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Portugal), and Mark J. Ferguson (University of Alabama).
In this section, I examine research on several types of government, looking at how well each performs in terms of pledge fulfillment, beginning with an examination of single-party majority governments, and, ending with majority coalitions and minority governments.

Under single-party majority parliamentary systems, some researchers have argued that fulfillment should be easier because the instruments of government are controlled by one party. This is further supported by the fact that, in such systems, in addition to most parliamentary systems, party discipline is high. Together, one should expect high levels of fulfillment success. In coalition systems, the instruments of government are shared with more than one party, with each party potentially having its own policy focus, which may conflict with other parties in government. More compromising on policies is expected, thereby having the potential to hurt pledge fulfillment. In minority governments, the party in power lacks the majority to completely control policy formation and implementation. The possibility of the majority opposition parties blocking legislation is higher when compared to the aforementioned systems. Thus, pledge fulfillment should be lower.

i. The Comparison of US Presidential System to Single-Party Majority Parliamentary Governments

Using the mandate theory, Royed (1996) examines party platforms to determine if parties fulfill their pledges in the United Kingdom and the United States. Her approach accomplishes two things: First, her research makes the results systematic so that future results are easier to compare and, second, her research makes institutional differences comparable (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006, 426-428). For example, Royed (1996; 2009) directly compares the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the United States under President Ronald Reagan, and their institutional differences. In these eras, both leaders held similar ideologies and programs.
Institutionally, the United Kingdom’s Westminster system has the advantage of having single-party majority governments, in which the majority party can fulfill its pledges. Under this system, the largest party does not have to compromise their pledges with other parties. However, unlike the UK, the United States often experiences divided government, which can limit the success of a party. From this institutional vantage point, one should expect Thatcher was better able than Reagan to fulfill her campaign pledges. Indeed, Royed (1996) finds confirmatory evidence in both the U.S. and Britain.

In Britain, the Conservative Party fulfilled 81% of their pledges during their first government and 88% during their second government (Royed 1996, 63). In contrast, the Labour Party dropped from 33% fulfillment success during Thatcher’s first government to 15% by the end of the second Thatcher government (Royed 1996, 63). In the United States, the effects of divided government on fulfillment can be seen. In both Reagan terms, the Republicans were able to fulfill their pledges at 61% and 58% respectively, while the Democrats had stronger fulfillment successes than Labour, 48% and 50% during Reagan’s two terms as President (Royed 1996, 64). Royed (1996) provides strong evidence that parties are affecting public policy by enacting their pledges. Additionally, pledge fulfillment is a function of different institutional arrangements that exist among democratic states, which will provide different degrees of party success.

What one notices by examining the United Kingdom and the United States is that institutional arrangements were instrumental to party success. Under the Westminster system, the Conservative Party performed better in affecting policy than the Republicans and Democrats in the American system because the American institutions provided barriers to fulfillment.

Lower results can be found in the cases of Ireland and Spain. From 1977 to 2007, Ireland’s governments have either been single-party majority governments, minority coalition governments, single-party minority governments, or majority coalition governments (Thomson et al. 2009, 1). The last single-party majority governance in Ireland, the Fianna Fail government of 1977-81, fulfilled 58% of its pledges. In Spain, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) held an absolute majority of parliamentary seats from 1989 until 1993. During this period of single-party majority rule, the PSOE was able to fulfill nearly 74% of its pledges (Artés 2009, 9). Other research on single-party majority governments has found fulfillment rates of 74% (Greece), 73% (New Zealand), and 72% for Canada (Kalogeropoulou 1989, 293, McCluskey 2008, 421, 438, and Rallings 1987, 11-2). The norm then appears to be pledge fulfillment over 70% for these types of government; the single Irish government appears to be the exception.

ii. Semi-Presidentialism: France

In addition to research on Westminster and federal-presidential systems, research has been conducted on France’s semi-presidential system. A semi-presidential system has features that are common to both presidential and parliamentary systems. In semi-presidential systems, both the president and the prime minister are important political actors. This system, however, differs from parliamentary systems because the president is more than a ceremonial figure or head of state. Rather, the president is invested with significant constitutional authority to shape

---

13 Royed (2009) concludes that pledge fulfillment for the UK governing party will always be higher than U.S. fulfillment, higher than coalition governments and that pledge fulfillment in the US is “affected by party control of the three main lawmaking institutions” (18). The more institutions either of the parties control, the higher fulfillment rates are.

14 The cases of Ireland and Spain include examples of a number of types of government.
public policies. In addition, this system also differs from a presidential system because the cabinet, though typically named by the president, is responsible to parliament.

Anna Holmqvist’s (2009) finds that, during times when France’s government is controlled by one political party, pledge fulfillment is easier to achieve. However, during periods of cohabitation, the president is less successful in achieving pledge fulfillment than the majority party in parliament. Holmqvist (2009,14) concludes that the French president is perhaps not as strong as conventional wisdom holds.

iii. Majority Coalitions: The Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy

The next focus is on majority coalition systems, starting first with an examination of the Netherlands. In coalition governments, no one party is solely capable of controlling the policy formation process and policy approval. The governing parties must make compromises in order to secure passages, compromises that may not fulfill pledges or may even contradict stated campaign promises. In looking at the Netherlands, Robert Thomson (2001) finds that Dutch parties in coalition governments have average pledge fulfillment rates of 57%. Thomson shows that parties do matter for policy, because parties in the Netherlands are keeping their promises on policy. In addition, Thomson (2001) finds that parties in the governing coalition have higher redemption rates than opposition parties.

Lucy Mansergh and Robert Thomson (2007) examine the Irish case and compare it with the U.S., U.K., and the Netherlands. In their conclusion, Mansergh and Thomson (2007) find that Irish parties do redeem pledges; however, fulfillment varies by type of government. Coalition governments fulfill their pledges, but at lower rates than in the Westminster system and the American system. Single-party majority systems have higher fulfillment rates and larger
gaps between in- and out-of-government parties (Mansergh and Thomson 2007). Again, Mansergh and Thomson show that parties affect policy by acting on their policy pledges.

In subsequent studies, Rory Costello and Robert Thomson (2007) continue with the examination of the 2002-2007 Irish government. Costello and Thomson (2007, 8) find that parties in government have higher fulfillment rates than parties out of the government. The authors also find that, in coalition governments, the party that controls the governing ministry is better capable of fulfilling or partially fulfilling its pledges (Costello and Thomson 2007, 10). Thomson et al. (2009, 14-15) find that, in minority coalitions, parties not in control of the relevant ministries or the office of prime minister are no more likely to see fulfillment, compared to fulfillment of the opposition party. However, all government types are more likely to have their pledges fulfilled than not fulfilled (Thomson et al. 2009, 15).

This finding is consistent with Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle’s (1990) and Mansergh and Thomson’s (2007, 322) findings that the party that controls the ministry which is affected by the pledge is better able to get its party pledge fulfilled. Government agreements between the two parties can foster fulfillment success as well (Costello and Thomson 2007, 10-11 and Mansergh and Thomson 2007, 321). Despite the institutional challenges associated with coalition governments, political parties are able to affect policy by enacting pledges.

Paul Pennings (2005) takes an opposite view to Thomson’s 2001 findings of Dutch political parties. Pennings (2005, 29) finds that the Dutch political parties “are not very responsive to voter priorities and that the policy distances between parliamentary parties and governments are relatively small.” Pennings (2005, 31 and 38) states that, as long as Dutch political parties are ideologically similar, the mandate model assumption that there will be at
least two distinct party policies does not apply. Ideological convergence among the parties provides the average citizen little variation in policies from which to choose. He concludes:

In the Dutch context the mandate theory does not apply in the same manner as in Britain because Dutch parties are not in a position to make a direct translation of voter priorities or their own priorities into policy-making since they have to compromise.

A problem with this argument is that Pennings (2005) fails to provide us with basic evidence that voters perceive the major Dutch parties as being ideologically similar. If the average voter is able to distinguish between the major parties, for example: “This party is left of center” or “This party is right of center,” one might argue that the perceptions are enough for the voter to know what the proposed policies mean in terms of ideological distance. There is a sure bet that the label of the party is enough for the average voter to make a reasonable distinction between the major parties’ platforms. Moreover, Thomson never declared that the Dutch parties are able to fulfill the mandate model at the same rate as British parties. In fact, Thomson (2001) concludes that, though the Dutch are able to fulfill pledges, their rate of fulfillment success is lower than that of the British parties.

iv. Minority Governments: Sweden, Spain, and Ireland

There has also been research examining single-party minority governments. Under such governments, legislative acts can be blocked by a majority of parities in opposition. One would expect that pledge fulfillment would suffer because the government does not command the majority. In such a scenario, when the opposition blocks the enactment of laws, the potential for governmental deadlock ensues. However, for the Swedish case of minority government, the Social Democrats were capable of fulfilling their pledges with a nearly 86% success rate (Naurin
2002 and 2007). Naruin’s research reveals that minority governments are fully capable of fulfilling their pledges.

In similar work examining Spanish minority governments, Joaquin Artés and Antonio Bustos’s (2008) work focuses on two issues: First, why do parties-out-of-government in Spain support the minority government; and, second, under these governing conditions, does the Spanish system fulfill the mandate model. Artés and Bustos (2008) and Artés (2009) conclude that opposition parties, in particular the Catalonia party, the Convergència i Unió (CiU), rationally support minority governments to achieve pledge fulfillment, which would otherwise be lacking. Under this arrangement, both the minority government of Spain and the CiU mutually benefit from this reciprocal relationship to achieve legislative success (Artés and Bustos 2008 and Artés 2009).

However, minority governing parties have a more difficult time redeeming pledges in Ireland than in Sweden or Spain. Thomson et al. (2009, 20) find that the governing party or parties in Ireland’s minority governments were more likely to redeem their pledges than opposition parties if they maintain control over the office of prime minister and the corresponding ministerial post, or if the party is the single governing player. They also found that the minority coalition governments, Fine Gael and Labour (1981-82), and, Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats (1997-02), had lower fulfillment rates, compared to the minority single-party government of Fianna Fail (1987-89) (Thomson et al. 2009, 20-22).

v. Ministerial Control and Pledge Fulfillment

In his research on coalition governments, Thomson focuses on party control over relevant ministries and pledge fulfillment. Generally, coalition parties are given wide latitude in controlling and forming policies for the ministries that they control. If, as argued, a party has
control over a ministry and all policies emanating from this ministry, one should expect these policies to better reflect the party’s policy declarations in that field. Thus, one should expect higher pledge fulfillment for a party controlling the relevant ministry.

Thomson (2001) examines this relationship between ministry control and pledge fulfillment for three Dutch governments between 1986 and 1994. He hypothesizes that election pledges are more likely to be fulfilled if a party that supports them receives responsibility for the relevant ministerial post. He finds the hypothesis confirmed: 55% of a party’s pledges are fulfilled when that party controls the relevant ministry, compared to 36% of pledges fulfilled when the relevant ministry is controlled by the party’s coalition partner. In their examination of the 1977-81 Fianna Fail government, Thomson et al. (2009, 20-21) conclude that in coalition governments, parties that control the “relevant ministerial post, the prime ministership or both have a probability of pledge fulfillment comparable to that of the majority single-party government.”

Further evidence of ministry control and pledge fulfillment is presented by Thomson et al. (2010). The paper attempts to explain the variations observed in pledge fulfillment by examining the U.S., U.K., the Netherlands, and Ireland. Each of the selected cases had varying governing types, single-party governments (U.K. and Ireland), divided government (U.S.) and coalition governments (Ireland and the Netherlands). Each covered roughly the same period of time, from the mid-1970s to the late-1990s, with Ireland’s analysis extending to 2007. Each case experienced similar economic problems during the 1990s that placed pressure on public sector finances.

In examining control over the relevant ministry, Thomson et. al.’s (2010) study reveals several interesting findings. First, U.S. presidential parties with some degree of congressional

---

15 During this period of study, the Irish case experienced single-party and coalition governance.
control or with full congressional control have higher fulfillment rates than presidential parties with no control. Institutionally, single-party majoritarian governments have higher fulfillment rates than non-single-party majoritarian controlled systems. Additionally, Thomson et. al. (2010) find that controlling the prime ministerial post or controlling the relevant ministry will lead to higher pledge fulfillment rates for parties in government. Finally, minority governments, Ireland in particular, tend to have a dampening effect on the probability of pledge fulfillment (Thomson et. al. 2010).

5. Closing the Gap in the Literature: Adding the German Case

As we have seen, pledge research has dealt with institutional designs that produced majoritarian governments (UK), coalition systems without federalism (Italy, Ireland, and the Netherlands), a federal presidential system (USA), a unitary semi-presidential system (France), and cases of minority governments (Sweden and Spain).\footnote{See Moury (2009) for Italy, Mansergh and Thomson (2007) and Thomson (2001) for research on pledge fulfillment in Ireland and the Netherlands, Royed (1996) for the UK, and Holmqvist (2009) for France, Naurin 2002, 2007, and 2009 for Sweden and Artés and Bustos 2008 for Spain for additional research on pledge fulfillment.} Observations of how pledge fulfillment is done when a state changes its electoral system and how it is done in the Central and Eastern European states that transitioned to democracy have been made.\footnote{See McCluskey (2009) for New Zealand and Kostadinova (2009) for Central and Eastern Europe.} The German case will help to complement these cases by adding a case which allows us to look at the impact of more institutional variation.

First, this case provides an excellent opportunity to examine how federalism works in Germany. Federalism tends to lead to more veto points, because federal systems tend to have a powerful upper house and judicial review. The literature on pledge fulfillment shows that federalism in the U.S. seems not to be a big obstacle to fulfillment. However, no one has looked at pledge fulfillment in a parliamentary system with both coalition government and a federal
In Germany’s case, this is a system with more potential veto points than most coalition systems. Germany has a fairly powerful upper house and a constitutional court with the power of judicial review. These institutional features, in addition to the coalition governing structure, could lead to lower fulfillment than other coalition systems.

Second, the German case allows one to compare grand coalitions with normal coalition governments. Since grand coalitions are rare political events in Germany and are considered more difficult to govern, one is better able to understand how pledge fulfillment might suffer. So far, no large-scale effort has made these comparisons. The German case will provide us with the first true foray into pledge fulfillment of grand coalitions. A closer examination of Germany will bring us closer to understanding democracy in these systems. A preliminary examination of grand coalitions in Germany provides context for this rationale.

a. **German Federalism and the Bundesrat**

In the previous sections several theoretical questions were presented: Are elections important and do political parties matter for policy? Also presented were scholarly works arguing that parties can enjoy pledge fulfillment at high rates and pledge redemption rates based on the various institutional designs of the states.

Federalism is an important feature of institutional design that may impact pledge fulfillment. In this section, this author will examine literature on federalism and pledge fulfillment and how these two relate to German federalism. In most federal states, we tend to find bicameral legislatures (Mahler 2003, 74; and Lijphart 1999) with powerful upper houses and strong judicial systems with judicial review (Lijphart 1999). The upper houses have the potential of being captured by the opposition, which could block or change stated policy goals. Judicial

---

18 As discussed above, Rallings (1987) looked at pledge fulfillment in Canada. However, Canada is unusual among federal systems in that it does not have the strong upper house that tends to go along with federalism (See Lijphart 1999). In addition, Canada has single party majority governments.
review, too, might block government action. For these reasons, federalism may matter when it comes to pledge fulfillment.

In *Patterns of Democracy*, Arend Lijphart (1999, 34-42) examines the structure of thirty-six democracies, identifying among them shared characteristics of federal systems. He finds that federal systems tend to have strong upper houses and powerful judiciaries with judicial review. Lijphart (1999) also argues that strong upper houses have traditionally provided representation to the states or minority groups, while the lower houses are representative of the people (Lijphart 1999, 39). According to Lijphart (1999, 39), however, these upper houses must meet two criteria to be considered powerful: first, a separate electoral base from the lower house, and, second, the upper house must possess real political authority, not just ceremonial authority (Lijphart 1999, 39-40), i.e., veto and consent power over legislation. In contrast, unitary systems tend to be weak on these variables. Traditionally, most parliamentary systems tend to have weak upper houses (Lijphart 1999, 213), for example, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords.

The relationship between federal systems and strong upper houses is not a perfect relationship, as illustrated by Canada. Canada is a federal system with a bicameral legislature -- the lower house, the House of Commons, and the upper house, the Senate. In this constitutional framework, the House of Commons is by far the more dominant institution vis-à-vis the Senate (Dickerson et. al. 2010, 434 and Kurian et. al. 1998). First, the government is formed within the House, and, second, though legislation may originate in either house and requires the approval from both, rarely has the Senate rejected much legislation. What we see in Canada is a federalism that does not act as a veto point for the passage of legislation most of the time and thus is not an important impediment to pledge fulfillment.
The discussion to this point provides general characteristics that many federal systems possess, in particular that in Germany. These features tend to go along with federalism, but not necessarily in all cases. However, in federal systems with powerful upper houses, the upper houses can be controlled by the opposition and become an effective veto point. This last point is perhaps the key to understanding federal institutional design and pledge fulfillment. During the course of the governing period, legislation of a federally structured state is passed by the lower house, and typically that legislation must obtain approval from the upper house. For the government, passage is easier to obtain if the upper house is controlled by the same party or coalition of parties. However, as evident in the case of divided government in the United States, if the upper house is controlled by the opposition, then passage is more difficult to obtain. The upper house may reject the bill in its entirety or force the lower house to compromise on key legislative goals to secure passage.

The German upper house, the *Bundesrat*, is a strong institution that can be controlled by the opposition, providing a veto point to legislative passage (Kurien et. al., 1998; Mahler 2003; Kesselman et. al., 2009; and Almond et. al., 2008, 269). The *Bundesrat* has an important impact on how successful the government can be in pledge redemption, especially when the opposition is in power. Federalism matters in Germany in the sense that, as is the case in American politics, the majority party in both houses may not be from the same party and the *Bundesrat* may provide an additional veto point to the passage of legislation. Even in the event that both houses are controlled by the same party, there is no guarantee that the *Bundesrat* will acquiesce to the policy goals of the party in the *Bundestag*.

The function of the *Bundesrat* is to represent the states (*Länder*) within the federal system; members of the *Bundesrat* are elected by the state legislatures. By constitutional design,
legislation that directly affects the states and that comes out of the *Bundestag* must be approved by the *Bundesrat*. As German political history has shown, it is possible the *Bundesrat* may be dominated by the opposition and provide an effective veto point against the *Bundestag*.

Members, or delegates, of the *Bundesrat* are chosen based on the legislative composition of the political parties in each of the states’ legislatures, with each state possessing its own policy agenda which often contrasts with the *Bundestag*. As an institution, the constitution requires *Bundesrat* approval of laws that directly affect the states or constitutional changes. State delegations are required to vote in the *Bundesrat* as the state government instructs and as a whole (Bundesrat.de (3) and Reuter, 2009). Since the *Bundesrat* is an independent organ within the German government and has its own power base, the institution can play an important role in the success of pledge fulfillment for the governing parties. The *Bundesrat* also has the potential of being dominated by the opposition party and blocking legislation, which may make governing more difficult for one party to fully control the policy outcomes.

The importance of the *Bundesrat* to the federal nature of the German political system is seen in the German constitution. First, the German constitution states that Germany shall be a social and federal state, with the states possessing sole constitutional rights in some policy areas, e.g., education (Bundesrat.de (4)). For instance, the German constitution states in Article 79, Sub-section 3 (*Artikel 79 Absatz 3 des Grundgesetzes*):

> Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.\(^19\)

---

\(^{19}\) In the original German: „Eine Änderung des Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig.“
As an institution, the Bundesrat is considered the defender of “the federal states' interests” (Bundesrat.de (1)), such as control over education. The Bundesrat is designed to defend the states’ constitutional rights against the encroachment of the federal government and, indirectly, from the European Union, is responsible for the stability of the German state; and is to provide “political and administrative expertise” (Bundesrat.de (3)).

Second, in policy areas not solely the domain of the states, the constitution requires the consent of the Bundesrat before the legislation becomes law, e.g., the federal budget and tax policies (Deutscher Bundestag.de, Bundesrat.de (2) and BMF). A more detailed explanation of the budgetary process will be provided in Chapter Four; however, the role of the Bundesrat in the general budgetary process is significant in that it may force changes to the budget. In instance, the Bundesrat has an absolute veto on tax policies and has used this authority in gaining concessions from the federal government.

At the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, an average of 10% of all legislation approved by the Bundestag required Bundesrat consent (König 2005 and Auel August 8, 2008, 3). However, from the early 1990s to the end of the decade, the number of laws requiring Bundesrat approval ballooned to 60% (König 2005 and Auel August 8, 2008, 3). It has been estimated that half of all laws passed by the Bundestag require Bundesrat consent (Tatsachen Über Deutschland and Reuter 2009, 40, König 2005 and Auel August 8, 2008, 3). The expansive responsibility of the Bundesrat in legislation approval is complicated by the existence of divided governments.

Traditionally, German governments have enjoyed what is termed concordants, or unified governments (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 31), meaning the Bundestag and Bundesrat were controlled by one party and mostly functioned harmoniously. Over the past two decades, the
opposition has often controlled the Bundesrat, with the exception of the first year of the Schröder I government (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 31-32).

When the Bundesrat is controlled by opposition parties, the opposition parties have a powerful voice at the legislative negotiation table. In this sense, federalism may have the effect of hurting pledge fulfillment for the national parties in Germany. During Schröder’s second term, the Christian Democrats controlled the Bundesrat. Even in times of unified government, the Bundesrat has also been known to defend its interests over the interests of the government. The veto power of the Bundesrat becomes an important obstacle for national political parties to fulfill pledges when controlled by the opposition (Mahler 2008, 261 and Schmidt 2003).

During the late 1990s, the Kohl administration faced opposition control over the Bundesrat, which blocked Bundestag legislation. In particular, the SPD-controlled Bundesrat was successful in blocking tax cuts in 1997 (Orlow 1999, 313). Under Schröder’s two terms as chancellor, the Bundesrat came under the control of the Christian Democrats. In 2000, Schröder was successful in securing the support of the Christian Democrat-led Bundesrat; he won passage of tax cut legislation, but only after concessions to the opposition. However, the CDU-dominated Bundesrat proved to be a veto point to some reform provisions the Bundestag passed, such as Agenda 2010 in 2003 (Eironline November 12, 2003, Landler December 16, 2003, Zohlnhoefer and Egle 2007, and Williamson November 8, 2005). After lengthy negotiations between the government and Christian Democrat leaders, the Bundesrat eventually passed a compromise version of the reforms in July 2004.

The degree to which the Bundesrat has been able to be an institutional veto point in the past has been criticized by German political leaders (Strohmeier, 2003).20 The critiques center

---

20 Dieter Althaus, president of the Bundesrat in 2003 and 2004 said: “We need a reform of the federal structure. Above all, it is about the correction of improper institutional developments and a sensible return to what was placed
on a slow political process that thwarts the will of the people, which is centered in the
Bundestag. According to the critics, when the Bundesrat vetoes legislation and/or extensive
inter-institutional negotiations are required for the passage of legislation, the time required for
the entire political process to be exhausted is significantly expanded, and valuable time is wasted
during the process (Bundesrat.de (5) and Reuter 2009, 8). A term that is appropriate to this
discussion is Reformstau, or reform blockage. The term was created by the Kohl administration
out of frustration to refer to the propensity of the Bundesrat to prevent needed reforms initiated
by the Bundestag (Deutsche Welle March 7, 2006).\(^2\)

The political discussions on streamlining the political process continued through the
Schröder administrations and to the eve of the grand coalition. In 2006, the federal government
and the states agreed to federal reforms that would reduce the number of instances of Bundesrat
consent on legislation. The institutional effects of the 2006 federal reforms have reduced the
Bundesrat’s ability to affect legislation during much of the grand coalition (Deutsche Welle
March 7, 2006, BMI, BMBF and Reuter 2009, 37-40), however, to which extent is not fully
known at this time.

Some argue that the Bundesrat may not be the strong veto player as argued (König 2005).
The Bundesrat has rarely used its veto powers to block legislation from the Bundestag (König
2005, Auel August 8, 2008, 1 and Reuter 2009, 64). For instance, during Kohl’s last term as
chancellor, roughly 3\% of bills requiring Bundesrat consent were defeated in the Bundesrat
(Auel August 8, 2008). Rather, it appears that conciliation committees, similar to the U.S.

\(^2\) The popularity and expanded use of the word Reformstau led to the word being named the “Word of the Year” in
the German language for 1997 (Strohmeier 2003).
Congressional reconciliation committees, are used to reconcile differences between the Bundestag and Bundesrat (König 2005, 1) before institutional differences caused the scuttling of legislation, which can have significant impact on how legislation is drafted and whether it is passed.\textsuperscript{22}

A second common feature of federal systems that Lijphart (1999, 41) identifies is a strong constitutional court, such as the US Supreme Court. The power to strike down legislation as unconstitutional is a powerful political tool in limiting power of the government.\textsuperscript{23} In Germany, the Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, is as active and powerful as the US Supreme Court. It has involved itself in many controversies and has ruled on issues of constitutional importance since its creation in 1949, and its rulings have generally been respected and followed (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006, 95).\textsuperscript{24} When one examines the court systems of other governments, unitary systems for instance, the highest court may be allowed to provide interpretation of laws; however, they are rarely granted the authority to overturn legislation for violating the constitution (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006, 101). This potential roadblock to government action is near non-existent in most unitary systems.

Again, the Canadian case challenges Lijphart’s claim on federalism, which shows that there are examples of federal systems that do not fully match Lijphart’s characterization of federal systems. In Canada, the powers of judicial review were mostly absent in the judicial system until the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 in which, for all intents and purposes, created a real concept and application of judicial review powers

\textsuperscript{22} Katrin Auel (August 8, 2008) argues that though 3\% is statistically insignificant, the problem lays in the conciliation committee system which “says little about the quality of the final bills.”

\textsuperscript{23} Since the conception of the Supreme Court in the 1780s, the idea that it is the final arbiter of the law was finally firmly established by the 1940s and 1950s (McCloskey 2005).

\textsuperscript{24} For instance, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of politically banned parties, abortion, the post-reunification electoral system, etc. (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006, 95-96).
(Department of Justice of Canada). These powers were not original to the establishment of a federal Canada as an independent state in 1867 through The British North America Act of 1867, now known as the Constitution Act, 1867.

However, for the purpose of this study, judiciaries are not considered as an important feature that can block legislation. The rationale behind the exclusion of judiciaries is directly related to the time factor. In the normal judicial process, once a bill has been challenged, and after all the litigation and appeals have been made at the lower levels of the judicial system, it is often years before the final judicial decision is made by the US Supreme Court or Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht. By the time the court makes a decision, the government that passed the legislation has expired; and a new government, albeit sometimes with the same party or coalition of parties, is now operating under a new legislative mandate. Therefore, the pledge was made and passed during the allotted governing period and only declared unconstitutional after the governing period expired.25

b. Grand Coalitions in Germany

Typically, German governments are two-party coalitions, with either the CDU/CSU or SPD governing with the FDP and recently with the Greens. However, twice in German post-war political history has Germany experienced grand coalition governments, 1966-69 and 2005-2009.26 Grand coalitions are considered to be rare events that occur only when the major parties simultaneously suffer electoral losses or when there is significant realignment of party ID that

25 In the case that the judiciary did declare a law to be unconstitutional, the actual number of laws would be fairly small during any given parliamentary session. In such instances, the courts’ actual impact on pledge fulfillment would be negligible to the overall results.

26 The German party system was characterized by this Volksparteien system. Both the CDU/CSU and SPD became catch-all parties (Elo 2008, 50). The rise of the Linke Partei and the declining electoral support for the Volksparteien may indicate that this era may be coming to an end (Elo 2008, 50). However, Elo (2008, 50) contends that the rise of the Linke Partei and the decreasing electoral support for the CDU/CSU and SPD indicates a maturation of the German party system rather than a failure of the system.
weakens the traditional major parties in Germany (Helms 2005, 49; Williams 2006, 26; and Pappi and Eckstein 1998, 11-12).

In Germany, a grand coalition is defined as the union of the two largest political parties, the SPD and CDU/CSU, in German called *Volksparteien* (people’s parties), which are ideologically opposed and yet united in a governing coalition. In other words, this definition includes size and ideological dimensions: size meaning that when combined, the parties dominate the *Bundestag* with a super-majority of seats held, and ideological in the sense that the polar left-right ideological spectrum is contained in the coalition (Clemens 2010, 1). Grand coalitions are typically thought to be short-lived governments (Miko 2006, 1).

The origins of the first grand coalition appeared in the early 1960s as Germany began to experience increasing economic, employment, and budgetary pressures (Handlesblatt.de August 9, 2005). The FDP, unhappy with the leadership of CDU Chancellor Ludwig Wilhelm Erhard and rising budget deficits, left the coalition government, hoping that the CDU/CSU would select a replacement more to the liking of the FDP (Goertemaker 1999, 437 and Helms 2005, 50-51). However, the CDU/CSU, weakened from internal divisions, selected Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as the next chancellor in 1966 and formed the first post-war grand coalition government with the SPD (Goertemaker 1999, 437-8, Helms 2005, 51 and Conradt 2005, 21 and 124).

---

27 According to J. Blondel (1968, 192-195), when scholars examine the quality of representation based on governing type, e.g., single-party, coalitions, etc., scholars will discover “distortions in representation.” In single-party governance, the distortion is greater because parties not in the government rarely have a voice in policy formation. In contrast, coalition systems, in particular grand coalitions, allow for greater input on policies (Blondel 1968, 192-195). Despite better input from all parties, Blondel (1968, 198-199) also recognizes that there are inherent institutional instabilities of coalitions; for example, Italy. Blondel (1968, 198-199) writes, “[c]oalition(s), whether small or large, appear directly antagonistic to stable government, though differences can also be large, from Austria to France and from the Netherlands to Finland.”

28 It is more common to expect grand coalitions at the German Länder level. As of September 20, 2009, there were five Länder that are in a grand coalition government. These Länder include Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein.

29 Most Germans at the time viewed the grand coalition as unnatural because of the ideological divide (Deutsche Welle September 19, 2005).
The grand coalition was a marriage of convenience as the CDU/CSU wanted to remain in power while the SPD - which was the traditional opposition party (Conradt 2009, 123-124) - desperately wanted to prove to the German electorate that it could govern responsibly (Helms 2005, 51). Before this marriage began, there was a clear understanding between the two parties that the “grand coalition enterprise was to remain the exception with a strictly limited time frame” (Helms 2005, 65). In other words, each party had neither the desire nor the expectation that this political arrangement would continue in the future; one of the major parties would return to the role of opposition party. Once formed, the grand coalition controlled nearly 90% of all legislative seats and received nearly 87% of all legislative votes on policies (Engelmann 1972, 31).

The grand coalition was plagued with several challenges. First, the economic downturn was top priority for both parties, but how to solve it was difficult due to their differing ideological stances of the partners. Second, the ideological differences between the parties made governing difficult, resulting in a quasi-governmental organization to be formed, the Kressbronner Kreis, to get party leaders to agree to policies and subsequently to win party support (Goertemaker 1999, 447). Third, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s Nazi past during World War II hurt his ability to govern (Goertemaker 1999, 443 and Handlesblatt.de August 9, 2005).

30 In 1966, the CDU/CSU remained the senior party, retaining the right to name the chancellor, while the SPD assumed junior party status under the leadership of Willy Brandt (Goertemaker 1999, 438 and Conradt 2009, 124).
31 The ideal of a grand coalition was approached with trepidation. Germans who opposed a grand coalition did so because of the experiences Austria had had with their traditional grand coalition governments (Engelmann 1972, 31). Germans feared that a grand coalition would create a “self-serving (to the parties), barren, and everlasting” political environment that many saw Austria as having created (Engelmann 1972, 31).
32 Frederick C. Engelmann (1972, 31-32) points out that despite the misgivings about a grand coalition, the populace expected a proactive German government in dealing with the economic problems, not a reactionary government. The population expected action and could have theoretically punished both parties electorally by supporting other parties at their expense.
33 The political arrangements of the grand coalition in 1966-1969 did not allow for one party to have sole control over a policy area, as was the custom in Austria (Engelmann 1972, 32). Rather, each party had an effective veto over policy, requiring interparty negotiations and compromises on policies.
Though the grand coalition was able to address the economic issues of the day (Englemann 1972, 32), it suffered from several other secondary issues as well. First, though not necessarily indicative of grand coalitions, the personality types of Kiesinger and Brandt clashed; and Kiesinger often interfered with the foreign ministry, which was headed by Willy Brandt (Orlow 1999, 251). As is the case in a grand coalition, the opposition was small and ineffective, since the majority parties formed the government, forcing the creation of the “extraparliamentary opposition” (Außerparlamentarische Opposition - APO), which consisted mainly of university students (Orlow 1999, 252). The student and societal unrests over perceived governmental fascism (Kiesinger) and the Vietnam War threatened the stability of the state, and the resulting response by the grand coalition cabinet was viewed as ineffective (Orlow 1999, 252).

Once the grand coalition ended in 1969, the SPD had replaced the CDU/CSU as the largest political faction in the Bundestag and remained so for the next thirteen years. Most Germans, when asked, saw this period as atypical of the political system (Conradt 2005, 20; Conradt 2009, 125; Orlow 1999, 253; Goertemaker 1999, 446; and Handlesblatt.de August 9, 2005).34 For nearly forty years the prospects of another grand coalition seemed rather remote, with German normal coalition governments being formed until 2005, when again the SPD joined the Christian Democrats after inconclusive elections (Williams 2006, 1).35

The foundation for the second grand coalition was laid in 1998. After the SPD/Greens won a majority in the Bundestag in 1998, the Schröder I government was plagued with a lack of

34 This contrasts with Engelmann’s (1972, 53-54) findings that the grand coalition was generally accepted and popular among the population.
35 As in 1966, when the CDU was experiencing internal divisions and electoral defeats, the SPD, under Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor (1998-2005), began to experience internal divisions and major Länder level electoral defeats, most notably in Nordrhein-Westfalen, a traditional SPD stronghold. The decades-long trend of moderating Social Democratic ideology and the adoption of neo-market principles alienated traditional Social Democratic supporters (Braunthal 2003, 3-8). The left-wing faction of the SPD opposed many of the Schröder proposed economic and social-welfare reforms, causing an internal split within the party so severe that Schröder was forced to rely on the Christian Democrats to secure passage of the reform packages (Braunthal 2003, 9-11).
economic growth, rising deficits, and rising unemployment, which were heavily influencing voters’ electoral choices (Rohrschneider and Wolf 2003, 4-6; Kornelius and Roth 2007, 36-38 and James 2003, 63). Additionally, Schröder, after assuming more market oriented policies, while pushing for social-welfare reductions, faced internal party dissent.

Going into the 2002 Federal Elections, many observers felt that Schröder was very vulnerable; however, the CDU/CSU was not in a position to exploit this advantage (Rohrschneider and Wolf 2003, 1-4). In the end, Schröder won a narrow victory, with a vote margin less than 9,000 nationally (Rohrschneider and Wolf 2003, 1). Schröder’s reelection was aided by a) Chancellor Schröder’s response to flooding along the Elbe River in September 2002 and b) his stated opposition to the Iraq War (Rohrschneider and Wolf 2003, 10; Kornelius and Roth 2007, 38-40 and James 2003, 63).

During his second term as chancellor, Schröder was hampered by continual internal opposition to the economic and social welfare reforms. After intentionally losing a vote of no confidence on July 1, 2005 in the Bundestag, Schröder called for fresh federal elections, held in September 2005 (Conradt 2005, 17-20). The results of the federal elections predicted that a grand coalition government was the likely governing outcome (Deutsche Welle September 23, 2005).

The CDU/CSU and the SPD united to form the second grand coalition, with the

---

36 During the 1998 campaign, Schröder stated his government should be judged on how successful the government is in reducing the unemployment rate. By the end of Schröder’s first term, the unemployment rates increased (Kornelius and Roth 2007, 37-42).
37 In protest over Schröder’s pro-market policies, Oskar Lafontaine resigned from his federal post and eventually left to form a rival party. This internal break-up of the SPD explains the weak electoral results in the 2005 and 2009 federal elections.
38 Early in the campaign season, it appeared the CDU/CSU would win. Public opinion polls showed the CDU/CSU holding a five point advantage over the SPD due to the poor economy (Kornelius and Roth 2007, 43).
39 From the proportional part of the ballot, the SPD and CDU/CSU both received 247 seats in the Bundestag (James 2003, 59). However, the SPD won a slim plurality of single member district seats, compared to the Christian Democrats. This allowed the SPD to remain the largest legislative faction in the Bundestag (James 2003, 59).
40 Eighty percent of Germans opposed military intervention in Iraq (Kornelius and Roth 2007, 45).
41 Neither of the traditional German coalitions – either the SPD-Greens, or the CDU/CSU-FDP – controlled a majority of seats. The SPD constrained its governing options by announcing beforehand that the party would not
CDU/CSU retaining the right to name the chancellor, and the SPD held the junior party position, naming the vice-chancellor (Helms 2005, 49).

c. Negative Perceptions of Grand Coalition Governance

The parties by no means were welcoming of the potential of a grand coalition between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, fearing the potential of producing gridlock between the governing partners and the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 41 and Clemens 2010, 2).\(^4^3\) William Drozdiak (2006, 68) writes, “[m]any pundits are predicting that ideological differences will prove so great - and your clout diminished – that you will be lucky to lead for two years.” In contrast to the pessimism (Deutsche Welle November 10, 2005), the German public held a more positive opinion. The German public viewed the grand coalition as the “best way to fix the country’s economic problems” (Whitlock November 15, 2005), but the citizens worried that the experiment would be a short one.

An indication of how difficult it is to govern under a grand coalition can be seen in how long it took both parties to agree to form the next government. After nearly two months of intense negotiations - from the date of the federal elections on September 18, 2005, to November 13, 2005 - the two parties finally came to an agreement, with Angela Merkel (CDU) assuming the chancellorship on November 22, 2005 (Deutsche Welle November 13, 2005). Normally the process takes a few weeks to complete.

---

\(^4^2\) This inconclusive nature of the 2005 election was a long-term trend of the breakup of the German party structure (Helms 2006, 318-319). Traditionally, the governing coalitions had large governing majorities. However, since 1994, German coalitions have been characterized by narrow majorities (Helms 2006, 318-319). The traditional three-party system had expanded to four by the late 1980s and to five with the inclusion of the PDS party by the mid-1990s, serving to weaken the electoral support of the traditional three parties (Helms 2006, 318-319). The 2005 elections were a reflection of this trend.

\(^4^3\) Matthias Platzeck, at the time the chairman of the SPD, was even reported to have said, “This is a sober marriage of convenience” (Whitlock November 15, 2005).
Public statements by the former SPD party leader, Franz Müntefering, indicated that, if Chancellor Merkel were to attempt to be a proactive policy maker, which has been the traditional right of the chancellor, the SPD would leave the grand coalition (Deutsche Welle November 10, 2005). Other analysts, relying on the previous grand coalition experience and a simple examination of the political ideology of the two parties, questioned whether the government would accomplish much due to its stark ideological differences (Straubhaar 2005, 306-307). Again, the expectation is that partisanship during the grand coalition will triumph over government performance, i.e., passing legislation.

Moreover, Ludger Helms (2006, 324) argues that with the overwhelming legislative size advantage for the government, transparency and democratic accountability would suffer, since there was no effective opposition to hold the government accountable for policy failures or for unpopular positions. Helms (2006, 324) further argues that the opposition parties, left without effective avenues to affect policy changes, may be forced to adopt “radical forms of political opposition.” From this legislative size critique, Helms also identifies an important advantage of a grand coalition. The grand coalition, according to Helms (2006, 325), will be better positioned for “implementing their legislative agenda” due to the numerical advantage enjoyed by the government.

In examining the governing process of 2005 and 2009, Thomas Saalfeld (2010) presents evidence of differing behaviors of grand coalition parties and normal coalition parties. In September 2009, the grand coalition ended; and negotiations between the CDU/CSU and their preferred partners, the FPD, began. However, the Merkel I government was plagued early by public and bitter disagreements between the coalition partners while, for the most part, the grand coalition

\[44\] Müntefering also acknowledged at the time that the “odds” were not in the favor of a long-lasting grand coalition and that the parties had to learn the art of compromise during the negotiations over government formation (Deutsche Welle November 13, 2005).
coalition government experienced little public disagreement from the governing parties (Saalfeld 2010, 84-85).

Saalfeld (2010, 85) attributes this distinction to the legislative size each coalition party enjoys. As grand coalition members, neither party was able to use its legislative size to fully control policies. In fact, the cabinet ministries were roughly equally distributed between the CDU/CSU and SPD (Saalfeld 2010, 86). Neither party, therefore, had the ability to fully block the policies of the other. In contrast, the legislative size and ministry distribution between the CDU/CSU and FDP heavily favored the CDU/CSU. To the chagrin of the FDP, the CDU/CSU was capable of using its ministries and legislative size to limit the FDP’s policy goals (Saalfeld 2010, 85).

Additionally, Saalfeld (2010) argues that another difference between the two governing periods explains why the early Merkel I government was characterized as divisive. The nature of the two governing agreements was fundamentally different. The 2005 grand coalition government agreement was detailed (Saalfeld 2010, 85), which left little doubt or room for deviation of policy goals. Going into the government, the CDU/CSU and the SPD knew what policies the government would pursue and how. In contrast, the 2009 governing agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP “tended to be vague and ‘implicit,’ postponing contentious policy decisions to” the actual governing period (Saalfeld 2010, 85) and allowing for unresolved issues to become public political embarrassments.

In general, grand coalitions provide the government larger control of legislative seats, but more compromises on policy are required. Elections are about who or which party controls the instruments of decision-making, based on the policies the parties advocate and promote among the electorate. The voters often respond to the parties by voting for the party that best fits the
voters’ ideology. In a grand coalition, however, with constant compromising on policies, resulting in policies that will not fully satisfy the electorate, one would suspect increasing voter dissatisfaction.

Conversely, as a function of gridlock, grand coalition parties, in the hopes of providing governance, might reduce the ideological differences by seeking a more centrist position, reducing diversity of policy choices for the electorate (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 41-42). This is problematic because voters may seek distinct policy differences from the fringe political spectrum (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 42). This is seen in Germany that the breakup of the electoral strength of the CDU/CSU and SPD parties is partly due to a lack of ideological differences (Schmitt and Würst 2006, 35-36; Weldon and Nüsser 2010, 51 and Clemens 2010, 3-4), as both parties, more so the SPD, have moved more to the center.

The example of Merkel I influenced public thinking on grand coalitions in neighboring countries; in the Netherlands there was potential for grand coalition government in 2006. The inconclusive Dutch results during the 2006 general elections led to pessimism over the prospects of a grand coalition, leading some political observers to echo concerns of governing gridlock (Casert November 25, 2006). From these perceptions on Germany’s grand coalition, the Dutch parties were motivated to avoid a grand coalition government and, in the case a grand coalition was unavoidable, to resolve these governing issues. The government that eventually formed on February 13, 2007, consisted of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the PvdA, and the Christian Union (CU).

Austria also provides insight on the difficulties of grand coalition governance. Austria experienced two major periods of grand coalition governance, 1945 to 1966 and 1987 to 2000,

---

45 Schmitt and Würst (2006), however, do not acknowledge that centralist positions could provide positive aspects to governing. Some positives of centralist positions are reduced partisanship and increased cooperation between the parties, which could make it easier for the parties to form and agree to policies.
between the center-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the center-left Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) (Kiss 2008; Kraske and Mayr July 18, 2008; Helms 2005, 49; and Rauchensteiner 2002, 235-239). Austrian grand coalition governments established a power-sharing arrangement, or the Proporz System (Rauchensteiner 2002, 246). The system rarely solved outstanding issues and left most contentious issues, the Cold War, the economy, the government’s relationship with the Catholic Church, etc., without satisfactory resolutions for years by the grand coalitions. In many cases, governing paralysis emerged due to inter-governmental disagreements over legislation, as cooperation between the parties broke down (Rauchensteiner 2002, 248-249). After a twenty year absence, grand coalition governance returned to Austria from 1987 to 2000, with similar governing characteristics.

There are several striking features of Austrian grand coalitions. First, these governments tend to end earlier than the given electoral mandate given. Second, political ideology makes it more difficult for the grand coalitions to last and govern. Lastly, political instability within the right and left wings of the Austrian political spectrum is weakening the traditionally dominant parties (Kiss 2008, 4-5; Kraske and Mayr July 18, 2008). There were similar dire expectations for the Merkel-led government (Paterson November 15, 2005; Deutsche Welle November 10, 2005; and Whitlock November 15, 2005). Drawing from not only the 1969 experience but also

---

46 Wolfgang Müller (1994) expands our knowledge of internal grand coalition behavior. In interviews with former members of past Austrian grand coalitions, Müller (1994, 15-17) asked whether cabinet meetings were used to solve important policy questions or whether there was some extra-governing body where decisions were made. Universally, Müller’s (1994, 17) respondents replied that most grand coalition cabinet meetings were exercises in ritualism, in which “[s]ubstantive discussions and negotiations [were] conducted elsewhere.” These extra-governmental discussions typically involved the formal cabinet minister and his/her counterpart from the partner party (Müller 1994, 17). If a consensus was not obtained, the chancellor and the vice-chancellor were brought into the discussions to solve the political difficulties, leaving “the policy details to lower-level negotiations” (Müller 1994, 17). This system was similarly adopted by Kiessinger and Merkel (Clemens 2010, 11-12).

47 Under the Proporz system that developed in Austria, “the rule was that a state secretary would be paired with an undersecretary from one of the other parties in order to assure a nearly foolproof system of reciprocal oversight” (Rauchensteiner 2002, 238-239).
from the Austrian experience, it is not surprising that many Germans held a pessimistic view of the future government.

**d. Positive Perceptions of Grand Coalition Governance**

As several of the historical cases and politicians have indicated, governing and pledge fulfillment in a grand coalition is not an easy process. However, not all German scholars are as pessimistic about the prospects of a second grand coalition. Dorothee Heisenberg (2005) speculates that a grand coalition between the two major parties may not be a repeat of the previous experience which produced the current pessimism and the fear of stalemate because both parties have similar economic policies and ideological stances, which can be the basis for agreement. Even the past grand coalition proved capable of making important reforms (Turner 1987, 91-94; Orlow 1999, 251; and Conradt 2009, 198).

Heisenberg (2005) argues that, when scholars examine the economic policies of the two parties, they will find more similarities than dissimilarities. According to Heisenberg, the ideological divide between the parties has been closed. She also states that the economic reforms under both Kohl and Schröder were stymied by the veto points that have blocked reforms, in particular the *Bundesrat*, and that a supermajority within the *Bundestag* will be able to push through much needed reforms.  

Other political observers were also optimistic about the prospects of the 2005-2009 grand coalition. In a November 21, 2005 interview with the Bernard Gwertzman of the Council of Foreign Relations, Fritz Stern characterized the political developments as “a major achievement”

---

48 Other German analysts, for instance Andreas Würst, at the *University of Mannheim*, remarked to the press that the SPD leadership under Schröder had adopted the CDU/CSU’s position on labor market reforms already (Deutsche Welle November 11, 2005). From this point of view, a major point of contention has already been removed, thus making an agreement between the two parties easier to achieve. In a Deutsche Welle article from September 22, 2005, both the CDU/CSU and SPD were portrayed as having more policy similarities than disagreements on important policy issues, providing the basis for a stable government.
because both the CDU/CSU and SPD were capable of “overcome[ing] their difficulties, that there’s actually a kind of collegial atmosphere in anticipation of a joint government.” Stern foresaw continuity and stability in policy approaches with key politicians, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a Schröder confidant, and Wolfgang Schäuble, who brought ideological credibility to Chancellor Merkel’s side (Gwertzman November 21, 2005).

There is historical precedent to support Heisenberg’s and Stern’s claim. In contrast to the grim perspectives of the grand coalition of 1966-69, the government was not entirely dysfunctional. According to Henry Ashby Turner in *The Two Germanies* (1987), the 1966-69 grand coalition provided stable governance that Germany had been lacking, though, it did not produce any “far-reaching policy initiatives” due to ideological differences (Turner 1987, 91). The government did pass legislation that would have lasting effect on German politics. First, the government introduced regulations of political parties, and, second, introduced federal funding to the parties for federal elections (Turner 1987, 91-92). Third, the government reassumed emergency powers traditionally reserved to the Allies, United States, United Kingdom, and France, after occupation had ended in 1949 (Turner 1987, 91-92).

In foreign policy, the German government reestablished diplomatic recognition of Romania and Yugoslavia and increased discussions with East Germany (Turner 1987, 93). The grand coalition also provided stability, not only to the aforementioned government, but also to the society during the turbulent years of the late 1960s (Turner 1987, 94). More importantly, recovery of the German economy began under the grand coalition (Turner 1987, 91; Orlow 1999, 251).

A cursory examination of the performance of Merkel I also supports Heisenberg’s optimism. First, though governing was by no means without controversy and gloomy
predictions, Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition survived the entire four-year electoral mandate and were able to function as a government (Conradt 2009, 198). Second, during Merkel I, the government acted on important issues, e.g., economic and financial reforms, retirement age reforms, foreign policy issues (patrolling off the coast of Somalia for pirates), and environmental issues (Deutsche Welle September 27, 2009).

As in the previous grand coalition, governing was characterized by continuous compromises and deals between the parties to achieve some level of policy satisfaction between the two parties before legislation was presented to the Bundestag for a vote (Conradt 2009, 198; Clemens 2010, 11; and Miko 2006). Perhaps we can characterize grand coalition governance as the ultimate form of bipartisanship, albeit more forced upon the parties than voluntary. In this way, compromises will encompass policies that each governing party supports and dislikes, as well as from the opposition parties. Parties typically make pledges that overlap and are often included in governing actions. When that is the case, this would mean that the fear of a supermajority governing coalition railroading the opposition is minimized because they will have some influence in policy decisions.

e. Grand Coalition Governance Perceptions: Lacking Systematic Evidence

Despite the apparent legislative success of the 2005-2009 grand coalition, the question remains: how successful were the governing parties in fulfilling their pledges? As the literature has shown, there is a common perception that grand coalitions are more difficult to govern than normal coalition governments because of ideological differences between the governing parties. This difficulty is analogous to mixing water and oil: when two ideologically opposed parties,

---

49 However, as of September 27, 2009, the grand coalition was voted out of office, ushering in a new era of center-right governance by the CDU/CSU and FDP (ARD Bundestagswahl Ergebnis September 27, 2009).
50 Economists expected the ideological differences between the SPD and CDU/CSU would block much needed reforms (Deutsche Welle September 18, 2005).
possessing uncompromising core beliefs, form a governing coalition policy compromises and agreements are more difficult to achieve. Eventually, the ideological gulf between the political parties may be too great to overcome, leading to government paralysis and eventually fresh elections to resolve the impasse.

Indeed, the overarching concern among some political observers in Germany on the eve of the second grand coalition was the potential for ideological differences to cause governing paralysis or gridlock and not last the full legislative term. Although Heisenberg (2005) acknowledged that there were ideological differences between the two parties about how to proceed with economic reforms, she did not take into account that most legislation would be a result of significant back-and-forth negotiations, as was the case during 1966-69 (Conradt 2009, 198). In the end, legislation could be a watered-down version of the policy visions of both parties, not fully pleasing either one. As a result, Heisenberg (2005) argues that fulfillment of promises would potentially only be partial because of ideological differences between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

On the other hand, the assumption of governing paralysis may not be warranted. First, the 2005 to 2009 grand coalition lasted its full electoral term, which contradicted the arguments about the stability of grand coalitions. In a preliminary examination of German grand coalition actions in three policy areas, Richard Lehne (2006) argues that, though beset with inter- and intra-party discord, the grand coalition acted on policies.

However, the question remains as to how reflective government actions were of the respective parties’ manifestos. Not surprisingly, during the 2005-2009 grand coalition,
ideological differences did emerge between the major parties that made governing difficult, but these differences did not produce the level of gridlock feared.51

One of the drawbacks to these arguments for or against grand coalition governance is the problem of a lack of compelling evidence supporting their claims. These scholars use anecdotal evidence to support their claims, but no systematic evidence. This study of pledge fulfillment is one way to systematically evaluate the performance of grand coalition governance. Overall, this research will contribute to the expansion of the study of pledge fulfillment by adding a parliamentary federal system and by making a comparison between coalition governments and grand coalitions.

6. Summary

This chapter has covered several themes. Each theme helps to establish the central focus of this work: the extent to which pledge fulfillment is evident in Germany. These themes examined the importance of elections and the application of the mandate model, how to evaluate the linkages between government policy and party manifestos, and the contribution of Germany to pledge research.

This work will examine the Schröder II and the Merkel I governments. The Schröder II government was a coalition union between the Social Democrats and the Greens. During Schröder II, the government faced institutional opposition from the Bundesrat and internal party dissent over the Agenda 2010 reforms (Schmid 2007). The Merkel I government was a grand coalition between the aforementioned Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. The potential of ideological gridlock remained a possibility.

51 Controversies with Hartz IV, the BND’s Iraq spying affair under the previous government, the highly contested Hessen state elections, and the buildup to new federal elections in 2009 contributed to this governing difficulty.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF GERMAN MANIFESTOS

This chapter establishes the rationales and processes under which this work is conducted. This chapter is divided into three main topic areas. The chapter begins with the process by which German manifestos are examined and how identification of pledges was made. This includes a brief recount of the case selection, how pledges are defined and tested, and the questions and hypotheses of this work. The next topic consists of the analysis of German manifestos. This includes the breakdown of pledges by policy areas and change, examples of coded pledges, and the relationship among pledges. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the order of this dissertation.

1. Research Design

   a. Case Selection

       The focus of this work is to examine pledge fulfillment of governing and opposition parties of the two most recent governing periods in Germany: the Schröder II administration (2002-2005), a normal coalition, and the Merkel I administration (2005-2009), a grand coalition. Germany is a good test case for three reasons. German pledge fulfillment has not been studied. Germany features examples of grand coalitions, which have not been examined. Last, this case provides with an excellent opportunity to examine how pledge fulfillment is accomplished in a coalition system a federal system and veto points. Germany, as field of research, complements the existing literature on pledge fulfillment well.
b. Defining and Testing Pledges

In this section, I lay out my methodological approach to understanding pledge fulfillment in Germany. To identify campaign pledges, I conducted a content analysis of the 2002 party manifestos of the German Social Democrats’ (SPD) and their junior coalition partner, the Greens, and all opposition parties in the Bundestag. Similarly, the 2005 party manifestos of the CDU/CSU and SPD parties were analyzed, along with all opposition parties in the Bundestag during this period. All manifestos were obtained in the original German language. Each party manifesto was constructed and introduced to the wider voting public at its party conferences before the elections of this study. These documents are easily obtainable from the parties’ websites.

i. The Process of Pledge Identification

To identify pledges, Royed’s (1996) definition of party pledges is used. Royed (1996, 79) defines a pledge as “a commitment to carry out some action or produce some outcome, where an objective estimation can be made as to whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced.” Thus, pledges are statements that generally have two phrases: one indicating commitment or support for an issue, and a second indicating an action/outcome on the part of the party. Pledges can indicate a firm commitment or support (we will) or a soft commitment (we support, must, should, etc.). Following Royed, I treat both firm and soft pledges as potential pledges, with proposed actions or outcomes as criteria for determining a pledge.

The approach utilized to identify pledges involves a further step that takes into account the language itself. I performed a keyword search to develop a base number of potential
pledges. For instance, I looked for the following words: *sollen* (shall), *wollen* (want), *werden* (will) and *veranlassen* (arrange), excluding weak action verbs, i.e., *möchten* (want or would like). In German, *möchten* is a verb used in conjunction with another verb to indicate desire, however, weak.

The rationale behind using a key word search is that the German language is quite specific in indicating an action. These words in the German language are strong grammatical indicators of intent to perform some action and have strong grammatical meaning. I must emphasize that this process was used as a guide to identify potential pledges, not as the final determinant of a pledge, thus complementing the established definition criteria established by Royed (1996).

After a base number of pledges was established, a filtering process was used to eliminate potential pledges determined to be judgmental or rhetorical. If a pledge was repeated, both original numeric citations for that pledge were given to a single pledge. When first reading through the manifestos, potential pledges that required further thought and examination were presented. If uncertainty existed about the potential pledge, that pledge was assigned a number and re-examined.

Once rigorous consideration was made of the potential pledge, that potential pledge was either accepted as a pledge and placed in its respective category based on the established criteria or was rejected as judgmental/rhetorical. Many potential pledges were eliminated because they failed to meet the criteria established for pledge identification or were repeats of a previously-stated pledge and, therefore, would not be counted in the final tally of pledges.

---

52 After a potential pledge is identified, a number is assigned next to the pledge to establish a base number.
53 For instance, if pledge 115 were similar to pledge 275, the pledge was/is identified as pledge 115/275.
ii. Intercoder Reliability

To test intercoder reliability, five native German speakers were asked to examine the manifestos to provide confidence in the results. Portions of the CDU/CSU and SPD parties’ manifestos from both governing periods were given to five native German speakers for consideration. Additionally, I translated Royed’s definition of pledges and instructions on how to identify pledges into German. These translations were checked for grammatical accuracy by a native German speaker.

Initially, each participant was asked to examine the manifestos to familiarize themselves with the process of pledge identification. This original attempt was treated as a practice round because the results were inconsistent. I additionally worked with the participants to improve the reliability results, and each participant was again asked to examine the manifestos, which improved over the practice round.

Table 3.1 shows the final intercoder reliability results. The results of the intercoder reliability are encouraging to say the least. Overall, the participants identified 299 pledges in 2002 as compared to my 245 identified pledges. In 2005, the participants identified 269 pledges as compared to my 240 identified pledges. The reliability results were 82% in 2002 and 89% in 2005. The results indicate a strong level of pledge identification reliability between the participants and me.

---

54 Translations of the pledge definitions and instructions can be found in the Appendix.
55 Please see the attached Appendix for the translations of Royed’s pledge definition and instructions.
56 There are varying levels of acceptable reliability. According to K. Kippendorff (1980), reliability results should range from a minimum of sixty-seven percent to seventy-nine percent for acceptable results. Results of eighty percent are considered good results. I accept Kippendorff’s minimum reliability standards for reliability analysis.
The final step was to examine redemption rates once a final pledge count had been established. To identify pledge fulfillment, numerous sources that should indicate fulfillment were examined: newspapers, books on each government, magazines, and the governments’ and political parties’ websites. These sources are rich with information on the actions of the governments.

A pledge is considered fulfilled if there is supporting evidence showing government action on the pledge. Conversely, a pledge is considered unfulfilled if one of two things is true: First, if a party pledges change, but fails to act on a pledge. Second, a government may act by pursuing contradictory policy courses and outcomes. For example, if the party promised tax cuts, taking no action would break this pledge, as would taking any action to raise taxes. Status quo pledges are fulfilled by a lack of action. In cases where pledges were not fully kept, but

---

57 Percentages were rounded up to the nearest whole number.
some form action has occurred, these pledges are considered to be “partially fulfilled,” in line with previously cited literature. Some pledges involve not just a promise of action, but a promise to produce a particular outcome, e.g., the reduction in unemployment, in which statistical evidence is used to determine the status of that pledge.

Once a final tally of pledge fulfillment rates is achieved, pledge fulfillment rates of the coalition governments with the rates of the most recent grand coalition government will be compared. From these comparisons, we can address the questions presented earlier in this chapter. This data will allow us to examine the questions enumerated below.

d. Questions and Hypotheses

In this section, I present a number of questions and hypotheses. The hypotheses explore how well the mandate model applies to Germany; how the grand coalition compares to traditional coalitions; and how well the German case compares overall to the existing research on pledge fulfillment.

i. Question 1: Will the Mandate Model Apply?

This work attempts to address three substantial questions regarding pledge fulfillment in Germany. First, it examines the extent to which German government parties fulfill their pledges and thus are connected with the mandate model.58 In line with previous research on the mandate model, I apply the mandate model’s hypothesis that parties in government should be better capable of fulfilling pledges, compared to out-of-government parties. The rationale behind this hypothesis is simple. Government parties are better capable of controlling and exercising the instruments of governmental authority to obtain legislative success.

58 I consider a governing system to be able to fulfill the mandate model criteria if the governing party or parties are capable of fulfilling a minimum of fifty percent of their pledges. This is a threshold that should be easily met by most systems. Fulfilling anything below fifty percent would mean that the governing system should be considered not to support the mandate model.
Addressing this question requires looking at the pledge fulfillment of both government and opposition parties. In line with previous research, I hypothesize that parties out of government are capable of fulfilling pledges, however, at lower fulfillment rates than parties in government. Royed (1996) and Thomson (2001) found evidence that parties-out-of-government do enjoy some legislative success. One possible explanation for this is that some pledges -- e.g., crime prevention and security -- are pledges that are advocated by all parties regardless of the political control over government, thus becoming a source of legislative success for all political parties.

By answering this question, we are better able to address the extent to which the German political system corresponds to the mandate model. This work hypothesizes that the majority of government pledges and more than the opposition parties should be redeemed, as was the case for other countries that have been studied.

ii. Question 2: How Will Grand Coalitions Compare to Coalition Governments?

A second question this work attempts to address is to what extent do the results obtained for the German grand coalition and normal coalition governments differ? For this question, I argue that the literature gives no clear guidance on what to expect. One possibility is: Hypothesis 2a: The normal coalition government will have slightly higher fulfillment rates than the grand coalition government. A second possibility is: Hypothesis 2b: The grand coalition will function as well or better than normal coalition governments.

These hypotheses are based on perceptions of what governing life under grand coalitions will be like. Hypothesis 2a is based on a pessimistic view. The literature has shown that coalition governments have more difficulty fulfilling their pledges, compared to single-party majority governments. However, when ideologically opposed parties are forced to form a
government, even lower fulfillment rates might be expected. Again, the expectation is that ideological differences make it more difficult for the grand coalition to govern, producing more government gridlock, and ultimately more compromises on policy issues. In addition, if compromise is not found, the government parties in a grand coalition may agree to leave the issue for the next government to address, with each party hoping to defeat the other in the next election. In this scenario, the failure to act on their pledges in the mandated timeframe is a distinct possibility. For our purpose, failure to act because both parties are waiting to see where the political winds will blow is equivalent to enactment failure due to institutional issues. The parties, regardless of the reason, failed to keep their promise. For these reasons, we should expect lower fulfillment rates compared to normal coalition governing parties.

However, the literature has also shown an opposite positive outlook on grand coalition governance. Heisenberg (2005) argued that there was great opportunity for government action under Merkel I because the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats share similar economic policies and ideological stances, which can be the basis for agreement. Fritz Stern made similar arguments in favor of a grand coalition in November 2005 (Gwertzman November 21, 2005). We also see from the historical examination of the 1966 through 1969 grand coalition that government action is possible to solve pressing issues of their era (Turner 1987, 91-94; Orlow 1999, 251; and Conradt 2009, 198). Finally, the literature on Austria indicates that grand coalitions can function and exist for relatively long periods of time (Rauchensteiner 2002). Combined, these arguments challenge the pessimism over grand coalitions.

How do opposition parties fare in grand coalitions? Again, consistent with the literature, we should expect lower fulfillment rates in grand coalitions compared to normal coalitions. However, there may exist an advantage for these parties out of government under grand coalition
governments. This advantage arises when the grand coalition parties are unable to come to terms and when one party seeks outside legislative support to accomplish a goal. In return, these parties may demand higher rewards in the form of pledge support.

iii. Question 3: How Does the German Case Compare to the Literature?

A third question attempts to ask how well do German fulfillment rates compare with fulfillment rates in other systems. In place of a formal hypothesis, I intend to investigate this question further for reason spelled out below. If we examine Table 3.2 on countries’ fulfillment averages, we see where previous research has placed other countries and their rates of pledge fulfillment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Studied Period</th>
<th>Election Promises at least Partially Fulfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1974-1997 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1970-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1981-1985 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1989-1993 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1945-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand 1972-2005 (SPM &amp; Coalitions)</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 1945-1978 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 1944-1978 (Presidential)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 1976-2000 (Presidential)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 2001-2005 (Minority Coalition Govt)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1997-2007 (Semi-Presidential)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1996 -2006 (Coalition Govts)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 1977-1981 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 1986-1998 (Coalition Govts)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 1977-2007 (Minority/Majority Govts)</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of these Pledge Studies</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 Results are taken from Naurin’s (2009) Table 4.1, pg. 58. It is important to note that Naurin uses the averages for the best performing party in the U.S. A case could be made that if Naurin were to use the averages for both parties, the average fulfillment for the U.S. would be lower. Finally, Spain 1989-1993, Italy, and Ireland 1977-1981 are recent addition and not part of Naurin’s original table.

60 Rallings’ examined the U.K., from 1945-1979. His findings for the U.K. is only 64%. However, among his study are three British governments that lasted less than two years each. When Rallings excludes these three governments, and only includes full-term governments, the fulfillment rate increases to 73%.
fulfillment. We notice that majoritarian systems have higher rates of fulfillment than the United States or coalition governments such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, etc.

With Germany’s parliamentary-federal system, reliance on coalition governments and grand coalition governments make it more difficult to accurately place Germany in any one category in the absence of concrete findings, compared to most parliamentary systems. On the one hand, there are more veto points in the German system that could lead to lower fulfillment than in other coalitions. On the other hand, as the literature indicates, institutional designs with multiple veto points need not necessarily be an obstacle to pledge fulfillment. After all, the U.S. has exhibited good pledge fulfillment rates in spite of its multiple veto points. In the next section, I will provide an analysis of German party manifestos.

2. Analysis of German Party Manifestos

An examination of each party’s manifestos yielded a combined total of 990 pledges from all legislative parties in the Bundestag, 2002 and 2005. I identified 522 government and 468 opposition party pledges from the 2002 and 2005 manifestos.\(^{61}\) The Schröder II governing parties collectively made 288 pledges, while the opposition parties collectively made 227 pledges. The Merkel I governing parties collectively made 234 pledges, and the opposition parties collectively made 241 pledges.

a. Breakdown of Pledges by Policy Areas

Once a final pledge count for each manifesto was made, each pledge was placed in a policy category: Economics, Social Welfare, Civil Rights and Liberties, Crime and Security, Foreign Policy, Environment, and “Other,” a category which consists of pledges that do not fit any of the main categories.

\(^{61}\) This number is derived by adding the total number of pledges found by the legislative parties in Table 6.1.
Some pledges were found to have characteristics of multiple categories. An example of this is that some economic pledges would obviously mirror social welfare pledges; such as unemployment compensation.\(^{62}\) A decision to place these pledges in only one category was made that best reflected the essence of the category. For instance, some pledges dealt with certain investment taxes that ran contrary to certain EU regulations.\(^{63}\) These pledges have characteristics of economic policies and foreign policy, i.e. the EU. A decision was made to place these pledges in the Economic category. Additionally, within each policy area, an EU subcategory was created when possible.

Sub-categories were created to identify more specific policy areas. For example, several sub-categories to the Social Welfare category, including General Pledge, Health Care, and Education were created. A similar approach to place these pledges in a single sub-category was undertaken, placing a pledge in a sub-category that best reflected that sub-category.

Table 3.3 shows the breakdown of pledges into policy areas and for each party. Additionally, the table shows the percentage each policy area comprises of the total identified pledges for each party. In each party’s manifesto, the policy areas of Economics and Social Welfare are consistently in the top tier of the number of pledges made by the parties. In only three instances was a policy area emphasized more than, or much as, the Economic and Social Welfare policy areas. These exceptions are environmental policy for the Greens in 2002 and Linke.PDS in 2005, and “other” policy for the Linke.PDS in 2002.

---

\(^{62}\) For example, pledges dealing with unemployment compensation might be considered social-welfare policies in nature; pledges to reduce unemployment would be economic in nature.

\(^{63}\) See SPD pledge 291: “The taxable investment premium (for East Germany) will expire at the end of 2004 according to European laws.”
Table 3.3: Percentages of Pledges by Policy Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>19.1% (26)</td>
<td>21% (24)</td>
<td>25% (23)</td>
<td>39% (46)</td>
<td>14% (21)</td>
<td>20% (18)</td>
<td>30% (29)</td>
<td>30% (25)</td>
<td>20.5% (8)</td>
<td>20% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>51.5% (70)</td>
<td>44% (51)</td>
<td>22% (20)</td>
<td>24% (28)</td>
<td>33.5% (51)</td>
<td>20% (18)</td>
<td>31% (30)</td>
<td>27% (22)</td>
<td>36% (14)</td>
<td>34% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>3.5% (4)</td>
<td>3% (4)</td>
<td>3% (3)</td>
<td>4% (5)</td>
<td>12% (18)</td>
<td>10% (9)</td>
<td>2% (2)</td>
<td>5% (4)</td>
<td>10% (4)</td>
<td>3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/Security</td>
<td>7.4% (10)</td>
<td>6% (7)</td>
<td>22% (20)</td>
<td>11% (13)</td>
<td>11% (17)</td>
<td>4.5% (4)</td>
<td>3% (3)</td>
<td>8.5% (7)</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
<td>3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>8.1% (11)</td>
<td>7% (8)</td>
<td>7% (6)</td>
<td>6% (7)</td>
<td>7% (11)</td>
<td>15% (13)</td>
<td>9% (9)</td>
<td>5% (4)</td>
<td>5% (2)</td>
<td>7% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>4.4% (6)</td>
<td>8% (9)</td>
<td>9% (8)</td>
<td>7% (8)</td>
<td>16% (24)</td>
<td>13.5% (12)</td>
<td>3% (3)</td>
<td>5% (4)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>23% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6% (8)</td>
<td>11% (13)</td>
<td>12% (11)</td>
<td>9% (11)</td>
<td>6.5% (10)</td>
<td>17% (15)</td>
<td>22% (21)</td>
<td>19.5% (16)</td>
<td>20.5% (8)</td>
<td>10% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALPLEDGES</td>
<td>100% (136)</td>
<td>100% (116)</td>
<td>100% (91)</td>
<td>100% (118)</td>
<td>100% (152)</td>
<td>100% (89)</td>
<td>100% (97)</td>
<td>100% (82)</td>
<td>100% (39)</td>
<td>100% (70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It makes sense that economic and social welfare policies would be most emphasized. First, this has been found to be the case in the U.S. and U.K. (Royed 1996). Second, for the German legislative parties in both periods, the major point of discussions centered on how to revive the economy and how to secure the social welfare system. It is true that other policy areas were salient at different points of the German political discussions. The emphasis on policy areas outside of economics and social welfare remained inconsistent across the legislative parties. For instance, foreign policy issues were very much center stage in 2002 as the debates over what to do with Iraq heated up. However, with the exception of the Greens, foreign policy pledges did not comprise a greater percentage than 15%, and these results manifested themselves in the following electoral period, 2005, when the debates were not as heated and emphasized. Logically, we would expect the emphasis on foreign policy pledges to have occurred during the period in which the discussions were most prominent.

b. Breakdown of Pledges by Type of Change

In addition, pledges were examined for type of action advocated by the party. For instance, some pledges call for no policy changes. These pledges were classified as being “status quo” (SQ) pledges. In contrast, some pledges called for policy changes. These pledges are classified as “change” pledges. The rationale for identifying SQ vs “change” pledges is that we might expect SQ pledges to be more easily fulfilled. It is generally easier to do nothing than to enact change. Table 3.4 presents the results of the number of pledges identified as either status quo or change from the 2002 and 2005 party manifestos.

One might expect that a party in government would advocate more SQ. A possible rationale for this is that the party or parties in the government will project an image of a successful government. Moreover, parties in government have presumably already produced
changes, and at some point must advocate status quo pledges to simply protect those changes. Out-of-government parties will most likely advocate change pledges in order to convince the electorate that the government has not been successful and should be voted out of office.

First, Table 3.4 shows that each party manifesto advocated for significantly fewer status quo pledges than change pledges. In fact, the legislative parties were adamant in demanding policy changes throughout their manifestos. Second and not surprising, the opposition parties consistently advocated for more change pledges than status quo pledges. In 2002 and 2005, no opposition party dedicated less than 90% of their manifestos to change pledges. These results are in line with the above argument that opposition parties will try to present a negative view of the government’s performance to the electorate.

Third, Table 3.4 also shows that the government parties were just as likely as the opposition parties to advocate policy changes. Over 90% of the SPD’s and Greens’ pledges advocated some type of policy change in 2002. I interpret these 2002 results as the then-government viewing its mission to correct the problems left to it by the previous government as incomplete and more work was still needed. As incumbent American presidents might view one four-year term too short to secure a successful legislative overhaul, going into the 2002 German Federal Elections, the incumbent German government saw its work as incomplete as well.

In contrast, the 2005 results are lower than 2002, as the percentage of change pledges advocated by the government parties declined to approximately the mid-80s. The drop in change pledges can be explained as a function of the duration of the government. Because the governing union of the SPD and Greens had been in place since the fall of 1998, the government was more established seven years later and had a longer legislative record to defend than it did four years prior. The government saw it as important to protect the legislative successes it had already
secured. However, the vast majority of the SPD’s and Greens’ 2005 pledges were
overwhelmingly in favor of changes.

Table 3.4: Number and Types of Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo</td>
<td>8% (11)</td>
<td>16% (19)</td>
<td>10% (9)</td>
<td>8% (10)</td>
<td>7% (11)</td>
<td>18% (16)</td>
<td>8% (8)</td>
<td>10% (8)</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
<td>10% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>92% (125)</td>
<td>84% (97)</td>
<td>90% (82)</td>
<td>92% (108)</td>
<td>93% (141)</td>
<td>82% (73)</td>
<td>92% (89)</td>
<td>90% (74)</td>
<td>92% (36)</td>
<td>90% (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PLEDGES</td>
<td>100% (136)</td>
<td>100% (116)</td>
<td>100% (91)</td>
<td>100% (118)</td>
<td>100% (152)</td>
<td>100% (89)</td>
<td>100% (97)</td>
<td>100% (82)</td>
<td>100% (39)</td>
<td>100% (70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In politics there occasionally arises the situation in which all parties advocated
significantly more change pledges than previously argued. For instance, if there is economic
stagnation, rising unemployment, and a failing welfare system, and if public opinion is strongly
in favor of reforms, then it would not be difficult for the party to advocate more changes to the
system. In other words, seeing its political future in dire conditions, a political party might
advocate more changes to stem off a potential electoral defeat.

The 2005 governing parties were in such a situation. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the economic situation had not improved under the Schröder governments.
Additionally, the social welfare system, long a concern for German politicians, remained under
considerable financial and administrative strain. The Schröder II governing parties recognized
this and adapted their manifestos to meet the environment of change sweeping through Germany.

C. Examples of Pledge Coding

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show examples of pledges identified for the 2002 and 2005 legislative
parties in the German Bundestag. Each pledge was randomly selected using a random number
generator program called “Random Number,” created by Scott D. Saccenti (2006).

---

64 The symbol * denotes government party.
Table 3.5 Examples of Pledge Fulfillment (2002):  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Translated Pledge</th>
<th>Original Pledge</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SPD*         | 343. We will therefore create a nationwide program called "Future Education and Care" with an introductory budget of € 4 billion, € 1 billion per year. (Change) | Wir werden deshalb ein bundesweites Programm „Zukunft Bildung und Betreuung" mit einem Finanzvolumen von 4 Milliarden € auflegen, 1 Milliarde € pro Jahr. | This pledge was classified as fulfilled. On May 12, 2003, the federal and state governments agreed to create this program with the federal government allocating 4 billion Euros for the program. | Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF)  
| CDU/CSU      | 1. That is why we will gradually and consistently sink that state quota, the percentage of the work of the public sector in the entire economic performance, from the current ca. 50% to under 40%. (Change) | Wir werden deshalb die Staatsquote, den Anteil der Ausgaben der öffentlichen Hand an der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistung, von derzeit knapp 50% schrittweise und dauerhaft auf unter 40% senken. | This pledge was marked as partial. According to Table 1 of Giacomo Corneo’s ([ESifo Economics Studies, Vol. 51, 1/205 p159-189](http://www.bmbf.de/en/1125.php)) indicates tax rates for this was reduced to 41%. The results are close to the Christian Democrat’s goals, but they did not fall below the 40% mark the party advocated. | Table 1 of Giacomo Corneo’s ([ESifo Economics Studies, Vol. 51, 1/205 p159-189](http://www.bmbf.de/en/1125.php)) |
| Greens*      | 383. We want Germany to take the initiative in introducing the Tobin Tax and other recommended instruments to regulate and restrict the currency speculations. (Change) | Wir wollen, dass Deutschland in Europa eine Initiative zur Einführung der Tobin-Steuer und anderer geeigneter Instrumente ergreift, um die internationalen Finanzmärkte zu regulieren und die Devisenspekulationen einzuschränken. | The Tobin Tax is/was a proposed global tax on financial transactions. This pledge was considered as unfulfilled because this tax was not introduced during Schröder II. |  |
| FDP          | 208. The FDP rejects the so-called “Tobin Tax.” (Status quo)                       | Eine Sondersteuer auf Devisentransaktionen - die so genannte "Tobin-Steuer" - lehnt die FDP ab.                                                                                                                          | This pledge was considered fulfilled as the party rejected the introduction of the Tobin Tax and it failed to become law during Schröder II. |  |
| PDS.Linke    | 44. We will introduce according to France’s example a quota law for all party election lists (ballots) for the areas of political participants. (Change) | Für den Bereich der politischen Teilhabe werden wir nach dem Beispiel Frankreichs ein Quotierungsgesetz für alle Listen von Parteien zu Wahlen vorlegen. | Some parties already have rules in place that require gender quotas for female candidates. However, during Schröder II, this did not come about as a legal requirement. Therefore, this pledge was considered unfulfilled. |  |

---

65 The symbol * indicates governing party.
Table 3.6 Examples of Pledge Fulfillment (2005):\(^{66}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Translated Pledge</th>
<th>Original Pledge</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD*</td>
<td>17. The corporate tax for corporations will be reduced from 25% to 19%. (Change)</td>
<td>17. Der Körperschaftssteuersatz für Kapitalgesellschaften wird von 25 % auf 19 % reduziert.</td>
<td>This pledge was classified as fulfilled. In 2008, the government passed the Business Tax Reform Act (Unternehmensteuerreform 2008 - UntStRefG), which reduced the corporate tax from 25% to 15%.</td>
<td>Federal Government’s Bundesgesetzblatt - (BGBl. I S. 1912). Changes found in Art. 16 G vom 20. Dezember 2008 (BGBl. I S. 2850, 2858) and (Art. 17 G vom 20. Dezember 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU*</td>
<td>74. For the period of 2006-2019, the sum of 156 Billion Euros has been promised through the Solidarity Pact Aid. These promises remain unchanged and in the complete sum. (East Germany) (Status quo)</td>
<td>74. Für den Zeitraum 2006 – 2019 sind Solidarpaktmittel in Höhe von 156 Mrd. Euro zugesagt. Diese Zusage gilt unverändert und in voller Höhe.</td>
<td>This pledge was identified as fulfilled. There were two major sources supporting this fulfillment claim. Both sources detail that the German government did pass funding legislation of 156 billion Euros as part of the Solidarity Pact II program for eastern Germany.</td>
<td>Deutsche Welle’s October 3, 2006 article, “Germans Celebrate Unity Day With Mixed Emotions.” <a href="http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2192138,00.html">http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2192138,00.html</a>, The Federal Republic of Germany. <a href="http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_239470/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/Schwerpunkte/Wirtschaftsstandort_20Deutschland/kasten4-aufbau-ost-wird-fortgesetzt.html">http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_239470/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/Schwerpunkte/Wirtschaftsstandort_20Deutschland/kasten4-aufbau-ost-wird-fortgesetzt.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>50. We reject an increase of the VAT. (Status quo)</td>
<td>50. Eine Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer lehnen wir ab.</td>
<td>This pledge was classified as not fulfilled. At the time of the 2005 elections, the VAT was at 16%. However, on June 16, 2006, the German government raised the VAT to 19 %, which was eventually approved by the Bundestag. The raise came into effect on January 1, 2007.</td>
<td>The German Statistical Federal Ministry (Statistisches Bundesamt). <a href="http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung,property=file.pdf">http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung,property=file.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>56. We want the dissolution of the Federal Agency for Work (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). (Change)</td>
<td>56. Wir wollen die Auflösung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit.</td>
<td>This pledge was identified as not fulfilled. Originally called the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, the Federal Institution for Work, was renamed Bundesagentur für Arbeit, the Federal Agency for Work, as part of the “Dritte Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt” (Hartz-III) and was not dissolved.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/">http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS.Linke</td>
<td>80. The VAT shall remain at 16%. (Status quo)</td>
<td>80. Die Umsatzsteuer (Mehrwertsteuer) soll bei 16 Prozent bleiben.</td>
<td>This pledge was as not fulfilled. On June 16, 2006, the German government raised the VAT to 19% and came into effect on January 1, 2007.</td>
<td>The German Statistical Federal Ministry (Statistisches Bundesamt). <a href="http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung,property=file.pdf">http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung,property=file.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{66}\) The symbol * indicates governing party.
Each pledge is accompanied with the original German and a description of the particular pledge, which includes whether or not the pledge was fulfilled and background information as to why the decision was made.

Before each pledge is a number that corresponds to the pledge identification designation this author assigned to the pledge in each of the original party manifestos. Each pledge was identified as either a “Change” pledge or “Status Quo (SQ)” pledge. Finally, each pledge is accompanied with sources or explanations that were used to make a decision on pledge fulfillment.

The examples cover a variety of policy topics, ranging from tax and finance policies to gender representation. The pledges also present a good mixture of pledges that advocated policy changes or status quo. Approximately 60% of the presented pledges proposed policy changes. When possible, the sources that determined the outcome of these pledges in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 came directly from the German government’s website.

The use of government websites was at times problematic as not all legislative information was readily available. The deficiency of accessing official government actions was mainly a lack of making the transition to egovernment in a timely manner. The lack of available government information was recognized by the parties as an area of reform in 2002 and 2005. The parties were mainly motivated by the example the U.S. government had established during the 1990s to place government legislative results and access to services online. When information could not be found on the government’s website, as previously mentioned, other sources were used - such as newspapers, magazines, scholarly papers - to supplement the information gap.
d. Relationship Among Pledges

The following tables present information on the relationship among pledges made by German political parties. The tables distinguish pledges that are in agreement or disagreement with one another. Table 3.7 shows the combined agreement and combined disagreement rates for the parties on all policy areas, economics, and social welfare from 2002 and 2005. I include only economic and social welfare pledges in this table because that is where the bulk of the pledges are found in each of the manifestos. This table excludes comparisons with the Linke.PDS because none of the other parties were willing to form a coalition government with the party. Moreover, the Linke.PDS also declared its own unwillingness to work with them in return.67

Several principal findings are derived from the results. First, the majority of the identified pledges generally fell within the unrelated category. That is, except for a few cases, pledges identified were not directly related to one another. In some cases, the pledges placed in the unrelated category failed to surpass 50% or better. However, in the majority of these instances, the unrelated category generally remained the largest identified category.

Second, there is strong agreement and low disagreement among parties from the same party family. For example, for the SPD and Greens, 48% (All policy Areas), 35% (Economics), and 47% (Social Welfare) of pledges were in agreement. Overall, there was little disagreement between the parties as only 5% of the Social Democrats’ and Greens’ total pledges were in disagreement, with only 6% of social welfare pledges in disagreement. However, economic pledges show strong disagreement, at 27%, as the Greens argued for more ecological oriented policies in their manifestos, which the SPD did not do in their manifestos.

67 For a complete look at the individual data for each party and how the rates for this table are calculated, please refer to the Appendix.
Table 3.7: Relationship Among Pledges in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The CDU/CSU and FDP exhibited similar results as the percentage of agreement between the parties was in the low forties; disagreement was at 11%. Both parties were in strong agreement over economic and social welfare policies and the need for more market oriented reforms.

In contrast, when we examine the relationship among the parties that are not of the same party family, the level of agreement decreases and the level of disagreement increases, as would be expected. By itself, if is not surprising to see these results as they are. We should expect disagreement to be more prevalent among ideologically distinct parties, especially on the role of the government in economic matters, e.g., tax cuts, spending priorities, and how expansive social welfare programs should be, and this is what we are seeing in Table 3.7.

However, when we examine the Volkspartien, there is a relatively high level of agreement between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. Pledges identified as agreeing between the two parties were generally in the high thirties and low forties. This is a high level of agreement between the two ideologically opposed parties. We also see that there is lower disagreement between the parties, ranging from approximately 11% to 17%, than one would expect. This serves to confirm Heisenberg’s (2005) observation that the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats held similar policy goals. In fact, in economic policy, there is more agreement and less disagreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU than the SPD and Greens which appears to support Heisenberg’s (2005) assertion of having similar economic policies.

3. Organization of Dissertation

To better understand policies in Germany, the remaining chapters will present the results of pledge fulfillment. First, Chapters Four and Five respectively examine the results of

---

68 Volkspartien, or people’s parties, is the term given to the SPD and CDU/CSU.
Economics and Social Welfare pledges and their respective sub-policy areas - taxes, health care, etc. These policy areas were chosen for two reasons. First, these policy areas traditionally occupy the vast majority of the political discussions in Germany. The debates center on how to maintain Germany’s strong social welfare system while improving economic conditions. Not surprisingly, there are a myriad of approaches that German parties advocate. Second, as Table 3.3 illustrates, these two policy areas consistently comprised the vast majority of pledges issued by the legislative parties in 2002 and 2005. Lastly, Chapter Six provide the complete fulfillment results of both governing periods.

The remaining chapters will generally be broken down as following: First, each chapter briefly presents commentary on each policy area and their respective sub-categories. Second, each chapter presents an historical overview of the development of economic and social welfare policies. In both cases, this overview will include discussions of West Germany and East Germany and how each policy area was addressed in the post-reunification era, from 1990 through the Schröder governments and the Merkel I government. This will include a discussion of various reform approaches the governments advocated during this period. Lastly, each chapter examines and provides examples of economic and social welfare pledges from all legislative parties in 2002 and 2005.
CHAPTER FOUR
ECONOMIC PLEDGES

Previously, I argued that pledges on economic policies and social welfare are particularly salient issues and tend to occupy the majority of the political discourse in Germany. Moreover, these policy areas consistently comprised the majority of pledges made. Combined, these pledges are good areas for explaining pledge fulfillment. In this chapter, I will explore the topic of economic pledges.

Since the end of World War II, Germany, particularly West Germany, was known for its quick reconstruction and development of the German economy, known as the “Wirtschaftswunder,” or the “economic miracle”. The rapid economic development continued for several decades, which positioned West Germany to be one of the strongest economies in the world, with low unemployment and deficit levels, a strong currency, and trade surpluses. In contrast, the East German economic recovery did not have nearly the same strength as that experienced by the West German economy and began to falter during the 1980s.

The unification of Germany in 1990 created strains to the unified German economy that have yet to be fully resolved. Successive German governments have sought ways to revitalize the economy, while striving to solve rising unemployment, inflation, public sector debts, and rebuilding eastern Germany, with mixed success. Despite these challenges, Germany remains an economic powerhouse, with the fifth largest world economy and the largest single EU economy (CIA).
Since reunification, both the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have sought ways to solve Germany’s economic problems. The SPD traditionally advocated stronger protections under the German social market economy, with economic outputs distributed equitably. Under Chancellor Schröder, the SPD moved further to the center on economic policies under Gerhard Schröder’s Third Way philosophy. The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, traditionally advocated Christian approaches to addressing social ills while promoting free market philosophy, i.e., they advocated the _Soziale Marktwirtschaft_ (Social Market Economy). In recent years, the Christian Democrats have promoted more supply-side economics policies while, in turn, reducing government expenditures on social welfare programs.

This chapter begins by examining how fiscal and taxation pledges are translated into policies. Second, the chapter will briefly highlight the economic history of Germany from the end of World War II to the present. Finally, this chapter examines the economic policy pledges made by all legislative parties in 2002 and 2005.

1. **Economic Policies in Germany: Budget Process**

   In Germany, the Chancellor and the relevant ministers, in particular the Finance Minister, work together to establish a general budgetary framework and fiscal guidelines each fiscal year (Deutscher Bundestag.de). Once the basic guidelines are established, the Finance Minister is responsible for completing the intricate spending details of government programs; the Finance Minister may reject spending changes to the budget that deviate from the budgetary framework (Deutscher Bundestag.de). The chancellor ultimately resolves any spending disputes between the ministries and the Finance Minister.

   This is true of the budget as well; the Finance Minister, once the budget is compiled, submits the budget to the _Bundestag’s_ Budget Committee and to the corresponding _Bundesrat_
committee for consideration and debate (Deutscher Bundestag.de). The process starts with the 
Bundesrat receiving the budget proposal first, thus ensuring the German states’ input in the
budgetary process, having six weeks to formulate spending change recommendations to the
government (Deutscher Bundestag.de). The government, in turn, then formulates responses and
submits the budget along with the Bundesrat’s recommendations to the Bundestag’s Budget
Committee (Deutscher Bundestag.de).

Once the Bundestag passes the budget, the approved budget is submitted to the Bundesrat
for approval. If the Bundesrat gives its consent, the budget immediately becomes law; however,
if the Bundesrat objects to parts or whole of the budget, a Mediation Committee is established to
resolve the dispute. Recommendations of the Mediation Committee are submitted to the
Bundestag, which must vote again on the new recommendations. The Bundestag may ultimately
reject the recommendations over the objection of the Bundesrat and pass the budget as is
(Deutscher Bundestag.de), however, only on rare occasions has this happened.

Since the 1950s, German governments have maintained a reputation of strong fiscal
discipline and low inflation have contributed to Germany’s economic resurgence after World
War II. This reputation has been challenged by the reunification of East and West Germany after
1990.69 The German government is also constrained by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact that
restricts the size of a government’s budget deficit to 3% of GDP.

Historically, taxation has been mainly the responsibility of the states, before and after the
formation of Germany in 1871 with a more centralized system developing over the following
decades (Orlow 1999, 53-54 and BMVBS). After World War II, the federal system of taxation
was reintroduced in West Germany and, after 1990, extended to the eastern German states

69 For instance, during Schröder’s second term as chancellor, the European Union warned the German government
that the government would violate the EU budgetary rules for the third consecutive year (Deutsche Welle May 5,
2003).
through the *Grundgesetz* after 1990. Taxation legislation, as with budgetary issues, requires the consent of the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* before becoming law (Orlow 1999, 313). Currently, the most commonly used taxes in Germany are business and personal income taxes, social security taxes, and value added taxes (VAT).

2. Economic Development of Postwar Germany, 1945 - 1990: East and West

In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was a defeated, occupied country with virtually no economic output of any kind. In addition, in the occupation of Germany, two political and economic systems developed; West Germany adopted a democratic form of government and a free market economic system. East Germany eventually adopted the communist economic structures and form of government. Though both Germanies recovered economically after the war, the recovery disproportionately favored West Germany’s social market economy; the East German economy was near collapse by the eve of reunification with West Germany in 1990.

a. The West German *Wirtschaftswunder*, 1949 - 1990

At the end of World War II in 1945, the German nation stood in ruins and divided between the four main allies: the market economies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the Soviet Union’s command economy (Orlow 1999, 212-213 and Van Hook 2004, 19-24). West Germany adopted the market economic approach, which quickly brought recovery; West Germany became a major world economic power by the mid-1950s (Orlow 1999, 242-245; Bennett 1950; Van Hook 2004, Henderson 2008 and Time Magazine January 6, 1967). This period of post-war West German economic recovery has been called the *Wirtschaftswunder*. By the mid-1960s, the *Wirtschaftswunder* that had been so successful during the previous decade showed signs of slowing, unemployment began to rise, and the economic engine
appeared to have fluttered as West Germany entered its first post-war recession in 1965.\footnote{Ever since the disastrous hyperinflation of the late 1920s, economists and politicians alike in West Germany were particularly sensitive to large budget deficits (Orlow 1999, 254). The Erhard government responded to the rising budget deficit by cutting the budget and social benefits, while raising surcharges on incomes.} Over the next three decades, the West German economy experienced similar periods of recovery and recessions. The recoveries would never reached the level produced by the \textit{Wirtschaftswunder}; federal debt, rising unemployment, and economic revitalization were part of the political debates during the 1970s and 1980s (Orlow 1999, 265). Under Chancellor Helmut Kohl during the 1980s, deficit reductions were achieved by implementing greater cost control measures, and stabilizing government expenditures (von Hagen 2005, 1-3).

\textbf{b. East German Economic Recovery and Decline, 1949 - 1990}

In postwar East Germany, the established Communist government also faced a long and difficult path to recovery. Additionally, the East German authorities adopted the communist system of centralized economic planning and production (Orlow 1999, 272). The East German economy did recover; however, the economy did not meet its own potential or West Germany’s economic progress (Orlow 1999, 273-274). Over time, the East German population’s standard of living began to fall further behind that of the West’s. In seeking political and economic freedom, many East Germans sought new lives in West Germany (Orlow 1999, 274 and 278-279).\footnote{A contributing factor, though not the sole factor, to the downfall of East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, in 1971 has been attributed to the poor economic development (Orlow 1999, 287).}

During the 1970s, East Germany, under Erich Honecker, imposed further central planning on the East German economy with more nationalization. The results produced marginal improvements; the economy continued to contract, and the government amassed massive public debts in order to finance the state’s social-welfare programs (Orlow 1999, 287-290). By 1989, the East German economy, long-suffering and “liv[ing] beyond its means,” was
near total collapse (Orlow 1999, 290). Faced with political suppression and near economic collapse, the East Germans either continued to seek new and better lives in West Germany or took to the streets to protest (Orlow 1999, 290-295).

3. The German Economy, 1990 - 2002

With the reunification of Germany in 1990, political unity has proven easier than creating economic and social unity as the predicted economic boom in eastern Germany did not materialize as rapidly and extensively as the German government and investors wanted (Orlow 1999, 308-310, Neubacher and Sauga July 1, 2010, and Protzman April 24, 1990). The degree of economic depression in eastern Germany was greater than originally calculated (Orlow 1999, 309-310). In May 1992, the Kohl government introduced an increase of consumer taxes and an income surcharge of over 5% to help fund the rebuilding of eastern Germany with the Solidarity Pact (*Solidarpakt*) program (Orlow 1999, 310).

A layered German economic system developed in which a drop in the standard of living and real wages, higher unemployment and the problem of a brain drain all emerged in East Germany as compared to the more prosperous western Germany (CIA). The German economy as a whole began to weaken and in 1993-1994 experienced “one of the worst post-war recessions” (Orlow 1999, 310-311).

The political debates on economic revitalization that emerged during the mid-1990s highlighted several themes. One theme, argued by the Kohl government, called for increases in industrial productivity, reduced labor costs, more private investment partners, and reduced taxes (Orlow 1999, 309-311). The Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats advocated reductions in direct taxes on the German citizens (Orlow 1999, 313 and von Hagen 2005, 1-3 and

---

72 Germans, up to the early 2000s, shouldered a remarkably high tax obligation to pay for the social welfare system, the rebuilding of the East, etc. For example, taxpayers in the top tax bracket paid nearly 53% in income taxes and the lowest tax bracket paid nearly 26% (Orlow 1999, 313 and von Hagen 2005, 5-7).
In 1996, Kohl introduced new tax legislation to the Bundestag, which included income and corporate tax cuts, but also advocated the elimination of tax deductions and loopholes (Business Week February 3, 1997).

In contrast, the opposition Social Democrats, who controlled the Bundesrat, argued that tax reforms should be tied to “social and ecological goals” (Orlow 1999, 311-313). They complained that the Kohl government was not actually reducing government spending nor the deficit, but placing the burden of funding and administering the social welfare programs in the hands of the states and municipalities in order to give the illusion that the federal government was working to reduce the federal deficit (Orlow 1999, 311). The Bundesrat eventually vetoed Kohl’s tax legislation (Orlow 1999, 313 and Wallace August 28, 2000).

In 1998, Gerhard Schröder’s SPD came into office, promising to solve Germany’s economic problems (Orlow 1999, 313). During the campaign, Schröder stated that his government would be evaluated for its ability to reduce unemployment, then at 4 million, to 3.5 million by the time of federal elections in 2002; otherwise, his government did not deserve to be reelected (BBC September 9, 2005 and BBC August 25, 2003). Schröder, as head of the SPD, attempted to moderate the SPD’s economic policies through a policy called the Neue Mitte or the “Third Way.” Schröder argued that his vision of economics was the middle ground between the excesses of capitalism and socialism, which would combine the best of both approaches (BBC September 27, 1999).}

---

73 Schröder’s Third Way was heavily inspired by the economic reorientation of both the American Democrats under President Bill Clinton and the UK Labour Party under Prime Minister Tony Blair.
74 By excesses, it is noted that uncontrolled capitalism is not only detrimental to the overall health of the economy, but also to the social cohesion of a country. In contrast, social welfare policies may have a dragging effect on the economy as more individuals draw from government provided benefits and budget deficits begin to expand in response. In order to make up the revenue shortfalls, a government may resort to raising taxes, which may discourage economic activity.
When Schröder assumed office in 1998, his first priority for the government was to reduce unemployment. As part of their economic plan, the government proposed reductions in both corporate and personal taxes (Landler 2003). The plan called for a similar reduction in taxes as Kohl had promoted in 1997 (Wallace August 28, 2000). However, the political environment had changed by 2000; and the Bundesrat was dominated by the Christian Democrats who opposed the Bundestag’s tax legislation (Wallace August 28, 2000). The Schröder government recognized that the Bundesrat would be an obstacle to any potential tax cuts and compromised with the Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat over the objections of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag to secure passage (Wallace August 28, 2000, Garfield 1998, and von Hagen 2005, 6).

At times, the policy goals of the states come in conflict with one of the party in the Bundestag; this was one such case. The Christian Democrats in the Bundestag wanted to maintain a united front against Schröder, whereas the Christian Democrat-led states wanted more tax cuts for small businesses than what Schröder originally proposed (Wallace August 28, 2000 and Hurriyet Daily News July 15, 2000). Schröder was able to secure passage by agreeing to increase small business tax cuts concessions to the states (Wallace August 28, 2000 and Hurriyet Daily News July 15, 2000).

The tax cuts, however, did not prevent the German economy from regressing into another recession in 2001. In response, in February, 2002, Schröder established the Hartz Commission to examine a two-prong reform agenda: how to generate job growth and at the same time reduce the government’s public debt by reforming the social welfare system (BBC September 9, 2005).

The Christian Democrats argued that though the party would generally support tax cuts, the German government at that time could not financially afford the cuts and its loss of government revenues (BBC June 30, 2003).

The reforms were praised by economists and political observers as one of the most important tax reforms in decades that the German government attempted to introduce (Williamson and Wassener July 7, 2005).
The commission reported its findings in August 2002 and proposed four concepts. Each of these concepts became part of the SPD’s campaign platform in 2002.

The first three concepts discussed ways in which job creation could be encouraged by creating new government agencies that would assist in creating job placement and training. These concepts included the creation of *Personal-Service-Agenturen* (Staff Services agencies), increased funding for vocational education, creation of the *Minijob* concept, the creation of or more self-employment opportunities through the *Ich-AG* (Me, Inc.) concept, and the reform of the *Arbeitsamt* (Federal Labour Institution) into the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* (Federal Labour Agency). The fourth concept, Hartz IV, proved to be more contentious. Hartz IV advocated combining unemployment and welfare benefits while imposing time restrictions on recipients, all of which was seen as a reduction of benefits (BBC June 30, 2003 and September 9, 2005, and Deutsche Welle February 2, 2010). These reforms eventually became the basis of Schröder’s reform packages known as Agenda 2010.


As the parties prepared for the September 2002 federal elections, the legislative parties issued economic pledges that reflected Germany’s desire for economic reforms. The Schröder II legislative parties were very likely to push for changes in economic policies instead of no changes. Table 4.1 shows the number and type of economic policy pledges made by all parties in both 2002 and 2005. We can see that, as we saw in Chapter Three, that vast majority of economic pledges in both years were overwhelmingly pledges that advocated policy changes.
Table 4.1: Number and Types of Economic Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD*</th>
<th>SPD*</th>
<th>Greens*</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>CDU/CSU*</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>Linke.PDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PLEDGES</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A * denotes a government party.
a. Schröder II: 2002 - 2005

Table 4.2 presents examples of economic pledges from the SPD and Greens in 2002. Table 4.3 presents similar examples of economic pledges from the 2002 opposition parties. The tables also explain the rationale of whether a pledge was fulfilled or not. What is interesting about the SPD’s 2002 economic pledges is how much the Third Way is encapsulated in the party’s pledges. A cornerstone of the Third Way was the promotion of a middle ground between neo-market and social welfare philosophies. In the finance and tax pledges, the market economic and investment philosophies are evident. Finance pledges and tax pledges are also characterized as strongly specific pledges.

In the area of economic pledges, each of the parties’ pledges was divided into General, Finances and Tax subcategories. In 2002, the SPD made 26 pledges, or 19% of their total pledges. Among these pledges fulfilled in Table 4.2 were: *The federal government will make available an additional €51 billion for additional benefits for the targeted building of the east* (Germany) and *The Solidarity Pact II: the federal government will provide €156 billion for an additional 15 years* (for East Germany). This pledge was found to be fulfilled as evidence was found from the Federal Ministry for Transportation, Building, and Urban Development (BMBVS) that this funding was approved.

Several SPD economic pledges were not fulfilled. For instance, while most of the SPD’s tax pledges were fulfilled, with the aim to spur economic growth, a few tax pledges did fail to become legislation. The SPD made the pledge to *increase tax credits to 2,448 € (4,788 DM)* and *the basic allowance of 7,158 € (14,000 DM) to 7,664 € (approx. 15,000 DM) by 2005* respectively. In this case, no evidence was found to substantiate this pledge.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pledge:</td>
<td>Explanation:</td>
<td>Pledge:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes or Partial</td>
<td>Additional € 156 billion/15 years for Solidarity Pact II.</td>
<td>According to the BMVBS, this funding was made available to the states for infrastructure improvements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of upper tax rates, from 53% to 42%.</td>
<td>The Agenda 2010 reforms introduced tax cuts to stimulate economic growth.</td>
<td>Reduction of lower tax rates, from 25.9% to 15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase tax credits for families with children to 2,448 € (4,788 DM) by 2005.</td>
<td>Found no evidence of this.</td>
<td>We want to strengthen employee participation in business capital to make the ownership of productive assets in Germany fairer. Agenda 2010 makes it easier for businesses to fire workers (which we want to prevent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.3: Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Schröder II Opposition Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>PDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes or Partial</strong></td>
<td>Pledge: Keep the “church taxes” (Kirchensteuer). (2002)</td>
<td>Explanation: Tax remains to this day, if you actively belong to a religious organization.</td>
<td>Pledge: The inheritance tax will not be raised. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>Eliminate the 2003 Environmental Taxes. (2002)</td>
<td>Tax went into effect on January 1, 2003</td>
<td>Eliminate Article 77. Section 3 of the Business Contract Law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). (2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The SPD’s junior partner, the Greens, made similar economic pledges; however, pledging slightly fewer in total. Overall, the Greens made 21 economic pledges, or 14% of their total pledges. Overall, the Greens’ pledges often referred to their green ideology of ecological and social protection. The Greens also referred to the continued reconstruction efforts of eastern Germany. As the junior partner, the Greens were supportive of the SPD’s efforts to reduce taxes. The Greens promised by 2005 to reduce the lower tax rates from 25.9 percent in 1998 to 15 percent. The Greens also were supportive in reducing agricultural subsidies. Evidence supports that these pledges were fulfilled.

The governing parties also had difficulties in fulfilling some of their pledges. The SPD promised to reduce the budget deficit and submit a balanced budget by 2006. High budget deficits plagued successive German governments, particularly during Schröder’s first terms as chancellor. This pledge was unfulfilled as the budgets continued to produce deficits, albeit at lower rates, and the government ended before 2006. The SPD also wanted to increase tax credits for families, for which no increase was observed. The Greens supported the introduction of the Tobin Tax, the taxation of cross-border financial transactions. The Tobin Tax was not passed.

One particular economic pledge made by the Greens is notable. As part of the SPD’s support of Agenda 2010, employers would be given greater rights to fire employees. The Greens appeared to have reservations concerning this aspect of the SPD’s proposals. In particular, this pledge appeared in the Greens’ manifesto: We want to strengthen employee participation in business capital to make the ownership of productive assets in Germany fairer. Agenda 2010 makes it easier for businesses to fire workers (which we want to prevent). Despite being the SPD’s coalition partners, the Greens did not agree over aspects of Schröder’s Third Way approach. Ultimately, the Greens were unable to prevent the passage of this legislation.
The CDU/CSU made 23 economic pledges, or 25% of their total number of pledges. The FDP advocated 29 economic pledges, which comprised 30% of the party’s total number of pledges. Additionally, the CDU/CSU’s and FDP’s economic pledges were overwhelmingly in support of changes to economic policies. As opposition parties that were interested in regaining office in the future, it is not surprising that both parties were overwhelmingly supportive of changes to the government’s general policies and to economic policies specifically. As opposition parties, parties want to highlight the failings and deficiencies of the government’s policies, and the CDU/CSU and FDP were no exceptions, while the government would like to project the image of improvements.

The PDS, on the other hand, was clearly more ideological and rhetorical in its 2002 manifesto than the previously discussed parties, which made pledge identification more difficult. Most of the PDS’ statements concerning economic policies failed to meet the standard of a pledge established in this work because of the rhetorical nature of the statements. This failure mainly contributed to relatively few economic pledges identified in the 2002 PDS manifesto, 8 pledges, which is roughly 21% of their total number of pledges. The areas of the manifesto identified as pledges were often very specific in their policy statements. For instance, the PDS pledge to increase taxes on inheritances over 300,000 DM (150,000 Euros), and to raise the tax-free minimum subsistence levels from 14,000 DM to 17,000 DM/year (8,720 Euros). The goals of these policies, according to the PDS, were to create more social justice.

Overall, the PDS’s economic pledges placed the party well to the left of the Social Democrats and the Greens. Many of their pledges advocated called for tax increases, which were in contrast to the political environment at the time. It seems apparent that the party was more intent on solidifying its support among the German electorate that supported policies
further left than the SPD. It also seems apparent that the party was intentionally setting itself for
collection failure by staking out the extreme ends of the left-of-center political spectrum instead
of moderating its policy stances. The party may not have been as concerned with fulfilling
pledges, per se. Rather, the party may have been more concerned with providing a parliamentary
voice for those German citizens who fall further left of the ideological spectrum.

Table 4.3 presents examples of economic pledges from the opposition parties. The
Christian Democrats made tax cut pledges and, while most of their pledges were not fully
fulfilled, the majority of them were at least partially fulfilled. For instance, the CDU/CSU
favored lowering the top rates to 40%. The evidence indicates that the top rates were reduced to
41%. The FDP also opposed raising the inheritance tax, which the PDS supported. The pledge
was fulfilled by the FDP as no increase was observed, while the pledge remained unfulfilled for
the PDS.

There were a number of status quo pledges that were fulfilled by a lack of action. Table
4.3 show that the CDU/CSU, FDP, and PDS wanted to maintain current tax policies or opposed
the passage of another. For instance, the Christian Democrats wanted to keep the so-called
“Church Tax,” Kirchensteuer, a deduction from one’s wages that goes to support the worker’s
declared religious organization. Additionally, the Christian Democrats and FDP opposed the
introduction of the Tobin Tax. Finally, the PDS wanted to maintain tax-free surcharges for
Sunday, holidays, and overtime and no reductions in corporate tax rates. In each of these cases,
no action was taken by the government thus, allowing the CDU/CSU, FDP, and PDS to fulfill
these promises. The PDS’ pledge to prevent corporate tax cuts was nearly jeopardized as
Schröder called for these cuts in March 2005, but the government ended before action could be
taken.
Table 4.3 also shows examples of pledges unfulfilled. Both the CDU/CSU and FDP were united in revoking the environmental tax that would impose surcharges on aluminum and certain plastic bottles. The tax, passed in 2002, came into force January 1, 2003 and presently remains part of German law. The CDU/CSU also sought to return industrial property tax rates to levels before Schröder took office in 1998. The FDP also sought the elimination of Article 77, Section 3 of the German Business Contract Law, which makes corporate mergers extremely difficult to achieve. In both cases, no action was observed. As previously discussed, the PDS sought to introduce the Tobin Tax and higher inheritance taxes and both pledges were not enacted.

After winning reelection by a slim margin in 2002, the Schröder II government in March, 2003, introduced a comprehensive reform package called Agenda 2010 (BBC September 9, 2005, Der Spiegel March 3, 2003, EIROnline (2) March 13, 2003 and Landler 2003). The reforms targeted the revitalizing of the economy by cutting taxes, reforming the social welfare state, and improving Germany’s international competitiveness by providing training for workers (Landler 2003). However, the Bundesrat, still controlled by the Christian Democrats, continued to provide an institutional veto point to Schröder’s Agenda 2010 proposals.

Negotiations between the Schröder government and the Bundesrat over Agenda 2010 were exhaustive and intense. This time the Christian Democrats remained united and the same tactic of dividing the Christian Democrats used by the Schröder I government in the 2000 tax cut debates were not viable (Auel 2008, 1). Eventually, the Bundesrat referred the Agenda 2010 reforms to the mediation committee (Eironline November 12, 2003). In resulting negotiations between the Schröder government, the Christian Democratic national party leadership, and the Christian Democratic state leaders, a compromise in which Schröder agreed to include
alterations to the government’s original legislation was eventually formed (Williamson November 8, 2005). The reforms became law between January 1, 2003, and January 2005.

The reforms were mainly unpopular among German citizens for several reasons, and the unpopularity of the reforms manifested itself in unique ways. First, the expected reductions in unemployment did not happen as initially predicted. By February 2005, unemployment had risen to over five million (12%). Second, with the introduction of the Hartz IV provision, the government benefits were reduced and time limited, creating criticism among citizens and weekly “Monday Protests” over the changes (Owen January 5, 2005).

The combined unpopularity of the reforms and continued economic problems plagued Schröder’s control over the party. Internally, the Social Democrats were split between those who supported Schröder’s economic policies and those who opposed, which led to open opposition to Schröder in the Bundestag (Sturcke March 17, 2005 and UPI March 17, 2005). Continued internal opposition, combined with a devastating electoral defeat of the SPD to the CDU/CSU in the traditional Social Democratic stronghold of North Rhine Westphalia in May 2005, led Schröder to call for early elections for September 2005, as Schröder felt he needed a new mandate from the electorate to legitimize his reforms.

---

78 Schröder believed that businesses were not doing enough to reduce unemployment despite the reforms that should have created an environment of job creation (Bernstein March 27, 2005), as unemployment continued to rise to even higher levels (BBC March 1, 2005).

79 Additionally, in German pop culture, Schröder’s tax policies became the subject of ridicule in popular song in late 2002 and 2003. Elmar Brandt’s parody of Schröder’s policies first emerged with Die (The) Gerd Show, which produced the hit song, “The Tax Song” (Der Steuersong). The song lampooned Schröder’s supposed attempt to impose indirect taxes through extraordinary means, such as taxes on dogs, bad weather and simply breathing in order to bring Germany’s finances in order. Schröder was portrayed as robbing collection plates to satisfy his need for money. The popularity of the song propelled sales of the album to double platinum.

80 In March 2005, as unemployment reached over five million, Schröder again called for additional tax cuts, reducing the corporate tax rate from 25% to 19%, while calling for more infrastructure investments and increased government assistance for the long-term elderly unemployed (BBC June 30, 2003, Landler, June 30, 2003 and Sturcke March 17, 2005). To offset increases to the budget deficit, Schröder proposed, “closing tax loopholes, raising tax on dividends from 50 to 60% and limiting companies’ abilities to write off past losses against current profits” (Benoit March 17, 2005).
i. Schröder II Results: Government Parties’ Results

Table 4.4 presents fulfillment results for economic pledges for Schröder II. The results in Table 4.4 show that neither of the governing parties had great difficulty at least partially fulfilling their economic pledges. The table shows that the SPD made 26 economic pledges and at least partially fulfilled 73% of their economic pledges. Moreover, the table shows that the SPD’s junior partner, the Greens, performed nearly as well when they at least partially fulfilled 67% of their 21 economic pledges. As a whole, the Schröder II government at least partially fulfilled 70% of its economic pledges.

Table 4.4 shows that there was not much difference between the governing parties. With the SPD being the largest party in the coalition it would be normal to expect the SPD to use its weight to secure higher fulfillment vis-à-vis the Greens. However, this is not the case in Table 4.4 as the actual difference is only 6 percentage points. In a sense, we can declare this a victory for the Greens as the literature indicates that junior governing parties are at a fulfillment disadvantage (Thomson 2001), and this was clearly not seen in the case of economic pledges.

ii. Schröder II Results: Opposition Parties’ Results

In contrast, the Schröder II opposition parties were quite disadvantaged when it came to fulfilling their pledges. The best performing of the three opposition parties was the CDU/CSU. Table 4.4 shows that the CDU/CSU at least partially fulfilled 44% of their 23 economic pledges. In contrast, the FDP and PDS results show that neither party managed to surpass 30% of their pledges at least partially fulfilled. The FDP made 29 economic pledges and at least partially fulfilled 28% of their pledges. The PDS made the fewest number of economic
Table 4.4: Economic Pledge Fulfillment, 2002-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>65% (17)</td>
<td>48% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>8% (2)</td>
<td>19% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>73% (19)</td>
<td>67% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>27% (7)</td>
<td>33% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (26)</td>
<td>100% (21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
pledges, 8, and at least partially fulfilled 25% of their pledges. Collectively, the opposition parties at least partially fulfilled 33% of their pledges.

b. **Merkel I: 2005 - 2009**

As in 2002, economic reforms remained an important point of discussion in 2005 as the economy remained a top priority of both governing and opposition parties. As the incumbent largest party and as the elections loomed, Schröder and the SPD leadership were still keen on promoting Schröder’s Third Way, but made fewer specific economic pledges when compared to the 2002 manifesto. Numerically, the SPD made the same relative number of pledges as in 2002, 24 pledges, or 21% of their total number of pledges.

In the subsequent elections, Schröder’s Social Democrats narrowly lost to the Christian Democrats; however, the Christian Democrats and the SPD were forced to form a grand coalition. The CDU/CSU became the largest party faction in the Bundestag. When Merkel came to office in late 2005, the German economy was faced with high unemployment, expanding deficits, and low growth. The prospects of solving Germany’s economic woes appeared even more challenging with the onset of the grand coalition.

Table 4.5 presents additional examples of economic pledges made by the parties in 2005. In a departure from 2002, the Social Democrats appeared to have reduced the number of free market pledges in favor of economic pledges that sought to increase taxes on the higher earners. This was done to discourage the SPD’s base from further defections to the newly formed Linke.PDS party. One such pledge identified states, *We want to strengthen the individual income tax with a 3% raise in income taxes for those earning a yearly income of 250,000 Euros (single) or 500,000 Euros (married) in order for the state to finance the necessary state...*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong> 3% individual income tax increase starting at 250,000 Euros (single) or 500,000 Euros (married)</td>
<td>July 2006, <em>Reichensteuer</em> (rich man's tax) was passed.</td>
<td>Promised to maintain the 156 billion Euro funding of Solidarity Pact II as promised in 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong> Promised to maintain the 156 billion Euro funding of Solidarity Pact II as promised in 2002.</td>
<td>No changes observed.</td>
<td>Raise VAT from 16% to 18%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong> Introduction of banks for the middleclass with interest rates 2% points lower than the market rates.</td>
<td>Observed no action on this pledge.</td>
<td>Reduce the entrance tax rates of wage and income taxes to 12% and the top tax rate to 39%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong> Reduce corporate tax rates from 25% to 19%.</td>
<td>Observed no action on this pledge.</td>
<td>Reduce the individual business tax rate to a flat 22%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.6: Economic Policy Pledges and their Outcomes: Merkel I Opposition Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Linke.PDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explanation:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explanation:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject the CDU/CSU flat rates on individual incomes.</td>
<td>CDU/CSU unable to pass this legislation.</td>
<td>No “Tobin Tax.” (2005)</td>
<td>No such tax introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Introduce the Tobin Tax. (2005)</td>
<td>No such tax introduced.</td>
<td>Liberalization of business operating hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject an increase of VAT.</td>
<td>VAT increased from 16% to 19%.</td>
<td>Reject an increase of VAT.</td>
<td>VAT increased from 16% to 19%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
programs, such as education and research. This tax was fulfilled when the Merkel I government passed in July 2006 a tax on the wealthy, called the Reichensteuer.

The Social Democrats’ transition can be explained in two interrelated ways. First, the unpopularity of the Hartz IV/Agenda 2010 reforms, particular by those reducing government obligations, inspired several demonstrations, the Monday Protests, against the reforms. Many felt the reforms went too far and jeopardized the long-established German social safety net.

Additionally, this unpopularity of the reforms and the splits within the Social Democrats were eventually manifested in the stunning electoral defeat of the SPD in their traditional stronghold of North Rhine Westphalia late spring of 2005. The SPD was trying to solidify its traditional base to prevent further defections and hopefully encourage those who left the party or simply cast a protest vote against the party to again support the Social Democrats.

In contrast to their 2002 manifesto, the 2005 CDU/CSU manifesto contained considerably more economic pledges, 39% of pledges compared to 25% in 2002. As in the previous manifesto, the CDU/CSU advocated for more changes in economic policies (41 out of 46 pledges) than status quo pledges. The Christian Democrats’ pledges heavily focused on tax incentives and reductions for individuals and businesses.

There is not a clear rationale to fully understanding the variance in the number of pledges made by the Christian Democrats in 2002 and 2005. One possible explanation is that when the Christian Democrats viewed public opinion polls, the party noticed how vulnerable the SPD was concerning economic reforms and management, since the reforms did not appear to be benefiting the economy. The Christian Democrats wanted to appeal more to business interests and to individuals alike with proposals that were squarely targeted to these groups with promises of tax cuts and tax code reforms. To prevent a further increase in the deficit, the Christian Democrats
also pledged VAT tax increases and the closure of tax loopholes. These types of pledges, though made by the party in 2002, were not as numerous or expansive as advocated in 2005.

As we saw in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, some pledges required no action to be fulfilled and Solidarity Pact II was no exception. Reconstruction of eastern Germany remained an important policy issue for the German government. In 2002, the Schröder II government passed funding bills that total to the amount of 156 billion euros as part of Solidarity Pact II. In the era of reducing government spending and balancing the budget, both governing parties agreed that the funding would not be touched during Merkel I.

The governing parties also failed to fulfill some of their pledges. The SPD wanted to create a bank for the middle class with interest rates 2% lower than the market rates. The SPD also sought to reduce the corporate tax rates from 25% to 19%. The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, sought to introduce a flat tax rate of 22% on individual business incomes and to lower individual income taxes to 12% (entrance rate) to 39% (top rate.) In each of these cases, no evidence was found showing that fulfillment had occurred.

Table 4.6 shows examples of the opposition pledges. In general, the Greens’ 2005 manifesto was markedly more negative not only to the Christian Democrat’s free market policies, but also to many of the reforms supported by Schröder. Overall, the Greens’ made 18 economic pledges, or 20% of their total number of pledges. The Greens campaigned against coal subsidies and the Christian Democrats’ flat tax. Under Merkel I, the government agreed to phase out these subsidies by 2018. Additionally, with the failure of the CDU/CSU to pass such legislation on flat taxes, the Greens were able to fulfill their promise.

The FDP, however, continued to promote free market pledges, with little change in the total number of pledges from 2002, which was 25 pledges; the percentage of total pledges was
consistent from 2002, at 30%. The FDP also agreed with the Greens to eliminate coal subsidies. The issue of the Tobin Tax reappeared during the 2005 campaign. As in 2002, the FDP opposed the tax. In both cases, the FDP’s pledges were considered fulfilled.

In 2005, Linke.PDS made 14 economic pledges, or 20% of their total number of pledges. The Linke.PDS’ 2005 manifesto continued to support policies that were further left of the Greens and Social Democrats, which affected their fulfillment rates. Three pledges were found to be at least partially fulfilled in the Linke.PDS’ manifesto; among these pledges was the pledge to maintain tax-free surcharges for Sunday, holidays, and overtime pay. The effects of the pledge to increase development aid to 0.7%/GDP by 2015 cannot not be fully analyzed for fulfillment.\(^{81}\)

The opposition parties continued to experience fulfillment difficulties. While maintaining the party’s promotion of ecological protections through taxes, the Greens also supported more tax increases on higher individual earnings. For example, the Greens pledged \textit{to increase the top tax rates to 45%}. However, this pledge was not fulfilled.

There were other pledges that gained agreement among the opposition. Both the Greens and Linke.PDS continued to support the Tobin Tax, while the Greens and FDP rejected an increase in the VAT. In of the cases, the Greens, Linke.PDS, and FDP were unsuccessful as the Tobin Tax was not passed during Merkel I. Moreover, Merkel I passed legislation to increase the VAT to 19%, over the objections of the Greens. Additionally, some of the pledges made by the FDP were pledges that would have found difficulty in amassing enough parliamentary and popular support to push through. For instance, the FDP pledged \textit{to repeal the Tax Class V (Steuerklasse V) and tax brackets with flat tax rates of 15, 25 and 35% on incomes over 7,000}\(^{81}\)}
Euros. The Linke.PDS advocated policies that promised to increase the top tax rate to 50% on incomes of 60,000 Euros and above. The Linke.PDS wanted to win the support of the German left political electorate that rejected Schröder’s economic policies. These policies appeared to be targeting that segment of the electorate with these pledges.

i. Merkel I Results: Government Parties’ Results

Table 4.7 presents the economic pledge fulfillment results for Merkel I. Table 4.7 shows that the Merkel I governing parties are able to fulfill more of their economic pledges than the opposition, but the results are lower than the Schröder II governing parties’ results. As a governing party, the Christian Democrats made 46 economic pledges, of which 57% were at least partially fulfilled. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, performed better than the CDU/CSU by at least partially fulfilling 67% of their economic pledges. The Merkel I government at least partially fulfilled 60% of their pledges.

The SPD performed better than the CDU/CSU because the party controlled the Ministry of Finance, which is in the most important position for the budget. Most of both parties’ economic pledges were tax and finance pledges -- something that would fall under the Ministry’s purview. By the virtue of ministerial control, the SPD was able to control tax and financing policy formation. An example of the SPD using its ministerial influence to affect policy in positive ways for the party is seen in the inheritance tax discussion. In 2005, the CDU/CSU had wanted no raise in the tax. On the other hand, the SPD called for an increase from 1.8% to 2.0%. The tax was raised with the passage of the German Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009 (January 19, 2009).

---

82 The Tax Class V (Steuerklasse V), is a tax bracket that married couples with low incomes. In this case, the spouse with the lowest income is placed in the Tax Class V, if the second spouse is placed in Tax Class III.
Table 4.7: Pledge Fulfillment for Economic Pledges, 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When we compare the results with those of the Schröder II government, we see a noticeable drop in fulfillment success. Whereas the SPD and Greens at least partially fulfilled 73% and 67% of their economic pledges, the Merkel I governing parties’ results were 6% to 10% lower. The Merkel I governing parties together at least partially fulfilled 60% of pledges, compared to 70% for Schröder II. During Merkel I, the CDU/CSU achieved only partial fulfillment for 22% of their economic pledges and the SPD 38% of theirs. Looking at Schröder II, the SPD and the Greens had fewer partially fulfilled pledges, i.e., more that were completely fulfilled.

These results reflect the nature of grand coalition governance. Since there is not a single dominant party, as is expected in normal coalitions, neither party could realistically dictate the course of legislation alone. More compromise is likely to be necessary in a grand coalition, and this is reflected in the results here. In fact, the Schröder II governing parties together completely fulfilled 57% of their pledges, while for the Merkel I parties the figure only 33%.

Merkel and her Social Democratic governing partners recognized the need to continue the reforms started by Schröder, but Merkel was not capable of pursing more aggressive pro-business economic policies as she was constrained by the SPD (Gathani November 18, 2005 and Böttcher and Deutsch September 27, 2007, 2). A year after Merkel took office, the German economy appeared to be on the rebound, with lower unemployment numbers and a rising GDP (Böttcher and Deutsch September 27, 2007).

ii. Merkel I Results: Opposition Parties’ Results

Whereas the governing parties experienced a reduction of pledge fulfillment under Merkel I because of the grand coalition, this very same system of governance allowed for better opposition fulfillment results as compared to Schröder II. Both the Greens and FDP had
identical fulfillment results. The Greens at least partially fulfilled 44% of their economic pledges and the FDP at least partially fulfilled 44% of their economic pledges. The Linke.PDS at least partially fulfilled only 22% of their pledges. The opposition as a whole at least partially fulfilled 39% economic pledges.

With the exception of the Linke.PDS, the Merkel I opposition performed individually better than the Schröder II opposition. Even as a group, the Merkel I opposition performed better. As part of the Merkel I opposition, the Greens and FDP were tied with the results of the CDU/CSU as an opposition, which was the best performing opposition party under Schröder II. In the FDP’s case, the party improved upon its own Schröder II results by 16 percentage points. The Linke.PDS experienced a slight decline from Schröder II, from 25% to 22%, but made more economic pledges in 2005 (14) than 2002 (8).

5. Summary

In this chapter, I explored the institutional process of establishing finance and tax policies and the method the German constitutional system requires consent from both the Bundestag and Bundesrat on budgetary matters, i.e., finances and taxes, before the budget becomes law. As seen in this chapter, the Bundesrat has in the past presented itself as a veto point in the area of tax policies. Additionally, this chapter has explored the historical development of the postwar German economy, along with the effects of reunification and the massive reconstruction obligations the German government assumed after 1990; and how recent German governments attempted to revitalize the slumping German economy.

It is notable that the SPD fulfills almost the same percentage of its pledges in the two periods (73% in government with the Greens, 67% with the CDU/CSU). Thus, changing from a partner to its left (the Greens) to a partner on the right who are normally considered their primary
opponent (CSU/CDU) does not matter much for overall SPD fulfillment. It is possible, though, that it matters for substance – i.e., pledge fulfillment might have been similar in 2005-2009 had the SPD continued in government with the Greens, but what would have been done might have been different.

On the other hand, if the Greens had remained in government in 2005, it is conceivable that the SPD would have experienced more difficulties in fulfilling their economic pledges, as the Greens appeared to oppose further economic reforms. We saw in 2005 that the Greens expressed concern that the economic reforms were benefiting only the upper class at the expense of the lower classes. The Greens sought to reign in these reforms. For example, under Schröder II, the upper tax rates were lowered to 42% from 53%. In 2005, the Greens supported raising upper tax rates, while the SPD was opposed, and the rates were not raised under Merkel I.

In other economic policy areas, it is difficult to claim there would have been much difference, if the Greens remained in government. For example, we see agreement among the legislative parties on financing of eastern Germany reconstruction through the Solidarity Pact II program. There was general agreement among the parties that the financing of this program was a major policy initiative. We also see that the parties supported the reduction of the lower tax rates.

When we look at the addition of the Christian Democrats, we see that they and the SPD held similar economic policies (See Appendix Table 1). This level of agreement helped the government achieve additional economic reforms. However, the CDU/CSU and SPD did have direct disagreement that affected pledge fulfillment. First, the SPD was successful in raising the inheritance tax, over the objections of the CDU/CSU. Second, the CDU/CSI was effective in opposing both the SPD’s and Greens’ support to end subsidies, particularly in coal and airport
subsidies, as both subsidies remained unchanged. Overall, there was strong agreement between the Merkel I governing parties.

Finally, this chapter has presented fulfillment results for the economic pledges made by the legislative parties. The results show that the governing parties at least partially fulfilled their economic pledges at higher rates than the opposition. The Schröder II government performed better than the Merkel I government, but the Merkel I government had higher fulfillment rates.

In the next chapter, I will explore the social welfare policies of Germany. Germany is known for its strong welfare system, being the first country to introduce such legislation in the late 1800s. The system was further developed and expanded over the next 100 years. The concept of a social welfare system is even enshrined in the economic philosophy of Germany, in the social market economy. The next chapter will show that after a long and strong period of expansionism of social welfare policies recent governments, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic, have tended to support retrenchment, or reductions, of social welfare policies and benefits.
CHAPTER FIVE
SOCIAL WELFARE PLEDGES

Germany’s social welfare system has been praised as a strong model of social responsibility that seeks to reduce poverty, and to provide unemployment protections and access to high quality health care and to an advanced education system. The German state was the first state to provide direct social welfare benefits to its people. This system, first developed under Bismarck in the 1880s, is called the *Sozialstaat*.

Modest at first, the *Sozialstaat* under Bismarck and successive governments created expanded protective programs from government mandated health coverage to unemployment insurance. Future entitlements expanded to include free education, health care, etc. So important was the social welfare state to the Germans that the postwar German government enshrined the *Sozialstaat* concept within its constitution as one of the pillars of German governance. The constitution recognizes Germany’s “democratic and social federal” existence, while requiring the state to harmonize its laws to this basic concept. As discussed in the previous chapter, the “social market economy” concept of postwar Germany merged economics and social protections. It charges the government with the task of providing social protections for those individuals who have not benefited from market economic forces.

The importance of the *Sozialstaat* to the German state and individual citizen can be expressed by the high percentage of Germany’s GDP that is dedicated to the social welfare programs. Nearly one-third of the German GDP is dedicated to financing these programs (Siebert March 2003, 31 and Sommer-Guist November 2008). Financing of these programs by
the German state was generally stable. However, two economic issues challenged this. First, the reunification of Germany in 1990 placed strains on the German government with an addition of ten million new potential recipients (Hassel 2010, 102). Second, poor national economic growth during the 1990s and the 2000s placed strains on the German government’s financial ability to meet its social security obligations, resulting in an environment of retrenchment of the Sozialstaat.

This chapter examines the Sozialstaat and how social welfare pledges are formed. This chapter will first examine the historical development of the Sozialstaat and the reforms that subsequent German governments have used. Second, this chapter will examine the social welfare pledges made by all legislative parties in 2002 and 2005. Finally, this chapter will present the pledge fulfillment results of the Schröder II and Merkel I governments.

1. What is the Sozialstaat?

The Sozialstaat (the social state) principle states that a government aspires in its actions to protect social security and social justice in order to ensure the participation of all in social and political developments (Soziale Stadt.de). As part of this principle, the totality of government institutions and control measures and standards are used to achieve the objective of the Sozialstaat to mitigate risks in life and social outcomes as much as possible (Soziale Stadt.de) and BMWi). The state, therefore, is constitutionally mandated to preserve the social equality of Germany, which is accomplished through social policies. The Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend (BMFSFJ) is responsible for the formation of the development of policies on the family, seniors, women and the youth.

---

83 “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.” From the Grundgesetz: Artikel 20 Absatz 1 GG.
2. Social Welfare Policies in Germany

Social welfare policies in Germany have five main areas of focus. These areas include family and childcare, poverty alleviation, health care, labor and education. Administratively, the German social welfare system is a decentralized system with multiple institutions and actors, all of which are involved in social welfare programs. German governments give a combination of tax credits and benefits to recipients, and use a combination of means-tested and universal benefits approaches. The distribution of benefits is administered by national agencies and independent organizations, such as the Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen (AOK), the Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK), and the Innungskrankenkassen (IKK), which administer the sickness funds (Siebert March 2003).

These social welfare programs have provided Germans with some of the highest levels of protections and assistance in the world. The importance that Germans and their government place on social security is expressed in several ways. First, social protections are a requirement of the German constitution. Second, the amount of government expenditures dedicated to social welfare programs are more than 30% of Germany’s GDP.

Social welfare programs account for 27.4% of the GDP without expenditures on education or 33.2% of the GDP with education expenditures included (BMAS and Sommer-Guist November 2008). Contributions to the welfare system are financed by income taxes and additional state payments for some benefits (BMAS, Siebert March 2003 and Sommer-Guist November 2008), as well as employer and employee contributions.

---

84 For example, the Chancellor, the Federal Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economics, along with the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth or the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs work together to establish social welfare guidelines and policies. However, in the case of education, the administration is controlled by the German states.
Since the 1970s and unification in 1990, in order to keep the social welfare system financially healthy, the focus of German governments has been on cost reductions. Increased unemployment in the east and decreased economic growth have placed financial strains on the ability of the German government to continue to meet its obligations (Siebert March 2003, 1). Increasing budget deficits during the 1990s to the present have often led to the violation of the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact requirement that budget deficits be below 3% of GDP (Deutsche Welle (3) May 5, 2003 and BBC June 30, 2003). Since 2000, Germany has spent in excess of 700 billion Euros per year on social welfare programs (BMAS and Sommer-Guist November 2008).

According to the German Federal Ministry for Work and Social, roughly 40% of one’s income is dedicated to financing these social welfare programs (BMAS and Siebert March 2003, 31). Contributions, Beiträge, to four principle social insurance schemes are equally paid by both employees and employers, approximately 26.5% from each. The federal government contributes 25% to the total financing of the social welfare programs through income taxes and other non-payroll taxes (BMAS and Sommer-Guist November 2008). The German states and communities contribute 10.4% and 9.3% respectively (BMAS and Sommer-Guist November 2008). The remainder is contributed by private organizations and insurance schemes.

3. The Development of the Sozialstaat after Bismarck

The emergence of the German welfare state can be traced back to the policies of the Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s, which became the basis of the modern Sozialstaat of today (Orlow 1999, 26). These first social welfare policies covered retirement

---

85 In 2007 alone, expenditures on social welfare programs topped 707 billion Euros, or 29% of the GDP (BMAS and Sommer-Guist November 2008).
86 Rentenversicherung (Pension insurance), Arbeitslosenversicherung (Unemployment insurance), Krankenversicherung (Health insurance), and Pflegeversicherung (Nursing care insurance).
pensions, medical care, unemployment insurance and accident insurance as a government response to the declining economic conditions in Germany of the late 1880s (Orlow 1999, 22-23). As part of its *Sozialpolitik*, social policies, the Weimar Republic introduced compulsory unemployment insurance in 1927 to protect workers during the world depression (Orlow 1999, 133-135).

a. West Germany’s *Sozialstaat*, 1949 - 1990

Social welfare policies in West Germany remained mostly in place as enacted before the war. The West German government over the next few decades expanded some aspects of social welfare policies but did not radically change them. The West German government also sought other methods to secure the social security of Germans. In the area of pension reforms, the West German government was particularly active.

Starting in 1957, the West German government began introducing pension reforms, with the passage of the *Rentenreformgesetz*. The new law introduced a pay-as-you-go financing scheme and pension benefits were determined by the amount of gross wages of employees (Siebert March 2003, 4 and 25). The retirement age was set at 65 (Büro gegen Altersdiskriminierung, January 1, 2001). In 1972, the Willi Brandt government modified the pension law with a decrease of the retirement age to sixty-three (Büro gegen Altersdiskriminierung, January 1, 2001 and Siebert March 2003, 26).

However, cost control became the focus of the West German government after the late 1970s. In the area of health care, rising costs were a particular concern. In 1977, the Schmidt government introduced the Health Care Cost Containment Act. The system established tighter reimbursement restrictions on the regional sickness funds in which physicians bill the regional physicians’ association for compensation, which in turn bill the regional sickness fund for
reimbursement (Henke et. al. 1994, 9). In 1986, the Kohl government introduced annual spending caps to the regional sickness funds (Siebert March 2003 and Henke et. al. 1994).

b. East Germany’s *Sozialpolitik*, 1949 - 1990

Under the communist system in East Germany, the government was more heavily involved in creating a socialist society, rather than the West German *Sozialstaat* concept. Mostly, private economic production, labor unions and social welfare implementation were controlled by the government (Orlow 1999). Government subsidies for housing and food were high, and education policies were centrally controlled and heavily influenced by Marxism-Leninism (Orlow 1999, 279).

c. The *Sozialstaat* After Reunification, 1990 - 2002

With the absorption of East Germany in 1990, the economic and social welfare systems of West Germany were extended to the eastern states. Regional economic problems and increased unemployment in the unified Germany created strains on the German government’s ability to create sustained economic growth while providing high levels of social-welfare protections. Over the following decade after reunification, reforms to social welfare have sought ways to reduce costs to the government, such as increased copayments for health care services or tuition to attend state universities (Burgermeister 2003, Deutsche Welle April 18, 2003 and July 24, 2003, and Busse and Riesberg 2004).

Under Kohl, the German government continued to focus on rising health care costs. In 1989, the Kohl government passed a new Health Care Reform Act. The Act increased regulations on prescriptions and drug costs, called for more coordination of outpatient and inpatient care, more autonomy for the Sickness Fund Accounts (*Krankenkassen*), and allowed for the implementation of fee for services (Vail 2010, 131-135). In 1992, the Kohl government

---

87 Wages earned in the East are up to 33% lower than in western Germany (Bild.de).
readdressed rising health care costs by placing physician expenditures caps, with financial penalties for exceeding the cap was passed (Vail 2010). Kohl also introduced further increases on medication restrictions, reduced drug costs and “linked payroll contributions to payments to doctors” (Vail 2010, 132). The reforms to rein in costs were met with mixed success as costs increased, but at slower rates.

When Schröder took office in 1998, the government implemented further reforms to the pension schemes and health care. In 2000, the Schröder I government reduced pension benefits to 67% of a worker’s income (Vail 2010). The Schröder I government also introduced subsidies to the pension schemes of low-income workers, capped contribution rates to a maximum of 22%, and created voluntary, supplemental pension schemes (Vail 2010, 132-136).


We have seen that reform of social welfare programs was a priority in the years prior to 2002. Not surprisingly, these issues continued to be a significant part of all parties’ agendas in 2002 and 2005. Social welfare policies comprised a significant portion of pledges made by the legislative parties. Table 3.2 shows the percentage of pledges dedicated by policy area. In 2002, SPD dedicated nearly 52% of their manifesto to social welfare pledges, while the Greens dedicated approximately 34%. The 2002 remaining legislative parties dedicated the following percentages: CDU/CSU, 22%, FDP, 31%, and PDS, 36%, of their manifestos to social welfare pledges. In 2005, the CDU/CSU dedicated 24% of their manifesto to social welfare pledges. The SPD, in turn, dedicated 44% of theirs to social welfare pledges. The remaining parties dedicated 20%, Greens; 27%, FDP; and 34%, Linke.PDS, to social welfare pledges.

Table 5.1 shows that overwhelmingly change pledges dominated the types of pledges the legislative parties made in 2002 and 2005. As with economic pledges, the legislative parties in
Table 5.1: Number and Types of Social Welfare Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD*</th>
<th>SPD*</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>CDU/CSU*</th>
<th>Greens*</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>Linke.PDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status Quo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL PLEDGES</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2002 and 2005 were consistent in pledging change to social welfare policies as the lowest percentage of change pledges observed was from the SPD in 2005 with 84% of their pledges called for changes, which is a slight decrease from their 2002 percentage of 91%. Among the Greens, we also observe similar rates as 94% of their 2002 and 89% of their 2005 social welfare pledges advocated changes. This trend is similar to economic pledges and can be explained in similar ways: the SPD and Greens felt that reforms were producing the desired outcomes and were protecting their reforms from excessive reforms that a potential CDU/CSU and FDP government could introduce.

Change pledges by the Christian Democrats, FDP, and Linke.PDS remained consistently high in both periods. As discussed in Chapter Four, it is not surprising that as opposition parties they would find fault with the government’s policies. The percentage of change pledges from each of the parties’ manifestos were in the high 80s to 100%. For 2002 and 2005, the Christian Democrats’ pledges contained 100% and 89% change pledges, respectively, while the FDP issued 87% and 91% change pledges, respectively. In 2002 and 2005, the Linke.PDS’ pledges contained 93% and 88% change pledges.

a. Schröder II: 2002 - 2005

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide examples of social welfare pledges made by the legislative parties in 2002. The SPD sought to increase the overall quality and care of the German health care system, while providing greater bureaucratic freedoms for doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers (Woerz and Busse 2002). The SPD pledged to make the system more cost efficient, while maintaining access to quality care, and providing more contractual freedom for doctors, hospitals and other providers, and the health insurance companies. These pledges were found to have been fulfilled as the Schröder II government introduced reforms that introduced
cost cutting measures. The government required patient co-payments for doctor and hospital visits and required supplemental health insurance (Vail 2010, 132). Private insurances received “per diem sickness benefits” and reduce the government’s contribution health care (Vail 2010, 132).

The SPD also pledged to protect and promote the family and gender equality. The SPD made pledges that combined tax policies and direct child payments to families. For instance, the party pledged to raise direct child payments to 200€. This pledge was considered fulfilled as the Schröder II government agreed to raise payments to 240€, surpassing their original stance. In the area of gender equality, the party pledged that at least once during the legislative period that the Chancellor would make a statement on the situation on gender equality (Regierungserklärung zur Lage der Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen in Deutschland). This pledge was fulfilled on October 29, 2003. To further the careers of mothers, both Schröder II and Merkel I governments pledged to increase the number of and access to all-day daycares. Ultimately, neither government was successful.

Tax policies were used by the government to encourage married couples to have larger families, while giving generous family-based assistance through services or financial aid.

Education has been challenged by poor results on international standardized exams (The Programme for International Student Assessment, or PISA) and rising operational costs have been the focus. (Bulmahn 2002, BMBF March 10, 2005, BMBF July 7, 2007, PISA, and Die Frankfurter Allgemeine December 4, 2001).

88 German law does allow fathers to remain home to look after the children, but since males continue to earn more than women, on average, it is more common for mothers to remain home. Currently, public daycare services typically close by 2:30 PM and there is limited availability for children, which requires rationing of places, with guaranteed placement for children age 3 and over. The earlier closing times, as compared to American daycares and rationing of places have a depressing effect on the career choices of women. There are private daycares, of course, but there are a limited number available and families must pay directly out of pocket. Successive German governments have sought solutions to increase the number of available daycare spots (Deutsche Welle July 21, 2004).
### Table 5.2 Social Welfare Policy Pledges and their Outcome: Schröder II Governing Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explanation:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Increased child stipends to 200€.</td>
<td>Child stipends were raised to 240€/child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Present annual report on gender equality called, “Government Statement on the Situation of Equality between Men and Women in Germany”</td>
<td>Chancellor Schröder gave a speech before the Bundestag on October 29, 2002 titled, &quot;Gerechtigkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung schaffen - für eine Partnerschaft in Verantwortung&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Promised to keep all universities tuition free.</td>
<td>Education policies, including tuitions, are controlled by the states. This position was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on January 26, 2005, after which, several states began to charge limited tuitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejected decreases in unemployment benefits.</td>
<td>Agenda 2010 through Hartz IV reduced benefits: unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and the welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe) were combined. Payout of benefits were calculated to be at the lower end of monetary assistance. Plus, the length of time to draw from the benefits was shortened from 36 months to 12 months. Altogether, this pledge was considered unfulfilled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pledge</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td>Pledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjust state social security benefits for employees working more than 20 weeks and earn between 401 Euros and 800 Euros.</td>
<td>Part of Agenda 2010/Hartz Reforms with the law “Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt” came into effect January 1, 2003.</td>
<td>Outlaw of human cloning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care reforms</td>
<td>Agenda 2010 reforms</td>
<td>Create an Education Test Foundation (Stiftung Bildungstest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No observed change here.</td>
<td>Elimination of school districts (Schulbezirke).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace state child benefits (Kindergeld) and childcare scheme (Erziehungsgeld) with family-benefits (Familiengeld) scheme.</td>
<td>Daycares typically close at approximately 2:30PM.</td>
<td>Unemployment benefits are not to begin before the 6th month of unemployment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The SPD was not as successful in other areas. As with cost control of health care, state
governments were concerned over the long-term viability of tuition-free universities. In
response, several states moved to impose tuition (Studiengebühren) charges to offset costs. The
SPD, however, wanted to keep universities tuition free and in 2003 moved to prevent tuitions
from being imposed, prompting several states to sue the federal government on constitutional
grounds. On January 26, 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the states, allowing
states to impose tuition. In this one instance, this was a relatively rare case where judicial review
did act as a veto point, limiting pledge fulfillment. Lastly, the SPD also promised not to reduce
unemployment benefits through the reforms. However, the Agenda 2010 reforms had the
opposite result as unemployment benefits were limited to 12 months instead of 36 months, with
lower monetary support distributed through Arbeitslosengeld II.

The Greens expressed concern for gender equality. They supported the Gender
Mainstreaming concept, started in 1999, to eliminate sexism and promote women’s issues in
German society and government. They also pledged to end gender discrimination at the federal
administrative level and to create a Gender Competence Center (GenderKompotenzZentrum),
that would be engaged in anti-discrimination politics and promote diversity. In each case, these
pledges were considered fulfilled. The Schröder II government continued to end gender
discrimination through the “Modern State – Modern Administration” program. The
GenderCompetenceCenter was created at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 2003, in
accordance with the Greens’ pledge.

However, the Greens were not successful in every area of gender equality. They pledged
to enact an equality law for the private sector, and to establish clearly defined skill requirements
for job openings so that women are not discriminated against. In each case, no evidence was found that showed action was made on these pledges.

There was a degree of consensus between the Greens and the Social Democrats concerning education and health care policies. The Greens pledged to keep the government funded Federal Education and Trainings Assistance Act, the BAföG (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz), as the primary source of funding for low-income college students. The Greens, like the SPD, were opposed to university tuitions. The Greens also supported free day cares and the creation of a women’s college to promote women’s education and issues. In the former case, the pledge was considered fulfilled as the BAföG was not eliminated. In the latter two cases, the pledges were considered unfulfilled as parents still pay a quarterly fee for day cares and no such evidence of a college solely dedicated to women’s education and issues was found. The Greens sought the adoption of EU psychotherapeutic standards; no evidence was found of this occurring.

The right-of-center opposition parties were mainly united in calling for greater reforms. The Christian Democrats supported the reduction of government expenses attributed to the maintenance of the social welfare system. In addition, they sought to place greater emphasis on individual responsibility for financing, e.g., contributions to the sickness funds and copayments for medical treatments. They also advocated organizational changes and consolidation of the various illness insurance schemes. These pledges were considered fulfilled because the Schröder II government passed in October 2003, the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act.

However, the Christian Democrats did not advocate spending reductions in all areas of social welfare policy. They proposed increasing the monetary assistance to families with children from 325 Euros to 400 Euros per month and reducing the social security contributions
for part time workers earning between 401 and 800 Euros. These pledges were fulfilled with the passage of the Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt as part of the Agenda 2010/Hartz Reforms.

The CDU/CSU was unable fulfill other pledges. They pledged to create adequate all-day childcare centers for all children. This pledge was considered unfulfilled because Germany continuously suffers from daycare shortages. The Christian Democrats also pledged to gradually eliminate the government child benefits (Kindergeld) and childcare scheme (Erziehungsgeld) family assistance programs. These programs would be replaced by a family assistance (Familiengeld) program. These pledges were considered unfulfilled as neither of these programs were eliminated and replaced, nor were they consolidated into the family assistance program.

The FDP, on the other hand, wanted further changes and reforms, as discussed in Chapter Four. They wanted to reduce the individual monetary contributions to the social welfare system to under 40% of one’s income. This pledge was considered partially fulfilled as contribution rates dropped from approximately 45% to 41% in 2005. The FDP was also successful in two other areas. The party pledged to prevent the legalization of human cloning for medical purposes; human cloning continues to be illegal in Germany. The FDP also pledged to create an Education Test Foundation (Stiftung Bildungstest) to monitor students’ academic progress. This pledge was fulfilled as the foundation was created by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung) in 2003.

The FDP did fail to fulfill some of their pledges. Such examples are found in their unemployment and education pledges. They wanted to delay distribution of unemployment compensation for six months upon employment termination. However, the law allowed for immediate dispensation of benefits in such cases. In education, the party sought to eliminate
school districts (*Schulbezirke*), start school at the age of 5, and create national education standards. Each of these pledges was found to be unfulfilled.

In contrast to the pledges of the governing and other opposition parties, the PDS called for greater expansions of the social welfare system. They wanted to introduce a minimum-wage structure while reducing the work week to a maximum of 40 hours. Here the party met with mixed success. First, the promotion of minimum wages by the PDS never materialized, as employment is conducted through contracts that determine the salary amount. Because of this, this pledge was considered unfulfilled. The second pledge was considered to be partially fulfilled. Work contracts that employees sign typically start overtime at 35hrs/week, however, many employees work well beyond 40 hours/week.

In agreement with the Greens and Social Democrats on gender equality in the workplace and in society, i.e., workplace gender quotas, the PDS also called for legislation that would establish mandatory quotas for female candidates on election ballots. In this case, the PDS was taking as an example France’s push to create greater female representation by requiring female candidate quotas. This pledge was found unfulfilled at the time because the main political parties already had, as part of the parties’ rules on candidates, requirements for candidate gender representation. The PDS also pushed for a gender equality law (*Gleichstellungsgesetz*) that required gender employment quotas and was passed in 2006. This pledge was unfulfilled because the bill was passed after the conclusion of the Schröder II government.

89 The Greens (1985/1990) were the first to adopt a party rule, followed by the SPD (1988), the PDS (1991), and the CDU (1996), with the Bavarian CSU using non-binding guidelines (Davidson-Schmich 2006 and Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2008). The FDP does not have a mandatory rule (Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2008). This pledge was considered unfulfilled because the intent of these parties was to make the gender quota for candidates a legal requirement for all political parties and the government did not pass any corresponding legislation.
i. Schröder II Results: Government Parties’ Results

Under Schröder II, the government parties enjoyed very strong pledge fulfillment for social welfare pledges. Table 5.4 shows that the SPD at least partially fulfilled 64% of their social welfare pledges. Additionally, the Greens as the junior governing partner at least partially fulfilled 59% of their social welfare pledges. Thus, the Schröder II government as a whole at least partially fulfilled 62% of its pledges. When we compare these results with those for economic policy (Table 4.4), we see that the parties had a noticeably higher fulfillment advantage for economic pledges, 70% for the government as a whole.

As with economic policy, the Greens were not far off from the SPD’s performance, which seems to suggest that the SPD were not the overly dominating senior partner. As the senior partner, the party had nearly three times the number of parliamentarians than the Greens; however, if the SPD had attempted to govern in a heavy-handed manner at the expense of their partners, the Greens would have certainly abandoned the government.

The Greens remained supportive of the coalition and worked within the system instead of against it when policies they disliked were under consideration. In the area of health care, both parties recognized that reforms to the system were necessary to reduce costs, but both wanted to protect the most vulnerable.

ii. Schröder II Results: Opposition Parties’ Results

Table 5.4 shows that the opposition parties did not fare as well as the government, which was to be expected. The CDU/CSU at least partially fulfilled 50% of its social welfare pledges, the FDP 47%, and the PDS 36% of their pledges. As compared to the results in Table 4.4, overall performance was slightly better than that for economic pledges; the only major difference is that the PDS made nearly twice as many social welfare pledges than economic pledges. The results continue to indicate that a reformist strain existed among the parties.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>57% (40)</td>
<td>55% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>7% (5)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>64% (45)</td>
<td>59% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>36% (25)</td>
<td>41% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (70)</td>
<td>100% (51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas the CDU/CSU and FDP were closer to the government’s position of retrenchment reforms and benefited from that, the PDS was not interested in retrenchment, but rather in expansion of the social welfare system. The PDS did manage to partially fulfill four pledges. These partially fulfilled pledges covered topics of expansion of government child payments (Erziehungsgeld), elimination of poverty among the elderly (Altersarmutsfest), and adjustments to the “Equal Work for Equal Pay” (Gleiche Beiträge – Gleiche Leistungen) law to make it easier for mothers to return to the work force.


Going into the 2005 Federal Elections, concerns over reforms of the social welfare system would continue to dominate the legislative parties’ policies on social welfare. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present examples of pledges issued by the legislative parties for the 2005 federal elections. The Christian Democrats continued to promote changes to health care, education, and the labor market, and their pledges often used terms like “competition,” “simplification,” cost-cutting and “optimization” to describe the effects of proposed reforms.

In the policy area of health care reforms, the Christian Democrats were successful in passing most of their pledges. The party pledged to maintain an effective health care system that would cover everyone, paid for by increased employer and employee contributions to the sickness funds, while introducing stronger competition among the service providers. The party sought, as part of the cost-cutting efforts, employer and employee contributions to a newly established health care premium. These pledges were considered at least partially fulfilled because the Merkel I government passed the Health Care Reform Act on October 25, 2006 which provided for these provisions.

In other areas of social welfare policy, the party continued to perform well in fulfilling
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes or Partial</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explanation:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pledge:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Islamic religious education in German in German schools.</td>
<td>Considered partially fulfilled as some states have not allowed Islamic education in their schools due to a lack of qualified teachers.</td>
<td>Maintain religious education in public schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require all, wealthy, government bureaucrats, independents, and politicians to be insured.</td>
<td>In the past, these groups were exempted from joining. 2007 Health Care Reforms (<em>Gesundheitsreformen</em> 2007) requires all to have health insurance.</td>
<td>Use part time employment for child rearing and care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote tuition-free universities.</td>
<td>As in 2002, the SPD promoted tuition-free universities. Several conservative-led states imposed tuitions.</td>
<td>Wants to abolish the <em>Ich-AG</em> (Me, Inc.) from Hartz II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of 230,000 daycare and nursery positions by 2010.</td>
<td>No observed evidence</td>
<td>Monthly 50 euro child bonus starting January 1, 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pledge:</td>
<td>Explanation:</td>
<td>Pledge:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes or Partial</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support new law creating minimum working conditions for employees.</td>
<td>Law passed on April 20, 2009 - Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG)</td>
<td>Rejects contribution pension rates increase to 22% and keep rates at 19%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Heroin Project (Heroinprojekt).</td>
<td>Government distribution of heroin with clean needles to users. Cities like Bonn, Hamburg, and Frankfurt had distribution programs.</td>
<td>End the Center for Contracting of Student Positions (Zentrale Vergabestelle für Studienplätze – ZVS) by May 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Immediate implementation of equal pay for equal work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still disparities in the earning power of males and females.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allow therapeutic cloning, e.g. culture heart muscle cells, liver or nerves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported the creation of the Foundation for Occupational Education (Stiftung für betriebliche Bildung)</td>
<td>Observed no action.</td>
<td>Reduce unemployment benefits by 30% if recipient rejects work and a further 30% for each additional rejection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their pledges. Echoing the PDS’ call for a gender equality law (Gleichstellungsgesetz), the CDU/CSU pledged to pass similar legislation. This pledge was considered as fulfilled as the gender equality law was passed in 2006. In the area of education, the party pledged to maintain religious education as part of the public school curriculum. German law also provides avenues for students/parents who object to religious education to take a replacement course, i.e., ethics. Those who participate generally take religious classes according to their declared denomination. This status quo pledge was considered fulfilled as religious education is still available in public schools.

In the labor market, the CDU/CSU was partially successful in fulfilling their pledge to reduce the termination protections, particularly for new hires, which reflected the FDP’s position in 2002, i.e., suspend the law for new employees who were employed by companies of up to 20 employees, and provide for a probation period of two years. On March 26, 2008, the Merkel I government amended the Protection Against Termination Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) law to allow for easier termination for businesses with a maximum of 20 workers, however, with probation period of 6 months, rather than two years.

The CDU/CSU had difficulties in other areas. The CDU/CSU pledged to abolish the Ich-Ag program created as part of the Agenda 2010 reforms through the Hartz II provisions in 2003. The program provided financial assistance to startup businesses that were created by unemployed individuals. The Christian Democrats viewed the program as ineffective and a backdoor way for the unemployed to receive additional unemployment benefits. This pledge was not fulfilled as the program remained in place throughout Merkel I.

The party also pledged to provide a monthly 50€ child bonus starting January 1, 2007. The evidence provided shows that the Merkel I government surpassed the pledge and approved
100€ on November 2008 with the passage of the Economic Stimulus Packages I and II (Konjunkturpaketen I und II), which became law on January 1, 2009. However, the pledge was considered unfulfilled because the program started two years later than was originally pledged. The date is a specific date that was not met. If the party had excluded a specific date, then naturally, the pledge would have been considered fulfilled.

The SPD was equally successful in at least partially fulfilling their pledges. In health care, the Social Democrats proposed the elimination of private health insurance as the primary form of coverage, requiring citizens to buy into the sickness fund system. Private insurance, therefore, would be used as supplemental to the sickness fund, if the sickness fund did not fully cover expenses. Additionally, the SPD pledged that the wealthy, government officials, and politicians would be integrated in the solidarity health insurance, all of whom had the option to opt out. Previously, German law allowed for individuals to opt out of buying insurance if the individual fell into one of the targeted categories. This pledge was considered fulfilled with the passage of the Health Care Reform Act (Gesundheitsreformen 2007).

The Social Democrats pledged to increase financing to create all-day school opportunities and to make more spots available for children in kindergarten, nurseries, etc. They pledged to make available 4 billion Euros for the creation of 10,000 new all-day schools by 2008. This pledge was considered partially fulfilled as the government made available 3.2 billion Euros instead of the full 4 billion Euros. The Social Democrats, like the Christian Democrats, were supportive of permitting religious education to remain in primary and secondary education. They pledged that Islamic religious education should be offered in German schools in German. This pledge was considered partially fulfilled because schools do provide for Islamic religious education where qualified Islamic experts, determined by the states, are available.
The SPD had difficulties in fulfilling several pledges. They pledged to create 230,000 additional daycare and nursery spots. The pledge was considered unfulfilled because no evidence was found to support such an increase in availability. Additionally, the political discourse continues to discuss ways to relieve the shortage of available spots.

As in 2002, the SPD continued to support tuition-free universities, which remained unfulfilled. With the ruling from the Constitutional Court the previous January, German states, mostly conservative-led states, continued to impose tuitions. Lastly, the SPD adopted the position of the PDS with regard to promotion of a minimum wage law. This pledge went unfulfilled because there continues to be no legal provision for minimum wages.

Turning to opposition parties, in the area of education and family/child policies, the Greens did not promote radically different pledges, compared to the 2002 manifesto. In education, the party continued to call for an increase in spending. The Greens also supported children continuing to receive free insurance. Both pledges were considered fulfilled. Finally, the Greens supported new legislation establishing minimum working conditions for employees. This pledge was fulfilled when the government passed the *Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz* (AEntG) on April 20, 2009.

In the area of health care, the Greens focused on drug dependency and how to combat addiction. They pledged to continue their support of the 2003 “Action Plan Drugs and Dependency” (*Aktionsplan Drogen und Sucht*) that focused on prevention and treatment. In addition, the Greens promoted the Heroin Project (*Heroinprojekt*), a government sponsored distribution of synthetic heroin to addicts. Both pledges were found to be fulfilled as the Action Plan remained in force, while several cities developed distribution projects.
Examples of pledges the Greens were not able to fulfill come from gender equality and education. In gender equality, the Greens demanded the immediate implementation of equal pay for equal work and easier access to all job areas. This pledge was considered unfulfilled because income disparities still exist between men and women. The Greens pledged to achieve tuition-free daycare spots for the last year before the start of elementary school. This pledge was also unfulfilled as parents continue to pay a quarterly fee for daycare services. Finally, the Greens supported the creation of a Foundation for Occupational Education (Stiftung für betriebliche Bildung). No evidence was found of its existence.

The Liberal Democrats did not advocate radically different pledges than those the party argued for in 2002. The FDP opposed the Schröder II government’s plan to raise pension contribution rates to 22%; they pledged to keep rates at 19%. This pledge was considered partially fulfilled as the contribution rates slightly increased to 19.5% under Merkel I. The party also called for the elimination of the Center for Contracting of Student Positions (Zentrale Vergabestelle für Studienplätze – ZVS) by May 2010, which was responsible for the placement of prospective university students in a university. This pledge was fulfilled as the ZVS was replaced by Foundation for College Entrance (Stiftung für Hochschulzulassung) June 2008 and came into effect May 2010.

The FDP pledged to reduce the time it takes to take the Abitur (graduation exams) to 12 years. This pledge was unfulfilled as the length of the gymnasium system has remained at 13 years. In unemployment reforms, the party continued to take a stricter stance on the duration of unemployment payments. The solution the Liberal Democrats proposed to reduce unemployment was to implement reductions of benefits to recipients who reject job offers. For instance, the FDP pledged that unemployment benefits will be reduced by 30% for the first
rejection of employment and a further 30% for each additional rejections of reasonable work. This pledge was not fulfilled as such penalties were not imposed.

The Linke.PDS Party continued to oppose reforms to the social welfare system. In the 2005 manifesto, the party attacked the Agenda 2010 reforms as being anti-social and a threat to society. The Linke.PDS called for greater labor participation in business matters and greater strike protections. Additionally, the party was vehemently opposed to giving managers stock options as a form of compensation. The party pledged to eliminate the anti-strike paragraph in SGB III and introduce a minimum wage of 1,400€ per month. The Linke.PDS was unable to fulfill these pledges.

In the areas of gender equality and education, the party continued to promote greater female integration in society and in the workplace, while continuing to oppose tuitions. As in 2002, the Linke.PDS called for a gender equality law. This pledge was considered fulfilled as Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz was passed in 2006. In the area of education, the Linke.PDS called for education not to be privatized and rejected college tuitions. The party had mixed success with these two pledges; education has remained under public administration, however, university tuition has been introduced in some states as noted above.

The Linke.PDS was partially successful in raising child benefit and unemployment payments. The party wanted to raise child benefit payments from 154€ to 250€ and unemployment payments to 420€. Both pledges were considered partially fulfilled. The child benefits was raised to 195€ in 2009 and unemployment payments were raised to 345€ in 2007.

i. Merkel I Results: Government Parties’ Results

Table 5.7 shows the fulfillment results of social welfare pledges for the Merkel I governing parties. The CDU/CSU performed better in fulfilling their social welfare pledges than their economic pledge results; they at least partially fulfilled approximately 79% of their pledges,
as compared to 57% for economic policy (Table 4.7). The SPD at least partially fulfilled 66% in Table 5.7 as compared to 67% of their economic pledges (Table 4.7). As a government, Merkel I at least partially fulfilled 71% of all pledges.

In contrast to economic policy, we see that the Christian Democrats performed better than the Social Democrats. Of the three social welfare ministries, the CDU/CSU controlled two of them – the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and the Youth and Ministry of Education and Research. The SPD controlled the Ministry of Health. The majority of social welfare policies are formed within these ministries. There were very few pledges from both parties that were in direct disagreement. However, the debate over tuition-free university education remained an issue. As under Schröder II, the SPD continued to reject tuitions at all universities, while the CDU/CSU supported tuitions. In the end, tuition charges continued to be applied at some universities.\(^90\)

As with economic policy, we see more pledges that are only partially fulfilled in the grand coalition compared to the normal coalition. Whereas the Schröder II governing parties had results of partially fulfilled pledges in the single digits, under Merkel I, the CDU/CSU and SPD had partially fulfilled results in the high thirties and twenties, respectively. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this appears to be the nature of grand coalition governance as neither party is able to dominate the other.

**ii. Merkel I Results: Opposition Parties’ Results**

Table 5.7 also shows the opposition parties’ pledge fulfillment results for social welfare. The Greens at least partially fulfilled 50% of their social welfare pledges and the FPD at least partially fulfilled 36% of theirs. The Linke.PDS at least partially fulfilled 29% of their seven

---

\(^90\) This is one of the few cases where the courts played a role in determining pledge fulfillment. The Constitutional Court ruled that universities must be free to charge tuition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
social welfare pledges. The opposition as a whole at least partially fulfilled approximately 38% of their social welfare pledges.

However, what was an advantage for the Merkel I opposition in fulfilling economic pledges, does not materialize for social welfare pledges. The results show a slight decline in the percentage of pledges fulfilled among the opposition parties as compared to Schröder II in Table 5.4, with the exception of the Greens. The Greens’ results were equal to the Christian Democrats’ under Schröder II. The FDP and Linke.PDS individually performed worse than they did under Schröder II. Of the two, the FDP had the more significant decline in 2005 by 11 percentage points. The Linke.PDS’ 2005 fulfillment rates declined from their 2002 rates, while increasing their total social welfare pledges from 14 to 24.

5. Summary

This chapter presented the development and expansion of the German social welfare systems from the late 1880s to the present. Being the first state to provide an extensive social welfare system to its citizens, Germany’s social welfare system has become the model for many states seeking to provide similar protections. By the early 1970s through the 2000s, German governments sought ways to control rising social welfare costs as economic difficulties have strained the government’s ability to fund social welfare programs (Braunthal 2003, 2 and Hassel 2010, 109-110)

Overall, the pledges made by the legislative parties on social welfare policies in 2002 and 2005 emphasized continued reforms to the Sozialstaat. Reforms to the health care system, worker termination rights, and reforms in education were attempts by the German parties to reduce the government’s obligations, to make German companies more competitive, and to
produce better-educated and trained students for the workforce. These were repeated themes of the legislative parties.

Additionally, these pledges illustrate a political environment that viewed reforms to the social welfare system as important. Despite having disagreements on the scope of the reforms, the political parties generally agreed with the basic premise of reforms, with the exception of the Linke.PDS. The pledges presented in this section reflected the reformist-minded arguments of the parties. The pledges also illustrated the parties’ attention to providing social protections, such as family/child financial assistance.

As with economic policy, we see that if the Greens had remained in government beyond 2005, the fulfillment of the SPD’s social welfare pledges might have been challenged. The SPD wanted further reforms to the system, which the Greens opposed and the Christian Democrats supported. The Greens wanted to halt further reductions. However, there were areas on which the Greens and SPD agreed. For instance, the Greens supported the SPD’s position of maintaining free tuition at all universities; they were ultimately unsuccessful. In other policy areas, it is again doubtful that any one particular governing coalition would have ensured passage. In these cases, any results were mostly out of the control of the government. For example, among the three parties, there was agreement on the need to increase the number of day care positions for children. The SPD proposed an increase of 230,000 additional positions, which never came close to materializing.

This chapter shows that governing parties are better able to fulfill their pledges than opposition parties. We also see that the Merkel I government performed better than the Schröder II government. In the following chapter, I will present the pledge fulfillment results for all remaining policy areas from 2002 and 2005. These remaining policy areas include the policy
areas of civil rights, crime, foreign policy, environment, and, lastly, an umbrella category called “Other.” The Other policy area includes pledges that do not fit any of the previously discussed areas. Pledges that are included in this category include pledges on the German military, sports and the World Cup, bureaucratic reforms, and infrastructural pledges.
CHAPTER SIX
REMAINING POLICY AREAS AND COMPLETE FINDINGS

Chapters Four and Five have presented us with the fulfillment results for the economic and social welfare pledges. This chapter will expand upon the previous two chapters and present the fulfillment results of the remaining policy areas and provide the complete results for both governing periods.

This chapter will evolve in the following ways: First, the chapter will present the results of the relationships of pledges among the parties. Second and third, this chapter will present the complete fulfillment results for Schröder II and Merkel I. Fourth, this chapter will discuss the fulfillment results in relationship to the hypotheses. This chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the findings of this chapter.

1. Remaining Policy Areas Results: Civil Rights, Crime, Environment & “Other” Policy

This section will present the results of the remaining policy areas for 2002 and 2005 not discussed in Chapters Four and Five. This section will be divided into two main parts: first, it will present the results of the 2002 manifestos and, second, present the 2005 results.

The results for all remaining policy areas are shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. All remaining policy areas consist of the following: civil rights (CR), crime, foreign policy (FP), environment (ENV), and “other,” which includes pledges that do not fit in any of the previously mentioned policy areas. Policy areas that are in this category include the following: General, Military, Sports, Federalism, Culture, and Infrastructure.
A distinctive feature of these remaining policy areas is the relatively fewer pledges that each legislative party dedicates to them as compared to economic and social welfare policies, with a few exceptions as noted in Chapter Three. (See Table 3.2 for data on each policy areas as a percentage of total pledges).

a. Schröder II: All Remaining Policy Areas, 2002 - 2005

Table 6.1 presents the results for the Schröder II governing parties. The SPD had very good fulfillment results. None of their fulfillment results of all remaining policy areas were below 50%. The SPD at least partially fulfilled 75% of their civil rights pledges, 60% of their crime pledges, 73% of their foreign policy pledges, 50% of their environmental pledges, and 100% of their pledges classified as other.

In comparison, the Greens had more difficulties in at least partially fulfilling their pledges in these remaining policy areas. As shown in Table 6.1, the Greens were able to at least partially fulfill approximately 58% of their environmental pledges. However, this policy area is the only major fulfillment success the Greens enjoyed. In all other remaining policy areas, the Greens at no time at least partially fulfilled greater than 45% (foreign policy) of their pledges. The Greens fulfilled 28% of their civil rights pledges, 35% of their crime pledges, and 20% of their other pledges.

There was little difference between the government parties’ and the opposition parties’ ability to at least partially fulfill its pledges in all remaining policy areas, with an actual difference of only 3%. The Schröder II government fulfillment results on these policies barely exceeded 50% of pledges. The results are mainly driven by the Greens’ poor showing. The Greens had a significant negative impact on the government’s results as the party at least partially fulfilled only 40% of their 80 pledges in all remaining policy areas, as compared to a smaller number of pledges, 39, for the SPD, which at least partially fulfilled 72% of their
Table 6.1: Pledge Fulfillment for Remaining Policy Areas (Government), 2002-2005\(^{92}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>ENV</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>ENV</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All Policy Areas(^{91})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>38.66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50.42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pledges</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{91}\) Excluding Economic and Social Welfare pledges.
\(^{92}\) CR = Civil Rights; FP = Foreign Policy; ENV = Environment/Natural Resources
pledges. The SPD did significantly better than the Greens, in all policy areas except environment in which the Greens have a slight advantage. The gap is largest on “other” pledges.

The Greens did not fulfill pledges that promised to lower the voting age to 16, eliminate airport security procedures, and end the obligatory military service. Obligatory military service remained in place during Schröder II, and was eventually eliminated in 2010.

Table 6.2 shows the results for the Schröder II opposition parties. Starting first with the Christian Democrats, we see that the CDU/CSU had the best fulfillment results of the opposition parties -- even better than the Greens. The CDU/CSU at least partially fulfilled 67% of their civil rights pledges and foreign policy pledges, 75% of their crime pledges, 50% of their environmental pledges, and 55% of pledges classified as other. Moreover, Table 6.2 shows that the Christian Democrats made 20 pledges in the policy area of crime, however, in no other policy area did the party exceed 11 pledges (other).

The FDP and the PDS each performed very poorly in fulfilling their remaining policy area pledges as compared to the governing parties and the CDU/CSU. Table 6.2 shows that the FDP at least partially fulfilled 33% of their crime and foreign policy pledges, and approximately 29% of their other pledges. In two policy areas, the FDP failed to achieve any level of fulfillment, civil rights (0%) and environmental (0%); however, very few pledges were made in these areas. In only one policy area did the FDP issue more than 9 pledges: “other,” with 21 pledges. However, we need to keep in mind that the policy area of other is the agglomeration of numerous unrelated policy areas that did not fit in any of the policy areas.

The PDS in 2002 made by far the fewest pledges of all the legislative parties. However, the party still performed well for an opposition party in all remaining policy areas. As Table 6.2 shows, the PDS made 17 pledges, which is roughly half of the total number of pledges each of
### Table 6.2: Pledge Fulfillment for Remaining Policy Areas (Opposition), 2002-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>Opposition Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>ENV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>67% (2)</td>
<td>60% (12)</td>
<td>50% (3)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>15% (3)</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>50% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>33% (1)</td>
<td>25% (5)</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>50% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pledges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

93 CR = Civil Rights; FP = Foreign Policy; ENV = Environment/Natural Resources
94 Excluding Economic and Social Welfare pledges.
the other legislative parties made, with the exception of the Greens who made 80 pledges. The PDS at least partially fulfilled 25% of their civil rights pledges, 67% of their crime pledges, and 50% of their other pledges. In the policy area of foreign policy, the PDS failed to achieve any fulfillment success. Interestingly, pledges that could have been potentially classified as environmental were not identified for the PDS. Initially, several statements were identified as potential pledges; however, upon further inspection and consideration, these statements were found to be rhetorical without any concrete policy proposals and rejected as pledges.

Collectively, the opposition parties performed rather well. Table 6.2 shows that the opposition’s collective fulfillment results came very close to that of the government’s results: 47% of the opposition’s pledges were fulfilled as compared to the government’s 50% results. The opposition’s positive results are driven mainly by the Christian Democrats, as the party at least partially fulfilled 65% of their pledges, while the FDP’s results served to depress the opposition results as only 26% of the party’s pledges were at least partially fulfilled.

b. **Merkel I: All Remaining Policy Areas, 2005 - 2009**

After the 2005 federal elections, somewhat of a role reversal happened in which the Christian Democrats became the senior governing party and the Social Democrats became the junior party. However, the actual difference in legislative strength between the two governing partners was minuscule as compared to the partners under Schröder II. This may help explain why we see little difference in the fulfillment results for the CDU/CSU and SPD for all remaining policy areas.

Table 6.3 presents the fulfillment results for all remaining policy areas for the governing parties during Merkel I. Table 6.3 shows that the CDU/CSU at least partially fulfilled all of their civil rights pledges and crime pledges, 86% of their foreign policy pledges, 50% of their environmental pledges, and 45% of pledges classified as other. In comparison, the SPD was
Table 6.3: Pledge Fulfillment for Remaining Policy Areas (Government), 2005-2009\textsuperscript{96}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th></th>
<th>Govermen</th>
<th>All Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>ENV</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{95} Excluding Economic and Social Welfare pledges.
\textsuperscript{96} CR = Civil Rights; FP = Foreign Policy; ENV = Environment/Natural Resources
capable of fulfilling 75% of their civil rights/liberties pledges, 60% of their crime pledges, 73% of their foreign policy pledges, and, finally, 100% of pledges classified as being “other.” Unlike in 2002 where the Greens were the junior partner and roughly at least partially fulfilled 40% of these pledges, the Social Democrats did very well being technically the junior party in the grand coalition government.

The government as a whole also performed extremely well as compared to Schröder II. As shown in Table 6.3, the Merkel I government at least partially fulfilled 69% of all remaining pledges as compared to only 50% for Schröder II, nearly twenty percentage points lower than Merkel I. Again, what essentially drove the Schröder II results downward in Table 6.1 were the poor results that the Greens exhibited. During Merkel I, there was no single party that had created such a negative impact on the government’s results as each party at least partially fulfilled greater than 60% of all remaining pledges.

Table 6.4 shows the fulfillment for the Merkel I opposition parties. Starting first with the largest opposition party, the Greens, we see strong fulfillment results under Merkel I. The Greens at least partially fulfilled 75% of their crime pledges, 58% of their environmental pledges and 73% of other pledges were at least partially fulfilled. Finally, Table 6.4 shows that the Greens failed to at least partially fulfill 50% of their civil rights (44%) and foreign policy pledges (31%).

Table 6.4 shows fulfillment rates mainly at or slightly above 50% for the FDP. They at least partially fulfilled 100% of their civil rights pledges, 57% of their crime related pledges, and 50% of both their environmental and other pledges. In the area of foreign policy, the FDP at least partially fulfilled only 25% of their pledges.
Turning to the Linke.PDS, Table 6.4 shows that they at least partially fulfilled 100% of their crime pledges, 20% of their foreign policy pledges, 76% of their environmental pledges, and 43% of pledges categorized as other. They were unable to at least partially fulfill any of their civil rights pledges (only two pledges).

Table 6.4 also shows the combined fulfillment results of the opposition as a whole. Unlike the Schröder II opposition, the table shows that the opposition parties under Merkel I did exceptionally well and for all remaining policy areas actually flourished considerably, fulfilling 55% of pledges.

Remarkably, Table 6.4 also shows that the fulfillment rates for the opposition parties were very consistent across party. Unlike the opposition parties under Schröder II in Table 6.2 in which the percentages fluctuated wildly between parties, 26% (FDP) to 65% (CDU/CSU), the Merkel I opposition parties remained very close to each other in terms of fulfillment. The Greens at least partially fulfilled 55% of all remaining pledges, the FDP at least partially fulfilled 54%, and the Linke.PDS 56%.

However, the question is why did the opposition parties perform so well under Merkel I as compared to the Schröder II opposition parties? After all, the Merkel I opposition parties were not nearly as disadvantaged fulfilling their pledges. The results can be explained by the very composition of the grand coalition. A basic premise of the German grand coalition is the union of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, which includes the left-right ideological spectrum of the opposition parties. In contrast, the normal German coalition government discussed here represented a single ideology, center-left, from 1998 until 2005.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>PDS.Linke</th>
<th>Opposition Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>ENV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>44% (4)</td>
<td>50% (2)</td>
<td>23% (1)</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>25% (1)</td>
<td>8% (1)</td>
<td>42% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>56% (5)</td>
<td>25% (1)</td>
<td>69% (9)</td>
<td>42% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97 CR = Civil Rights; FP = Foreign Policy; ENV = Environment/Natural Resources
98 Excluding Economic and Social Welfare pledges.
Theoretically, the center-right parties should experience more difficulties in pledge fulfillment in addition to being out of office as their policies would come into conflict with the government’s own ideology.

The grand coalition afforded the opposition parties with these results because each governing party was closer to that of the opposition parties’ individual ideologies in these remaining policy areas. As a governing party achieved fulfillment success, the corresponding ideologically similar party or parties would sometimes in turn also experience fulfillment success. We can see this with the results of the parties that were in opposition for both periods: the FDP and Linke.PDS. During Schröder II, the FDP at least partially fulfilled 26% of all remaining pledges while the Linke.PDS at least partially fulfilled 41%. During the following governing period, the corresponding results are 54% and 56%, respectively.

2. Full Results: All Pledges Combined

The previous section presented the fulfillment results for all policy areas other than economic or social welfare. This section presents the complete fulfillment results for Schröder II and Merkel I for all seven policy areas.

a. 2002 - 2005 Fulfillment Results: Schröder II, Normal Coalition Government

Table 6.5 presents the combined fulfillment results for both the governing and opposition parties for Schröder II. The findings indicate that, regardless of the type of government, pledge fulfillment was possible and mirrored findings already conducted on coalition systems, but was far lower than in the Westminster system (See Table 3.2). An examination of each party in each governing period illustrates this trend.
Table 6.5: Pledge Fulfillment During Schröder II, 2002-2005: All Policy Areas Combined\(^{99}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>58.8% (80)</td>
<td>41% (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>9.6% (13)</td>
<td>9% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>68.4% (93)</td>
<td>50% (76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>31.6% (43)</td>
<td>50% (76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parties in bold denote governing party.
i. Schröder II Results: Governing Parties’ Results, 2002 - 2005

In 2002, as the senior coalition partner, the SPD had a distinct advantage over the Greens in pledge fulfillment. Of a total of 136 pledges made by the SPD, the SPD was capable of at least partially fulfilling 68.4% of pledges. In comparison, 50% of total of 152 pledges made by the Greens in 2002 were at least partially fulfilled. In other words, the SPD was able to enjoy a nearly 20% fulfillment advantage over their junior partner during 2002-2005.

A breakdown by category reveals further evidence of the SPD’s dominance in achieving full/partial fulfillment when compared to the Greens. Tables 4.4, 5.4, 6.1 and 6.2 showed that the SPD was more successful than the Greens in all policy areas but environmental, and the gap is particularly large with civil rights, crime, foreign policy and “other” policy.

If one were to examine the government as a whole in terms of fulfillment, in other words to take the total number of pledges made by both governing parties and treat them as a whole, these results for the Schröder II government are in line with previously conducted research on coalition systems. Table 6.5 shows that the Schröder II government was able to at least partially fulfill 58.7% of their pledges. Tables 4.4, 5.4 and 6.1 show that the figure is highest in economic (70%) and lowest in the policy areas of civil rights and crime/security, the government failed to at least partially fulfilled a majority of their pledges.

Given that the SPD was the largest party faction within the Bundestag, one is not surprised that they had a distinct advantage over their junior partners. As discussed in Chapter Two, research generally indicates that the party that controls a relevant ministry is better capable of fulfilling its pledges. An examination of the Schröder II cabinet in Table 6.6 illustrates the advantage that the Social Democrats held in ministerial control, which translated into higher fulfillment success. Of the fifteen ministerial positions available, the Social Democrats held
eleven positions, in contrast, the Greens held four ministerial positions with one person, Joschka Fischer, holding two positions: Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

Of these three ministries under the Greens’ control, the Greens enjoyed a fulfillment advantage only in the area of environmental policy -- not in the high profile Ministry of Foreign Policy. This result can be explained in several ways. First, most of the foreign policy goals of the Greens were contingent upon external cooperation and remained unfulfilled. The Greens wanted to introduce reforms to several international organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. For example, they wanted to insert ecological, social, and international criteria within the WTO’s decision making process. Any reforms to any of these IOs would require the consent of the member states, and this did not occur during Schröder II.

Table 6.6: Ministerial Control during Schröder II, 2002-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schröder II</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ministerial Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joschka Fischer</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Struck</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto Schily</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Eichel</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte Zypries</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Clement</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Economics and Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renate Künast</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Minister of Consumer Protection, Food, and Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manfred Stolpe</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Transport, Construction, and Eastern Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renate Schmidt</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Family, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulla Schmidt</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Health and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edelgard Bulmahn</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Education and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jürgen Trittin</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A final point of consideration: The Greens wanted to introduce and promote the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union as part of an EU constitution and to eliminate all forms of sexism and discrimination within the EU. The debate on a proposed EU constitution had started during the late 1990s. An attempt was made by EU members to approve a
constitution, which required the ratification by each member’s legislative structures or through popular vote. The constitution was rejected by the French and Dutch in 2005. Though the Charter was approved by the EU, its legal standing remained in question and not enforceable until the Lisbon Treaty came in effect in 2009. Finally, the attempt to eliminate sexism and discrimination in the EU again requires action on the part of external actors, and the Greens were unable to deliver on these pledges.

ii. Schröder II Results: Opposition Parties’ Results, 2002-2005

Previously conducted research has indicated that opposition parties are capable of fulfilling their pledges, too, albeit at significantly lower levels than the governing parties’ results. When we examine the results of the Schröder II opposition parties collectively, the evidence largely confirms these prior findings. The opposition parties had lower levels of fulfillment success than the SPD, and the government as a whole, but not necessarily the Greens.

Table 6.5 shows that the largest opposition party, the CDU/CSU, did very well considering its lack of ministry control over policy formation. They fulfilled fully or partially 56% of their pledges. This included 44% of their economic pledges and 50% of its social welfare pledges as illustrated in Tables 4.4 and 5.4. In other policy areas, as shown in Table 6.2, they were able to fully and partially fulfill 65% of their pledges.

The smaller opposition parties, the FDP and PDS, were not as successful as the CDU/CSU. Table 6.5 shows that, overall, the FDP and PDS parties were able to at least partially fulfill 33% and 36% of their total pledges, respectively.

The Christian Democrats’ overall results as an opposition party are lower than the SPD’s fulfillment results, but clearly higher than the Greens’ results as a governing party. As Heisenberg (2005) observed, the SPD and CDU/CSU held similar policy positions on economic reforms, which may have contributed to the better than expected results for the Christian
Democrats. Overall, the CDU/CSU’s results are nearly in line with the full governmental fulfillment results for the Schröder II government.

The stronger ideological nature of the manifestos of the FDP and the PDS were part of the reason of their low fulfillment results. The parties were further ideologically from the main governing party, the SPD, than was the CDU.

Table 6.5 shows the combined fulfillment results of the opposition parties as a group. They at least partially fulfilled 42.7% of a combined total of 227 pledges. The fulfillment gap between government parties and opposition parties for all policies is 16%.

b. 2005 - 2009 Fulfillment Results: The Grand Coalition Government (Merkel I)

Table 6.7 illustrates fulfillment results for all policy areas combined for all legislative parties during the legislative period 2005-2009.

i. Merkel I Results: Governing Parties’ Results

Table 6.7 shows that the Christian Democrats were able to at least partially fulfill 69% of their 118 identified pledges from their 2005 party manifesto. We can also see that the junior partner, the SPD, did well; 66% of their 116 pledges were at least partially fulfilled. The fulfillment gap between the two governing parties is insignificant, in contrast to the nearly 20% gap for the Schröder II governing parties. Table 6.8 helps to explain this small fulfillment gap. Unlike the Schröder II government, there does not appear to be a distinct advantage for either party with ministerial control. Whereas the ministerial distribution heavily favored the Social Democrats during Schröder II, on the surface there was no ministerial dominance by either party under Merkel I: each party controlled ten ministries.

Also highlighted is the fact that under the Merkel I government aspects of economic policy were equally controlled by both the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats controlled the Ministry of Economics and Technology, while the SPD
Table 6.7: Pledge Fulfillment in a Grand Coalition, 2005-2009: All Policy Areas Combined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Governing Parties</th>
<th>Opposition Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
controlled the Ministry of Finance. However, as we saw in Chapter Four, the SPD had better fulfillment results because they controlled the most relevant economic-related ministry – the Ministry of Finance. The same can be said about social welfare policy as both parties controlled overlapping ministries. The CDU/CSU controlled the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and the Ministry of Education and Research, while the SPD controlled the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health.

Table 6.8: Ministerial Control during Merkel I, 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merkel I</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ministerial Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Angela Merkel</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franz Müntefering</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>First Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs until November 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Second Vice-Chancellor, after November 21, 2007, and Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olaf Scholz</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, after November 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigmar Gabriel</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Glos and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg</td>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Minister of Economics and Technology, until February 10, 2009; Guttenberg (CSU) after February 10, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Franz Josef Jung</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ursula von der Leyen</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Minister of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Thomas de Maizière</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Chancellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Annette Schavan</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Minister of Education and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulla Schmidt</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horst Seehofer and Ilse Aigner</td>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Minister of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection, until October 31, 2008; Aigner (CSU) after October 31, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Steinbrück</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Tiefensee</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte Zypries</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These ministries inevitably overlapped in authority and focus and required a considerable amount of negotiation to create policies. This helps explain the higher percentages of partially fulfilled pledges under Merkel I than under Schröder II. With diffuse control over the relevant
policy areas among the governing parties, along with the development of an Austrian-style 
*Proporz* system, each party was unable to fully control the policy process and was forced to 
compromise on pledges.\(^{100}\)

We can also point to the size each governing party had in the grand coalition as another 
explanation. The governing parties are closer in size to one another than what we would 
normally see in a typical coalition. In typical coalitions, the governing alliance is usually 
characterized by one large party and one smaller party. In that case, the bargaining power is 
mostly concentrated with the larger party, which largely controls the legislative process. In a 
grand coalition, with each partner being nearly equal in size, each party would possess more 
bargaining power than otherwise expected.

Overall, the governing parties under Merkel I were extremely successful in pledge 
fulfillment; Table 6.7 shows that they at least partially fulfilled slightly more than 67% of their 
pledges.

**ii. Merkel I Results: Opposition Parties’ Results**

The results for the opposition parties are very striking. An individual examination of the 
opposition parties yields some interesting results. First, the Greens, who were part of the 
previous two German governments and who hoped to continue on with the SPD, achieved the 
best fulfillment results of the three opposition parties.

Table 6.7 shows that 51.7% of all pledges were at least partially fulfilled from the 2005 
Green manifesto. The FDP and Linke.PDS did not fare as well. The FDP, out of government 
since 1998, made a total of 82 identifiable pledges, of which 46% of their pledges were at least 
partially fulfilled.

\(^{100}\) Please refer to Chapter Two for additional information.
The Linke.PDS had the worst showing of the three opposition parties. Of the 70 identified pledges, the Linke.PDS at least partially fulfilled 40% of their pledges. An explanation for this result can be given in two ways. First, the entire 2005 Linke.PDS manifesto was fraught with far-left-of-center rhetoric that was clearly further to the left of the SPD and Greens, making it very difficult for more moderate parties to support policy initiatives of the PDS.Linke.

Second, the Linke.PDS formed as a result of disenchanted SPD members who disliked the moderating trend that the SPD underwent under Schröder. The Linke.PDS staked out the policy elements that the SPD had rejected or had moderated on. Thus, most of the policy goals of the Linke.PDS were discordant with the more moderate parliamentary parties in the Bundestag. Additionally, it was an avowed position of the national SPD leadership not to work in any way with the Linke.PDS. Closer cooperation between the two parties may have resulted in higher fulfillment rates for the Linke.PDS.

Table 6.7 shows a total of 241 pledges were identified among the 2005-2009 opposition parties, and 46.5% of the combined total opposition pledges were at least partially fulfilled. The results for the combined 2005-2009 opposition parties are not surprising. Again, they illustrate the fact that the lack of majority control and control over the relevant ministries, will create large fulfillment disparities between the opposition and government parties.

3. Discussion: Are Hypotheses Borne Out?

This chapter has not up to this point explicitly addressed the hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. Hypothesis 1 states that German governing parties should have higher fulfillment rates than opposition parties. Hypothesis 2a states that a normal coalition government should have higher fulfillment rates as compared to a grand coalition government. Hypothesis 2b argues that grand coalitions will function as well or better than normal coalitions. Question 3 asks: “How does Germany compare to the current pledge fulfillment literature?”
a. **Hypothesis 1**

Based on pledge fulfillment results provided in this chapter the hypothesis is borne out. Therefore, we can safely conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported by the evidence presented here. German governing parties are better able to fulfill their pledges, as compared to their opposition party counterparts.

b. **Hypotheses 2a and 2b**

The results indicate that our understanding of grand coalition governments may need to be revised. Stronger fulfillment rates were seen by the Merkel I government, not as expected by the Schröder II government. Despite the institutional challenges, Merkel I performed better than Schröder II in overall pledge fulfillment. The results show that the Merkel I government at least partially fulfilled approximately 67% of their pledges, as compared to 59% for the Schröder II government.

On the face of it, the results appear to be counter-intuitive to prevailing thought. Two possible explanations seem to explain this phenomenon. First, since Schröder was faced with internal SPD opposition to many of his policies and the fracturing of the SPD as a whole, Chancellor Schröder’s coalition was unable to secure continuous party support. The breakdown of party discipline among the Social Democrats created a governing atmosphere that made it more difficult to pass legislation, which led to an early termination of the government.

Second, as Heisenberg (2005) previously suggested, the policy differences between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats in 2005 were not as great as expected, especially in economic and social welfare policies, which were the most emphasized area. The similarities between the parties on economics and social welfare pledges provided a stronger point of agreement and action for the grand coalition parties than under Schröder II. One must keep in mind that while the SPD, under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder, moderated and moved more
### Table 6.9: Combined Pledge Fulfillment Results, 2002-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Schröder II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Merkel I</th>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2009 Combined</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(142)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(241)</td>
<td>(132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Partially</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>(97)</td>
<td>(157)</td>
<td>(112)</td>
<td>(326)</td>
<td>(209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(119)</td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>(196)</td>
<td>(259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(288)</td>
<td>(227)</td>
<td>(234)</td>
<td>(241)</td>
<td>(522)</td>
<td>(468)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
toward the center; the SPD’s partners the Greens, did not make such a move.

Finally, another advantage the grand coalition enjoyed that was instrumental in pledge fulfillment was the aforementioned control of the legislative seats in the Bundestag by the governing parties. Over 70% of the legislative seats were controlled by the CDU/CSU and SPD. So, once the party leadership of both parties agreed on a compromise, it was very certain that the passage of the legislation would happen.

Therefore, we can conclude that Hypothesis 2a was not supported, while Hypothesis 2b was. The evidence indicates that, in this case, a grand coalition need not be hampered in pledge fulfillment and has the ability to surpass the fulfillment abilities of a normal coalition.

However, does this necessarily mean grand coalitions are more preferred to normal coalitions to achieve strong pledge fulfillment? In short, not necessarily. There are two conditions of a grand coalition we need to keep in mind. First, the ideological differences between the governing parties remain the defining distinction between them and remain a source of friction between the two parties. This will serve to hamper fulfillment. As Heisenberg noted, there was moderation by the Social Democrats on some policy issues. However, if a party can moderate, that same party or the other party may also become more radicalized as the political environment dictates.

Even with the policy similarities on economic and social welfare, there was still ideological friction and public dissatisfaction with the direction of the government’s policies among members of both parties during Merkel I. Additionally, as evident with the defection of many SPD supporters to the Linke.PDS, the support of policies by the party leadership may not translate to full support by parliamentarian back-benchers and the typical party supporter.
Though the governing parties controlled a super-majority of the legislative seats, among many parliamentarians, the support was begrudgingly given to the party leadership.

Second, and more to the point, we simply do not have enough evidence that would support the assertion that grand coalitions in general outperform normal coalitions in regards to pledge fulfillment. One case on pledge fulfillment is hardly adequate to make that determination. Further study of grand coalitions is most definitely needed before we can make a concrete claim to that effect. An excellent case to include in any future examinations of grand coalitions would be Austria as the state has a long history of utilizing them since 1945.

**c. Question 3**

Question 3 seeks to place the German results in relationship to previous research. Based on the complete results in Table 6.9, I am able to place the German system within a revised version of Table 3.2. This is presented in Table 6.10. Looking at total fulfillment for both governments, Germany comes out slightly higher than other coalition systems -- 62%, compared to the next highest coalition fulfillment rate, 60% for Norway. The normal coalition results of 59% (Schröder II) are a bit further down the list, and closer to the results of the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and France. The grand coalition results (Merkel I) are identical to the results of U.S. Presidential system.

The results thus show that the German system on the whole performs well for a coalition government. Federalism and the potential veto points it brings – a strong upper house and judicial review – do not act as a particularly great impediment to pledge fulfillment. This is in spite of the fact that the opposition controlled the Bundesrat for the majority of Schröder II.

We have also discussed in this work how the Bundesrat was instrumental in blocking or modifying legislation. Under Chancellor Kohl’s administration in 1997, the opposition-led Bundesrat vetoed the tax cuts of the government. Under Schröder I, the government actively
sought the Bundesrat’s cooperation by promising the opposition-controlled states more federal spending in their states. However, we do not see strong effects of the Bundesrat on pledge fulfillment. We can only account for the Bundesrat’s influence on legislation at least once during the period of study here. The CDU-dominated Bundesrat proved to be a veto point to Schröder’s attempt to pass the Agenda 2010 in December, 2003 (Williamson November 8, 2005). However, beyond that, we are pressed to find strong incidences of such behavior.

Table 6.10: Average of Government Parties’ Election Promises Fulfilled (Revised)\textsuperscript{101}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Studied Period</th>
<th>Election Promises at least Partially Fulfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1974-1997 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1970-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1981-1985 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1989-1993 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. 1945-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand 1972-2005 (SPM &amp; Coalitions)</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 1945-1978 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany Merkel I (Grand Coalition)</strong></td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 1944-1978 (Presidential)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 1976-2000 (Presidential)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany 2002-2009 (Average, Coalition/Grand Coalition)</strong></td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 2001-2005 (Minority Coalition Govt)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1997-2007 (Semi-Presidential)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1996 -2006 (Coalition Govts)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany Schröder II (Normal Coalition Govt)</strong></td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 1977-1981 (Single-Party Majoritarian)</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 1986-1998 (Coalition Govts)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 1977-2007 (Minority/Majority Govts)</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean of these Pledge Studies</strong></td>
<td>67.1%\textsuperscript{102}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{101} See Table 3.2 for the original comments. 
\textsuperscript{102} This average does not include the individual results of Schröder II and Merkel I governments.
The expectation that the Bundesrat would be a veto point also did not really materialize for the grand coalition, partly due to the fact that the Christian Democrats remained in control of the Bundesrat and did not wish to oppose its own party in the Bundestag.

According to Thomas König (2005), the Bundesrat rarely uses its veto powers to block legislation. Rather, conciliation committees, similar to the U.S. Congress’s reconciliation committees, appear to have been used to reconcile differences between the Bundestag and Bundesrat before institutional differences caused the scuttling of legislation (König 2005, 1). The 2006 federal reforms may have further reduced the Bundesrat’s ability to affect legislation during much of the grand coalition (Deutsche Welle (2) March 7, 2006 and BMI). These results seemed to have suggested that the Bundesrat might at times be an effective veto point to legislative passage and at times not.

Overall, one can conclude from these results that, as a coalition system, Germany is able to fulfill pledges at rates that are similar to other coalition systems. Beyond the anecdotal evidence of the Bundesrat’s role during the Agenda 2010 debates (Schröder II), the actual impact of the Bundesrat on pledge fulfillment during Merkel I seems negligible. What might be said of the Bundesrat, instead of its being a strong veto player, is that the Bundesrat may be more effective in forcing compromises between/among the governing parties. This helps to explain some of the fulfillment difficulties that both governments experienced.

4. Summary

This chapter has presented the results of pledge fulfillment for the Schröder II and Merkel I Governments. The results generally supported the hypotheses we began with. The evidence supports Hypothesis 1. German governing parties did fulfill their pledges at higher rates than their opposition counterparts did. Thus, Germany did fulfill the mandate model. Hypothesis 2a, on the other hand, was not borne out, while Hypothesis 2b was. This was not the case. Finally,
Question 3 was answered as the aggregate fulfillment results of the German government places Germany within the range of the findings on coalition systems previously examined.

The results presented here, again, illustrate Germany’s conformity to the mandate model assumptions and conformity with the prevailing pledge fulfillment research. The following chapter will summarize this work and its findings and will also present arguments for areas of further study.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this final chapter is to review and summarize the work presented in this
dissertation. In the first section, this author reviews the theoretical questions of this work and the
way literature has addressed them. Section two of this chapter reviews the findings of this work
and how Germany compares to those findings. Finally, the last section explores avenues of
future research on pledge fulfillment and Germany.

1. The Focus of this Research

This work has expanded the scholarly understanding of pledge fulfillment by adding the
German case, and also by including the opportunity to examine how pledge fulfillment under a
grand coalition government is accomplished. An underlying theme of this work is examining
how well democracy functions in Germany. According to the mandate model, the operational
concern of democracy is the ability of governing parties to translate campaign promises to
legislative actions. In other words, are parties in government, regardless of institutional design,
capable of controlling the legislative policy formation process in order to fulfill campaign
pledges? If these parties are unable to fulfill their promises, what are the fundamental causes for
this failure?

The scholarly work on pledge fulfillment has found that institutional design matters.
These results also indicate that ministerial control is an important determinant of pledge
fulfillment success for coalition systems. Research found that single-party majoritarian systems
typically have higher rates of pledge fulfillment than other democratic governing institutions, for
e.g., presidential, semi-presidential or coalition systems. Political parties in such systems are often faced with fewer institutional veto points. Moreover, these systems are better capable of translating campaign promises into legislative action. If, therefore, the standard of democratic governance is measured by the rates of pledge fulfillment, then one might argue Westminster systems certainly have a higher quality of democratic response. From the mandate model position, this is how democracies should function.

However, the literature also shows that pledge fulfillment and the quality of democratic responsiveness are not solely confined to Westminster systems. Other democratic systems have exhibited levels of pledge fulfillment that also qualify them as fitting the mandate model, including presidential, semi-presidential, coalition, and minority governments. Scholars have studied the United States, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Sweden.

Germany complements this research by providing an additional case. By examining Germany, we are able to see how the mandate model applies to a federal parliamentary system with a powerful upper house, and we are able to compare normal coalitions with grand coalitions in that system.

This work examines two German governing periods. The first period examined was a traditional coalition system under Chancellor Schröder. The government, Schröder II, lasted from September, 2002, through 2005. During this legislative period, the government was faced with weakening economic conditions that were coupled with increased financial strains in the support of the expansive welfare state, and with internal Social Democratic dissension, which made it more difficult to govern. The second legislative period examined was the second grand coalition government, Merkel I, which lasted from November, 2005, through September, 2009.
Merkel I was faced with continuous economic and social welfare reforms, while balancing the ideological differences between the Volkspartien.

Pledges were identified using the same definition as has been applied in numerous other pledge studies, so that the results can be compared. Once a pledge was identified, the pledge was placed in a corresponding category best associated with the nature of the pledge, e.g., economics, foreign policy, etc. Economic and social welfare policy areas are the most emphasized policies in most manifestos; and so they were given particular attention, with a chapter focused on each.

2. Hypotheses and Findings: Pledge Fulfillment in Germany

Hypotheses were developed that sought to incorporate the German case with existing pledge fulfillment research. A discussion of the results for each hypothesis follows.

a. Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 states that German governing parties should better fulfill their pledges than opposition parties because government parties are better capable of controlling and exercising the instruments of governmental authority. Under Schröder II, the gap in pledge fulfillment between the government as a whole and opposition parties as a whole is 16 percentage points (Table 6.5). For Merkel I, that gap is 20.6 percentage points (Table 6.7), confirming Hypothesis 1.

Looking at the results in closer detail, we find that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for all policy areas. When we examine the fulfillment results for economics (Chapter Four), social welfare (Chapter Five) and all remaining policy areas (Chapter Six), we notice that the governing parties had very little difficulty fulfilling their pledges. Government parties have the distinct advantage of controlling the instruments of government and are better able to ensure passage of their pledges. Thus, we can say that Germany fulfills the mandate model rather well.
On the other hand, we also see that an individual opposition party performs better than an individual government party in one case: under Schröder II, the CDU/CSU had 56% fulfillment compared to 50% for the Greens. As a government party, it is unexpected that the Greens would be outperformed by the opposition Christian Democrats. This may be explained in two ways. First, there may be a stronger ideological affinity between the CDU/CSU and SPD than expected. On economic policy (Table 3.7), there is more agreement, and less disagreement, between the SPD and CDU/CSU than the SPD and Greens. Second, as noted in Chapter Six, in 2002 the Greens made several pledges that depended on external actors to act in particular ways.

Does this finding – an out-of-power party achieving higher fulfillment than an in-power party – pose a major challenge to the mandate model? That is, can we still say the mandate model “fits” Germany, under these circumstances? Perhaps one answer is that the biggest coalition partner, the SPD, has a significant advantage over the CDU/CSU – 12.4 percentage points. So, the party that a plurality of people voted for in 2002 does fulfill the highest proportion of pledges.

Table 6.6 shows that the SPD controls 10 ministries, in addition to the chancellor position, while the Greens control only 3. The significant gap in pledge fulfillment is consistent with Thomson et al.’s finding that control of the head of government position as well as control of ministries enhances the probability of pledge fulfillment. On the other hand, Table 6.10 shows that under Merkel I, the SPD controlled 9 ministries, while the CDU/CSU controlled 7, in addition to the chancellor position. The CDU/CSU’s miniscule advantage in pledge fulfillment is consistent with that relatively equal sharing of cabinet positions. It seems that when parties are so equal in size and sharing of the cabinet, the position of chancellor does not confer much of an advantage when it comes to pledge fulfillment.
b. Hypotheses 2a and 2b

This dissertation also compared traditional coalition governments and grand coalition governments. It was argued that the literature leaves us with no clear expectation regarding the performance of these two types of government. On the one hand, if we assume that the ideological divide between governing parties is greater than for typical coalitions, legislative gridlock might be the result, and thus pledge fulfillment for both parties will be lower than for normal coalitions. On the other hand, some have suggested that gap in ideology between the two main German parties is not so great, and that therefore cooperation on policy should be facilitated (Heisenberg 2005). In addition, the two parties between them control a huge majority of legislative seats, meaning that some dissention within each party could occur without jeopardizing the passage of government legislation. For these reasons, one might expect that pledge fulfillment for Grand Coalitions would be as high, or even higher, than that of normal coalitions.

Hypothesis 2a states that the Schröder II government should have higher fulfillment rates than the Merkel I government. Hypothesis 2b states that the Schröder II government should have lower fulfillment rates than Merkel I. Hypothesis 2a was not borne out, as the grand coalition performed better than the normal coalition. Overall, the Merkel I Government was capable of fulfilling over 67% of its pledges, compared to the slightly less than 59% for Schröder II. In nearly all policy areas, the Merkel I Government outperformed the Schröder II Government.

The results confirm that Chancellor Schröder had a very difficult governing period. Internal divisions with the SPD made it more difficult for Schröder to rely on unified party support. The lack of party cohesion eventually led to the early termination of the Schröder II Government. As a counter-factual, it is difficult to ascertain with certainty if a phenomenon
would have turned out differently if another course of action was taken. One can only speculate about a counterfactual’s full impact on potential outcomes. However, it is quite possible that if the Schröder II Government had lasted the full legislative term, fulfillment rates for Schröder II would have been higher.

c. Question 3

Finally, I proposed a question in lieu of a hypothesis: how will Germany compare to other systems on pledge fulfillment? Due to its parliamentary-federal system, reliance on coalition governments and grand coalition governments, it is more difficult to accurately place Germany in any one category in the absence of concrete findings, compared to most parliamentary systems. On the one hand, there are more veto points in the German system that could lead to lower fulfillment than in other coalitions. On the other hand, as the literature indicates, institutional designs with multiple veto points need not necessarily be an obstacle to pledge fulfillment. When one examines the fulfillment rates of similar systems in Table 3.2, the results indicate that veto points are potential obstacles for pledge fulfillment.

Based on the fulfillment results of Schröder II and Merkel I, we are now able to place Germany in relationship to the results of other states. Table 6.10 shows where the Schröder II and Merkel I governments would rank in comparison to the other states, as well as the aggregate results for Germany. The fulfillment results of the Merkel I government are slightly above the mean, matching the results found for the United States of 67%. On the other hand, the results of Schröder II, 59%, and the aggregate results for 2002-2009 of 62% are more in line with the results of other coalition governments that have been examined. In addition, the aggregate results of Germany from 2002 through 2009 are also in line with the results of coalition systems that were examined.
In summarizing the findings of this work, the German state fulfills the mandate model rather well. Second, higher fulfillment rates were exhibited by the grand coalition compared to the normal coalition. Finally, the aggregate fulfillment results suggest Germany is typical of most coalition governments.

3. Where Do We Go From Here?

This work has not only addressed several questions concerning pledge fulfillment in Germany, but its findings have laid the foundation for further avenues of research. Over the course of preparing this work, several questions were answered; however, several observations have led to the development of new questions concerning pledge fulfillment in Germany.

This work examine two recent periods of German political history. The Schröder II and Merkel I governments provide the field with an excellent starting point for understanding pledge fulfillment in Germany. However, the inclusion of only two cases can have a limiting effect on a complete understanding of and confidence in pledge fulfillment. This limitation could be addressed by the inclusion of more cases in future research. By including multiple German governments, further results could bring more clarity about German pledge fulfillment in several ways.

First, the inclusion of more governments can help to determine whether the findings are reliable. The Schröder II results may prove to be an outlier when compared to additional governments. This is potentially so because of the abrupt way the legislative period ended. By ending a full year earlier than scheduled, the Schröder II government had less time devoted to fulfilling its pledges. Moreover, the Schröder II government was also unusual in the way that party discipline among the Social Democrats had considerably weakened to the point that Schröder was left with few political options other than to call for early elections. It is possible
that in future research, fulfillment results for normal coalitions will be higher. In other words, the fulfillment advantage found here for grand coalitions could be a result of the relatively poor performance of the Schröder II government. Including at least one full-term “normal” coalition will help clarify matters. For the same reason, the inclusion of the 1966-1969 grand coalition government would be useful. This would allow us to determine if fulfillment rates for grand coalitions are normally as high as found for Merkel I.

One problem with studying the first grand coalition is that it also had a limited legislative life, slightly more than two years, compared to the four years of Merkel I. It must be noted, however, that the first grand coalition was formed during the halfway point of the 1964 through 1969 legislative period. There was a smaller window of opportunity for the first grand coalition to fulfill its pledges. In addition, this case presents an interesting problem – how was pledge fulfillment divided between the two governments during 1964-1969? Did the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition perform better than the grand coalition that replaced it?

Before the grand coalition, the Christian Democrats formed the government with the FDP, which departed the government after more than two years. The legislative term of Schröder II was unexpectedly cut short, whereas the SPD-CDU/CSU coalition was intentionally short. During the 1964 federal elections, the three parties in the Bundestag at that time issued their campaign pledges and, once the government was formed, worked to fulfill those pledges under that government. Obviously, the governing and opposition parties had pledge fulfillment success under the CDU/CSU-FDP Government.

The question becomes: How does one separate pledge fulfillment that reflects the fulfillment rates that occurred under both governments? One possible solution would be to calculate the number of pledges that were originally fulfilled by all parties up to the point the
Government collapsed in 1966. The remaining unfulfilled pledges from the CDU/CSU-FDP Government would be assembled and examined for the grand coalition’s fulfillment rates. Under this method, the results should show a “before-and-after” picture of pledge fulfillment. The fulfillment rates of the government before its collapse can be compared with the fulfillment rates after its collapse. Additionally, the aggregate fulfillment results for the 1964-1969 period can also be examined.

The inclusion of more cases will also allow us to be more confident of Germany’s position among the pledge fulfillment results of other scholars. A 62% fulfillment rate is relatively high for a coalition system; will this finding hold true with the addition of more cases?

A second possible area of future research would be to focus on pledge fulfillment in Austria. As noted earlier, there are very few cases with which to compare grand coalition fulfillment results in Germany. Austria has had long periods of time in which a grand coalition government was in power, and therefore adding this case would provide a clearer picture of pledge fulfillment in these types of governing systems.

Third, future research can examine the differences between fulfillment rates in Germany before and after unification. For the majority of West Germany’s post-war political history, there were three parties to consider the CSU/CSU, SPD and the FDP. It was only in the mid- to late-1980s that the Green Party emerged and became a staple national party. After unification, the party structure expanded from what was essentially a three party system to a four, the Greens, and five, the PDS, party system. Future research could examine the extent to which unification has placed a strain on the ability of the German governments to fulfill pledges.

Finally, future research of more German governments can examine whether or not one party or the other more consistently fulfills more pledges. This research can again be approached...
in a multifaceted way by using unification in 1990 as the dividing point. Before 1990, the FDP was in practically every government, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic, starting in the early 1960s and lasting until 1998. For instance, one would be able to see how well Social Democratic-led governments fulfilled their pledges before unification, as compared to the Christian Democrats. Additionally, one can make cross-era comparisons, being able to examine how well the Social Democrats, for instance, were able to fulfill their pledges before unification and after unification. The same approach can be applied to the Christian Democrats.
REFERENCES


Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF). July 4, 2007. “Using the opportunities provided by the reform of Germany's federal system.”


Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau, und Stadtentwicklung. (BMVBS) - Bundesrepublik Deutschland. “Solidarity between the federal states - revenue sharing and the Solidarity Pact.”

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi). “Soziale Marktwirtschaft.”

Bundesrat.de (1). “The Bundesrat as the defender of the federal states' interests.”

Bundesrat.de (2). “Responsibility for federal policy.”

Bundesrat.de (3). “A constitutional body within a federal system.”


APPENDIX

1. Intercoder Reliability: Introduction and Instructions

This section corresponds to the Chapter Three discussion on establishing intercoder reliability. In the hope of achieving intercoder reliability, I asked several native-speaking Germans to review several examples of the parties’ manifestos. To further this goal, I created an introduction letter in German thanking the individual participants and explaining the purpose of this exercise. A copy of the letter can be seen on the following page. The letter also explained that each participant would receive portions of the parties’ manifestos from the parties’ 2002 and 2005 manifestos, with basic instructions for each of the participants to follow. These instructions include which pages to examine and the process to follow when a participant identifies a potential pledge, i.e., underline the potential pledges and to assign a numeric identification to the potential pledges.

Additionally, each participant received a translated copy of Terry Royed’s original instructions, titled, “Wahlversprechen,” which explained the process of pledge identification. To assist the participant further, I added examples of pledges and rhetorical statements that the participants would encounter that are not present in Royed’s original instructions. These examples come directly from three of the parties’ manifestos, but not directly from the portions of the manifestos that the participants were asked to examine. These examples are easily identifiable in the text by the use of German abbreviation “z. B.,” which stands for “zum Beispiel” or “for example.” Additionally, each pledge and rhetoric example was identified by party and the year of its manifesto, e.g., (SPD 2002).
a. Introduction Letter

den 2.3. 2011

Lieber Teilnehmer/Teilnehmerin:


Erklärung von der Arbeit:

Für diese Arbeit machen Sie eine statistische Methode, „Intercoder Reliabilität.“ Inter-Coder Reliabilität ist eigentlich ein Test, um festzustellen, ob der Forscher dieser Arbeit richtig Wahlversprechen identifiziert hat. Dieser Test kennzeichnet die Übereinstimmung von Codierungen durch von einander unabhängige Coder in der empirischen Sozialforschung.

Anweisung:


2. As erstes, bekommen Sie ein Erklärungsblatt, das „Wahlverprechen.“ Bitte, lesen Sie genau das Erklärungsblatt wie man „Wahlverprechen” identifizieren soll durch. Folgen Sie den Erklärungen so gut wie Sie können.


Mark J. Ferguson
Department of Political Science
University of Alabama
P.O. Box 870213
Tuscaloosa AL 35487-0213
205-348-5053
mjferguson@crimson.ua.edu
b. Wahlversprechen

Ein potentielles Wahlversprechen hat 2 Klauseln: 1. Eine Klausel zeigt eine Verpflichtung, Unterstützung an: wir unterstützen, wir werden unterstützen, wir sind dagegen, etc. 2. Die zweite Klausel gibt die Handlung oder politische Richtlinie für die Unterstützung angegeben wird.

Die erste Klausel kann entweder eine harte, starke Verpflichtung anzeigen (wir werden) eine sanftere Verpflichtung (wir unterstützen) oder noch sanfter wir müssen, wir sollten. Sowohl die harten als auch sanften Verpflichtungen, Versprechen werden als Wahlversprechen anerkannt. Die endgültige Determinante aber steht bei der Politikaktion in der 2 Klausel.

Die Politikaktion oder das Ergebnis kann ganz spezifisch oder eher unklar sein. Für jedes Wahlversprechen kann die Politikaktion einer der drei folgenden Kategorien zugeordnet werden:

a. Definitive: eine definierte, genaue Politikaktion ist gegeben und es ist klar, was eine Partei versprochen hat. Das Ergebnis tritt entweder ein oder nicht. Das ist ein klares Wahlversprechen.

z.B.: Wir werden deshalb die Staatsquote, den Anteil der Ausgaben der öffentlichen Hand an der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistung, von derzeit knapp 50% schrittweise und dauerhaft auf unter 40% senken. (CDU/CSU 2002)

b. Schwer definitiv: eine definitive Politikaktion wird versprochen, und theoretisch kann die Erfüllung objektiv bestimmt werden, aber die Testung ist schwierig zb umfasst die Testung nicht nur ob ein Gesetz verabschiedet wurde oder nicht sondern auch was steht im Gesetz und wäre es möglich ein Ergebnis zu sehen. Das sind auch Wahlversprechen.

z.B.: Wir treten ein für ein strenges Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, gegen Kartelle, Monopole und wettbewerbsbeschränkende Fusionen. (FDP 2002)

z.B.: Sozialdemokraten und Grüne brachen auf zentralen Politikfeldern in eine Richtung auf, die wir grundsätzlich ablehnen. Die Remilitarisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik, die erstmalige Aussendung der Bundeswehr in Kriege sind für die PDS inakzeptabel. (PDS 2002)

Falls Sie auf ein Versprechen stossen, welches offensichtlich wiederholt wurde, und genau identisch wiederholt wurde, markieren sie es, aber schreiben sie Wiederholung oder repeat. Wenn sie diese danach auflisten, werden nicht eingeschlossen. Wenn sie sich aber unsicher sind, ob das Versprechen wiederholt wurde oder doch neu ist, markieren sie es als ganz neues Versprechen.

Nachdem Sie alle Wahlversprechen identifiziert haben, müssen Sie sie durchnummerieren und aufgelisten. Schreiben Sie bitte die Gesamtanzahl der Wahlversprechen des Manifestes auf z.B. 150, etc.

Viele Dank für Ihre Hilfe bei meinem Doktorandenprojekt.
2. Relationship Among Pledges, Cont.

In Chapter Three, I presented the combined rates of the relationship between pledges. To arrive at these findings, each identified pledge was examined and compared with pledges derived from the party manifestos of this study. Pledges that were found to agree with a pledge of another party, that pledge was placed in the “Agree” category. For a pledge to be in agreement, the pledge must contain the same basic premise as the pledge it is being compared with. For example, the Greens in 2005 pledged to eliminate bombing practice at Kyrizt-Ruppiner Heide, the German military’s installation for field training. The Linke.PDS in 2005 also pledged to eliminate bombing practice at this facility. These pledges were found to be in agreement. A similar process was made for pledges found to be in disagreement or unrelated with other pledges. Each pledge was accordingly placed in one of the aforementioned categories.

To calculate the combined relationship among pledges in Chapter Three, the results each pledge was examined and compared with pledges from the other parties. The percentages were calculated using the following formula:

\[
\frac{(\text{Party A Pledges Agree with B}) + (\text{Party B Pledges Agree with A})}{(\text{Total Party A Pledges}) + (\text{Total Party B Pledges})} = X\%
\]

When calculating the agreement scores, it is possible for Party A to have a pledge that agrees with Party B, while Party B may not have a corresponding pledge with Party A. Party A’s total agreement with Party B is added together, and Party B’s total agreement with Party A, and divide by the total number of Party A’s and Party B’ pledges.

Appendix Tables 1 through 8 present similar results for each year of this study and for all policy areas. Each table is broken down into each policy area and shows the combined years

---

103 All tables in the Appendix will simply be referred to as “Table” and its corresponding number, unless otherwise noted.
(2002 and 2005) and then each year individually. Each table shows the results for pledge that are unrelated to each other. Finally, the tables also include the relationship results of the Linke.PDS. Table 1 shows the relationship among all policy areas. Since the results of all policy areas for both years have been discussed in Chapter Three, I will complete the discussion with a brief discussion of the Linke.PDS. Overall, the Linke.PDS had stronger agreement with the center left parties than with the center right parties in 2002/2005. 33% of the SPD-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, with 11% in disagreement. The level of agreement was stronger between the Greens and Linke.PDS at 46%, with 14% of their pledges in disagreement. There was general agreement among the center left parties and the Linke.PDS on social and environmental protection. The Linke.PDS was in opposition to Schröder’s economic reforms.

In contrast, the level of agreement between the CDU/CSU and Linke.PDS was low at 15%. 31% of the FDP-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement. We also notice that the level of disagreement is significantly higher between the center right parties and the Linke.PDS. 28% of the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ and 40% of the FDP-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in disagreement, where the most disagreement between the parties was on economic and social welfare reforms. The center right parties generally pushed for more pro-business reforms and the reduction of social welfare benefits. In contrast, the Linke.PDS called for higher taxes on the wealthy, wealth equality, and the expansion of the social welfare state.

In 2002, 34% of all pledges from the Volkspartiens’ 2002 manifestos were roughly in agreement and 13% of their pledges disagreed. However, during the lead up of the following federal elections in 2005, we see that the agreement among the two parties became stronger at 46% in Table 5, with 11% of their pledges were in disagreement. This high level of agreement
Appendix Table 1: Relations among All Policy Areas Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU- Linke.PDS</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
between the two major parties served to reduce friction over policies, although not to entirely eliminate it, during the grand coalition government.

We see stronger agreement between the SPD and the Greens in Table 1 among all pledges. The tables show that the Greens consistently remained in agreement with their governing partners, the Social Democrats. Table 1 shows that 46% of all of the SPD’s and Greens’ pledges were in agreement in 2002, with only 4% in disagreement. 2005 shows even stronger agreement, 56%, between the two parties. In comparison, agreement between the Christian Democrats and Greens in both tables remained in the lower twenties in both tables, 21% and 24%, respectively, with disagreement pledges also in the twenties, 24% and 21%, respectively. The Greens and FDP also experienced relatively high agreement rates among their pledges, 31% in 2002 and 30% in 2005. However, they also experienced relatively higher disagreement rates, 20% in 2002 and 26% in 2005.

Among the FDP and PDS (Left), policy agreement continued to favor their ideological families. The FPD in Table 1 was more likely to be in agreement with the center-right CDU/CSU than with the center-left parties. 38% of the Christian Democrats’ and FDP’s pledges were in agreement in 2002, with 4% of their pledges in disagreement. In 2005, their pledges remained in the high thirties, 37%, with 18%. However, the SPD’s and FDP’s results nearly mirror those of the CDU/CSU-FDP results. Agreement between the two parties was relatively high at 36%, with 16% of their pledges disagreeing, in 2002 and 31%, with 18% disagreeing, in 2005.

In contrast, the Linke.PDS continued to be in agreement with the center-left parties more than the center-right and tended to heavily favor the Greens in policy areas. The Linke.PDS In 2002/2005 was in policy agreement with the Greens 41% and 52% respectively. Disagreement
between the two parties was 16% in 2002 and 13% in 2005. 27% of the SPD’s and Linke.PDS’ 2002 pledges were in agreement, with 9% in disagreement, while 38% of their 2005 pledges were in agreement, with a slight increase to 10% among disagreement pledges.

Table 2 shows the relationship results among economic pledges. The results showed that the Volkspartien were generally in agreement on economic policies during 2002 and 2005 with 42% of their pledges in agreement. In 2002/2005 respectively, the level of agreement among the parties’ economic pledges remained in the low forties. With the revitalizing of the stagnant German economy a top priority for the electorate, in addition to the Social Democrats adopting more market-oriented policies under Schröder’s tenure, the mirroring of economic policy agreement between the Volkspartien is not surprising. The level of disagreement for both governing periods was 17%, with 20% of their pledges in disagreement in 2002 and dropping to 14% in 2005. The level of disagreement can be surmised as the Christian Democrats advocated for more pro-business reforms than the SPD was willing to pursue.

Table 2 shows that the Greens and Social Democrats continued to remain in high agreement with one another in economic policies. 48% of the parties’ economic pledges for 2002 and 2005 were in agreement, with only 5% of their pledges in disagreement. In 2002, the level of agreement between the parties was 60%, with 2% of their pledges in disagreement. In 2005, the level of agreement decreased to 48%, however, the level of disagreement rose only slightly to 7%. In contrast, the agreement between the Greens and Christian Democrats was lower; only 19% of CDU/CSU-Greens’ pledges were in agreement, while 35% of them were in disagreement. The Greens were able to find high level of agreement with the PDS (Left) in economic policy, but very little agreement with the FDP.
Appendix Table 2: Relations among Economic Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The FDP and PDS continued to follow a similar pattern of expressing economic policies that reflected their ideological families. In 2002/2005, the CDU/CSU and FPD mirrored the SPD’s and Greens’ results. 45% of the Christian Democrats’ and FDP’s pledges were in agreement on economic policies, with very little disagreement. In 2002/2005, both parties’ pledges continued to show strong agreement, with low levels of disagreement.

The Linke.PDS was more likely to be in agreement with the center-left parties, particularly with the Greens. The level of agreement between the SPD and the Linke.PDS showed low levels of agreement in Table 2. 28% of the PDS pledges agree with the SPD; 36% of them disagree. This is easily explained by the internal dynamics of the SPD party during 2002 and 2005. As previously discussed, the SPD began to fracture between groups that supported Schröder’s economic policies and those who supported Lafontaine’s call for the Social Democrats to return to traditional social democratic economic values. Those who disagreed with Schröder’s policies eventually joined the Linke.PDS. The low percentage of agreement for the Linke.PDS with the SPD appears to be a function of the party rejecting Schröder’s market friendly policies.

In contrast, pledges among the Linke.PDS and center-right parties showed a stronger level of disagreement as compared with the center-left parties. In the view of the Linke.PDS, the pro-business pledges that the center-right parties advocated were harmful to society and created stronger wealth inequality. The center-right parties objected to the Linke.PDS’ call for higher taxes on the wealthy.

In 2002/2005, only 9% of CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, with 39% in disagreement. We see similar results for each individual year. In 2002, 7% of the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, 58% of their pledges in disagreement. In 2005, 10% of
their pledges were in agreement, 28% of their pledges in disagreement. Even though agreement between the FDP and the Linke.PDS is higher than the results seen between the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS, we continue to see that disagreement pledges remained the highest category. In 2002/2005, 21% of the FDP-Linke.PDS’ economic pledges were in agreement, 36% in disagreement. In 2002, 19% of their pledges were in agreement, with 43% in disagreement. In 2005, 23% of their pledges were in agreement, with 28% in disagreement.

In the policy area of social welfare, the pledges from the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats exhibited relatively high levels of agreement in Table 3. Social welfare reforms were a key component to Schröder’s overall reforms drive during his terms as chancellor. Under Agenda 2010, the goal of economic revitalization was coupled with reforms to the social welfare system, particularly to unemployment benefits. Agenda 2010 also sought reforms to labor laws, family payments, and health care reforms. These reforms were designed to reduce the government’s overall financial obligations to the system.

Generally, the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats were in agreement over these reforms. Table 3 shows that the level of pledge agreement between the SPD with the CDU/CSU was only 36% in 2002/2005. When we examine each year separately, the agreement between the parties become stronger. Table 3 shows that roughly 29% of the SPD-CDU/CSU’s 2002 pledges were in agreement, with 11% of their pledges in disagreement. However, in 2005, we see that the level of agreement between the parties increases to 43%, with 10% disagreement. This relatively high level of agreement is primarily driven by the CDU/CSU’s support of reforming the social welfare system.

The Greens remained highly supportive of the SPD in social welfare policies, even in the face of reductions of benefits, reductions that the Greens traditionally opposed. Pledge
Appendix Table 3: Relations among Social Welfare Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002, 2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU- Linke.PDS</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agreement between the SPD and Greens remained relatively high, with very low disagreement. In 2002/2005, 47% of their pledges were in agreement, with 6% of their total social welfare pledges in disagreement. In 2002, 45% of their pledges were in agreement with the SPD, with 5% disagreement. In 2005, however, there is an increase in the level of agreement, 52%, among pledges, with 9% in disagreement.

On average, we see similar levels of agreement between the Greens, the CDU/CSU, and FDP in Table 3. 33% of the CDU/CSU-Greens’ pledges were in agreement in 2002/2005, with 15% in disagreement. In 2002, 37% of their pledges were in agreement, with 13% in disagreement. We observe in 2005 that 28% of their pledges were in agreement, with an increase in disagreement pledges to 17%. In 2002/2005, 31% of the Greens-FDP pledges were in agreement, with 19% of their pledges disagreed. In 2005, 30% of their pledges were in agreement, while 23% of their pledges were in disagreement.

The FDP and PDS remained polar opposites of each other. Examining the FDP first, it would be wrong to conclude that the party opposed social welfare policies, particularly policies that were targeted to provide aid to the unemployed, family, etc. In fact, the FDP did make pledges in their manifestos that supported such assistance, however, in a more restrictive, limited fashion. This helps to explain the relatively low agreement between the FDP and the other legislative parties in both periods, ranging from the upper-teens to the low-thirties in Table 3. From the FDP’s position, government-provided assistance should be directed to those individuals who truly require assistance; otherwise, social welfare policies, as generous as they have traditionally been, tend to encourage laziness and a refusal to seek employment, which places budgetary strains on the government. However, the FDP supported the Agenda 2010 reforms as promoted by Schröder.
In Table 3, the FDP displayed strong agreement with the Volkspartien to reform social welfare. In 2002/2005, 41% of the SPD-FDP’s pledges were in agreement, with 13% in disagreement. In 2002, 36% of their pledges were in agreement, with 11% in disagreement. In 2005, 23% of their social welfare pledges were in agreement. In 2005, the FDP’s position on social welfare appeared to take a more laissez-faire approach: the FDP argued for stronger cuts to government services that the SPD opposed. However, the CDU/CSU-FDP’s results again mirrored the SPD-Greens’ results, perhaps even stronger agreement results. Whereas the SPD-FDP exhibited expected disagreement among pledges, there was no disagreement found between the CDU/CSU-FDP on social welfare pledges in Table 3. 42% of their pledges were in agreement in 2002/2005. For each individual year, agreement was 38% (2002) and 46% (2005).

The Linke.PDS remained in agreement with its center-left party family, particularly with the Greens. Table 3 shows in 2002/2005 that 50% of the Greens-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, with 2% in disagreement. In 2002, 43% of their pledges were in agreement, with 3% in disagreement. From 2002 and 2005, the level of agreement between the parties increased. In 2005, the agreement among social welfare pledges between the Greens-Linke.PDS increased to 60%, with no pledges found to be in disagreement. The results in Table 3 show similar past trends between the SPD and the Linke.PDS, relatively high agreement, but higher rates of disagreement than between the Greens and the Linke.PDS. In 2002/2005, 31% of the SPD-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, with 8% in disagreement. In 2002, 27% of their pledges were in agreement, with 5% in disagreement, compared to 35% of their 2005 pledges in agreement, with 12% in disagreement.

In contrast to the economic pledges, the relationships seen in Table 3 among the social welfare pledges between the center-right parties and the Linke.PDS were clearly higher.
Appendix Table 4: Relations among Civil Rights Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

208
However, the rates of disagreement between the center-right parties and the Linke.PDS were higher than those seen between the center-left parties and the Linke.PDS. In 2002/2005, 23% of the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, with 22% of their pledges disagreed. In 2002, only 15% of their pledges were in agreement, while 18% disagreed. In 2005, 29% of their pledges agreed, while 25% disagreed. Between the FDP and Linke.PDS, 18% of their 2002 and 2005 social welfare pledges agreed, while 26% disagreed. In 2002, the results mirrored the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ 2002 results, 16% of their pledges agreed, with 18% disagreed. In 2005, 20% of their pledges agreed, with 33% disagreed.

The following tables present further findings on the relationship among pledges between the legislative parties. In the following policy areas, what is evident is each party made far fewer identifiable pledges in each category than economic and social welfare pledges. With so few pledges available, it is harder to draw generalizations about the nature of the relationship among the pledges.

Table 4 shows civil rights pledges. The pledges made by the parties dealt with a wide variety of issues: gay marriage, immigrant/asylum rights, assisted suicide, reduction of the voting age to sixteen, and privacy rights. Each party emphasized different aspects of each issue; for example, center-left parties were supportive of gay marriage rights, while the Christian Democrats were opposed. In general, center-left parties tended to be more permissive and supportive of societal changes.

One of the first observations to be made in Table 4 is the distribution of unrelated pledges does not appear to match any discernible pattern. Most of the parties made so few civil rights pledges that it is not useful to try to generalize about patterns. The agreement results fluctuate too wildly to accurately provide an explanation.
Table 5 presents the results for crime and security pledges. The legislative parties during 2002 and 2005 issued pledges that covered juvenile crime, drug consumption and the proper use of the Bundeswehr (the German military) in providing internal security from potential terrorist threats. The CDU/CSU called for stiffer penalties against juvenile criminals and the installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in crime-ridden areas.

The table shows that the SPD and CDU/CSU tend to agree, while the FDP sided more with the Greens and PDS on this issue. In 2002/2005, 54% of the SPD-CDU/CSU’s pledges were in agreement, with 2% disagreed. In 2002, 47% of their pledges agreed, while 3% disagreed. The SPD-CDU/CSU’s level of agreement increased to 65% in 2005.

The SPD continued to enjoy relatively high agreement rates with the Greens, FDP, and Linke. PDS. In 2002/2005, 26% of the SPD-Greens’ pledges agreed, with 5% disagreed. In 2002, 26% of their pledges agreed, with 4% of their pledges disagreed. In 2005, 27% of their pledges agreed, with 9% in disagreement. In 2002/2005, 30% of the SPD-FDP’s pledges were in agreement, with 22% disagreed. In 2002, 39% of their pledges were in agreement, with 8% disagreed. In 2005, 21% of the SPD-FDP’s pledges agreed, while the percentage of pledges that disagree increased to 36%.

Agreement between the Christian Democrats and the other legislative parties was highly challenged. Only the CDU/CSU-Greens combination managed to outperform pledges that were in disagreement, as compared to the results from the FDP and PDS. In 2002/2005, 19% of the CDU/CSU-Greens’ pledges agreed, with 17% disagreed. In 2002, 19% of their pledges agreed, 16% disagreed. In 2005, 18% of their pledges equally agreed and disagreed. Normally, supportive of the CDU/CSU’s economic policies, the FDP followed their libertarian philosophies, which conflicted with the Christian Democrats’ promotion of an orderly state.
### Appendix Table 5: Relations among Crime/Security Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002, 2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2002/2005, only 12% of the CSU/CSU-FDP’s pledges agreed, 26% disagreed. In 2002, 13% of their crime/security pledges agreed, 16% disagreed. In 2005, 12% of their pledges agreed, while 35% disagreed. Table 5 shows similar results high disagreement rates among the CSU/CSU-PDS’ crime/security pledges.

Among the Greens, PDS, and the FDP, there was also general agreement to decriminalize drug possession and consumption and rejected the use of CCTV technology and the military for security. Apart from disagreeing with the Christian Democrats on drug policy, the PDS was in agreement with the Volkspartien on continual monitoring and prosecution of right-wing hate groups. The FDP and Greens were also supportive of monitoring right-wing groups, but also called for the reduction and/or the elimination of anti-terror laws that were adopted by the (West) German government during the 1970s and 1980s that were designed to combat left-wing terrorist groups; such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang. The Greens also supported the FDP’s position on opposing the reduction of criminal culpability for juvenile criminals, a position that the Christian Democrats supported.

This helps to explain the relatively high rates of agreement in Table 5 among these parties. In 2002/2005, 52% of the Greens-FPD’s pledges agreed, with 7% disagreed. In 2002, 50% of their pledges agreed, while 5% disagreed. In 2005, the level of agreement between the parties remained consistent at 55%, while 10% of their pledges disagreed. Agreement between the Greens-PDS and FDP-PDS remained high, well above 50% for each combination.

Table 6 presents agreement results among foreign policy pledges in Germany. Each party, in different proportions, issued pledges concerning multilateralism, NATO, UN Security Council reforms, and Germany’s relationship to the United States. The 2002 manifestos reflect the fact that German-American relations were severely strained over the issue of Iraq. Germany,
being a member of the non-permanent representative on the Security Council, remained heavily opposed to any potential war with Iraq through the Schröder government. In fact, the SPD elevated the issue of foreign policy to a major campaign issue in 2002. The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, supported the Bush Administration’s position on a rocket defense system and remained mainly silent over Iraq, but publicly criticized the Schröder government for jeopardizing relations with the USA.

The Greens and FDP were in general agreement about multilateralism and reforms of the UNSC. The Greens were very supportive of the Social Democrats’ opposition to the 2003 Iraq War. The FDP generally agreed with the Christian Democrats that the United States was important to the overall German foreign policy, but also promoted multiculturalism and, in 2005, wanted the United States to remove any and all tactical nuclear weapons that have been stationed in Germany since the 1980s.

The PDS, however, advocated policies that were generally not found among the other legislative parties, particularly in 2005. In 2002, the Linke.PDS called for the complete disarmament of Germany and the prohibition of exporting arms. The Greens were in general agreement with the PDS on the matter, but were opposed by the FDP, CDU/CSU, and Social Democrats. However, in 2005, the party advocated the complete elimination of any military units in Europe, European and NATO, the replacement of the European Armament Agency with an Agency for the Disarmament and Conversion. Finally, the Linke.PDS wanted the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 that sought to consider the needs of women and girls in a post-conflict environment.

In 2002/2005, 285 of the SPD-CDU/CSU’s foreign policy pledges agreed, 19% disagreed. In 2002, 35% of their pledges agreed, 24% disagreed. However, we observe in 2005
Appendix Table 6: Relations among Foreign Policy Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU- Linke.PDS</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
38% of their pledges agreed, with no disagreement. This is because the contentious issue of the
Iraq War and Germany’s involvement had for the most part been settled by 2005 as the war and
occupation occurred without direct German involvement. The Greens and SPD were in strong
agreement as approximately 60% of their pledges were in agreement. Similar strong support was
found among the FDP’s and Linke.PDS’ manifestos.

Support for the Christian Democrats’ foreign policy pledges among the center-left parties
remained low, while support from the FDP was high. In 2002/2005, 16% of the CDU/CSU-
Greens’ pledges agreed, 14% disagreed. In 2002, only 6% of their pledges agreed, 18%
disagreed. In 2005, 25% of their pledges agreed, 20% disagreed. Again, the strong rise in
pledges that agree is a function of the Iraq War being settled in Germany policy-wise. Among
the pledges of the Christian Democrats and Linke.PDS, there was very little agreement to be had.
In 2002/2005, only 5% of their pledges agreed, 20% disagreed. In 2002, 13% of their pledges
agreed, 13% disagreed. In 2005, none of their pledges agreed, 25% disagreed. The FDP and the
CDU/CSU strongly agreed on their foreign policy pledges. In 2002/2005, 31% of their pledges
agreed, while none of their pledges came into disagreement.

Among the smaller legislative parties, there appears to be solid agreement between the
of their pledges were in agreement, while 5% disagreed. In 2005, 29% of their foreign policy
pledges agreed, 6% disagreed. Agreement between the Greens and Linke.PDS was even
stronger. 32% of their pledges agreed, while no pledge was found to disagree. The FDP and
PDS show in Table 6 weaker agreement, as compared to the level of agreement each party had
with the Greens. Here, a similar argument of the effects of the Iraq War is used to explain the
results in 2002 and 2005 respectively. In 2002/2005, 25% of the FDP-PDS’ pledges agreed,
15% disagreed. In 2002, 9% of their pledges agreed, 9% disagreed. In 2005, 33% of their pledges agreed, while 22% disagreed.

Table 7 presents environmental agreement results among pledges. The Greens by far issued the highest number of pledges for both periods combined. Of course, environmental protection is a seminal issue for the Greens. However, all of the legislative parties did make pledges concerning environmental protection in their manifestos, albeit at different proportions to each other. Generally, the parties supported the Kyoto Protocols in reducing carbon dioxide emissions and the promotion of renewable energies. However, the ideological differences between the center-right and center-left parties were evident.

The FDP sought the elimination of environmental laws that conflicted with economic development and were thus viewed as unnecessary or inefficient. Pledges included rejection of new energy efficiency laws for newly erected buildings, and surcharges on plastic bottles. One of the major policy initiatives of the Schröder administrations was the move of the German government to eliminate the use of nuclear power in Germany for safety and environmental reasons. Both the Christian Democrats and FDP were opposed.

Beyond the strong agreement of the SPD and Christian Democrats in other areas of environmental policies, the center-left parties tended to reject the center-right’s environmental policies. The center-left parties were very supportive of the Greens’ policies. The Social Democrats and Linke.PDS were equally supportive of the elimination of nuclear energy and the reduction of CO2 emissions.

When we observe the relationships among pledges, we see across parties that there is a consistent and relatively strong increase of agreement pledges in 2005 over 2002. There does not appear to be any discernible causes why there is this consistent pattern. Even though most of
the disagreement centered on nuclear energy, however, these policy differences were equally
distributed through both years and were not a single year issue.

When we observe just the combined results, we see a strong consensus on environmental
protection. There was strong agreement in both 2002 and 2005 to support the Kyoto Protocols. 36% of the SPD-CDU/CSU’s pledges were in agreement, 15% disagreed. 43% of the SPD-Greens’ total environmental pledges agreed, 4% disagreed. 36% of the SPD-FDP’s pledges agreed, 23% disagreed. 55% of the SPD-Linke.PDS’ pledges were in agreement, 3% disagreed.

The Christian Democrats and FDP strongly agreed as 52% of their pledges were in agreement. The center-right parties did not experience nearly as strong agreement results with the Greens and Linke.PDS, which we can attribute to ideological differences as the center-right parties called for elimination of environmental policies that were harmful to business. 15% of the CDU/CSU-Greens’ pledges agreed, 17% disagreed, and 17% of the CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS’ pledges agreed, 16%, disagreed. 19% of the Greens-FDP pledges were in agreement, 23% disagreed and 26% of the FDP-PDS’ pledges agreed, 22% disagreed. Finally, the center-left parties showed strong agreement as 40% of the Greens-PDS’ pledges, 2% disagreed.

Table 8 shows the agreement results among pledges for the legislative parties for pledges
that do not fit any of the previous categories. These pledges were classified as “other.” Each party in different proportions made pledges covering culture, federal reforms, development of technology, military reforms, etc. In some cases, the issue of sports was addressed. The SPD and FDP were concerned about the increased usage of performance enhancing drugs among athletes, which both parties naturally wanted to eliminate. Additionally, as the host nation of the 2006 World Cup, the SPD was keen in providing the support to the German Football (Soccer) Federation in modernizing stadiums to FIFA standards.
### Appendix Table 7: Relations among Environment Policy Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU- Linke.PDS</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the federal reforms, the legislative parties agreed with the premise of reducing the number of Bundestag bills that required Bundesrat approval. The FDP supported complete privatization of state and joint enterprises, such as the Deutsche Bahn (the German Train Company) and public transportation. The FDP additionally advocated the elimination of several federal agencies: The Federal Agency for Work (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and the Regional Directors (Regionaldirektionen), which, as part of the Federal Agency for Work, is designed to coordinate employment opportunities for those seeking employment. The PDS (Left) was mainly silent on reforms to the federal system. However, the party did promote the parliamentary rights of single representatives in the German Bundestag. On the surface, this appears to be an odd pledge, however, when we examine the German electoral system, the rationale of the party’s pledge becomes apparent.

The German electoral system is a mixed system, consisting of elements of single-member district representation and proportional representation. German law requires political parties to obtain a minimum of 5% of the vote in order to gain representation. However, representation can be obtained if a candidate wins a district wide seat without the candidate’s party securing the 5% threshold. When this occurs, the single representative is generally grouped along with other representatives in similar situations, regardless of the representatives’ ideology. Understandably, the representatives are virtually isolated and powerless to affect policy changes. The reform of the political system that would grant greater power is what is meant by the Linke.PDS.

Additionally, each party sought to reform the German Bundeswehr. The general consensus was on reduction of the size of the military personnel. The range, however, was in dispute. The Christian Democrats argued for a military of 300,000 and the Linke.PDS argued for a maximum of 100,000. Other reforms to the military sought to eliminate the obligatory military service required of males. The choice was given to potential conscripts to accept military
Appendix Table 8: Relations among Other Policy Pledges in Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Unrelated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-CDU/CSU</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Greens</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-FDP</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Greens</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-FDP</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP-Linke.PDS</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conscription or a longer social service program, such as working as an orderly in a hospital. The Christian Democrats were the only party that sought to maintain the conscription system, which the CDU/CSU was successful in doing.

Unrelated pledges remained the largest single bloc of pledges identified. Even though common themes were discussed, not all parties made the same pledge under that theme. For instance, each party mentioned the importance and the promotion of culture. The debate centered on how to accomplish this goal. The SPD and CDU/CSU wanted to accomplish this goal by investing in the German film industry. The Linke.PDS wanted to enshrine a cultural concept in the constitution, and, along with the Greens, promote the creation of government-supported cultural foundation (*Kulturstiftung*) and support for the UNESCO Convention of Cultural Diversity.

It is clear that there were a wide variety of pledges made under this category. Despite the diversity, there were instances of strong agreement. The *Volkspartien* expressed strong agreement in Table 8. In 2002/2005, 44% of the SPD-CDU/CSU’s pledges agreed, with 17% disagreed. In 2002, 32% of their pledges were in agreement, 16% disagreed. In 2005, 54% of their pledges agreed, 8% disagreed.

Among the center-left parties, the SPD continued to show relatively high agreement levels with them. In 2002/2005, 37% of the SPD-Greens’ pledges agreed, 2% disagreed. In 2002, 33% of their pledges were in agreement, while no pledges were found to disagree. In 2005, 39% of their pledges agreed, 4% disagreed. In 2002/2005, 28% of the SPD-Linke.PDS’ pledges agreed, 6% disagreed. In 2002, 33% of their pledges agreed, 0% disagreed. In 2005, 20% of their pledges agreed, 10% disagreed. Agreement between the SPD and FDP was relatively high, but there were higher levels of disagreement between them than seen among the
other parties. In 2002/2005, 41% of the SPD-FDP’s pledges agreed, with 29% found to disagree. In 2002, 35% of their pledges agreed, 31% disagreed, and, lastly, in 2005, 52% of their pledges agreed, 30% disagreed. The higher level of observed disagreement originates mainly from the parties’ differing stances of government structural reforms. The FDP advocated the abolition of several agencies, e.g., The Federal Agency for Work (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), which the SPD opposed.

As previously seen, the Christian Democrats continued to mirror the agreement results of most of the previous policy areas with the remaining legislative parties. The CDU/CSU and the FDP remained in strong agreement, while agreement with the center-left parties was lower. In 2002/2005, 39% of the CDU/CSU-FDP’s pledges agreed, 7% disagreed. In 2002, 34% of their pledges were in agreement, 6% disagreed. In 2005, 41% of their pledges agreed, with 7% in disagreement. In 2002/2005, 23% of the CDU/CSU-Greens’ pledges agreed, 21% disagreed. In 2002, 19% of their pledges agreed, 33% disagreed, and, in 2005, 27% of their pledges agreed, 12% disagreed. As thus far seen, the level of agreement between the CDU/CSU-PDS continued to be low as 11% of their pledges agreed.

Among the remaining legislative parties, the center-left parties continued to enjoy relatively stronger agreement than with the FDP, as no disagreement was observed between the Greens and PDS. 35% of the Greens-PDS’ pledges agreed in 2002/2005, 39% of their pledges agreed in 2002, and, lastly, 32% of their pledges agreed in 2005. Even though the FDP showed relatively high levels of agreement with the Greens and PDS, the level of disagreement mirrored the SDP-FDP’s results. In 2002/2005, 32% of the Greens-FDP’s pledges agreed, 21% disagreed. In 2002, 29% of their pledges agreed, 29% disagreed. In 2005, 36% of the Greens-FDP’s pledges agreed, while 13% disagreed. Between the FDP and PDS in 2002/2005, 27% of their
pledges agreed, 14% disagreed. In 2002, 28% of their pledges agreed, 7% disagreed. In 2005, 30% of the FDP-PDS’ pledges agreed, 17% disagreed.